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Preface
In this book, I will argue that a pragmatist approach to the realism issue in the 
philosophy of religion—and more generally—is highly relevant to a novel criti-
cal reassessment of the theodicy discourse addressing the problem of evil and 
suffering. In a number of previous publications, I have examined the problem 
of realism from a pragmatist perspective (already since my early work in the 
1990s) as well as the problem of evil and suffering in the philosophy of religion 
(especially in my more recent work in the 2010s), and this volume will bring 
these two topics together in a novel way. I hope to show how, perhaps some-
what surprisingly, they are actually closely related and how pragmatism may 
be helpful in navigating the philosophical thicket of these complex discourses.
I have investigated the problem of evil and suffering in some of my recent 
books (see especially Pihlström 2014b; Kivistö & Pihlström 2016), and because 
those works also develop a pragmatist approach to this issue, some ideas and 
arguments will inevitably be repeated in the present volume. However, the 
close link between the problems of realism and truth, on the one hand, and 
evil and suffering, on the other hand, has (as far as I know) never been studied 
in any comprehensive manner, and the most important novelty of the present 
undertaking is my proposed pragmatist approach to this entanglement of those 
fundamental philosophical issues.
Traditionally, theodicies attempt to show how, or why, an omnipotent, 
omniscient, and absolutely good God might allow the world to contain appar-
ently meaningless horrible evil and suffering. However, theodicies can also be 
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formulated in secular contexts, as will also be explained in the book. In addi-
tion to developing a pragmatist account of religious and theological beliefs and 
language use, including the concept of truth applicable in these areas, this book 
firmly defends antitheodicism as an ethically motivated approach to the problem 
of evil and suffering, seeking to refute all theodicist attempts to force human 
beings’ experiences of meaningless suffering (or the sincere communication of 
such experiences) into grand narratives of alleged meaningfulness or purpo-
siveness.1 Thus, I will argue for a pragmatic form of religious and theological 
realism as well as a pragmatist understanding of antitheodicism as a presupposi-
tion for morally serious engagement in religion and theology genuinely seeking 
to recognize others’ experiences (of suffering) as something irreducible to our 
own attempts to view the world as meaningful. Fundamental issues concern-
ing religious diversity as well as the ethical acknowledgment of otherness and 
perspectivalness more generally will thereby also be addressed in what follows.
The most significant and (I hope) original philosophical suggestion of the 
present volume is, as already remarked, the argument that the theodicy issue 
and the problem of realism are thoroughly entangled, or even inseparable. It is 
precisely from the standpoint of metaphysical realism that theodicies seeking 
to justify apparently meaningless suffering (as something that is morally and 
metaphysically meaningful, after all) arise—with all their ethically problematic 
tendencies to instrumentalize others’ suffering in the service of some alleged 
overall good.2 The individual perspective of the sufferer, or the victim of evil, 
tends to be non- or misrecognized when one begins from a ‘God’s-Eye View’ 
metaphysical realism postulating a pre-fixed ontological—and ethical—struc-
ture of the world in general. As some recent contributors to the problem of evil 
(particularly Susan Neiman in her 2002 book, Evil in Modern Thought, but also 
others) have argued, the problem of evil is in the end a problem concerning the 
comprehensibility of the world in general. It is therefore not merely a problem 
to be addressed by the theist, or to be used in an evidential role in the theism vs. 
atheism controversy; it concerns everyone engaging in serious thought about 
the moral and existential meaningfulness (vs. meaninglessness) of our lives. 
It is a problem concerning the way(s) we view the world. Therefore, the meta-
physically realistic background assumptions of theodicist thinking need to be 
exposed to thoroughgoing critical assessment, and this can be best done by 
developing a pragmatist philosophical methodology and applying it to a critical 
inquiry into both realism and theodicism.
Unlike some of my earlier contributions to pragmatist philosophy of religion, 
this book will not provide any historical overview of the pragmatist tradition, 
but it will employ ideas drawn from William James’s and other pragmatists’ 
work to critically evaluate the current discussions of both realism and theodi-
cies. In addition to James, the other major philosophical classics to be discussed 
include Immanuel Kant (who is obviously a key background figure for prag-
matism and antitheodicism alike) as well as Ludwig Wittgenstein and (in this 
context somewhat more marginally) Emmanuel Levinas.
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My book is, I think, both specific and very broad. It addresses a carefully 
chosen specific topic, i.e., the way in which the (hitherto largely unnoticed) link 
between theodicism and metaphysical realism can be critically examined from 
a pragmatist perspective. At the same time, it is broad in the sense of offering 
pragmatist insights into the general issue of realism, building upon the results 
of decades of extensive work in this area. The book also shows the practical, 
human, and existential relevance of apparently very theoretical and abstract 
issues in the philosophy of religion.3 It refuses to make any artificial distinc-
tion between theory and practice; instead, it argues that attempts to defend the 
theodicy discourse from antitheodicist criticisms by claiming that theodicies 
are merely theoretical are themselves ethically problematic, failing to recognize 
the ethical need to avoid excessive theorization when it comes to reacting to 
others’ suffering.
The book aims at taking very seriously our need to recognize the genuine 
otherness of other human beings, especially their experiences of suffering. It 
goes without saying that humanly fundamental topics such as evil and suffer-
ing need further philosophical analysis and reflection, and this book provides a 
new perspective on these matters. It also reminds us that theodicies have secu-
lar variants that are highly significant in contemporary culture and ought to 
be subjected to serious critical examination. Finally, the book also shows why 
(and how) ethics and metaphysics, often thought to be entirely distinct areas of 
philosophical inquiry, are deeply entangled, both generally (especially from a 
pragmatist perspective) and more specifically in the context of the philosophy 
of religion and especially the problem of evil and suffering.4
The plan of the book is roughly as follows. The introduction will first offer 
a general account of pragmatism as a promising approach to the philosophy 
of religion, both epistemically and ethically or existentially; the latter kind of 
‘promise’ is shown to be fundamentally linked with the need to address the 
problem of evil and suffering. Chapter 1, the first substantial chapter of the 
book, then introduces the problem of realism both generally and in theol-
ogy and the philosophy of religion. It also tentatively formulates a pragmatist 
approach to this problem, suggesting how pragmatism ought to be applied to 
examining realism in its various dimensions, and articulating a preliminary 
pragmatic network of interrelated concepts, such as recognition, objectivity, 
and inquiry. Chapter 2 then develops the pragmatist approach to realism in 
some more detail, arguing for a complex reflexive picture of the way in which 
the world, or any set of objects, facts, or situations we encounter in it, must be 
regarded as both dependent on the pragmatically developed schemes through 
which we approach and interpret reality and contextually independent of any 
human thought and inquiry. Thus, the chapter defends pragmatic realism as a 
critical synthesis of realism and pragmatism, rejecting the ‘ready-made world’ 
of metaphysical realism, while also abandoning antirealist or relativist dis-
tortions of pragmatism. The first two main chapters thus articulate a general 
pragmatically realist position whose relevance to the philosophy of religion is 
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(I claim) considerable. They do so in broad strokes, preparing the ground for 
the more focused chapters that follow.
Chapter 3 shows how the form of pragmatism developed and defended in 
the first two chapters is to a large extent based on Kantian critical philoso-
phy. I argue that the pragmatist ought to recognize their Kantian roots (while 
not subscribing to all the details of the Kantian system, of course), especially 
regarding theodicies and antitheodicism. The basic methodology of pragmatist 
inquiries into realism, truth, and suffering—into how we ought to view the 
world, especially in relation to others—is, I suggest, the critical (transcenden-
tal) method. Continuing in this pragmatist Kantian vein, Chapter 4 starts from 
acknowledging the significance of the problem of realism, and especially of 
truth, to the currently widely relevant issue of religious diversity, moving on 
to a pragmatist discussion of truth focusing on the relation between truth and 
truthfulness and the ethical aspects of our pursuit of religious truth, includ-
ing the truth of sincere attempts to communicate experiences of suffering (in 
contexts of religious diversity). It is a core chapter in the book in the sense that 
it also makes the deep, albeit often implicit, connection between metaphysical 
realism and theodicism explicit. My joint criticism of both of these unfortunate 
ideas is formulated in this chapter, building on the kind of pragmatism outlined 
in the earlier chapters. Metaphysical realism is, I suggest, one of the most prob-
lematic presuppositions of theodicies. Chapters 3–4 thus constitute a unified 
argument, on pragmatist-cum-Kantian grounds, against the metaphysically 
realist background assumptions of theodicism.
Chapter 5 introduces Wittgenstein and Wittgensteinian philosophy of reli-
gion into this discussion. As one of the key varieties of antitheodicist thought in 
recent philosophy of religion has been based on the Wittgensteinian movement 
in this field, it is important to consider this approach—also in relation to prag-
matism—again both in the context of the theodicy vs. antitheodicy discussion 
and in the context of the realism issue. Like pragmatists, Wittgensteinians such 
as D.Z. Phillips reject both metaphysical realism and theodicism. Therefore, 
their ideas may be critically compared to the pragmatists’. The chapter includes 
an analysis of Wittgenstein’s own views on harmony and happiness, which I 
argue to be problematic in the context of Wittgensteinian antitheodicism. The 
final substantial Chapter 6 argues that theory and practice are inherently entan-
gled in the antitheodicist criticism of theodicies (and metaphysical realism). 
Accordingly, all sharp theory vs. practice dichotomies are themselves problem-
atic from a pragmatist perspective. Chapter 6 and the brief concluding chapter 
following it explore, among other things, Primo Levi’s antitheodicism (as a case 
study of acknowledgment) as well as the fundamental problem of meaningful 
vs. meaningless life—something that any pragmatist analysis of issues in the 
philosophy of religion ought to take seriously.
Given the number of topics to be brought into the discussion, this might 
sound like an argument running the risk of losing its guiding principles or its 
unifying thread of thought. However, I do think—and this, again, I see as the 
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true novelty of the book—that the problem of evil and suffering is fundamen-
tally a problem concerning the appropriate way(s) of seeing our place in the 
world, as finite and limited human beings. In this sense, the book deals with our 
ethical task of ‘see[ing] the world aright’ (to quote the closing remarks of Witt-
genstein’s Tractatus, §6.54; see also Kivistö & Pihlström 2016: chapter 6). As 
such, the conflict between theodicism and antitheodicism is crucially hooked 
up with basic philosophical issues regarding (metaphysical) realism and truth, 
especially in the context of philosophy of religion. I will try to make this con-
nection as clear as possible in the chapters that follow.
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Introduction
The Promise of Pragmatist Philosophy  
of Religion
Having already briefly outlined the contents of this volume in the preface, I will 
in this introductory chapter offer some critical remarks on why I think prag-
matism is an increasingly important philosophical approach today—and, pos-
sibly, tomorrow—not only in philosophy generally but in a specific field such 
as the philosophy of religion in particular. I will try to provide an answer to this 
question by considering the special promise I see pragmatism as making in the 
study of religion. A more specific treatment of this promise, especially regard-
ing the complex issues concerning the objectivity of religious belief, obviously 
entangled with questions concerning the rationality of religious belief, will be 
examined in Chapter 1 below. It is against this general background that my 
defense of pragmatic antitheodicism will unfold in the later chapters.
My discussion and defense of pragmatism in these pages will be partly based 
on my reading of and engagement with a broadly Jamesian pragmatic plural-
ism in the philosophy of religion, based on William James’s ideas, with due 
recognition not only of the value of other pragmatists’ (including John Dewey’s 
and the neopragmatists’) contributions but also of the crucial Kantian back-
ground of pragmatism (see Pihlström 2013a). Indeed, if one views pragmatism 
through Kantian spectacles, as I think we should (cf. Chapter 3, as well as some 
preliminary comments in this introduction below), the topics of realism, truth, 
and objectivity will become urgent; Kant, after all, was one of the key modern 
philosophers examining these notions, and we presumably owe more to him 
than we often are willing to admit.
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We may, I suggest, identify two key ‘promises’ of pragmatism in the philoso-
phy of religion. These are based on two different philosophical interests in the 
study of religion, which can be labeled the ‘epistemic interest’ and the ‘existen-
tial interest’. The topics of realism, truth, and objectivity—to be explored more 
comprehensively in the chapters that follow—are fundamental with regard to 
both. Philosophy of religion could even be considered a test case for pragma-
tist views on these issues, because religion is often taken to be too personal 
and ‘subjective’ to be taken seriously by scientifically minded thinkers pursuing 
truth and objectivity. Pragmatists themselves are not innocent to this: as we 
recall, in The Varieties of Religious Experience, James (1958 [1902]) proposed to 
study the subjective, experiential phenomena that people go through individu-
ally, thus arguably neglecting the more social dimensions of religious experi-
ence that Dewey emphasized in A Common Faith (Dewey 1991 [1934]). 
First, it is extremely important, for a thinking person in a modern (or ‘post-
postmodern’)1 society largely based on scientific research and its various 
applications, to examine the perennial epistemic problem of the rationality (or 
irrationality) of religious belief. This problem arises from the—real or appar-
ent—conflicts between science and religion, or reason and faith. It is obvious 
that this problem, or set of problems, crucially involves the notions of objectiv-
ity and truth: religious faith is often regarded as subjective, whereas scientific 
research and theory construction pursuing truth are objective. Therefore, typi-
cally, scientific atheists criticize religion for its lack of solid grounding, while 
defenders of religion may try to counter this critique by suggesting either that 
religious beliefs do have objective credentials, after all (e.g., traditionally and 
rather notoriously, in terms of the ‘proofs’ of God’s existence, which would alleg-
edly be objective enough for any rational inquirer to endorse), or that science is 
also ‘subjective’ in some specific sense, or at least more subjective than standard 
scientific realists would admit (e.g., as argued in various defenses of relativ-
ism or social constructivism). The notions of objectivity and rationality are of 
course distinct, but they are closely related in this area of inquiry in particular. 
It is precisely because of its pursuit of objectivity that the scientific method is 
generally regarded as ‘rational’, whereas religious ways of thinking might seem 
to be irrational because of their lack of objective testability, or might at least 
seem to require such testability in order to be accepted as rational.2
Here pragmatism can offer us a very interesting middle ground. As James 
argued in Pragmatism (1975 [1907]: Lectures I–II) and elsewhere, pragmatism 
is often a middle path option for those who do not want to give up either their 
scientific worldview or their possible religious sensibilities. Defending the prag-
matist option in this area does not entail that one actually defends or embraces 
any particular religious views; what is at issue is the potential philosophical legit-
imacy of such views, which leaves room for either embracement or, ultimately, 
rejection. Thus, pragmatism clearly avoids both fundamentalist religious 
doctrines and equally fundamentalist and dogmatic (and anti-philosophical)  
versions of ‘New Atheism’, both of which seek a kind of ‘super-objectivity’ 
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that is not within our human reach, a kind of ‘God’s-Eye View’. By so doing, 
pragmatism in my view does not simply argue for the simplified idea that the 
‘rationality’ of religious thought (if there is such a thing) might be some kind 
of practical rationality instead of theoretical rationality comparable to the 
rationality of scientific inquiry (because, allegedly, only the former would be 
available as the latter more objective kind of rationality would be lacking). On 
the contrary, pragmatism seeks to reconceptualize the very idea of rationality 
in terms of practice, and thereby it reconceptualizes the very ideas of truth 
and objectivity as well, as we will see in later chapters. Truth, objectivity, and 
rationality are then all understood as deeply practice-embedded: far from being 
neutral to human practices, they emerge through our reflective engagements 
in our practices.
We may formulate these suggestions in a manner familiar from the main-
stream debates of contemporary philosophy of religion by saying that pragma-
tism proposes a middle path not just between reason and faith (or, analogously, 
objectivity and subjectivity) but between the positions known as evidentialism 
and fideism: according to my pragmatist proposal, we should not simply assess 
religious beliefs and ideas on the basis of religiously neutral, allegedly fully 
objective evidence (in the way we would at least attempt to assess our beliefs in 
science and everyday life), because we do need to understand religion as a very 
special set of engagements in purposive, interest-driven human practices or 
language games; on the other hand, nor should we, when rejecting the simplify-
ing evidentialist categorization of religion as little more than poor science, step 
on a slippery slope ending at the other extreme of fideism, which advances faith 
in the absence of evidence or reason and consequently in the end hardly leaves 
any room for a critical rational discussion of religion at all—or any objectivity 
worth talking about.
We might say that pragmatism advances a liberal form of evidentialism, 
proposing to broaden the scope of evidence from the relatively narrowly con-
ceived scientific evidence (which is something that religious beliefs generally, 
rather obviously, lack) to a richer conception of evidence as something that can 
be had, or may be lacking, in the ‘laboratory of life’—to use Hilary Putnam’s 
(1997a: 182–183) apt expression (cf. Brunsveld 2012: chapter 3). Thereby it 
also broadens the scope of objectivity in religion and theology: when speaking 
about objectivity in the science vs. religion debate, we cannot take the objec-
tivity of the laboratory sciences as our paradigm. Different human practices 
may have their different standards for evidence, rationality, and objectivity. 
Pragmatism hence resurrects a reasonable—extended and enriched—form of 
evidentialism from the rather implausible, or even ridiculous, form it takes in 
strongly evidentialist thinkers’ such as Richard Swinburne’s theories, without 
succumbing to a pseudo-Wittgensteinian fideism, or naïve ‘form of life’ relativ-
ism (cf. Chapter 5). This is one way in which pragmatism seeks, or promises, to 
widen the concepts of rationality and objectivity themselves by taking seriously 
the embeddedness of all humanly possible reason use and inquiry in practices 
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or forms of life guided by human interests. To take this seriously is to take seri-
ously the suggestion that in some cases a religious way of thinking and living 
may amount to a ‘rational’ response to certain life situations, even yielding a 
degree of practice-embedded objectivity.
It is extremely important to understand the extended notion of evidence and, 
hence, rationality and objectivity in a correct way here. What is decisive is a 
certain kind of sensitivity to the practical contexts within which it is (or is not) 
appropriate to ask for rationally assessible evidence for our beliefs. This sen-
sitivity must, furthermore, be connected with a pragmatist understanding of 
beliefs as habits of action: the relevant kind of evidence, as well as its objectivity, 
is itself something based on our practices and hence inevitably interest driven. 
Evidence, or the need to seek and find evidence, may play importantly different 
roles in these different contexts; ignoring such context sensitivity only leads to 
inhuman pseudo-objectivity. Thus, the pragmatic question must always be how 
(or even whether) evidential considerations work and/or satisfy our needs and 
interests within relevant contexts of inquiry. Insofar as such contextuality is not 
taken into account, the notions of objectivity and evidence are disconnected 
from any genuine inquiry in the pragmatist sense. These notions, when prag-
matically employed, always need to respond to specific problematic situations 
in order to play a role that makes a difference in our inquiries.3 
In mediating between evidentialism and fideism and offering a liberalized 
version of evidentialism, pragmatism also, at its best, mediates between real-
ism and antirealism, another dichotomy troubling contemporary philosophy of 
religion and preventing constructive engagement with the topic of pragmatic 
rationality and objectivity. The realism issue will be explored in some detail in 
Chapters 1 and 2, immediately following this introduction. Let me here just 
note that just as there is a pragmatic version of the notion of objective evidence 
available, in a context-sensitive manner, there is also a version of realism (about 
religion and/or theology, as well as more generally) that the pragmatist can 
develop and defend. Hence, pragmatism, far from rejecting realism, truth, and 
objectivity, reinterprets them in its dynamic and practice-focused manner. 
Secondly, along with serving the epistemic interest in the philosophy of reli-
gion and the need to understand better the objectivity and rationality (vs. irra-
tionality) of religious belief, it is at least equally important, or possibly even 
more important, to study the existential problem of how to live with (or with-
out) religious views or a religious identity in a world in which there is so much 
evil and suffering. When dealing with this set of questions, we end up discuss-
ing serious and ‘negative’ concepts such as evil, guilt, sin, and death (see also 
Pihlström 2011a, 2014b, 2016). Here, I would like to follow James (1975 [1907]: 
Lecture VIII) in viewing pragmatism as proposing a fruitful form of meliorism 
reducible neither to naively optimistic views according to which the good will 
ultimately inevitably prevail nor to dark pessimism according to which every-
thing will finally go down the road of destruction. It is as essential to mediate 
between these two unpromising ‘existential’ extremes as it is to mediate between 
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the epistemic extremes of evidentialism and fideism. And again, I would argue 
that such a project of mediation is rational—and, conversely, that it would there-
fore be pragmatically irrational to seek a fully ‘rational’, or better, rationalizing 
and thus in Jamesian terms ‘viciously intellectualistic’, response to the problem 
of evil. Accordingly, pragmatist meliorism must—as it certainly does in James’s 
Pragmatism, for instance—take very seriously the irreducible reality of evil and 
unnecessary suffering. Pragmatism, in this sense, is a profoundly antitheodicist 
approach:4 it is, or at least should be, sharply critical of all attempts to explain 
away the reality of evil, or to offer a rationalized theodicy allegedly justifying 
the presence of evil in the world. On the contrary, evil and suffering must be 
acknowledged, understood (if possible),5 and fought against. 
If the reality of evil must be acknowledged and understood for us to be able 
to take a serious ethical attitude to the suffering of other human beings, then 
we need to carefully inquire into, for instance, the historical incidents of evil 
(e.g., genocides and other atrocities) as well as the human psychological capaci-
ties for evil. From a pragmatist point of view, such rational inquiries serve a 
crucial ethical task even if their immediate purpose is to obtain objective scien-
tific and/or scholarly knowledge about the relevant phenomena. For example, 
the various historical descriptions and interpretations of the Holocaust may 
be as objective as possible, humanly speaking, and at the same time implicitly 
embody strong value judgments (‘this must never happen again’). The ‘objec-
tive’ psychological results concerning human beings’ psychological capacities 
for performing atrocities, e.g., in conditions of extreme social pressure, can also 
embody a strong commitment to promoting the development of psychological 
and social forces countering such capacities.
Pragmatists, then, should join those antitheodicists who find it morally unac-
ceptable or even obscene to ask for God’s reasons for ‘allowing’, say, Auschwitz 
(whether or not they believe in God’s reality). Pragmatism, when emphasiz-
ing the fight against evil and the moral duty of alleviating others’ suffering, 
instead of theodicist speculations about the possible reasons God may have 
had for creating and maintaining a world in which there is evil and suffering, is 
also opposed to the currently popular ‘skeptical theism’, according to which our 
cognitive capacities are insufficient to reach the hidden (‘objective’) reasons for 
(‘subjectively’) apparently avoidable evil. Such speculations even about God’s 
possible reasons for allowing evil, or about evil even possibly being a necessary 
part of a completely rational objective system of creation and world-order, are, 
from the pragmatist perspective, as foreign to genuine religious practices as 
evidentialist arguments about, e.g., the a priori and a posteriori probabilities of 
theologically conceptualized events such as Christ’s resurrection.6 
On the basis of these preliminary remarks on a pragmatist approach to 
rationality and objectivity in the philosophy of religion, we will in the first sub-
stantial chapter below examine the problem of realism from a pragmatist point 
of view. It is through this discussion that we will in later chapters be led to 
an engagement with the problem of evil and suffering, as well as pragmatist 
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antitheodicism. However, I should like to add to this introduction some general 
remarks on how I find the classical pragmatists relevant to the issue of recogniz-
ing otherness and especially acknowledging others’ suffering—the key issue at 
stake when we consider the theodicism vs. antitheodicism opposition and its 
relation to the problem of realism.
One reason why pragmatism, I believe, is highly relevant here is due to its 
philosophical focus on ‘deep’ democratic politics. One of the preconditions of 
maintaining and further developing democracy—in a rich pragmatist sense 
as a ‘way of life’, as articulated, for instance, in Dewey’s views on democratic 
participation (see especially Dewey 2012 [1927]: 121–122)—is a continuous 
sincere attempt to respond to individual human beings’ legitimate need to be 
genuinely listened to in the societies they live in and contribute to. This need 
is manifested in various requests for recognition of others’ points of view, as 
well as responses to such requests, among individuals and social groups (cf. 
Ikäheimo & Laitinen 2011; Saarinen 2016; Koskinen 2017; Kahlos et al. 2019). 
Thus, from a pragmatist perspective it is natural to suggest that a socially highly 
important request concerns the acknowledgment of instances of suffering 
(individual and social).7 We may see pragmatists (especially James) as arguing 
that attempts to respond to such requests by delivering a theodicy are almost 
invariably ethically and politically problematic, because they fail to adequately 
acknowledge the individual sufferer and their concrete experience (see Kivistö 
& Pihlström 2016: chapter 6). The pragmatist antitheodicist may also argue that 
the theodicist failure to recognize individual and social suffering in its utter 
meaninglessness and absurdity may be seriously harmful for the preconditions 
of democracy as a way of life—though this argument will not be developed in 
the present volume at any length. 
Theodicism may, indeed, be as harmful for not only democracy but also gen-
uine religiosity as traditional supernaturalism associated with most religions is 
according to Dewey. In A Common Faith, his small book dealing with religion 
but perhaps even more strongly (if mostly implicitly) focused on democratic 
politics, Dewey attacked supernaturalist religions while affirming the continu-
ous relevance of ‘the religious’ as a quality of experience that can potentially be 
attached to various kinds of experience (e.g., moral, aesthetic, political, or even 
scientific).8 The kind of pragmatist and non-reductively naturalist philosophy 
of religion available in Dewey’s A Common Faith can in my view be intimately 
linked with pragmatist antitheodicism precisely because of its (largely implicit) 
challenge to recognize especially those experiences and perspectives that insti-
tutionalized supernaturalist religions tend to leave aside.
Within pragmatism, the Deweyan conception of democracy as a way of 
life and his criticism of supernaturalist forms of religion need to be supple-
mented by a Jamesian concern for the irreducibility of the individual: we have 
to be sensitive to what James (1979 [1891]) called the ‘cries of the wounded’ 
and avoid the kinds of Hegelian and Leibnizian theodicies he firmly rejected 
in Pragmatism (to be frequently revisited in the subsequent chapters). By 
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exploring these issues, we might also make more precise the pragmatist idea 
that democracy in the deep sense of truly engaged participation in democratic 
practices requires the recognition of others as (actual or potential) participants. 
In this sense, my pragmatist explorations in this book will, I hope, be implicitly 
relevant also to issues in social and political philosophy.
Let us here recall how James (1975 [1907]: Lecture II) compares his pragmatic 
method to a corridor in a hotel. Very different intellectual work can be done in 
individual rooms all of which can be reached by walking along the same cor-
ridor (i.e., by using the same pragmatic method): in one of them, we may find a 
religious believer engaging in prayer, while in another one we may find a scien-
tist conducting empirical experiments or a critic of religion writing an atheist 
thesis. Pragmatism thus recognizes, and James urges us to recognize, the irre-
ducible and often incommensurable value of different human practices having 
their distinctive purposes and goals. Pragmatism can also facilitate processes of 
mutual recognition between persons and groups maintaining divergent views 
on, e.g., science and religion—or, mutatis mutandis, evil and suffering. Thus, 
it may contribute to the integration of theological and secular approaches to 
evil.9 Moreover, pragmatism highlights the most vital task we face here, viz., 
the practical one of getting rid of or fighting against evil, or at least dimin-
ishing suffering, while also critically questioning and overcoming any sharp 
distinction between theoretical and practical approaches to the problem of evil 
and suffering (a dichotomy that is itself typical of theodicism, as we will see in 
Chapter 6 below). This is one obvious reason why pragmatism is considerably 
more promising than many of its rivals in this particular discourse; we may, 
indeed, at the meta-level reflexively argue for the pragmatic significance of prag-
matism in making sense of, and responding to, the antitheodicist challenge of 
acknowledging innocent suffering.
As already explained in some earlier work of mine (e.g., Pihlström 2003, 
2013a), my pragmatist ideas are implicitly based on a Kantian understand-
ing of the relations between theoretical and practical philosophy (which Kant, 
admittedly, distinguished much more sharply from each other than the prag-
matists do). Kant’s moral criticism of theodicies in his 1791 ‘Theodicy Essay’ 
(see Kivistö & Pihlström 2016: chapter 2) can itself be seen as a moral criticism 
of the failure to appropriately distinguish between theoretical and practical rea-
son and their distinctive concerns, particularly as a criticism of attempts to 
appeal to the former (in the form of metaphysical, speculative theodicies à la 
Leibniz) independently of the latter (i.e., genuine moral concern with suffer-
ing). Kant might somewhat anachronistically be regarded as a ‘pragmatist’ in 
the sense that he maintained that the ultimate task of human reason is practical: 
reason in general—in its theoretical and practical uses—is in the end guided by 
practical reason and its ethical concerns, because the division of labor between 
the theoretical and the practical uses of reason is itself inevitably ethically 
grounded and motivated. There is no non-ethical place for us to stand in order 
to establish such a division of labor. Kant, then, shifts the attention from meta-
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physics to morality—and, as we learn from his doctrine of the ‘postulates of 
practical reason’ (see Kant 1983a [1788]: A238–244), it is only on the basis of 
morality (i.e., the moral law codified in the categorical imperative) that we can 
hope for the (metaphysical) reality of God and the immortality of the soul.10
While we will not be able to deal with the Kantian postulates in any detail 
in this book, the key Kantian proposal to construct a moral metaphysics start-
ing from practical reason—further developed by the pragmatists—indicates in 
its own way why the epistemic challenge of viewing the world objectively and 
rationally is, for Kantian pragmatists at least, inextricably intertwined with the 
existential challenge of viewing the world (and especially the suffering it con-
tains) in an ethically appropriate, or at least decent, manner.
Next, consider briefly Peirce. He is of course a classical figure in the debates 
over realism, and his views are increasingly discussed in the philosophy of reli-
gion, too, but as far as I know he never explored the problem of evil in any great 
detail. In a recent commentary, Richard Atkins (2016: 133–136) does consider 
the problem of evil in relation to Peirce’s views on religion, though.11 He pre-
fers—arguably for Peircean reasons—what he calls the strategy of ‘exculpation’ to 
that of ‘excuse’, suggesting that, ‘given the information we have, we are not in the 
proper epistemic position to issue a verdict on whether God is blameworthy for 
permitting evil and suffering to exist and so we are at liberty to deny that God is 
to be blamed for the evil and suffering in the world’ (ibid.: 134). It seems to me, as 
well as (presumably) to many other antitheodicist philosophers of religion, that 
this is a non sequitur. It could still be argued to be insulting to the victims of evil 
and horrible gratuitous suffering even to maintain that we might ‘hold for now 
that God is blameless, that God has some reason for permitting evil and suffer-
ing, however inscrutable that reason may be to us now’ (ibid.: 135).
Insofar as Peircean philosophy of religion based on (as Atkins persuasively 
argues) sentiment and instinct in matters of vital concern leads us to such an 
exculpation approach to the problem of evil comparable to what is today dis-
cussed under the rubric of skeptical theism—and one can easily see it tends to 
do so—I think this might provide us with one reason for rejecting the Peircean 
approach in this area, possibly in favor of a Jamesian one. From James’s point 
of view, any theodicist attempt to speculate about God’s possible reasons for 
allowing evil and suffering is morally problematic—and this will become clear 
in the subsequent chapters through more detailed remarks on James. While 
Atkins’s examination of the problem of evil remains brief (and, unlike his gen-
eral defense of Peirce’s sentimental conservatism in ethics and religion, ignores 
James’s contribution to the matter), this might in fact be one of the most impor-
tant divisions between the Peircean and the Jamesian perspectives in the his-
tory of pragmatism. Jamesian antitheodicists taking seriously the meaning-
lessness of suffering would presumably challenge Peirce’s theodicist belief that 
‘God is loving the world into greater and greater degrees of perfection’ (Atkins 
2016: 161; cf. ibid.: 162).
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James’s relevance in this area is indeed rather different. It even seems to me 
that James, far from seeking any rationalizing theodicy or even an ‘exculpation’, 
is as firmly focused on the significance of the deeply vulnerable and embodied 
character of human experience of suffering, as, say, Levinasian phenomenolo-
gists are. The notion of the embodied other is, implicitly if not explicitly, at the 
core of Jamesian pragmatist antitheodicism. It is, very simply, our concrete 
embodiment that makes us vulnerable to suffering, and it is this vulnerability 
that we ought to ethically perceive in other human beings around us. Without 
appreciating such vulnerability in the lives we share with other human beings, 
no ‘cries of the wounded’ can be heard, and no pragmatic method can get off the 
ground. Therefore, James’s physiological metaphors of human finitude should 
be taken seriously as fundamental to his pragmatism: he finds both deafness 
(to what he calls the cries of the wounded) and blindness (to others’ experi-
ences in general) significant to his analysis of our responses—or, better, failing 
responses—to vulnerability and suffering. In an opening comment to a famous 
1899 lecture, he notes: ‘Now the blindness in human beings, of which this dis-
course will treat, is the blindness with which we all are afflicted in regard to the 
feelings of creatures and people different from ourselves’ (James 1983 [1899]).12
James narrates his personal experience, which I am here quoting at con-
siderable length in order to illustrate the phenomenological thickness of 
his description:
Some years ago, while journeying in the mountains of North Carolina, 
I passed by a large number of ‘coves,’ as they call them there, or heads 
of small valleys between the hills, which had been newly cleared and 
planted. The impression on my mind was one of unmitigated squalor. 
The settler had in every case cut down the more manageable trees, and 
left their charred stumps standing. The larger trees he had girdled and 
killed, in order that their foliage should not cast a shade. He had then 
built a log cabin, plastering its chinks with clay, and had set up a tall 
zigzag rail fence around the scene of his havoc, to keep the pigs and 
cattle out. Finally, he had irregularly planted the intervals between the 
stumps and trees with Indian corn, which grew among the chips; and 
there he dwelt with his wife and babes—an axe, a gun, a few utensils, 
and some pigs and chickens feeding in the woods, being the sum total 
of his possessions.
The forest had been destroyed; and what had ‘improved’ it out of exist-
ence was hideous, a sort of ulcer, without a single element of artificial 
grace to make up for the loss of Nature’s beauty. Ugly, indeed, seemed 
the life of the squatter, scudding, as the sailors say, under bare poles, 
beginning again away back where our first ancestors started, and by 
hardly a single item the better off for all the achievements of the inter-
vening generations.
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Talk about going back to nature! I said to myself, oppressed by the 
dreariness, as I drove by. Talk of a country life for one’s old age and for 
one’s children! Never thus, with nothing but the bare ground and one’s 
bare hands to fight the battle! Never, without the best spoils of culture 
woven in! The beauties and commodities gained by the centuries are 
sacred. They are our heritage and birthright. No modern person ought 
to be willing to live a day in such a state of rudimentariness and denuda-
tion. (Ibid.) 
But then he continues:
Then I said to the mountaineer who was driving me, “What sort of 
people are they who have to make these new clearings?” “All of us,” he 
replied. “Why, we ain’t happy here, unless we are getting one of these 
coves under cultivation.” I instantly felt that I had been losing the whole 
inward significance of the situation. Because to me the clearings spoke of 
naught but denudation, I thought that to those whose sturdy arms and 
obedient axes had made them they could tell no other story. But, when 
they looked on the hideous stumps, what they thought of was personal 
victory. The chips, the girdled trees, and the vile split rails spoke of hon-
est sweat, persistent toil and final reward. The cabin was a warrant of 
safety for self and wife and babes. In short, the clearing, which to me was 
a mere ugly picture on the retina, was to them a symbol redolent with 
moral memories and sang a very pæan of duty, struggle, and success.
I had been as blind to the peculiar ideality of their conditions as they 
certainly would also have been to the ideality of mine, had they had a 
peep at my strange indoor academic ways of life at Cambridge.
Wherever a process of life communicates an eagerness to him who 
lives it, there the life becomes genuinely significant. Sometimes the 
eagerness is more knit up with the motor activities, sometimes with the 
perceptions, sometimes with the imagination, sometimes with reflective 
thought. But, wherever it is found, there is the zest, the tingle, the excite-
ment of reality; and there is ‘importance’ in the only real and positive 
sense in which importance ever anywhere can be. (Ibid.; first and last 
emphasis added.) 
He then concludes by answering his own question: 
And now what is the result of all these considerations and quotations? 
It is negative in one sense, but positive in another. It absolutely forbids 
us to be forward in pronouncing on the meaninglessness of forms of 
existence other than our own; and it commands us to tolerate, respect, 
and indulge those whom we see harmlessly interested and happy in 
their own ways, however unintelligible these may be to us. Hands off: 
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neither the whole of truth nor the whole of good is revealed to any single 
observer, although each observer gains a partial superiority of insight 
from the peculiar position in which he stands. Even prisons and sick-
rooms have their special revelations. It is enough to ask of each of us 
that he should be faithful to his own opportunities and make the most 
of his own blessings, without presuming to regulate the rest of the vast 
field. (Ibid.)
In the context of this example, we should observe how fundamentally impor-
tant pluralism, tolerance, and the recognition of otherness are for James. These 
are all related to individual embodiment and bodily experiences, constitutive 
of both enjoyment and suffering. James, on my reading, employs not only the 
pragmatic but also the phenomenological method here by showing us how 
easy it is to dismiss others’ experiential perspectives on reality—both their per-
spectives of meaningfulness and their perspectives of despair and meaningless 
suffering. Simultaneously, he shows us how such blindness (or, analogously, 
deafness) is detrimental to the ethically challenging attitude to the world gen-
erally that his pragmatism requires. Hence, pragmatism, as we will see below, 
is framed by the problem of evil and suffering—to the extent, we might say, 
that the pragmatic method receives its philosophical relevance only by being 
intimately linked with this problem. This link also shows us an even more pro-
found link, the one between the epistemic project of knowing reality and the 
ethico-existential one of acknowledging others as suffering individuals with 
their distinctive points of view.13
James can be read as recommending a certain kind of pragmatic involvement 
in others’ experiences, especially experiences of suffering. We must not simply 
look aside when faced by the suffering other. We should, rather, attend to the 
concrete life of the other manifested in their bodily pain and experiences of 
meaninglessness—or, conversely, to their experiences of meaning. However, 
things are not quite as simple as this. There is a sense in which the pragmatist 
antitheodicist her-/himself might also find it necessary to at least occasionally 
adopt a ‘detached’ (rather than constantly involved) perspective. I will try to 
explain in later chapters in more detail what this means. Note that James, after 
all, does not step out and go to meet the manual laborers he seeks to understand 
better (avoiding his instinctive deafness and blindness); nor does he invite them 
to his ‘indoor academic ways of life at Cambridge’. He keeps a critical distance, 
knowing that there is no way of fully sharing a truly different way of life, while 
seeking to get rid of his blindness. When it comes to the pragmatic critique of 
metaphysical realism and theodicies, the key question is exactly what kind of 
distance we should maintain. It is this question that needs our constant self-
critical attention.
One implication of all this is that we must very carefully determine how 
exactly the pragmatist should assess the prospects of philosophical realism. To 
what extent is the world, including others’ experiences and perspectives, an 
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‘other’ to us—and to what extent can we really be involved in it, or in those 
experiences? I am not at all recommending any naïve understanding of prac-
tical involvement or embeddedness. Others’ points of view will to a certain 
degree inevitably remain other to us. We can never take the place of another—
nor, vice versa, can any other replace us. But we can constantly—from a critical 
and self-critical, hence to some extent detached, point of view—consider how 
exactly, and to what extent, we are able to acknowledge otherness, and better do 
so. This consideration requires a thoroughgoing pragmatist examination of the 
problem of realism and various related topics, including truth and objectivity. 
We will now turn to such an examination.
CHAPTER 1
A Pragmatist Approach to Religious 
Realism, Objectivity, and Recognition
This rather long chapter offers some conceptual preliminaries for the inquiries 
of the subsequent chapters. We will explore realism, objectivity, recognition, 
and the very idea of inquiry in a pragmatist framework. 
When examining the problems and prospects of realism in religion and the-
ology, we should begin by contextualizing the realism vs. antirealism debate 
(or, better, debates) into different local problem areas.1 In order to outline a 
plausible form of pragmatic realism in the philosophy of religion, I will first 
provide some brief remarks on relatively standard varieties of realism (or of 
the problem of realism) and then move on to applications of these realisms in 
the philosophy of religion. I will in that context introduce my own preferred 
pragmatist perspective on the realism controversy, enriched with a notion not 
usually employed by pragmatist philosophers, namely, the concept of recogni-
tion. The issues of pragmatic objectivity, already tentatively taken up in the 
introduction above, will be revisited toward the end of the chapter in the con-
text of a pragmatist theory of inquiry enriched by the concept of recognition.
Realisms: some preliminaries
First of all, we should note that realism has been a major theme in the philoso-
phy of science over the past few decades, and continues to be actively discussed 
by philosophers of science. According to scientific realism, there ‘really’ are 
unobservable theoretical entities postulated in scientific theories (or, in a some-
what more careful formulation, it is up to the world itself to determine whether 
or not there are such entities); those theories have truth values independently 
of our knowledge and experience; and scientific progress may be understood 
as convergence toward mind-independently objective (‘correspondence’) truth 
about the world. These features of scientific realism may, furthermore, have 
more specific applications in sub-fields such as the philosophy of physics, 
the philosophy of biology, or the philosophy of history. Another interesting 
example is mathematical realism, according to which numbers and other math-
ematical entities and/or structures exist independently of minds (possibly in a 
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Platonic world of eternal Forms), and our mathematical truths about them are 
objectively what they are.
Clearly, the realism debate is not restricted to the philosophy of science. In 
ethics (or, rather, metaethics), moral realism has been a major topic of dispute 
for decades. This is a controversy about whether there are objective moral 
values and/or mind-independent moral truths about ‘moral facts’ (or, perhaps 
better, about the nature of the moral values there are, or are not, independently 
of human minds). Just as the scientific realist believes in the objective truth 
values of scientific theories, even when they postulate observation-transcend-
ent theoretical entities and structures, and the antirealist denies that theories 
have such truth values, especially insofar as they are about the unobservable, 
the moral realist maintains that moral statements are objectively true or false 
(even though their truth or falsehood cannot, of course, be immediately per-
ceived), while the antirealist argues that this is not the case (for instance, for the 
reason that moral ‘statements’ are not really factual statements at all but moral 
discourse is, instead, mere expression of attitudes, e.g., emotions). More gener-
ally, axiological realism is the view that values (including not only moral but 
also aesthetic, epistemic, and other values) are objectively real, instead of being 
mere human projections or constructions.
Highly important dimensions of the realism issue are also discussed and 
debated in relation to other traditional core areas of philosophy, such as gen-
eral metaphysics. For example, the modal realist seeks to formulate a realistic 
account of the modalities, i.e., possibilities and necessities. According to such 
realism, possibilities, for instance, are ‘real’—or there are real possible worlds in 
addition to the actual world. A related—and of course ancient—for of realism is 
realism about universals, that is, the kind of realism about abstract Forms that 
may (or may not) be instantiated in particular objects that classical philoso-
phers like Plato and Aristotle (in their different ways) maintained. Metaphysi-
cians and epistemologists have also debated, e.g., realism about the past (and 
about future, or about temporality in general). The question here is whether 
past (and future) objects and events really exist independently of the mind and 
of any human discourse and whether statements about the past—analogously 
to statements about the unobservable world in science—have objective truth 
values. And many other examples of realism and antirealism in different fields 
of philosophy can easily be distinguished. These are all, as we may say, different 
local versions of realism (vs. antirealism).
These contextualizations or localizations of the problem of realism are to be 
distinguished from the quite different distinctions between the various philo-
sophical dimensions of the general or global realism issue that concerns the 
mind independence and discourse independence (vs. dependence) of reality in 
general. The ontological realism question is, obviously, whether there is a mind- 
and language-independent world at all. Epistemologically, we may ask whether 
we can know something (or anything) about such an independent world. The 
semantic realist, furthermore, maintains that we can refer to such a world by 
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using our language and/or concepts; according to such realism, our statements 
about the world are true or false independently of the mind, and truth is typi-
cally construed as correspondence with the way things are. All these differen-
tiations between the dimensions of realism and antirealism can also be applied 
more locally to the kind of issues preliminarily catalogued above. For example, 
scientific or modal realism can be discussed from the point of view of the onto-
logical, epistemological, or semantic dimension of the realism issue.2
The concept of independence—as well as, conversely, dependence—is crucially 
important for the entire realism discussion (see also Chapter 2). According to 
typical forms of realism, the world is (largely) independent of various things: 
minds or subjects; their experiences, perceptions, and observations; concepts or 
conceptual schemes; language, linguistic frameworks, or language games; theo-
ries and models; scientific paradigms; perspectives or points of view; traditions; 
practices; and so forth. I will mostly just use ‘mind independence’ as a short-
hand for all these and other standard forms of independence (to be contrasted 
with the relevant kinds of dependence). Furthermore, it should be noted that, 
in the realism discussion, the relevant concept of (in)dependence is, at least 
primarily, ontological: A is ontologically dependent on B, if and only if A cannot 
(or could not) exist unless B exists. Different modal forces are of course invoked 
insofar as this definition is formulated in terms of ‘cannot’ or ‘could not’, respec-
tively. This ontological notion of (in)dependence, in both stronger (‘could not’) 
and weaker (‘cannot’) modal versions, is to be distinguished from, for example, 
logical (in)dependence and causal (in)dependence. Statements or theories are 
logically independent of each other insofar as there is no logical entailment 
between them. (It is hard to say in what sense exactly the notions of logical 
dependence and independence could even be applied to the relation between, 
say, a statement and a non-linguistic fact, insofar as entailment is a relation 
between logical, propositional, and/or linguistic entities.) Regarding causal 
dependence and independence, we may say that, for example, a table is causally 
dependent on its maker but ontologically independent of them because it can 
continue to exist when they disappear from the world. When made, its exist-
ence no more ontologically presupposes its maker’s existence—even though 
antirealists may deny that the table, or anything, could exist entirely indepen-
dently of human beings’ thought, language, or experience.
Having reached a preliminary conception of what kinds of realism there are, 
globally and locally, we should also get clear about the different varieties of 
antirealism. There are, in fact, various rather distinct antirealisms, or several 
ways of being an antirealist, both globally and locally. An easy way of listing 
such antirealisms would be to just list the denials of the corresponding real-
isms. However, let me briefly indicate in what sense some traditionally best-
known antirealisms are opposed to realism—and in what sense some of them 
are not.
First, idealism is often represented as a version of antirealism. The problem, 
however, is that idealists can also be realists, depending on how exactly these 
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views are defined (there will be more to be said on this matter below in relation 
to pragmatism). Another key version of antirealism is, as is well known, relativ-
ism, according to which the way the world is is relative to, for instance, con-
ceptual schemes or perspectives. There is, then, no way the world is ‘in itself ’, 
independently of perspectives or schemes. Relativism is often relatively close to 
constructivism (which can also be compared to at least some forms of idealism): 
we ‘construct’ the world in and through our perspectival language, discourse, 
or conceptualization, and it is precisely for this reason that there is no non-
relative existence at all. A quite different version of antirealism is empiricism (as 
a view discussed primarily in the philosophy of science), which maintains that 
only the observable world is real and that metaphysical speculations about the 
existence of unobservables merely lead us astray. According to such empiricism 
(e.g., instrumentalism), scientific theories should be interpreted as mere instru-
ments of calculation and prediction, instead of sets of mind-independently true 
or false statements about (unobservable) reality. Furthermore, nominalism is a 
form of antirealism in the universals debate in the sense of claiming that there 
are no mind- and language-independent universals but only particulars. Yet, 
nominalists could be realists in other ways; for example, many influential con-
temporary scientific realists are nominalists in metaphysics. The varieties of 
antirealism are by no means exhausted by these well-known and much dis-
puted doctrines.
Finally, an important distinction ought to be drawn between antirealisms 
and nonrealisms. Not all denials of realism can be simply classified as antireal-
isms. For example, Richard Rorty (e.g., 1998) has repeatedly claimed that his 
‘antirepresentationalism’ leads us beyond the entire issue of realism, which 
in his view crucially depends on representationalist assumptions, that is, on 
the idea that the business of language use is to represent non-linguistic and 
mind-independent reality and that it may succeed or fail in this task. Another 
influential nonrealist position in the philosophy of science in particular was 
formulated by Arthur Fine (1986) with the label ‘NOA’, ‘the natural ontologi-
cal attitude’. The ‘NOAist’ just accepts the ontological postulations of science, 
avoiding any further philosophical speculation, problematization, or interpre-
tation of them.3 These nonrealisms, which can be regarded as close relatives, 
cannot be discussed here, but I want to note that the version of pragmatic real-
ism to be articulated and tentatively defended below is not committed to the 
kind of Rortyan antirepresentationalist neopragmatism that has given a fertile 
context to nonrealism. It is realism itself that we can and should, I think, save 
through pragmatism, even though the realism thus saved will have to be a thor-
oughly revised one. (Similarly, pragmatism may and should accommodate its 
own specific—pragmatic—notion of representation instead of giving up repre-
sentationalism altogether.)
After this brief preliminary survey, we should take a closer look at how the 
different forms of realism and antirealism—or, more modestly, some variants 
of them—are applicable to the philosophy of religion and theology.
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Applying realism(s) to theology and religion
The problem of realism in theology and religion obviously concerns the (in-)
dependence of the world and/or objects purportedly referred to in religious 
and/or theological language use. These objects could include God, souls, angels, 
and many other things traditionally postulated in religious practices and theo-
logical theorization. At least in principle, it is possible to be a local realist about 
some of these ontological commitments while being an antirealist about some 
others: for instance, one could be a realist about God’s existence while being an 
antirealist about angels. That is, one could maintain that it is a mind-indepen-
dently objective matter whether or not God exists, and which properties God 
has (if He does exist), while maintaining that statements about the existence of 
angels, or about their properties, do not have mind-independently determined 
objective truth values. Note, however, that at least according to most formula-
tions of realism and antirealism, one does not qualify as an antirealist about 
God if one just denies God’s existence, or as an antirealist about angels if one 
just denies their existence, because one may very well be a realist about the 
features of the mind-independent world itself that make it the case that there 
is no God, or that there are no angels. Atheism is not antirealism but typically 
presupposes realism.4
There are, to be more precise, different ‘levels’ of realism about religion. At 
least four such levels can be distinguished. It is helpful to introduce these dis-
tinctions by referring to the relevant relations between practices of language 
use and the relevant objects that those practices of language use can be sup-
posed to be about. First, we may apply the realism issue to religious language 
itself—that is, to the relation between religious language and its objects (what-
ever they are). Secondly, we may speak about realism and antirealism in rela-
tion to theological (e.g., Christian, Jewish, or Islamic) language and its objects. 
Thirdly, we may distinguish the language of non-confessional religious studies 
(or comparative religion)—and its objects—from the first two levels. Fourthly, 
and finally, the language of philosophy of religion—and its objects, whatever 
they might be—is a yet higher ‘meta-level’ context for investigating realism in 
relation to religion.
Accordingly, when asking whether to be realists or antirealists about religious 
matters, we may ask this question at four different levels (at least), that is, as the 
question of whether there are, e.g., mind-independent truths about objective 
reality in (1) religion, (2) theology, (3) religious studies, and (4) philosophy of 
religion. Let us pursue these questions in turn.
First, according to religious realism, the objects of religious beliefs and/or 
statements (e.g., God) exist, or fail to exist, independently of religious language 
use. That is to say, God is real or unreal independently of whether you, I, or 
anyone else believes or fails to believe Him to be real. If God exists, He will 
continue to exist even if no one believes in His existence.5 And conversely, if 
God does not exist, He will not come into existence no matter how strongly 
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He is believed in. Religious antirealism denies this independence and regards 
God as mind-dependent in some sense, for instance, as a construction based 
on religious language use, or a discourse-dependent construal, as some 
postmodernist orientations in philosophy of religion might put it.
Secondly, according to theological realism, certain theological doctrines are 
true or false depending only on the way the (religious) world those doctrines 
purportedly refer to objectively is, i.e., again, independently of the mind or of 
any theological discourse. For example, the doctrine of divine simplicity—that 
is, the view that God is the simplest possible being, which may also be taken to 
entail the view that all of God’s attributes, such as His absolute goodness and 
omnipotence, are identical to God himself—is either true or false depending on 
the true metaphysical nature of God. Either God is the way this doctrine says 
He is, or He is not that way; it is not up to the theological doctrine to determine 
what God’s metaphysical nature is, but it is the other way round. The truth or 
falsity of the doctrine is grounded in the nature of the world, and of God. The 
theological antirealist, again, denies such independence, maintaining that the 
truth or falsity of the kind of doctrines at issue here depends on their theologi-
cal formulation, or our theological perspectives on God and the world.
It may, however, be difficult to draw the exact line between religious and 
theological language use, and the corresponding versions of realism (and 
antirealism), although generally theological doctrines could be regarded as 
meta-level interpretations of actual religious beliefs. For example, Christologi-
cal, pneumatological, soteriological, and other sophisticated interpretations of 
Christian beliefs—regarding, respectively, the nature of Christ, the Holy Spirit, 
and salvation—can be regarded as doctrines belonging to this set of meta-level 
theological construals of ‘first-order’ religious beliefs. A ‘normal’ believer need 
not, and typically does not, have the kind of theological sophistication that the 
formulation and understanding of these doctrines requires. One’s entitlement 
to religious realism (or antirealism) cannot therefore depend on one’s being a 
realist (or an antirealist) about the meta-level theological doctrines.
One could, then, in principle, be a religious realist about, say, the existence 
of Christ but an antirealist about some more specific theological views, such 
as the doctrine of Christ’s second coming. But could one be a theological real-
ist while being a religious antirealist? This would, presumably, be an awkward 
position. One could hardly reasonably maintain that the truth values of claims 
about Christ’s second coming are mind independent and objective while deny-
ing such mind independence and objectivity to claims about God’s (or, indeed, 
Christ’s) existence. Furthermore, it may also be difficult to determine what it 
is to be a realist about Christ if one is not committed to the theological doc-
trines that define Christ. Which specific doctrines should be taken to play such 
a defining role? This may be a matter of theological dispute. Does Christ (or, 
for that matter, God) have only essential properties or also contingent ones? 
Could one, then, be an antirealist about a doctrine such as Christ’s second com-
ing, let alone a highly central doctrine such as Christ’s resurrection (or, say, 
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Christ’s two natures), without also being an antirealist at the basic religious 
level about God?6
The third level to be discussed is the problem of realism about religious stud-
ies. This may be compared to the more general realism issue that arises in the 
human sciences (such as history, anthropology, cultural studies, literary theory, 
and other fields): Is the human cultural and social world also objectively the way it 
is, analogously to the way the scientific realist regarding natural science believes 
the natural world to be, so that truths about it are determined independently 
of our theories and discourses? Or is it somehow a human cultural–theoretical 
construct, in a stronger sense than the natural world? The age-old nature vs. 
culture distinction is of course in some sense presupposed here. Scientific real-
ism in the natural sciences must certainly be distinguished from realism about 
the humanities and social sciences. There is clearly a sense in which human cul-
ture and society are human and therefore mind-dependent constructs, but the 
intended sense of ‘independence’ should be understood correctly here; obvi-
ously there is no a priori reason why one could not apply realism across the 
board, not only in the sciences but also in the humanities. Even if it may not 
be easy to regard human sciences such as literary theory as pursuing objective 
truth in the same sense in which we may regard physics or biology as pursuing 
objective truth, there is no principled reason why our statements and theories 
in these different fields could not be objectively true or false depending on the 
ways in which the (admittedly very different) objects of study are. The objects 
of the human sciences are not independent of human thought and action, but 
they could still be independent of the theorist’s or scholar’s views and experi-
ences in a sense relevantly similar to the mind independence of physical enti-
ties. Hence, according to realism, it would still be possible to pursue objective 
truth in the human sciences, even if that kind of truth would be about humanly 
constructed reality.
Now, insofar as religious studies (or comparative religion) is part of the 
human sciences in the same sense as history or anthropology are, the realism 
debate in the latter is directly applicable to the former, or the former is only a 
special case of the latter. Of course it must be kept in mind that the social and 
cultural world of religion, any more than the cultural world generally, is not 
fully objective or ‘mind independent’ in the same sense as physical nature is 
(according to the realist); yet, again, it can (arguably) be independent of the 
researchers’—the religious studies scholars’—minds, or of their theories, in an 
analogous sense.7
The relation between religious studies and theology is far from clear, how-
ever. Theological doctrines, such as (again) divine simplicity or Christ’s second 
coming, could be and often are seen as ‘confessional’: to be a Christian is to 
maintain that these and many other doctrines about God, Christ, and related 
matters are true (though it may be open to further discussion what it practi-
cally means in religious life to be committed to their truth).8 However, theo-
logical doctrines can also be studied entirely ‘neutrally’ and non-confessionally 
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as objects of religious believers’ (and theologians’) beliefs—and the one who 
engages in such non-confessional study need not at all engage in the practices, 
either religious or theological, within which those beliefs are actually main-
tained, or taken to be true. Thus, it may be a result of theological inquiry that 
a religious group X maintains, or has maintained at some point in its history, 
a doctrine Y (e.g., as interpreted in a certain way). Is this still theology, or is 
it, rather, religious studies? Or perhaps comparative religion? The disciplinary 
identities may be extremely unclear here.9
If theology can be pursued without commitments to any Christian or other 
theological doctrines, then there is no fundamental distinction between the-
ology and religious studies, nor between the relevant versions of the realism 
vs. antirealism debate. The same general points about realism in the human 
sciences will then apply to religious studies and theology alike. However, if the-
ology is interpreted confessionally, as it might be at various divinity schools 
around the world, then one could be a realist about a theological doctrine while 
being an antirealist about a meta-level interpretation and/or explanation of that 
doctrine within non-confessional religious studies (comparative religion). But 
is the converse position coherent? Could one be a realist about a non-confes-
sional interpretation of a religious doctrine about which one is a theological 
antirealist? I am tempted to answer affirmatively. One can of course be a real-
ist about, for example, historical issues regarding the emergence, prevalence, 
and maintenance of certain theological ideas and/or views in certain historical 
or contemporary communities while rejecting theological realism about those 
ideas themselves. One need not be a realist about, say, theological doctrines 
postulating angels, even if one is a strong realist about religious studies exam-
ining people’s and communities’ beliefs in angels. Even so, it might be more 
natural to maintain a realistic commitment across the board, at both levels.
Fourthly, how about philosophy (of religion)? Things get even more compli-
cated when philosophy enters the picture to supplement the practices of reli-
gion, theology, and religious studies. Philosophy of religion can be more or less 
directly concerned with religious concepts and beliefs, but it can also examine 
their relation to both theological interpretations and non-confessional expla-
nations and accounts offered within religious studies. We may here also want 
to distinguish, on the one hand, philosophy of religion, and on the other hand, 
philosophy of science—or something corresponding to the philosophy of sci-
ence—as applied to (i) the ‘science’ of theology (if it can be regarded as a science 
in any sense) and to (ii) the inquiries within religious studies.
Does philosophy of religion have any ‘objects of its own’? Can one be a realist 
(or an antirealist) about the language used within the philosophy of religion, 
and the relation between that language use and its relevant objects? Arguably, 
the complex relations between the objects of religion, theology, and religious 
studies, and the relations between the different ways (different languages) of 
speaking about those objects, can be among the ‘objects’ of the philosophy 
of religion.
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The more general question, not to be answered here, is whether there can be 
mind-independent and objective facts about philosophical theories and their 
actual or potential objects at all. Is there, moreover, a mind-independent and 
objective truth about, say, realism itself (or other topics in the philosophy of 
religion, such as the nature of evil)? That is, is it objectively true or false that 
realism holds, or does not hold, about religious views, about theological doc-
trines, or about the results of religious studies inquiries? (Are the statements 
made in this chapter on realism objectively true or false, accurately represent-
ing a subject matter independent of them?) The ‘reality’ studied by the phi-
losophy of religion should include all the levels of the realism debate: religious 
and theological entities (e.g., God), as well as relevant human activities within 
which such entities—and questions concerning their existence—are referred 
to, spoken about, and inquired into.
As has become clear through this discussion, however preliminary it must 
remain, there is a certain analogy between scientific realism and the different 
realisms applied to religion and theology. However, even though this analogy 
may be helpful, it may also be seriously misleading; at least we should be care-
ful to avoid too easy analogies. The entire attempt to discuss theological real-
ism by means of an analogy to scientific realism is, arguably, problematic, as 
it presupposes an evidentialist view of theology as relevantly comparable to 
science. According to evidentialism, religious beliefs—as well as, by extension, 
their theological meta-level interpretations—need to be evaluated on the basis 
of the rationally acceptable evidence that can be presented in their favor, just 
as one would generally evaluate scientific (and everyday) beliefs. Realism and 
antirealism cannot, then, be strictly separated from the evidentialism vs. fide-
ism issue (although these two issues are in principle distinct); this is part of a 
broadly Kantian entanglement of metaphysics and epistemology. Pragmatism, 
which we will soon discuss in more detail, rejects evidentialism, while also 
rejecting straightforward versions of fideism, and hence also the direct scien-
tific realism analogy. At any rate, when developing a pragmatist approach to the 
realism debate (in science, religion, and theology—and elsewhere), the genuine 
differences between all these practices must be appreciated.10
A pragmatist approach to the realism debate
The tradition of pragmatism offers a fresh perspective on the realism vs. antire-
alism issue. The rest of this chapter is devoted to showing—inevitably only very 
briefly—what the pragmatist contribution might be, and how it could, espe-
cially in the philosophy of religion, be enriched by considerations adapted from 
the theory of recognition.
The so-called classical pragmatists—especially Peirce, James, and Dewey—
all defended views that can be regarded as to some extent realistic but to some 
extent anti- or nonrealistic—or, if not strictly speaking antirealistic, at least in 
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some sense idealistic or constructivist (even though it also needs to be pointed 
out that none of the classical pragmatists was really tempted to defend any 
form of relativism). The tensions we find in these thinkers’ positions regarding 
realism and its alternatives illuminate the ways in which the realism issue has 
been and continues to be at the heart of the pragmatist tradition in philoso-
phy. A similar tension seems to be at work in contemporary neopragmatism, 
that is, in the thought of philosophers like Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam. 
In theology and philosophy of religion specifically, this tradition has more 
recently been represented by scholars such as Eberhard Herrmann and Dirk-
Martin Grube.11
Pragmatism can be seen as a philosophical approach seeking to mediate 
between realism and antirealism in a manner comparable to Kant’s attempt 
to argue that empirical realism is compatible with (and even requires) tran-
scendental idealism. More critically, this means that the realism vs. antireal-
ism tension is indeed inevitably present in pragmatism, both classical and ‘neo’. 
However, pragmatists have typically attempted to move beyond this tension in 
interesting ways. The relevant tension that needs to be dealt with here can be 
briefly expressed as follows: the world is (empirically) independent of us, but 
its independence is itself a human construct within our purposive practices and 
may receive different forms within different practices.
Moreover, the world and whatever exists or is real within it can exhibit a 
number of different practice-laden forms of mind independence. For example, 
the mind independence of electrons, of historical facts, and of God (if, indeed, 
such entities or structures are real independently of minds) are all quite differ-
ent kinds of mind independence, and it makes sense to speak about these dif-
ferent kinds only within different purposive practices in which they play some 
functional roles. The practice of physical science within which the independent 
existence of electrons is at issue does not, presumably, have any role for God 
to play, but on the other hand the religious person’s prayer addressed to a God 
believed to be real independently of that activity of praying hardly presupposes 
that electrons, or any other pieces of material world, are real. There is no need 
to reduce all these to the same essence of what it means to be mind-independ-
ent. Pragmatic realism—if we may use such a label—is itself ‘practice involving’, 
not just a view maintained for ‘practical’ (e.g., non-theoretical or instrumental) 
reasons.12 Rearticulating realism itself, like religion, in terms of human prac-
tices is the key program of pragmatic realism. This program is very different 
from the more radical neopragmatist program of giving up realism, or even the 
issue of realism altogether (as Rorty suggests).
Some contemporary pragmatists, including Eberhard Herrmann (e.g., 1997, 
2003), have suggested that the realism issue in religion and theology can be 
fruitfully articulated in terms of Putnam’s distinction between internal and 
metaphysical realism. According to Herrmann, Putnam’s internal realism can 
plausibly be used as a model for realism in theology and religion. While I am 
not entirely convinced by this proposal, let me briefly recapitulate the main 
A Pragmatist Approach to Religious Realism, Objectivity, and Recognition 11
points of Putnam’s form of realism; this will only serve as an example of an 
influential and theologically relevant version of neopragmatism here.
One of Putnam’s (1990: 28) characterizations of the difference between 
internal and metaphysical realism is based on his observation that our percep-
tions and conceptions of the world are relative to language and/or conceptual 
schemes, since ‘elements of what we call “language” or “mind” penetrate so 
deeply into what we call “reality” that the very project of representing ourselves 
as being “mappers” of something “language independent” is fatally compromised 
from the very start’. This formulation seems to employ a relatively straight-
forward idea of language dependence (or mind dependence). The contrasting 
view, metaphysical realism, maintains that we can, in principle at least, theo-
rize about a language- and mind-independent world an sich, as it is indepen-
dently of our thoughts and language use. The basic point of internal realism 
is that there is no such external, disengaged viewpoint available for us. All 
our engagements with reality begin from an internal standpoint that already 
involves human practices and linguistic categorizations of reality. One way of 
summarizing this distinction between two kinds of realism is by saying that 
metaphysical realism dreams of a theocentric conception of the world, while 
internal realism argues that we human beings cannot get rid of our anthropo-
centric, and therefore inevitably limited and contextual, ways of coping with 
reality. This corresponds to the way in which the world has, in the pragmatist 
tradition more generally, been seen as a ‘human world’, as in a way plastic or 
malleable to human beings’ purposeful actions and practice-related concep-
tual categorization.13
A pragmatist perspective on theological realism can be summarized in terms 
of the following key points, which arguably represent the main strengths of 
pragmatism in comparison to more standard versions of theological/religious 
realism and antirealism. First, pragmatism should be firmly set against sci-
entism (e.g., strong and reductive forms of scientific realism): non-scientific 
perspectives and practices are equally important for us as scientific ones. Sec-
ondly, even if scientific or metaphysical realism in any strong forms cannot be 
accepted, there is, nevertheless, a kind of realistic spirit operative in pragma-
tism.14 This is especially clear in James’s reflections on the brute reality of pain, 
suffering, evil, and death; these ethically pregnant themes seem to be, for the 
Jamesian pragmatist, in the end much more important than purely theoretical 
construals of realism vs. antirealism. More generally, thirdly, it can be argued 
that ethics and metaphysics are deeply entangled in pragmatism, both in early 
pragmatism such as James’s and in more recent pragmatism such as Putnam’s. 
According to these pragmatists, there is a sense in which our metaphysical con-
struals and categorizations of reality depend on our ethical perspectives; thus, 
the relevant realism issues are also entangled.15
These basic points about pragmatism correspond to the ways in which I see 
pragmatism as a major promise in the philosophy of religion more generally—
as outlined in the introduction above. Epistemically, as we saw, pragmatism 
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seeks to move beyond the evidentialism vs. fideism controversy and to thereby 
transform the debates on the rationality vs. irrationality and objectivity vs. sub-
jectivity of religious belief (both of which are closely related to, while not being 
identical with, the realism vs. antirealism issue). Existentially, pragmatism, at 
least in the form in which I am hoping to develop it, seeks to move beyond 
‘theodicist’ attempts to solve the problem of evil; responding to the reality of 
evil—in a ‘realistic spirit’—is thereby seen as a major challenge for any ethically 
serious religious and theological thought (cf. especially Chapters 3–6 below). 
The epistemic and the existential challenges in contemporary philosophy of 
religion are, of course, entangled—as should be clear, for instance, on the basis 
of the undeniable relevance of moral realism and antirealism to the problem 
of evil.
There are also further pragmatist ideas that may seem to be only indirectly 
related to realism but are nevertheless relevant to it. For example, most pragma-
tists have been non-reductive naturalists of some kind; the key example of such 
a position in the philosophy of religion would be Dewey’s (1991 [1934]) prag-
matic religious naturalism. Moreover, pragmatists’ general attempt to occupy 
a middle ground between realism and antirealism leads to the need to exam-
ine the complex relation between relativism and pluralism. It must be some-
how secured that the idea of a plurality of acceptable (and, possibly, equally 
rational) human practices and perspectives does not lead to a full-blown rela-
tivism according to which there are in the end no normative standards govern-
ing human reason-use and theorization at all, or no reasonable choices to be 
made between rival perspectives. Finally, the relations between religion, ethics, 
and politics need to be taken very seriously by any pragmatist who claims that 
philosophy of religion ought to make a difference to the ways in which human 
beings live in this world. That is, what is the place of religion in the public 
sphere, and how should it, possibly, be reconsidered? While this issue may not 
seem to be closely related to the problem of realism, it can be argued that it does 
in the end have a deep connection with that issue. Ethical and political realism 
need to be reconsidered from the point of view of the problem of introducing, 
or reintroducing, religious and theological perspectives into public discussions. 
(This book will not take any stand on this set of problems; I am just mentioning 
this topic as an example of the way in which pragmatist philosophy of religion 
can seek to be truly practically relevant.)
All these aspects of pragmatist philosophy of religion have dimensions that 
touch the realism debate. For example, should we settle the realism issue (at 
some specific level) before making any commitments regarding ‘religion in the 
public sphere’? Or can we leave the issue open? Furthermore, when developing 
pragmatic religious or theological realism, the multi-level structure of the real-
ism issue examined in the previous section must be kept in mind: one could, 
for instance, be a pragmatic realist about religion while being an antirealist 
about theology or religious studies. These commitments arguably require holis-
tic pragmatic assessment.16
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Recognition and recognition transcendence
My next suggestion in this discussion is that the pragmatist philosopher of reli-
gion may fruitfully apply the (broadly Hegelian) concept of recognition (Anerk-
ennung): it may be argued that our religious identities are largely based on rela-
tions of mutual recognition—loosely employing the concept of recognition as 
articulated by Axel Honneth and his many followers and critics.17 One key idea 
here, keeping in mind the general entanglement of ethics and metaphysics in 
pragmatism, is that the ethical relations of recognition may be primary to the 
ontological relations constituting our identities. Could the relations between 
realists and antirealists also be analyzed in terms of recognition? In particular, 
how should we make sense of the idea of recognizing a person (or a commu-
nity) as being committed to shared norms of rational thought and/or inquiry, 
that is, as a member of the same community of inquirers?18 Furthermore, how 
exactly should we distinguish between the notions of recognition, tolerance, 
and agreement—and make sense of the fact that these are, indeed, different 
notions, playing somewhat different roles in our habits of action and in our 
practices of sharing an ethically problematic world with other human beings?
Instead of attempting to provide answers to these questions, let alone a gen-
eral treatment of recognition in the philosophy of religion, even just pragmatist 
philosophy of religion, let me take up the more specific theme concerning rec-
ognition and recognition transcendence in pragmatic realism. There is a sense in 
which antirealism, e.g., relativism or fideism about religion (both culminating 
in some kind of rejection of objectivity), makes recognition too easy: we can 
certainly without difficulties (mutually) recognize each other as mere utterers 
of ‘inarticulate sounds’ or as mere ‘enunciators’ whose words have no norma-
tively evaluable content.19 This is what radical relativism, arguably, ultimately 
leads to. But when it comes to judgments with normatively evaluable content, 
objectivity becomes a challenge for us, something to be pursued in the ‘space 
of reasons’.20 Then, if we slide toward the other extreme—strong objectivity 
and realism (e.g., metaphysical realism in Putnam’s sense)—recognition may 
become too difficult: we would presumably first have to settle whether reli-
gious beliefs can be true or false independently of the mind, before being able 
to decide whether a person or a group is able to be ‘objective’ in this area, and 
to thereby recognize them as rational thinkers. These are in the end questions 
about the possibility of recognizing others as inquirers, as inhabitants of the 
space of reasons. But how objective do we have to be qua inquirers? Recogniz-
ing ourselves as responsible to others in our inquiries can be argued to be a 
matter of recognizing our own fallibility and dependence on our membership 
in a community of inquirers.21
In the semantically oriented realism debate in particular (as developed by Put-
nam as well as Michael Dummett), recognition-transcendent truths have played 
a major role: to be a realist is to accept that (possibly) recognition-transcendent 
statements (e.g., ‘There are no intelligent extraterrestrials’) are determinately 
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objectively true or false, in principle just like statements whose truth values it is 
easy to recognize (e.g., ‘There is no cup of coffee on the table’); to be an antireal-
ist is to deny this.22 One could also invoke recognition transcendence in another 
sense: if someone is ‘beyond recognition’ in the sense that s/he cannot be rec-
ognized as something or someone under some normative description (e.g., as 
an inquirer, or more specifically as an inquirer into recognition-transcendent 
truths), we may regard this as another kind of recognition transcendence. 
Now, we can presumably recognize someone as a potential recognizer (or 
non-recognizer) of (some or all) potentially recognition-transcendent truths. 
One might, indeed, argue that we should recognize each other as potential 
recognizers of there being recognition-transcendent truths. There is, then, 
a certain kind of iterability and variability in the notions of recognition and 
recognition transcendence, yielding a potentially indefinite complexity of rela-
tions of recognition and recognition transcendence. What does this teach us? 
Perhaps it only shows that metaphysical issues concerning the recognition 
of truths, or their recognition transcendence, inevitably invoke the ethically 
relevant perspective of recognition directed at other human beings instead of 
either mere truths (or facts) or mere principles of rationality or other norms. 
This also necessarily includes recognizing our own fallibility and dependence 
on other inquirers (cf. also Westphal 2013). Our recognizing, or failing to rec-
ognize, truths about the world depend on our always already being involved in 
practices whose normative governance inevitably involves (potential) relations 
of recognition and non-recognition among their participants.23
Moreover, a point worth emphasizing is that religious truths, if there are any, 
might be (humanly) recognition-transcendent. A reasonable form of religious 
or theological realism (as well as, by extension, a reasonable form of realism 
regarding religious studies) needs to account for this idea. Even more strongly, 
whether there are any religious truths may be recognition-transcendent. It may, 
arguably, be a feature of our religious practices and their theological interpreta-
tions and articulations that these limits of human recognition abilities need to 
be recognized by those (successfully) engaging in such practices or seeking to 
theologically articulate and understand them (or at least by anyone who could 
be recognized as successfully doing so). At least, at the meta-level, it needs to be 
recognized that it might be recognition-transcendent whether religious truths 
(if there are any) are recognition-transcendent or not. There are, as can easily 
be seen, several versions of recognition and recognition transcendence at work 
here; a more detailed theory of this matter would have to sort out their relations 
much more comprehensively.
Any such theory, if adequate, will also need to deal with the key distinction 
between recognizing people and recognizing something else—truths, prin-
ciples, criteria, norms, etc.—which in this case amounts to the distinction 
between recognizing people as recognizers (or non-recognizers) of truths and/
or their recognition transcendence, on the one hand, and recognizing recogni-
tion transcendence itself, or there being recognition-transcendent truths. All 
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of these recognition acts shape the normative ‘space of reasons’ within which 
humans live and inquire.
‘Objectivity without objects’
Let me now return to the issue concerning objectivity in a pragmatist setting, 
already preliminarily discussed in the introduction. It is important to keep in 
mind that when dealing with the two philosophical ‘interests’ in the inquiry 
into religion—the epistemic one and the existential one—pragmatism should 
not claim to be an absolutely novel approach. On the contrary, pragmatists 
(who, in James’s memorable words, are offering a ‘new name for some old ways 
of thinking’) should acknowledge their historical predecessors.
One of those predecessors is undoubtedly Kant, whose great insight in the 
philosophy of religion was that religious and theological questions must be 
considered primarily on the basis of ‘practical philosophy’, that is, ethics (Kant 
1983a [1788]). I see pragmatism as sharing this basically Kantian approach 
while not denying the epistemic and metaphysical significance of the philo-
sophical study of religion (see also Chapter 3 below). Again, this yields a novel 
account of the peculiar kind of objectivity we are able to pursue in this field. We 
are still interested in, e.g., the metaphysical (and epistemic) problems concern-
ing the nature of reality, the possible existence or non-existence of the divin-
ity, and our epistemic access to such matters—and these are clearly ‘objective’ 
issues—but as human beings embedded in our habitual practices of life we are 
dealing with all this from ethically loaded, value-laden (and hence partly ‘sub-
jective’) standpoints. For us as the kind of creatures we are, there simply is no 
non-interested standpoint to occupy in such matters. To admit this, however, is 
not to collapse objective inquiry into mere subjective preferences.
Insofar as this Kantian-inspired entanglement of ethics and metaphysics is 
taken seriously, we may also say that pragmatism incorporates a modern ver-
sion of Kantian transcendental philosophy. The philosophical issues of religion 
are examined by paying attention to the ethical context within which they are 
so much as possible as topics of philosophically interested study for beings like 
us. This is, in a way, transcendental philosophy ‘naturalized’. Therefore, it may 
also be suggested that pragmatism simultaneously proposes a liberal form of 
naturalism, distinguishing between a narrow (or ‘hard’) scientistic naturalism 
from a more pluralistic (and ‘softer’) form of naturalism according to which 
even religious qualities in experience can be humanly natural.24 This liberali-
zation of naturalism is parallel to the recognition that there are pragmatically 
embedded degrees of objectivity between the ‘full’ rigorous objectivity often 
associated with natural science and complete subjectivity some people may 
associate with religious experiences.25
A Jamesian interpretation of pragmatic objectivity can be taken to main-
tain that there is no metaphysically objective ‘fact of the matter’ regarding, for 
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instance, metaphysical issues or questions (such as, paradigmatically, God’s 
reality or human immortality) in abstraction from our ethical and more gener-
ally weltanschaulichen contributions; there are no fundamental objective meta-
physically realistic truths about metaphysical questions in that sense. Rather, 
our ethical perspectives contribute to whatever metaphysical truths there 
are, and ever can be, for us.26 Thus, when developing a (Jamesian) pragma-
tist account of religion, especially an account of the famous Kantian ‘transcen-
dental ideas’, viz., God, freedom, and immortality, as a pragmatically reinter-
preted version of what Kant in the Second Critique called the ‘postulates of 
practical reason’,27 we arguably may, in addition to steering a middle course 
between objectivity and subjectivity generally, make a legitimate commitment, 
from within our religious and ethical practices themselves, to a certain kind of 
transcendence (that is, the ‘transcendental ideas’).28 The legitimacy or, perhaps, 
moral necessity of such a commitment might even be defended by means of a 
certain kind of (practice-involving, hence ‘naturalized’) transcendental argu-
ment: as James argued—though, of course, not explicitly transcendentally—it 
may be necessary for us to embrace a religious view if we are seriously com-
mitted to a ‘morally strenuous’ mood in life and seek to, or find it necessary to, 
maintain this commitment.
However, we cannot employ this account of religion to develop a theory of 
any religious objects, because in the Kantian context only properly transcen-
dental conditions, such as the categories (e.g., causality) and the forms of pure 
intuition (space and time), are necessary conditions for the possibility of the 
objects of experience in the sense that all empirical objects must conform to 
them. Religious and/or theological ideas, such as the ideas of God, freedom, 
and immortality, do not play this objectifying and experience-enabling role, 
even if they can be argued to play a quasi-transcendental role as enablers of 
moral commitment. More precisely, while the categories, in Kant, are norma-
tive requirements of objecthood, this cannot be said about the postulates of 
practical reason, even if their status is also based on a transcendental argument.
Hence, although there can be a certain kind of pragmatic objectivity in reli-
gion and theology—or so my (real or imagined) Jamesian pragmatist would 
argue—there cannot be religious or theological objectivity in the sense of any 
legitimate rational postulation of religious objects, understood as an analogy 
to the postulation of, say, theoretical objects in science serving the purpose 
of explaining observed phenomena. Here, once again, the pragmatist must be 
firmly opposed to what is going on in mainstream Anglo-American philosophy 
of religion dominated by a strongly realist and evidentialist model of objectiv-
ity. Indeed, according to Kant himself, the key mistake of the traditional proofs 
of God’s existence was to overlook these restrictions and to treat God as a kind 
of transcendent object, instead of a mere idea whose human legitimacy can be 
derived only from moral action.29
Now, we may see this (Jamesian) pragmatist understanding of religious and/
or theological objectivity, analogous to the Kantian postulates, as a version 
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(or extension) of what Putnam (2002, 2004) calls ‘objectivity without objects’. 
The examples Putnam provides primarily come from mathematics and ethics. 
We can, and should, he argues, understand the objectivity of these different 
practices—and the related fact-value entanglement in ethics—as something 
not requiring the postulation of mysterious (transcendent) objects out there, 
whether mathematical (numbers, functions) or ethical (values, moral facts). As 
Putnam has argued for a long time (at least since Putnam 1981), there is no need 
to think of moral objectivity or (pragmatic) moral realism (cf. Pihlström 2005a) 
as needing any ontological commitments to ‘queer’ objects, contra metaethical 
‘error theorists’ like J.L. Mackie (1977). We should now understand whatever 
‘religious objectivity’ or ‘theological objectivity’ there is available along similar 
lines. The relevant kind of objectivity lies in our practices of engagement and 
commitment themselves, in our habits of action embodying certain ways of 
thinking about ourselves and the world in terms of religious notions such as 
God, freedom,30 and immortality.
This conception of pragmatic realism and objectivity in the philosophy of 
religion (and, analogously, in ethics) is compatible not only with certain views 
on religion as a practice or form of life derived from the later Wittgenstein’s 
writings (even though, as was pointed out above, I resist the fideist tones some 
Wittgensteinians resort to), but also with a transcendental position we find 
in the early Wittgenstein: God does not appear in the world; immortality is 
timelessness, or life in the present moment, instead of any infinite extension of 
temporal existence; and my will cannot change the facts of the world but ‘steps 
into the world’ from the outside.31 Accordingly, God is not an object of any 
kind, nothing—no thing whatsoever—that could ‘appear in the world’. Nor can 
my freedom or possible immortality be conceptualized along such objectifying 
lines. The subject philosophy is concerned with—that is, the metaphysical or 
transcendental subject—is a ‘limit’ of the world rather than any object in the 
world (Wittgenstein 1974 [1921], § 5.64).32 This idea is not as foreign to prag-
matism as it might seem; on the contrary, as soon as pragmatism is reconnected 
with its Kantian background, something like the Wittgensteinian conception of 
subjectivity, objectivity, and the world can also, in a rearticulated form, be seen 
as the core position of a transcendental-pragmatic account of objectivity and 
subjectivity (see also Chapter 5 below). In particular, a wrong form of objectify-
ing will turn out to be the decisive mistake of metaphysical realism leading to 
a non-recognition of others’ perspectives on reality, and hence to a failure to 
adopt an appropriate relation to the world we live in by sharing it with others.
Recognition and a processual conception of objectivity
One way of cashing out the pragmatist promise I opened this book with is by 
formulating the issues concerning the objectivity and rationality of religious 
belief and the appropriate reactions to the problem of evil in terms of the con-
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cept of recognition, already discussed in relation to recognition transcendence 
and realism above. This concept must be rooted in not only the Hegelian dis-
course on Anerkennung but also (again) the underlying Kantian idea of there 
being limits or boundaries that shape human cognitive and ethical life and 
need to be recognized by people (and groups) engaging in common projects 
of inquiry, understanding, and moral deliberation. Developing pragmatist phi-
losophy of religion into a pragmatic theory of relations of recognition will be 
a step toward a processual, hence properly pragmatic, account of objectivity. 
I cannot develop such a theory here, but I will offer a sketch, as the notion of 
recognition will figure repeatedly in later chapters as well.33
Since Hume and Kant, philosophers of religion have generally acknowledged 
that it is problematic, or even impossible, to ground theological and/or religious 
beliefs in rational demonstrations, such as the traditional ‘proofs’. Kant, as was 
noted above, drew a particularly sharp boundary between our cognitive capaci-
ties (that is, human reason and understanding), on the one hand, and matters 
of religious faith, on the other. Yet, while attempts to demonstrate the reality of 
God inevitably fail, according to Kant, God’s existence and the immortality of 
the soul must (along with the freedom of the will) be accepted as postulates of 
practical reason. Religious faith can only be grounded in what needs to be pos-
tulated in order to make sense of moral duty, not the other way round. Even so, 
theological issues are not beyond objectivity and rationality; they just require 
the practical use of reason, instead of theoretical or speculative use.
The concept of a limit is crucial for the entire post-Kantian paradigm in the 
philosophy of religion, and post-Kantian philosophy more generally, as Kan-
tian transcendental philosophy examines the necessary conditions for the 
possibility of, and thereby also the limits of, cognitive experience. Concepts 
and beliefs reaching out for the transcendent do not fall within those limits. 
According to Kant’s (1990 [1781/1787]: BXXX) famous dictum, he had to limit 
the scope of knowledge in order to make room for faith. (Hence there can be 
no legitimately postulated objects of faith, because all objects would have to fall 
within the scope of possible cognitive experience.) This creates challenges for 
acts of recognition across boundaries constituted by the transcendental fea-
tures of human capacities.
The central role played by notions such as limit, boundary, and reason opens 
up a number of fundamental issues in post-Kantian philosophy of religion 
(including pragmatism) that can be approached in terms of the concept of rec-
ognition. Most importantly, the boundary between religious belief and non-
belief—believers and non-believers—marks an intellectual, cultural, and politi-
cal division that needs to be examined from the perspective of recognition. 
Such a practice-oriented examination may lead to novel ways of approaching 
the highly controversial issues of science vs. religion (or reason vs. faith) and 
thereby also the methodological debates within religious studies today. 
The relevant issue of recognition here relates not only to the challenges of 
recognizing different groups of people (e.g., believers and non-believers) but also 
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to the need to recognize the relevant limits dividing them, as well as the reasons 
why those limits are taken to be there. These are often based on whether (and 
how) the relevant groups are recognized, or denied recognition, as certain spe-
cific kinds of groups or in some specific capacity. Accordingly, examinations 
of the limits of reason are, or contribute to, specifications of the content of the 
relevant act(s) of recognition. One must understand how ‘the other’—a per-
son or a group ‘on the other side of the boundary’—employs certain concepts, 
especially normative concepts such as reason and rationality, in order to engage 
in any acts of recognition at all. Furthermore, one must realize that different 
people or groups may, for various reasons, recognize the same limits (and each 
others’ ways of recognizing them) or quite different limits. The possible differ-
ences here need not (and should not) be reduced to merely intellectual differ-
ences among people (or groups); they are much more deeply embedded in our 
practices of life, including the existential dimensions of religious beliefs.
For example, from the point of view of atheism, theists simply fail to recog-
nize certain limitations of human reason, or intellectually responsible thought 
more generally: they postulate an immaterial spiritual being without having 
adequate objective evidence for its existence (and in many cases even with-
out seeking or evaluating evidence in appropriate ways). As Kant argued, no 
rational a priori demonstration of God’s existence is possible, and as Hume and 
many others have noted, the traditional a posteriori ‘design’ argument is highly 
implausible as well (although it continues to flourish in contemporary ‘intel-
ligent design’ theories). Conversely, theists may accuse atheists for a failure to 
respect another kind of limitation or boundary: scientifically oriented athe-
ists may believe in the unrestricted capacities of scientific research, or human 
reason use more generally, in providing explanations to all phenomena and 
thus solving the mysteries of the universe. Believers often find it important to 
acknowledge that there may be ‘more things between heaven and earth’ than 
rationalizing philosophy—or science—can ever demonstrate. Accordingly, 
there is a very important boundary between these two groups—theists and 
atheists, or believers and non-believers, or their respective ways of thinking—
and both groups emphasize certain humanly inevitable limits that according to 
them should not be overstepped.
Issues of recognition, then, are not restricted to the mutual recognition 
among persons or groups (e.g., representing different religious or non-religious 
outlooks) as being epistemically or rationally entitled to their (religious or non-
religious) views, but extend to the need to recognize (from the perspective of 
certain intellectual and/or ethical outlooks) certain limitations or boundaries 
that define the proper sphere of human experience, cognition, or reason use, and 
even to the need to recognize different groups and people as actual or potential 
‘recognizers’ of quite different boundaries. The diverging ways in which the-
ists and atheists recognize something as a boundary limiting human capacities 
should themselves be recognized by both groups—in a way that not merely 
tolerates these different boundary drawings but acknowledges that there may 
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be legitimately different ways of drawing them, without simply agreeing with 
the other party, either. Moreover, recognition in this rich sense also extends to 
the recognition of cases of recognition transcendence (see above).
Various acts of recognition across the boundary dividing believers and non-
believers may have as their content at least the following different types of rec-
ognition: one party may recognize the other as (i) human beings (e.g., with cer-
tain inviolable human rights), as (ii) thinkers capable of formulating thoughts 
and/or judgments with intelligible content, as (iii) actual or potential partici-
pants in political discussion and deliberation, and/or as (iv) ‘fellow inquirers’ 
(e.g., possibly, philosophers) seeking the truth about the matter at issue (e.g., 
about God’s existence or non-existence). These different specifications and 
qualifications of the content of the act of recognition involve quite different 
factual and normative commitments and expectations. The acts of recognition 
at issue here also presuppose at least some kind of understanding of the ways in 
which the people or groups to be recognized (or requesting recognition) view 
life and its problems.
For example, recognizing someone as a (fellow) inquirer in the pursuit of 
truth yields expectations significantly stronger than ‘merely’ recognizing the 
same person or group as (a) member(s) of the human species, or even as shar-
ing a common humanity in some stronger sense invoking, say, fundamental 
human rights. The different contents of the relevant acts of recognition may 
be crucially related to the concept of rationality: we may recognize someone 
as rational (as an inquirer, etc.) while disagreeing with them on fundamental 
issues—but can we also consistently disagree about the criteria of rationality 
itself? And how about the criteria of objectivity?
A key meta-level issue in contemporary philosophy of religion is the very 
possibility of critical discussion of religious beliefs. In order for such discussion 
to be possible across the boundary dividing believers and non-believers, both 
groups must recognize each other as members of the same intellectual (and, 
presumably, ethical) community—as rational discussion partners pursuing 
objectivity—and must in a sense overcome or at least reconsider the bounda-
ries dividing them. In order for such discussion to extend to ethical and politi-
cal matters related to religion, the rival groups must also recognize each other 
as belonging to the same moral and political community. (However, again we 
should avoid drawing another sharp limit between intellectual matters, on the 
one side, and moral or political ones, on the other; this division plays only a 
heuristic role here.) The issues of recognition arising in this situation can be 
philosophically analyzed by means of the model of recognition developed by 
scholars of recognition following Hegel, Honneth, and others.34 The pragmatist 
philosopher’s job here is to examine critically the conceptual presuppositions 
for the possibility of the relevant kind of recognition acts. For a pragmatist, such 
presuppositions are inevitably practice-embedded—in short, habits of action.
Now, if Christian believers and ‘new atheists’ are able to recognize each other 
ethically, politically, and/or intellectually, can they also recognize each other as 
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belonging to the same community of inquirers (a community that is, arguably, 
constituted by mutual acts of recognition)? Can they recognize each other as ‘fel-
low inquirers’ committed to the pursuit of objective truth? Could they do this even 
while maintaining very different normative conceptions of the role of reason, 
objectivity, and evidence in the evaluation of religious thought and beliefs, rec-
ognizing quite different (both factual and normative) limits for human thought 
and capacities? Examining these questions pragmatically, from the point of view 
of the theory of recognition, can be expected to lead to rearticulations of the tra-
ditional issues of, say, evidentialism vs. fideism. Thus, it will also be necessary to 
pragmatically re-evaluate key assumptions of contemporary philosophy of reli-
gion, seeking to critically transform the field from the perspective of the theory 
of recognition enriched by pragmatism. The different ways in which objective 
evidence can and ought to be taken into account in the evaluation of the ration-
ality of religious belief must themselves be subjected to a critical examination 
in terms of actual and potential structures of recognition: an evidentialist (or 
anti-evidentialist) methodology in the philosophy of religion must be grounded 
in (potential) acts of recognition across ‘post-Kantian’ boundaries.
Moreover, emphasizing recognition in this manner contributes to articulat-
ing objectivity itself dynamically as a mutual process of different subjects’ (peo-
ple’s, groups’) recognizing each other as co-constructors and -interpreters of 
common normative standards, instead of simply recognizing some pre-given, 
allegedly fully objective standards. There is no royal road to recognizing the 
absolutely correct standards—that is not what it means to be committed to a 
project of inquiry. Rather, the notion of objectivity relevant to inquiry is itself 
constantly in the making, open to creative construction and reconstruction—
and, hence, recognition. Just as there are different kinds of acts of recognition, 
there are also different types and/or degrees of pragmatic objectivity.
The notion of recognition—to be sure, only intuitively used here—is a key 
to the way in which epistemic issues (e.g., realism and objectivity) are in prag-
matist philosophy of religion entangled with existential ones (e.g., the ethics 
of otherness, the problem of evil and suffering). We may now, equipped with a 
preliminary conception of recognition as a notion potentially useful in making 
sense of the dynamics of both epistemic and ethical inquiry, pause to reflect on 
the way in which the notion of inquiry itself should be understood in pragma-
tist philosophy of religion.
Pragmatism and inquiry
How, then, does, or how ought to, the pragmatist understand the key concept 
of inquiry in general terms?35 One should begin answering this question by 
emphasizing the pragmatists’ resolute anti-Cartesianism. While Descartes, 
famously, started by doubting everything that can be doubted and arrived at 
the ‘Archimedean point’ at which, allegedly, doubt is no longer possible—that 
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is, the thinking subject’s self-discovery, cogito, ergo sum—Peirce’s anti-Carte-
sian essays in the 1860–70s questioned the very possibility of this traditional 
approach to epistemology.36 Skipping (here) the details of Peirce’s arguments, 
we may appreciate the pragmatist point that we can never begin from complete 
doubt; on the contrary, we always have to start our inquiries from the beliefs 
we already possess. There is no way of living—no way of ‘being-in-the-world’, 
to use terminology well known in a very different philosophical tradition, that 
is, Heideggerian phenomenology—in the absence of believing, that is, holding 
certain beliefs to be true about the world, at least one’s more or less immediate 
surroundings with which one is in constant interaction. Doubt does play a role 
in inquiry, but it is subordinate to belief in the sense that it is triggered only in 
specific situations within contexts of belief.
Moreover, beliefs themselves, as pointed out above, are habits of action. This 
is a basic pragmatist idea, also shared by those pragmatists that may not be as 
helpful as Peirce and Dewey in developing a general theory of inquiry, includ-
ing James. Beliefs do not just give rise to habits of action; they quite literally are 
such habits. To believe something to be the case amounts to being prepared to 
act in the world in a way or another—indeed, not only to concretely act but 
to be disposed to act in certain ways should certain types of situation arise. 
Pragmatism, thus, does not reduce beliefs to concrete individual actions but 
more generally rearticulates our notion of believing as tied up with the notion 
of habitual action.37
In the emergence of inquiry, the crucial step is taken when a habit does not 
function smoothly, when our action is interrupted or yields a surprise. Then, 
and only then, does doubt come to the picture. The surprise leads to genuine 
doubt (instead of the Cartesian ‘paper doubt’ that Peirce ridiculed), a state of 
doubt that is directed to the original belief(s) that gave rise to, or were, the 
habit(s) of action that led to the surprise. The purpose of the inquiry that 
then naturally follows is to settle that doubt and to fix a new belief or set of 
beliefs that do(es) not yield the same kind of surprising result that the original 
belief(s) and/or habit(s) of action did. Through this process of inquiry, the orig-
inal belief(s) and/or habit(s) are either replaced by new and better ones or are 
revised. The way Dewey (e.g., 1960 [1929]) describes inquiry as an intelligent 
response to problematic situations that need to be transformed into unprob-
lematic ones is essentially similar, though by and large somewhat more natu-
ralistically phrased, emphasizing inquiry as a continuous ‘transaction’ between 
a living organism and its environment.
How, then, does a process of inquiry, pragmatically conceived, proceed in 
seeking to terminate doubt and fix (new) belief? Peirce’s examination of the 
‘fixation of belief ’ is the pragmatist locus classicus here (though the term ‘prag-
matism’ does not yet appear in this 1877 essay). Famously, Peirce rejects the 
three methods of fixing belief he finds unsatisfactory for various reasons—the 
methods of tenacity and authority, as well as the ‘intuitive’ method of what is 
‘agreeable to reason’—and defends the scientific method as the only method 
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capable of truly rational belief-fixation in the long run. The distinctive feature 
of the scientific method in comparison to the inferior methods is that it lets the 
‘real things’ that are independent of us—that is, independent of the inquirers 
and their beliefs or opinions38—to influence the way in which the new beliefs 
are fixed. Our beliefs must thus be responsive to our experiences of the objec-
tive world that is largely independent of us in order for them to be properly 
scientific (see also Pihlström 2008b).
Peirce’s theory of the progress of scientific inquiry is also well known: if the 
ideal community of rational inquirers (who need not be human) were able to 
engage in inquiry, using the scientific method, for an indefinitely long time, its 
beliefs regarding any given question would converge to an ideal ‘final opinion’. 
This final opinion will, however, never be actually achieved; it is an ideal end, 
a ‘would’ rather than a ‘will’.
Now, how does the Peircean–Deweyan pragmatist conception of inquiry 
accommodate non-scientific inquiries, including religious and theological 
ones? One way of approaching this question is by asking whether the pragma-
tist conception of inquiry is monistic or pluralistic. Does it seek to provide us 
with the essence of objective inquiry? These questions are difficult to answer 
unless we make the relevant terms clear. It is, I think, helpful to view inquiry as 
a ‘family resemblance’ notion in Wittgenstein’s sense, without any permanent 
fixed essence. There are, as we know, quite different inquiries in different areas 
of life, from our everyday affairs to science as well as art, politics, ethics, and 
religion, and many other practices. There is no pragmatic need, or point, to 
force all these different modes of inquiry into the same model. In this sense, 
pragmatism definitely defends a pluralistic conception of inquiry. Hence, there 
is no reason to a priori exclude religious and theological ‘inquiries’ from the set 
of pragmatically acceptable forms of inquiry. However, it can simultaneously 
be maintained that all these rather different inquiries share a similar pragmatic 
approach, that is, the ‘doubt–belief ’ theory of inquiry (as it is often called) 
and the related scientific method (as distinguished from the inferior methods 
Peirce attacks) briefly sketched above. The movement from habits of action and 
beliefs through surprise and doubt to inquiry and new or revised beliefs and 
habits is general enough to allow an indefinite amount of contextual variation. 
A certain kind of context sensitivity is, then, a crucial feature of pragmatism—
not only of pragmatist theories of inquiry but of pragmatism more generally. 
Even if we can say that the ‘same’ pragmatist account of inquiry can be applied 
to inquiries taking place in very different contexts, or different human practices 
(including practices we consider non-scientific), that is only the beginning of 
our inquiry into inquiry. The notion of inquiry will only be pragmatically clari-
fied—its pragmatic meaning will be properly brought into view—when its local 
contexts are made clear. 
Moreover, when those contexts are made clear, it no longer matters much 
whether we call the methods that are used ‘scientific’ or not. This is mostly a 
terminological matter (though it is also important to keep in mind that ter-
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minological issues are often not at all trivial). We may, that is, employ Peirce’s 
‘scientific method’ also when we are not pursuing science literally speaking. 
Political discussion, for instance, may be ‘scientific’ and ‘objective’ in the rel-
evant pragmatist sense if it is genuinely open to belief revision in the face of 
recalcitrant experience, argument, and evidence, even if it does not aim at 
scientific-like results. If it is not open in this way, or if it is, rather, based on 
stubborn ideological opinions never to be changed no matter what happens, it 
is simply not a form of inquiry at all. And the same clearly holds for religion. It 
can be a form of inquiry if (and only if) it genuinely seeks to test and evaluate 
religious faith in the ‘laboratory of life’ (to cite Putnam’s apt phrase again)—and 
to revise one’s beliefs in a fallibilist spirit should that turn out to be necessary.
However, I would like to suggest that we leave the concept of inquiry, quite 
deliberately, vague enough to cover inquiries that do not exactly ‘pursue truth’ 
in the sense in which scientific and more generally academic and/or scholarly 
inquiries can be regarded as pursuing the truth. We should of course admit 
that the pursuit of (objective, mind-independent) truth is a pervasive phenom-
enon in academic life, not only in the natural sciences but also in those areas of 
inquiry (say, literary criticism or religious studies) where truth itself is largely a 
matter of interpretation, or construction of new illuminating perspectives on, 
e.g., certain historical documents.39 Again this directly applies to religious and 
theological reflections—or ‘inquiries’, insofar as this notion is appropriate in 
this context. But we should also admit that inquiry extends even to areas in 
which it no longer makes much sense to speak about the pursuit of truth. For 
instance, political discussion may take the form of an (objective) inquiry as 
long as the participants are genuinely responsive to each others’ possibly con-
flicting ideas and the evidence and other considerations brought to the picture 
by the discussants. Artistic inquiries, in turn, may very interestingly question 
our received views and conceptualizations of the world much more effectively 
than scientific theory-formation ever can. And even religious ‘inquiries’ into 
one’s most fundamental ways of relating to the world and to one’s individual 
and communal life may deserve the honorific title of an inquiry even if they 
are never responsive to evidence in the way science is but are, rather, primarily 
responsive to the deeply personal existential needs of the subject and the satis-
faction of those needs in that person’s concrete life situations.
A critic might argue that we are extending the concept of inquiry too far from 
its legitimate pragmatic meaning by seeking to accommodate even religious 
inquiries under this concept. If inquiry must be truly objective—responding to 
Peircean ‘real things’—how can one’s personal struggle with religious faith, or 
with losing one’s faith, be an instance of inquiry? Moreover, are we not running 
the risk of sacrificing objective truth in this frightening age of ‘fake news’ and 
‘post-truth’? It could be suggested that especially by Peircean (and/or Deweyan) 
lights, inquiry aiming at the truth must be responsive to experience in a way 
that religious inquiry or even political deliberation can never be. In particular, 
religious faith might be defined in such a manner that it cannot be responsive to 
experience in the relative sense (in order to be religious).40 This would lead to 
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fideism, according to which religious faith is simply not a rational matter—not 
a matter of inquiry. Now, my pragmatist account of realism, objectivity, and 
inquiry is clearly very different; as explained earlier, pragmatism seeks to tran-
scend the received opposition between evidentialism and fideism by developing 
a form of religious inquiry responsive to experience without thereby losing the 
distinctive character of religious thought in comparison to science. The key to 
this is the general pragmatist account of inquiry, enriched with the concept of 
recognition outlined above. Religious inquiry may be a genuine inquiry—and 
even genuinely ‘objective’—in the relevant pragmatic sense while being very 
different from standard scientific inquiries. It may still be responsive to experi-
ence and evidence drawn from the ‘laboratory of life’, distinguished from the 
scientific laboratory. There is no reason why our Weltanschauungen, or views of 
life and its significance, should not be regarded as pragmatically testable.
Religious inquiry, in the pragmatic sense, might be seen as an attempt to 
recognize different ways—one’s own and others’—of being responsive to expe-
riences of different types (or more generally of being responsive to argument, 
criticism, and other considerations that might lead to revisions in one’s belief 
system). The notion of recognition, briefly discussed above, would thus again 
seem to be highly central in the pragmatic understanding of inquiry in general, 
and religious inquiry in particular. Such recognitions would never be ‘objec-
tive’ in the sense of being based on a ‘God’s-Eye View’ on the world (cf. also 
Chapter 4 below); on the contrary, they would always, inevitably, be someone’s 
actions and perspectives, humanly situated and engaged acts in the social world 
in which we live in and in which our very identities may depend on our rela-
tions (including relations of recognition) to other socially engaged subjects.41 
This kind of inquiry would indeed be a species of recognition. From a pragma-
tist point of view, then, the notions of inquiry and recognition would not just 
be contingently related to one another but would actually be fundamentally 
linked, to the extent that for a pragmatist it may in the end be impossible to 
understand the relevant concept of inquiry without understanding what it is to 
recognize other inquirers. Nor would acts of recognition be possible without 
implying dynamic projects of inquiry into the shared world.
The religious and theological significance of these ideas, left implicit here but 
to be made more explicit in the chapters that follow, may in fact be enormous. 
In particular, the pragmatist idea of inquiry as a pluralistic, fallibilist, and self-
critical process of recognition is a necessary background for the entanglement 
of pragmatic realism and antitheodicism—as a response to our sharing the 
world with suffering others—to be developed later in this book.
Science and religion
What is it to recognize someone or some group as belonging to the same intel-
lectual community of inquirers, or as engaging in the practices of inquiry? 
What does it mean to be committed to a membership in such a community? 
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Is this ultimately a matter of recognizing certain people (‘fellow inquirers’) as 
rational (or attributing some other normative properties to them) or of recog-
nizing certain methodological norms or criteria as objectively valid or binding?42 
Are these acts of recognition essentially different from the corresponding acts 
required for one’s being able to live in a moral, political, and/or religious com-
munity? One hypothesis that a pragmatist could examine further is that the 
structures of recognition at work in these various cases can be used to clarify 
and evaluate certain important cases of conflict, e.g., situations in which one’s 
‘objective’ intellectual duties seem to run into conflict with one’s ‘subjective’ 
religious (or, possibly, ethical) commitments. The very notion of an intellectual 
duty, investigated in what is called the ‘ethics of belief ’, could thereby also be 
analyzed and redefined.43 It is clear that the notions of objectivity and realism 
will have to be invoked here.
Moreover, it may be asked why the relatively heterogeneous (yet allegedly 
objective) ‘scientific worldview’ is usually regarded as a single and unified pic-
ture of the world maintained by a single, unified community of inquirers based 
on relations of mutual recognition, even though that worldview is itself full of 
tensions and disagreements (and so arguably fails to be a unified worldview at 
all). Why should, e.g., religious views be automatically excluded from such a 
worldview? This is again a question addressing our practices of recognition in 
contexts of inquiry. It is not immediately obvious why, for instance, the differ-
ent philosophical interpretations of basic (‘objective’) ontological structures of 
reality—regarding, e.g., universals or modalities (cf. also Chapter 2)—would be 
any less dramatic conflicts of reason or rationality than the opposition between 
theism and atheism. Why do, say, realists and nominalists belong to the same 
community of rational inquirers committed to a scientific worldview and to 
the same rational methods of inquiry, while theists (according to new atheists, 
at least) do not? Analyzing these relations of recognition, or the lack thereof, 
is a key task for both pragmatists and non-pragmatists today, regarding both 
philosophy of religion and interdisciplinary religious studies.44 
In cases of extreme intellectual conflict (between, say, conservative Christian 
fundamentalism and militant new atheism), there is little hope for mutual rec-
ognition or even tolerance. In some other cases, including the much narrower 
gap between liberal Christianity and, say, philosophical agnosticism based on 
some version of non-reductive naturalism rather than eliminative scientism, 
it is possible to aim not only at tolerance but at deep mutual respect grounded 
in acts of recognition. Even then, the somewhat conflicting accounts of reason 
and its role in religion and theology must be carefully considered. It might be 
suggested that a kind of intolerance may already be built into the Enlighten-
ment project of reason use itself, if the latter is understood as being commit-
ted to the idea that the ‘objectively best argument’ necessarily ‘wins’ and that 
argumentative and/or intellectual considerations always ought to be followed 
‘wherever they lead’. Philosophical argumentation may itself have, e.g., ethical 
limitations that again need to be duly recognized. The pragmatist will therefore 
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also need to consider models of recognition that can be employed in a self-crit-
ical examination of one’s ethical limitations, and those of the groups and social 
practices one engages in: it should be possible to recognize (while disagree-
ing with) a perspective from which one’s argumentation, however intellectually 
sound, leads to ethically problematic conclusions.45
I have in this chapter emphasized pragmatism as a critical middle path 
between the implausible extremes of (strong) realism and antirealism, as well 
as evidentialism and fideism, among others. In conclusion, I should note that 
it would be an interesting further inquiry to reflect on this proposal to develop 
pragmatism as a via media by making a comparison to an apparently very dif-
ferent but on a closer look related position articulated and defended by Richard 
Kearney (2010), also intended as a middle ground option between traditional 
theisms and atheisms, and also offering an intriguing contribution to the prob-
lem of evil. I see Kearney’s ‘anatheism’ as analogous to the kind of pragmatism 
I am defending in relation to both the epistemic and the existential interest 
in the philosophy of religion. The anatheist, just like the pragmatist, rejects 
mainstream realisms and antirealisms, as well as mainstream conceptions of 
religious belief either as merely subjective or (alternatively) as objective in the 
sense presupposed in standard analytic evidentialist philosophy of religion. 
These conceptions of religion simply do not help us in making sense of the ways 
in which religion is a distinctive human practice or phenomenon that invites 
neither militant rejection nor anti-intellectual acceptance but requires an ethi-
cally sensitive way of viewing the world and other human beings.
In brief, both the pragmatist (in my sense) and the anatheist (in Kearney’s 
sense) seek to move beyond the standard dichotomies between evidentialism 
and fideism, as well as theism and atheism; both reject received views of objec-
tivity and realism (as contrasted to subjectivity and antirealism); and both also 
reject all rationalizing attempts to resolve the problem of evil as manifestations 
of ‘vicious intellectualism’. Here, however, I only want to recognize Kearney’s 
position as a potential discussion partner for pragmatist philosophers of reli-
gion pursuing practice-laden objectivity and rationality. Future pragmatist 
studies of theological realism, objectivity, recognition, and religious inquiry 
would have to engage with the anatheist alternative as seriously as they have 
hitherto engaged with the various received views that are now ready to be left 
aside as potential blocks to the road of inquiry.
There are also explicitly pragmatist resources still not in full use in the gen-
eral realism debate (and in its various localizations and contextualizations), as 
well as in the specific debate(s) on realism vs. antirealism regarding religion, 
theology, and religious studies. Pragmatism may be uniquely able to critically 
analyze the relations between these levels of the debate by contextualizing 
them in the underlying purposive practices and the needs or interests they 
serve (viz., religion, theology, scientific inquiry, philosophy itself), and due to 
its philosophical flexibility and inherent polyphony it may be well equipped to 
recognize other philosophical approaches, including mainstream ones such as 
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recognition theory and more idiosyncratic ones, such as Kearney’s anatheism, 
as relevant conversation partners in its on-going inquiries. Pragmatism may, 
moreover, be the only perspective on the debate on realism and objectivity in 
religion and theology that can seriously make sense of the idea that ‘mind inde-
pendence’ itself is not just a realistic ‘given’ but a human practice-laden con-
struct. The concept of recognition, as we have seen, can be employed to enrich 
the pragmatist approach to the realism issue. This is a further Kantian-inspired 
(and certainly not only Hegelian) development of pragmatism.
This final point about pragmatic realism being a fundamentally Kantian way 
of thinking, in philosophy of religion and elsewhere, needs to be taken seri-
ously. This even extends to the need to take seriously a pragmatic analogy of 
Kantian ‘things in themselves’ (or ‘noumena’) in this area (see again Chapter 3 
below). Putnam (1983: 226), who generally sought to avoid strong metaphysical 
commitments, once pointed out that he is ‘not inclined to scoff at the idea of a 
noumenal ground behind the dualities of experience, even if all attempts to talk 
about it lead to antinomies’; furthermore, he added that because ‘one cannot talk 
about the transcendent or even deny its existence without paradox, one’s attitude 
to it must, perhaps, be the concern of religion rather than rational philosophy’. 
In some later writings, too, Putnam (arguing against, say, what he regarded as 
pseudo-Wittgensteinian relativistic ‘language-game theology’) seems to main-
tain that a realistic attitude to what religious perspectives are perspectives on is 
a presupposition of making sense of religious and theological language use: ‘A 
perspective on something cannot simply be “constructed”; if it is to be a perspec-
tive at all, it must be constrained by what it depicts […]’ (Putnam 1997b: 414).
Insofar as such a realistic postulation of a transcendent reality of religion 
cannot really be spoken about in any ordinary language, pragmatic realism 
cannot be committed to any strong epistemological realism (or even semantic 
realism) about the transcendent. It can perhaps only incorporate a minimal 
assumption of ontological realism regarding transcendence, along with a fal-
libilist recognition of the possible recognition transcendence of any truths (or 
falsities) about it. There is something out there that we may have to postulate 
insofar as our religious attitudes are to have any sense in our practices (or to be 
sensibly denied), but we need to recognize that such postulations could always 
be completely mistaken. It is in terms of pragmatism itself that this kind of 
theological, religious, and philosophical attitudes and their presuppositions are 
to be critically evaluated.
Many of the themes of this book—realism, truth, recognition, objectiv-
ity—have in a preliminary way figured in my admittedly long, winding, and 
exhausting—even if still preliminary—sketch of a pragmatist approach to the 
realism debate and the philosophy of religion in this chapter. The next chapters 
will more systematically focus on more specific issues, each of which needs 
to be examined by employing these pragmatist notions now tentatively devel-
oped. First, however, we need to deepen our understanding of the pragmatist 
account of realism in Chapter 2.
CHAPTER 2
The Pragmatic Contextuality 
of Scheme (In)Dependence
This chapter has two main parts. First, I will present a brief historical survey of 
what I call, echoing the title of one of W.V. Quine’s famous papers, seven ‘mile-
stones’ in the historical development of the problem of realism. The final mile-
stone I will arrive at is the pragmatic one—or, more precisely, an integration 
of Kantian and pragmatist approaches to the realism issue—and in the second 
half of the chapter I will examine one possible way of cashing out the pragmatic 
attitude to this issue, and of thus articulating a distinctively pragmatist line of 
thought in epistemology and metaphysics.1 This is what I propose to call the 
contextuality of the notion of ontological scheme dependence (and, similarly, of 
scheme independence). While the first half of the chapter will go through a 
historical development of 2500 years in extremely broad strokes, the second 
half will offer a more detailed (albeit still relatively abstract and general) look 
at how the outcome of this development could, or should, be reconceptualized. 
A brief concluding section will then pull the threads together and point toward 
the subsequent chapters. This chapter will thus develop further the tentative 
pragmatist articulation of the interrelated issues of realism, objectivity, recog-
nition, and inquiry that Chapter 1 was devoted to.
Seven milestones in the history of the problem of realism
There are at least three importantly different perspectives on the realism issue 
(see Chapter 1). First, realism vs. nominalism is the traditional debate focus-
ing on the problem of universals. Secondly, realism vs. idealism (or, in more 
recent discussions, realism vs. constructivism, relativism, etc.) is primarily a 
problem concerning the existence of mind-independent reality and the objec-
tivity of truth. Thirdly, we may speak of ‘realism about X’, applying the prob-
lem of realism to different problem areas, e.g., theoretical entities, modalities, 
moral facts, or God.2 In both historical and systematic treatments of the real-
ism issue, these different meanings ought to be kept separate. Nevertheless, it 
is important to inquire into their points of contact. In my view, ‘realism’ is not 
just a homonymous term denoting quite different doctrines; the issues of real-
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ism vs. nominalism and realism vs. idealism, for instance, do have something 
in common.
Let me also briefly recapitulate how different varieties of the problem of real-
ism can be distinguished as follows (cf., e.g., Niiniluoto 1999):
• Ontological realism: is there a mind-independent reality, existing ontologi-
cally independently of the existence of minds (or, similarly, of concepts, 
theories, language, perspectives, etc.)?
• Semantic realism: can we refer to, or represent, such an independent reality 
by means of language; in particular, can the notions of reference and truth 
be cashed out realistically?
• Epistemological realism: is it (humanly) possible to (at least partly) know the 
mind-independent reality?
• Methodological realism: can we formulate methodological norms to guide 
our search for objective truth and knowledge about reality?
• Scientific realism: are scientific theories true or false about a mind-inde-
pendent reality (including the unobservable theoretical entities they pos-
tulate), and can we understand the progress of science as a progress toward 
the truth?
• Axiological and/or normative (e.g., moral) realism: are there objective moral 
facts and/or moral truths (or other valuational and/or normative truths)?
Different forms of antirealism can, of course, be construed analogously, as we 
already saw in Chapter 1. The ontological antirealist denying the reality of a 
mind-independent world is typically a subjective idealist (e.g., a solipsist or a 
phenomenalist), while epistemological realism can also be disputed by a skep-
tic who subscribes to ontological realism. Semantic realism is rejected by, e.g., 
coherence theorists about truth. Furthermore, methodological and scientific 
realisms are criticized by instrumentalists, according to whom scientific theo-
ries lack truth values, and others who refuse to accept the idea that science 
could be seen as progressing toward truths about a mind- and theory-inde-
pendent world. Finally, axiological realisms are attacked by antirealists who do 
not believe in objective moral (or other) values and truths, e.g., by moral non-
cognitivists and ‘error theorists’ who claim either that ethics is not a cognitive 
enterprise at all or that all moral (or generally valuational) statements are false, 
because there is nothing objective in the world corresponding to them.3
Let me in this historical overview draw particular attention to the ways in which 
the issues of realism vs. idealism and realism vs. nominalism are, though different 
problems with diverging histories, nevertheless entangled with each other. They 
are certainly not the same issue, but they are both historically and systematically 
connected in important ways, and these connections will play a role in the discus-
sion of the second main section of the chapter. I will integrate my remarks about 
their entanglement into a brief, and admittedly very loose, historical story about 
the development of this set of problems, epitomized in seven ‘milestones’.
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First milestone: ancient perspectives on realism. Generally, metaphysical 
realism—more precisely, the view that the world possesses its ‘own’ (presum-
ably humanly cognizable) intelligible structure ontologically independently of 
our beliefs, experiences, or conceptualizations—is a common presupposition 
in ancient metaphysical and epistemological discussions. However, there are 
interesting debates related to the modern realism issue(s) already in antiquity. 
These include at least Plato’s (and Socrates’s) criticisms of the Sophists, focusing 
on the latters’ subjectivism and relativism; Plato’s and Aristotle’s disagreements 
on Forms (universals); and the debates over skepticism (usually also presup-
posing metaphysical realism, however). Generally, from these very old discus-
sions, it is a long way to go to the modern problem framework of realism. Still, 
Plato’s refutation of Protagoras’s relativistic view that ‘man is the measure’ of all 
things (anthropos metron, homo mensura) is a standard reference in discussions 
of relativism even today. It also resurfaces in the pragmatist tradition through 
F.C.S. Schiller’s ‘humanism’: according to Schiller, Protagoras’s perspectivalism 
ultimately prevails over Plato’s realism.4
Second milestone: the medieval realism vs. nominalism dispute. While 
Plato and Aristotle, though disagreeing about the independent existence of 
Forms, were both realists about universals, nominalism becomes, as is well 
known, a genuine option in the late Middle Ages, through the work of Duns 
Scotus and especially William Occam. According to Occam’s Razor, we should 
avoid postulating explanatorily unnecessary entities, and universals were, for 
medieval nominalists, the prime example of such postulations. This has dra-
matic consequences for a number of other philosophical topics and issues, 
including the emergence of modern individualism. However, although the 
nominalist rejects the mind-independent reality of universals, endorsing the 
existence of particulars merely, those particulars are still usually regarded as 
mind- and conceptualization-independent entities. In this sense, nominalists 
are still metaphysical realists, believing that the world’s ‘own’ structure is such 
that it lacks a general structure (universals) but contains only particulars.
Third milestone: early modern philosophy. Metaphysical (or what Kant 
called ‘transcendental’) realism is the common presupposition of the real-
ism discussions in early modern philosophy, shared by very different think-
ers before Kant’s critical philosophy (e.g., Hobbes, Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, 
Hume, Spinoza, and Leibniz). However, new aspects of the problem of realism 
arise during the early modern period. Most importantly, the problem of the 
existence of a mind-independent reality, posed from the perspective of skep-
tical challenges, becomes urgent largely thanks to René Descartes and David 
Hume (although this problem does have its historical background already in 
ancient skepticism). In addition, nominalism and extreme subjective idealism 
(phenomenalism) are now combined in George Berkeley’s doctrine of esse est 
percipi. Still, it must be observed that a Berkeleyan idealist is a transcendental 
realist in Kant’s sense. Indeed, Berkeley’s phenomenalism is, from a Kantian 
perspective, a splendid example of a case in which transcendental realism leads 
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to ‘empirical idealism’. The basic distinction to be later emphasized by Kant, the 
one between things in themselves and appearances, is not yet made by any of 
the early modern thinkers—not, at least, in its Kantian and post-Kantian sense. 
Without this distinction, the problem of realism can hardly be posed in its truly 
modern sense.
Fourth milestone: Kant. It is only with Kant that we finally arrive at the real-
ism issue in (roughly) its contemporary shape. Kant is, then, the key figure of 
the development of the problem of realism (at least according to the pragmatist 
picture I am proposing). Here we can only briefly pay attention to some of the 
most central aspects of his views on this matter.
The distinction between transcendental idealism and transcendental real-
ism—closely related to the dispute over ‘one world’ and ‘two worlds’ concep-
tions of the distinction between things in themselves and appearances, as dis-
cussed by recent commentators (e.g., Allison 2004)—is undoubtedly Kant’s 
most important contribution to the development of the realism issue. Kant 
sought to rescue empirical realism within his transcendental idealism. Accord-
ing to Kant, we can only successfully be realists if we acknowledge that the 
basic spatio-temporal and categorial structure of the world is imposed by the 
subject—by us—and does not exist as ‘ready-made’ in the world an sich. Yet, 
empirical objects and events, Kant’s appearances, are real—not fictitious or 
merely imagined. Appearances are cognitively accessible to us in experience. 
So, realism is possible within a transcendental conception of the ‘ideal’ nature 
of space and time (as forms of pure intuition) and of the categories, i.e., the 
pure concepts of the understanding. This combination of realism and idealism 
sets the stage for later attempts to ‘save’ realism within a somewhat different 
kind of idealism (e.g., pragmatism or constructivism). I will in the second half 
of the present chapter explain more fully what this pragmatist rearticulation of 
Kantian idealism may look like.
In addition to reconceptualizing realism through transcendental philoso-
phy, Kant reinterpreted the very nature of metaphysics: this traditional philo-
sophical discipline is now to be understood as examining the necessary struc-
ture of our thought about reality, instead of examining (per impossibile) the 
structure of reality ‘in itself ’, thus (re-)entangling metaphysics and epistemol-
ogy (and, possibly, even ethics). In such Kantian metaphysics, there is no room 
for metaphysical realism presupposing the world’s ‘own’ ontological structure. 
Ontological categorization is up to us instead of being up to the world in itself. 
Whatever realism can be defended must, again, be subordinated to a criti-
cal transcendental theory of our human epistemic standpoint. Ontology, even 
realistic ontology, ceases to be epistemologically neutral or non-epistemic; 
rather, ontology (metaphysics) is possible only within a critical examination 
of our epistemic perspectives.
Fifth milestone: classical pragmatism. In the post-Kantian and post-Hege-
lian situation of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the classical 
pragmatists Peirce, James, and Dewey made further significant contributions to 
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the realism debate. What makes pragmatism ‘post-Kantian’ is not just the time of 
its historical appearance but also its tendency to place any humanly possible and 
meaningful pursuit of metaphysics, or ontology, in an epistemological context.
Peirce’s pragmatism includes a severe critique of nominalism, integrated with 
a vigorous defense of ‘extreme scholastic realism’ and ‘real generals’, as well as 
an early version of scientific realism (understanding the advancement of sci-
ence as a progress toward the truth, or toward the ‘final opinion’ of an idealized 
community of rational inquirers); yet, this realism is developed in connection 
with a kind of idealism: the world is not an unknowable Ding an sich but cog-
nitively accessible, that is, within the reach of rational inquiry. According to 
James’s more ‘humanistic’ pragmatism, we ‘carve up’ reality on the basis of our 
needs and interests; there is no ready-made world but only a humanly struc-
tured world. This position is most naturally interpreted as a naturalized ver-
sion of transcendental idealism, James’s distaste for Kant’s heavy vocabulary 
and aprioristic methodology notwithstanding. For Dewey, finally, the objects 
of knowledge do not exist ready-made prior to inquiry but are constructed 
through the process of inquiry; yet, this construction is a natural process tak-
ing place in the fully natural world. Dewey combines Peirce’s interest in the 
scientific method of inquiry with James’s ideas of our active ‘shaping’ of reality 
into a humanly intelligible structure.
The pragmatist tradition—if a possibly somewhat overhasty generalization is 
allowed here—is generally characterized by a deep but fruitful tension between 
realism and idealism, connected with the tension between realism and nomi-
nalism. James and Dewey are more nominalistically oriented compared to the 
strongly realist Peirce, who is an idealist of his kind, however. None of these 
philosophers embraced any simple form of idealism or constructivism, but 
none of them was a naïve realist either, though all of them were some kind of 
naturalists. This desire to integrate a plurality of relevant perspectives on the 
realism issue is what makes pragmatism particularly relevant here. We will see 
toward the end of this chapter how the pragmatist insights into the realism issue 
could be further developed (and how their interesting developments require us 
to take seriously their Kantian background). The search for pragmatic realism, 
a critical middle path between extreme views along the scale of realism vs. anti-
realism, is characteristic of the classical pragmatists’ struggles with the realism 
issue(s), and its complexity and perspectivalness are something it shares with 
Kantian transcendental idealism.5
Sixth milestone: 20th century philosophy of science and scientific realism. 
The issue of scientific realism became urgent in twentieth century philosophy of 
science, especially after the demise of logical positivism. Leading thinkers like 
Karl Popper, J.J.C. Smart, and Wilfrid Sellars defended realism in the 1960s, 
whereas radical new philosophers of science like Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyer-
abend criticized realism (and positivism), ending up with a kind of constructiv-
ism that again bears a striking resemblance to Kantian transcendental idealism 
(and arguably Jamesian pragmatism). These debates prepared the ground for 
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‘post-analytic’ neopragmatists’, especially Hilary Putnam’s and Richard Rorty’s, 
contributions. Several more or less independent, yet related, issues can be dis-
tinguished in this complex development, which is highly relevant to the philoso-
phy of religion, too, while primarily placed within the philosophy of science.
Scientific realism can, first, be contrasted with instrumentalism. In addition 
to the logical positivists of the earlier half of the twentieth century, Quine’s 
empiricism, as well as the more recent versions of empiricist philosophy of 
science, including Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism, are perhaps the 
most relevant points of reference here. In this controversy, the crucial issue is 
whether scientific theories have truth values, whether they can be said to be 
true or false also about the unobservable world, and whether (if their truth-
valued nature is acknowledged) we have any reasons to believe any theories 
to actually be true. The realist usually answers these questions affirmatively.6 
However, scientific realism also contrasts with (Kuhnian, neo-Kantian) con-
structivism. Here the main issue is whether scientific theories are true or false 
about a mind- and theory-independent world or whether the world they are 
‘about’ is somehow ‘constructed’ (or constituted, shaped, carved up, etc.) in 
and through scientific inquiry. Parallels to the Jamesian–Deweyan pragma-
tist ideas introduced above can easily be found here.7 The opposition between 
metaphysical and internal realism, as formulated by Putnam in the 1980s, does 
not, however, simply reduce to the controversy over realism and constructiv-
ism, because here a connection to the realism vs. nominalism dispute must 
also be observed; indeed, Ian Hacking (1983) plausibly characterized Putnam’s 
internal realism as ‘transcendental nominalism’. On the other hand, as internal 
realism allows multiple ‘correct’ ontological structures, it would be arbitrary to 
restrict these to nominalistic ones merely. As Putnam’s position is (primarily) 
pragmatist, the different ontological ‘structurings’ of reality are evaluated on 
the basis of their human (in a broad sense, practical) relevance.
More metaphilosophically, there is an opposition between those who take 
seriously the problem of realism and those more ‘quietist’ or antirepresenta-
tionalist thinkers (e.g., Rorty, Fine, some Wittgensteinian philosophers, per-
haps Quine) that would rather give up, or deconstruct, the entire realism issue. 
In twentieth century philosophy, one may, in addition, perceive a turning to 
‘local’ problems of realism in different fields, e.g., metaethics, philosophy of 
biology, philosophy of religion, etc. The sixth milestone in the development of 
the realism issue is thus ambivalent between novel perspectives on the issue 
itself and critical perspectives skeptical of that very issue, at least as a ‘global’ 
philosophical problem.
Seventh milestone: Kantian pragmatism. The final, seventh, milestone in 
this development is the reintegration of the Kantian and the pragmatist per-
spectives on the realism issue. This is something that can only arise through 
the post-analytic neopragmatist contributions to the realism debate. Hence, it 
might even be described as a post-Putnamian phase in this dispute. Thus: back 
to Kant, but through the classical pragmatists!
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We must, if we have arrived at this seventh milestone, instead of being satis-
fied with either Kant’s transcendental idealism or (classical or contemporary) 
pragmatism as such, interpret pragmatism itself transcendentally, and thereby 
also ‘naturalize’ Kantian transcendental idealism. A reinterpretation of Peircean 
realism about ‘generals’ will also fall into its place as a natural element of such 
a reconceptualization of the entire realism issue (cf., e.g., Pihlström 2003, 2009: 
chapter 6). Finally, the Kantian-pragmatic perspective on realism also enables 
us to avoid the radical postmodern, deconstructive, quietist, or ‘minimalist’ 
metaphilosophical proposals, according to which the entire issue of realism is 
‘dead’. This is a genuine philosophical issue, and has been since antiquity, with a 
number of different forms and variations, to be constructively (and reconstruc-
tively) debated further in contemporary philosophy.
In the latter half of this chapter, I want to suggest one way of integrating Kan-
tian and pragmatist perspectives into a (hopefully) novel account of realism. It 
is right here that we should move on to what I call the contextuality of scheme 
(in)dependence—an inescapably Kantian notion that I will try to illuminate in 
an irreducibly pragmatist way.
Contextuality 
One way of reviewing the developments that have been very briefly sketched 
in the first section of this chapter is to note that several thinkers in the cen-
tral traditions of modern philosophy, including the pragmatist tradition, have 
argued that the existence and/or identity of things (entities, facts, or whatever 
there is taken to be in the world) is in a way or another relative to, or depend-
ent on, the human mind, linguistic frameworks, conceptual schemes, practices, 
language games, forms of life, paradigms, points of view, or something similar. 
This relativity or dependence is seen as crucial in overcoming standard forms 
of metaphysical realism, as well as scientific realism.
Among the historically influential defenders of key variations of this ‘depend-
ence thesis’, as we will now call it—starting already from the pre-history of prag-
matism, including figures only marginally involved in pragmatism, and end-
ing up with relatively recent neopragmatism—are, for instance, the following 
twelve major thinkers (not to be commented on here in any scholarly detail):
• Kant: the empirical world is constituted by the transcendental faculties of 
the human mind, i.e., the forms of intuition and the categories;
• James: whatever we may call a ‘thing’ depends on our purposes and selec-
tive interests;
• Schiller: we ‘humanistically’ construct the world and all truths about it 
within our purposive practices;
• Dewey: the objects of inquiry are constructed in and through inquiry, 
instead of existing as ‘ready-made’ prior to inquiry;
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• Carnap: ontological questions about whether there are certain kinds of enti-
ties can only be settled within linguistic frameworks, ‘internally’, whereas 
‘external’ questions concern the pragmatic criteria for choosing one or 
another linguistic framework;
• Quine: ontology is not absolute but relative to a theory, language, or transla-
tion scheme;
• Wittgenstein: the ‘essence’ of things lies in ‘grammar’, thus in the language 
games we engage in, instead of transcending our language use and form of 
life;
• Putnam: there is no ‘ready-made world’ but only scheme-internal objects 
and properties;
• Goodman: we ‘make worlds’, or ‘world versions’, by employing our various 
symbol systems;
• Kuhn: different scientific paradigms constitute different ‘worlds’;
• Rorty: our ‘vocabularies’ constitute the ways the world is for us, and we 
must ‘ethnocentrically’ start from within the vocabularies we contingently 
possess;
• (possibly) Sellars: the best-explaining scientific theories are the ‘measure’ of 
what there is and what there is not.8
In their distinctive ways, these and many other thinkers have suggested, against 
strong(er) realists, that there is no absolute world an sich that we could mean-
ingfully conceptualize or cognize; if there is a world ‘in itself ’ at all, as Kant held, 
it is a mere limit of our thought and experience, a problematic Grenzbegriff. 
What there is for us (für uns) is a world we have constructed, and are con-
tinuously constructing, relative to our schemes of categorization and inquiry. 
Pragmatists, however, generally follow—or at least should follow—Kant in 
embracing something like empirical realism (and naturalism) within a broader 
pragmatist framework comparable to Kantian transcendental idealism, as we 
have seen. The pragmatist who has reached our ‘seventh milestone’ will not, 
as should be clear by now, simply opt for antirealism or radical constructiv-
ism and relativism in ontology but, rather, seek a moderate pragmatic realism 
compatible with non-reductive naturalism. The problem is how to combine the 
(transcendental) scheme dependence of entities9 with their pragmatic scheme 
independence (at the empirical level) in pragmatist metaphysics.10
This is, essentially, the pragmatist version of the Kantian problem of main-
taining both empirical realism and transcendental idealism—both the empiri-
cal independence of things and their transcendental dependence on the ways 
we construct them through our various schemes. For Kant, the hero of our 
‘fourth milestone’, spatio-temporal objects in the empirical world are ‘outside 
us’ (ausser uns) and in this sense exist empirically speaking independently of 
minds or schemes. Nevertheless, they are transcendentally dependent on us, 
because the spatio-temporal and categorial framework making them possible 
as objects of experience (appearances) arises from our cognitive faculties, i.e., 
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sensibility and understanding. Replace the latter with human cognitive and 
conceptualizing practices, and you have the pragmatist issue of ontological (in-)
dependence, an issue importantly characterizing the seventh milestone of the 
development of realism.
Now, the main proposal of the remainder of this chapter, one I hope could 
be attractive to pragmatist epistemologists and metaphysicians in particular 
(though not only to them), is that one promising way of dealing with the real-
ism issue, as explicated above, is by contextualizing the distinction between 
scheme-dependent and scheme-independent entities.11 Nothing is absolutely 
scheme (in)dependent but is dependent or independent only in a given con-
text, or from a specific perspective, rather than from an imagined God’s-Eye 
View. Thus, pragmatists should not deny the scheme-dependence vs. scheme-
independence distinction (understood as contextualizable) but only the cor-
responding dichotomy or dualism (understood as absolute, non-perspectival, 
uncontextualizable).12 One may, in other words, maintain the former by rede-
scribing it through practice-relative contextualization.
However, the contexts (or perspectives) invoked here are also themselves 
‘entities’ that need to be contextualized in order to be identifiable as contexts 
at all. A context C is ‘real’, and contextualizes the scheme (in)dependence of 
certain entities (a, b), only within a further context C’, and so on (in princi-
ple ad infinitum). For pragmatists, not even the contextualization—and, hence, 
the contextual validation—of the distinction between scheme dependence 
and scheme independence can be a non-contextual or absolute (or absolutely 
scheme-independent) matter. It is, rather, in and through our practice-laden 
schemes, which describe the contexts we are able to work within in given situ-
ations, that we determine the contexts within which things can be scheme-
dependent or scheme-independent for us. This process of contextualization 
is indefinitely long, as any reflexive process potentially is. The ‘situations’ we 
are ‘in’, giving rise to certain contexts of thought and inquiry, can themselves, 
again, be only contextually identified as such.13 Moreover, ‘we’ are whatever we 
are only in certain contexts we find ourselves in. I am not even assuming that 
‘we’ ourselves, though we in a sense construct experienceable reality, or reali-
ties, through our contexts, would have a context-independent identity—even 
though the contexts we may be in depend on us and thus on our contextually 
emerging identities.
The contextualization I am trying to articulate amounts to a kind of prag-
matic ‘naturalization’ of Kantian transcendental idealism (cf. Pihlström 2003, 
2008a, 2009). Therefore, it is possible only after the ‘seventh milestone’ has been 
reached. Given the kind of creatures we (context embeddedly) are, we are fully 
naturally situated within context-dependent and context-creating practices 
(or what Wittgenstein called ‘forms of life’) that constitute (again contextual) 
quasi-transcendental conditions for the possibility of various things we assume 
to be actual in our lives, such as cognitive experience or meaningful language. 
These practices contain ‘relative a priori’ conditions that structure our ways of 
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experiencing reality, that is, contextualized transcendental conditions for cer-
tain given human actualities. The key observation here is that this pragmatic, 
naturalized view is still transcendentally idealistic in the sense of emphasiz-
ing the Kantian-like constitutive role played by our natural practices of coping 
with the world, that is, in the sense of acknowledging the dependence of not 
just social reality but even the natural, worldly objects surrounding us on our 
specifically human, context-laden ways of conceptualizing, experiencing, and 
representing them from standpoints lying within our practices, or within con-
textually situated points of view embedded in those practices.
However, Kantian transcendental mind dependence or scheme dependence 
must not, as Robert Hanna (2001: 104) points out, be understood as depend-
ence on human biology or dependence on social consensus, but instead as the 
dependence of the empirical world ‘on the existence of the special finite sen-
sory, discursive, and rational cognitive architecture that defines us as minded 
creatures’—that is, on the existence of the special kind of cognitive practices 
we human beings naturally engage in, practices providing us with the relevant 
contexts for constituting whatever entities there are, or can be, in a world 
experienceable by us.14 Thus, I want to propose a profound analogy between 
Kantian transcendental structures and the inevitable pragmatic contextuality 
of any ontological postulations we are capable of. The fact that our ontologies 
are contextual—scheme-dependent—and the further fact that the distinctions 
between scheme independence and dependence are always inevitably contex-
tual as well are transcendentally necessary presuppositions of our conceptual 
scheming. They cannot be further grounded or metaphysically explained by 
anything more fundamental—that is, with reference to anything non-contex-
tual. Even this fact about the contextuality of the fact that the scheme-inde-
pendence vs. scheme-dependence distinction is contextual is itself contextual, 
and so on, ad infinitum. 
My picture of the contextuality of whatever there is, and the contextuality of 
drawing the distinction between what there is scheme dependently and scheme 
independently, is undeniably circular, but hardly viciously so. Our world-con-
stituting, contextual activity is both transcendental and empirical, both con-
stitutive of the world and part of it. It is this circularity, or these double per-
spectives, inherently present in any genuinely transcendental analysis of world 
constitutivity that prevents my pragmatic, naturalized version of transcenden-
tal idealism from collapsing into a full-blown metaphysical idealism. The fact 
that there is such world-constitutive activity at all is, again, itself contextual, but 
there is nothing more fundamental than that (endless) contextuality itself that 
can ground this analysis of the transcendental features of our world-constitutive 
activities—features that are themselves only relatively a priori and constitutive.
A critic, for instance, a Deweyan pragmatic naturalist, might ask why we 
should employ the Kantian vocabulary of the ‘transcendental’ here at all.15 
Instead, the naturalistic requirement that our practice-embedded, contextual 
ways of experiencing and categorizing reality should be seen as fully natural 
The Pragmatic Contextuality of  Scheme (In)Dependence 39
may lead us to think that the pragmatically contextualist position I am sketch-
ing is closer to, say, evolutionary epistemology or other forms of naturalized 
epistemology—or even relativism or epistemological anarchism, as captured in 
Paul Feyerabend’s (1993 [1975]) famous slogan, ‘Anything goes’—than anything 
like the Kantian transcendental critique of reason with its fixed and unchange-
able categories. True, the pragmatist (or pragmatic contextualist) must give up 
the universalistic element of Kant’s transcendental philosophy: human experi-
ence and our ontological categorizations of reality lack the universal, immuta-
ble, and acontextual (non-relativized) structures that Kant saw as necessarily 
governing humanly possible experience. Whatever necessity there may be in 
our world structuring, it is itself inevitably contextual, hence only relatively 
a priori.16
Certainly Kant himself did not endorse any pragmatic contextualism (or plu-
ralism) like this. However, a touch of Kantian transcendentality is maintained 
here—after the ‘seventh milestone’—because it is only within a given context 
that we are so much as able to experience or categorize reality in any mean-
ingful manner. It is, thus, only within one or another such practice-embedded 
context that the world can be for us in any determinate way. There is a plural-
ity of such contexts, and they may also change along with natural changes in 
our practices (or, in Wittgensteinian terms again, along with changes in our 
forms of life), but such changes can also be more or less rationally discussed 
and critically examined, albeit again only contextually, never from any absolute 
perspective supposedly provided by some kind of super-practice.
Accordingly, no Feyerabendian anarchism or radical relativism follows from 
pragmatic contextualism. Nor is our contextual world-categorizing reduced 
to the mere evolutionary survival of the ‘fittest’ schemes or vocabularies. Our 
schemes and contexts do evolve in the course of human history, but their evolv-
ing is much more than the mere biological development of our perceptual and 
classificatory capacities, and much more than the replacement of a worn-out 
‘vocabulary’ by a new one.17 The pragmatic contextualist, while endorsing natu-
ralism, must bear in mind that any human world categorization is a culturally 
transmitted, self-reflective habit of action, and that continuous critical reflec-
tion, at a normative level, on how such categorization ought to be further devel-
oped (within relevant contexts) is part and parcel of that categorization itself. 
This would be an illustrative pragmatist case of fostering the habit of critically 
reflecting on and transforming one’s habits.18
This leads us to a very important observation on the relations between the 
two dimensions of the problem of realism that were emphasized above. While 
the contextuality thesis is perhaps primarily an attempt to steer a middle course 
between realism and idealism by proposing a pragmatist variant of Kantian 
transcendental idealism, it is crucial to notice its connections with the realism 
vs. nominalism issue as well. Contextuality is generality; thus, even though I 
somewhat metaphorically called contexts ‘entities’, they are certainly not par-
ticulars. Instead, they are what enable us to ontologically individuate particulars 
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(and also other kinds of entity—that is, to engage in ontological categorization 
at all). In particular, when contextuality and contextualization are examined 
in close relation to the Peircean (and generally pragmatist) notion of habits of 
action, the link to Peircean realism about generality should be obvious. Again, 
I do not wish to interpret this form of realism in a metaphysically realistic man-
ner; yet, when subordinated to the kind of transcendental pragmatism19 I am 
generally proposing as the framework of this entire inquiry, Peircean ‘real gen-
erals’, including contexts, can definitely be ontologically postulated—though, 
again, only contextually.
Fact and value
Let us briefly discuss an application of these issues to a special case, the fact-
value entanglement. Fact and value, according to both classical (e.g., James’s 
and Dewey’s) and more recent (e.g., Putnam’s) pragmatism, are deeply entan-
gled. As James (1958 [1902]: 53) put it, values ‘form the background for all our 
facts, the fountain-head of all the possibilities we conceive of ’.20 Values, then, 
obviously re-emerge in the realism discussion after our ‘seventh milestone’, 
while in a sense they were never really absent from it; after all, the earliest for-
mulations of realism in antiquity were based on Plato’s theory of Forms, with 
the Form of the Good as the highest conceivable reality whose ‘light’ emanates 
to everything there is. When later philosophers, including pragmatists, main-
tain that there really are no value-independent facts or objects at all, they are, 
then, in a good company.
One of Putnam’s (e.g., 1990) central arguments for the fact-value entangle-
ment and the related picture of moral objectivity he defends is a kind of indis-
pensability argument. Putnam points out that objective, action-guiding moral 
values (that is, values that are no more subjective than facts) should not—pace 
moral skeptics, radical relativists, and ‘error theorists’ like Mackie—be regarded 
as ontologically ‘queer’ objects difficult to locate in the natural-scientific picture 
of the universe. Were values queer, all normative notions, including the ones 
we assume when defending the scientific conception of the world that Mackie 
and other critics of objective values regard as ontologically superior to ethical, 
value-laden conceptions, would be equally suspect. We would have no ‘empiri-
cal world’ at all as the object of our (scientific and non-scientific) descriptions, 
if we did not subscribe to the objectivity of at least some values. In order to have 
a coherent concept of a fact, Putnam believes, we must invoke values. The ways 
we discuss factual matters reveal and presuppose our entire system of value 
commitments; values are, in this sense, indispensable in all of our dealings with 
the world.
If this reasoning is plausible, there is no coherent way to deny the normative, 
action-guiding role played by the notions of rational acceptability, warrant, jus-
tification, and the like, and if such notions are allowed in our scientific con-
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ceptual scheme(s)—or contexts—then there is no clear motivation for exclud-
ing moral values. However, far from being located in any transcendent realm 
beyond the natural and social reality familiar to us, values are, according to Put-
nam’s pragmatism, entangled with the ordinary, natural facts we find ourselves 
embedded in.21 The pragmatist, in any event, questions the scientistic tendency 
to regard virtually everything non-scientific as ontologically and epistemically 
‘queer’. In short, a truly pragmatic naturalism must be non-reductive, preserv-
ing the natural features of our human world, including full-blown normativity. 
There is, then, no reason to see the pragmatist’s defense of the objectivity of 
moral values as non-naturalistic; on the contrary, we need to rethink our very 
idea of naturalism and accommodate distinctively human activities, including 
valuation, within nature, just as Dewey—the paradigmatic pragmatic natural-
ist—did in his thoroughgoing antireductionism about nature and experience 
(cf. Dewey 1986 [1929]).
Furthermore, drawing attention to the contingent actualities defining our 
practices of ethical evaluation, Putnam argues that as soon as that practical 
context is adequately taken into account, as any pragmatist should, there is no 
room for an artificial philosophical dichotomy between factual and evaluative 
discourse—nor, consequently, for a reductively naturalist or physicalist picture 
of reality that takes only scientifically established facts seriously and disregards 
values as ‘queer’ (cf. Mackie 1977). The human world is ‘messy’: if there is any 
fact/value distinction at all, it is inevitably fuzzy and contextual (cf. Putnam 
2002, 2004; Pihlström 2005a). Yet, on the basis of what was said above about the 
contextuality of the scheme-dependence vs. scheme-independence distinction, 
we may now argue that fact and value are also contextually distinguishable—
but only in contexts that specify criteria for distinguishing them. Hence, our 
ways of distinguishing between them, contextually, are themselves value-laden, 
dependent on further contexts, i.e., valuational schemes.
Fact and value, therefore, are not absolutely distinguishable, or distinct from 
a transcendent perspective (which we lack). Their entanglement, we may say, is 
a further pragmatic transcendental condition for our being able to experience, 
categorize, and represent the (only contextually identifiable) entities that we 
postulate in the world around us. The fact that our world is deeply structured 
by values is, again, constitutive of our being able to experience reality (facts) at 
all. While being, again, far removed from Kant’s original transcendental theory 
of the necessary conditions for possible experience, it plays an analogous role 
in setting up and constraining the framework(s) that are needed for the kind 
of human world-categorization we are familiar with to be so much as possible.
In Philosophy as Cultural Politics, the last collection of essays published in 
his lifetime, Rorty suggested that ‘cultural politics’ should replace systematic 
philosophical questions of ontology and epistemology. No serious pragmatist 
should in my view endorse this reductive view of philosophy, but an analogy 
to the present discussion ought to be acknowledged. Just as Rorty notes that 
the question of how exactly the relation between ontology and cultural politics 
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ought to be construed is itself a cultural-political question (Rorty 2007: 5), we 
may suggest that the question of how exactly the fact-value entanglement and/
or distinguishability ought to be settled is itself a question that can only be 
adequately discussed within a valuational context. The specific ways of draw-
ing this distinction or avoiding it are themselves dependent on our values. It is, 
therefore, always already a valuational issue whether there are, and in which 
contexts, any purely factual issues to be distinguished from valuational ones. 
Even to claim that there are is a valuationally relevant move—and this definitely 
is a move we should make in certain humanly valuable contexts.
Once again, we must very carefully pay attention to the ways in which all this 
connects with the realism vs. nominalism issue. I suggested above that con-
texts should be understood as Peircean ‘real generals’ (themselves postulated 
only contextually), and now the same suggestion can be made about values and 
valuational (or value-laden) schemes, which themselves function as contexts 
for ontological postulations of facts (or of anything). No pragmatist should 
mischaracterize the ontological status of values in terms of particularity; values 
are no ordinary—or extraordinary—‘things’ that would be located in a queer 
transcendent realm of Platonic objects. They can be described as things or enti-
ties only in our extremely broad sense of these notions. Better, they are, once 
more, contextual schemes enabling us to so much as engage in ontological cat-
egorization; hence, they have a Peircean-like nature of generality.
An infinite regress?
Does the view I have described and recommended as an explication of the sev-
enth milestone of our historical development lead to an infinite regress? This is 
a serious question, but upon careful reflection I believe it should be answered 
negatively. Rather, the result is just a potentially indefinite reflexive inquiry into 
the ways in which we draw and use distinctions in the contexts we continuously 
construct for ourselves. What our contexts are is, again, itself a contextual mat-
ter. In this sense, pragmatic contextualism—the version of pragmatism I have 
tried to tentatively develop in this chapter—is a version of Kantian transcen-
dental idealism, without sacrificing empirical (scheme-internal) realism any 
more dangerously than Kant himself did. Alternatively, this might be regarded 
as a form of Putnam’s internal realism, albeit one not committed to the notori-
ous epistemic ‘idealization’ theory of truth that Putnam still maintained in his 
internal realist period.22
However, we need to consider the metaphilosophical status of our contex-
tuality thesis. It can hardly be regarded as an empirical, factual, and contin-
gent truth about the ways things happen to be in the world. Nor can it be an 
absolute, non-contextual truth in the sense of supposed metaphysical truths 
traditionally put forward in the history of philosophy. It would also be hard 
to believe that it could be a conceptually necessary truth, or necessary in the 
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way in which, say, logical and mathematical truths are necessary (whatever we 
ultimately mean by the necessity of logic or mathematics). Pragmatic contextu-
alism should somehow combine (relative) necessity, in a quasi-transcendental 
sense, with non-absoluteness and reflexive contextuality. What we have here 
is only necessity in a context (see also Chapter 5 below), relativized to certain 
practice-embedded inquiries and uses of concepts, certain practice- and value-
laden ways of viewing the world (ways that are themselves habitual ‘generals’ 
in the relevant Peircean sense). Pragmatic contextualism is a truth—or at least 
a reasonable philosophical conviction—emerging from our continuous critical 
reflections on our use of concepts to structure the world.23 If it is ‘made true’ by 
anything, it is made true by our contextualizing inquiries into the very contex-
tuality of ontology, not by anything ‘ready-made’ in the world itself taken to be 
independent of contexts.24
The metaphilosophical status of the contextuality thesis might be compared 
to the status of such controversial philosophical theses as the Wittgensteinian 
one about the impossibility of a private language. Just as we may see Wittgen-
stein as arguing25 that, necessarily, language is a public human phenomenon, 
insofar as there can be any linguistic meaning at all, we may see the pragmatic 
contextualist as arguing that, necessarily, any entities there can be for us are 
identified within, and hence exist—as the kind of entities they are—only rela-
tive to one or another context of categorization and inquiry. Like the Wittgen-
steinian impossibility of a private language (or, say, the impossibility of disem-
bodied agency, also sometimes transcendentally defended, for instance in the 
phenomenological tradition),26 the impossibility of non-contextual identifica-
tion of objects, or of any absolute scheme independence, is a transcendental 
necessity, yet again a contextual and pragmatic one, itself depending on the 
kind of beings we are (according to the schemes or contexts that we contin-
gently, revisably, and fallibly employ), thus a necessity only in a relativized and 
not an absolute sense.
So are its specific versions, such as the fact-value entanglement: valuation 
provides one central context within which things and facts may be real for us—
or, better, different valuational schemes provide different contexts for identi-
fying things and their relations to each other—and it is (humanly speaking, 
contextually) necessary that all facts are value-laden. That is, the Putnamian 
thesis of the fact-value entanglement is not just a thesis about the ways things 
contingently are in the world; it is not just a thesis according to which fact 
and value happen to be entangled. Rather, it is a pragmatic transcendental, and 
therefore metaphysico-epistemological, thesis about the ways things necessar-
ily are for us. Without a valuational context, there could be no things—and 
no facts—at all for us. As always, a transcendental philosophical claim, how-
ever pragmatic, here expresses a conditional necessity: something (valuational 
schemes) is regarded as a necessary condition for the very possibility of some-
thing else we take for granted (in this case, there being factual things and states 
of affairs identifiable by us).
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Contextuality, furthermore, is a kind of contingency: the way the depend-
ence vs. independence distinction is drawn depends on the context we are 
working in, and our occupying a certain context is at least to some extent 
a contingent matter. However, this contingency, I have argued, is (transcen-
dentally) necessary—just like, for instance, the facts that any meaningful lan-
guage is public (as Wittgenstein reminds us) or that human cognition and 
consciousness are embodied (as phenomenologists like Maurice Merleau-
Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre, as well as more recent thinkers like Charles Taylor 
[1995] have argued). Moreover, this necessity is itself contingent at a meta-
level: these transcendental reflections are valid only within a human world, 
our ‘form of life’ (see further Chapter 5). Whether this meta-level contingency 
is itself in some sense necessary, or necessarily contingent, I must leave for 
others to reflect upon.
What these reflexive reflections indicate, in any case, is that an adequate 
investigation of the prospects of pragmatic realism, of any pragmatist theory 
of the contextuality of scheme (in)dependence, and hence of the empirical 
vs. transcendental distinction that I relied on above (and its contextuality), 
requires a dynamic integration of pragmatic and transcendental approaches.27 
More specific problems concerning, say, the fact-value entanglement—for 
example, whether this intertwinement is best understood as a matter of, say, 
emergence or, perhaps, Peircean synechistic continuity itself intelligible only in 
terms of real generality28—can fruitfully be posed (perhaps only) against such a 
background. Indeed, specific investigations of, say, the different versions of the 
contextualization thesis based upon different ontological dependence relations 
are needed.29
My main argument for the contextualizing maneuver I have suggested is, 
though transcendental in the sense of invoking contextualization as a necessary 
condition for the possibility of any ontological postulation and individuation 
we are capable of, also pragmatic (and, hence, itself contextualized into a spe-
cific historical situation in pragmatist philosophical inquiry, after the ‘seventh 
milestone’ identified above, though having broader relevance not restricted 
to pragmatism). This contextualization enables us to maintain both empirical 
realism and the transcendental-level pragmatic construction of entities that I 
take to be deeply analogous to Kantian transcendental idealism. This, I submit, 
is the pragmatic ‘cash value’ of my proposal. Hence, my strategy, I hope, prag-
matically ‘works’.
Subjectivity
It might finally be asked whether the distinction between subject and object, 
or subjectivity and objectivity, can be maintained in any form in the pragmatic 
contextualism I am defending. After all, preserving this distinction might seem 
necessary, as contextualization must presumably be ‘done’ or ‘performed’ by 
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someone—that is, the subject, or perhaps someone or something like Kant’s 
(and other transcendental philosophers’) transcendental ego or transcendental 
subjectivity. Once again, however, we should understand the present pragma-
tist position as softening some of the conceptual boundaries that were taken 
to be rigid and absolute in Kant’s system of transcendental philosophy. Just as 
nothing is, for us, absolutely scheme-independent, but anything can be only 
contextually so, we should also maintain the distinction between subject(ivity) 
and object(ivity) in a context-relative and thus scheme-dependent sense merely. 
Contextualization hence again functions at the meta-level. We do, pragmati-
cally and contextually, need the subject-object distinction (it does have its ‘cash 
value’, too), but we can definitely give it up as a sharp dichotomy, let alone a 
foundationalist principle of metaphysical or epistemological dualism. We must 
occasionally view ourselves as natural objects in the world, but we must also be 
able to switch into another perspective—another context—and view ourselves 
as the very origins of any perspectives or contexts (any kind of ‘world viewing’) 
there may be.
Accordingly, we are never mere objects in nature, but, given the kind of 
beings we naturally are, we are definitely also able to contextualize our own 
ontological status so that we can see ourselves as objects in nature, too. In criti-
cally reflecting and weighing, at a philosophical meta-level, those different con-
texts and their practical purposes we are… well, something like transcendental 
subjects?30 At least we may say that our task of self-reflection—a task both intel-
lectual (epistemic) and ethical—as beings capable of contextual world catego-
rization is endless, or infinitely deep, as we may always open up new critical 
perspectives on the ways we categorize reality, and on the contexts we employ 
for that purpose.
The significance of these reflections for pragmatist philosophy, and for the 
entire post-Kantian literature on the ‘dependence’ of things on the transcen-
dental (yet revisable) schemes and/or perspectives through which we identify 
them, and on our transcendental subjectivity, should be obvious. The prag-
matist tradition contributes to the Kantian tradition precisely by turning the 
dependence and contextuality at issue into something thoroughly pragmatic. 
It thereby also succeeds in turning our inquiries into that dependence or con-
textuality more fully reflexive than the original Kantian transcendental inquiry 
(whose key characteristic already is the reflexivity of reason use). It is (only) in 
and through our contextualizing inquiries themselves that the contextuality of 
any ontological postulations, including our own status as subjects of inquiry 
and contextualizers, as well as the contextuality of the epistemic points of 
departure of this inquiry itself, can be examined. This meta-level insight is pos-
sible only after a digestion of the basic ideas of the Kantian-pragmatic ‘seventh 
milestone’ of the history of realism. However, as we have seen, it also maintains 
a crucial connection to the earlier investigations—to be traced back to the first 
and second milestones—of realism in the sense of realism about universals or 
generals that Peirce greatly admired.
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Thus, I want to once again emphasize the depth of the realism issue. It is 
not just one philosophical puzzle among many. It is, in many areas of phi-
losophy, an absolutely central question that must be taken into account when 
determining what a responsible thinker should say about not only science and 
knowledge but also morality, politics, and religion. It is Kant who made this 
problem possible in its current form; it is the pragmatist tradition that enables 
us to fruitfully work on it further in the contemporary philosophical context. 
As the later chapters will show, the realism issue itself—elaborated on in this 
Kantian-cum-pragmatist spirit—will provide a crucial context for exploring 
key topics in the philosophy of religion, especially the theodicy problem. In 
this chapter I have stayed at an abstract metaphilosophical level and left those 
issues implicit, but it should be obvious that the pragmatic contextualism we 
have reached is relevant, or even indispensable, to the pragmatist elaborations 
of the next chapters.
CHAPTER 3
Pragmatism and Critical Philosophy
According to Dewey’s famous words—toward the end of Experience and 
Nature—philosophy can be characterized as the ‘critical method of develop-
ing methods of criticism’ (Dewey 1986 [1929]: 354). I have already argued in 
Chapter 2 that we should appreciate the way in which pragmatism is indebted 
to, or is even a species of, critical philosophy, perhaps not exactly in Kant’s 
original sense of this term but in a developed sense that still retains something 
from the Kantian idea of criticism, especially the idea of the reflexivity essential 
to human reason use and inquiry. It is through inquiry itself that we can (only) 
hope to shed light on what it means to inquire. Philosophy is an inquiry into 
inquiry, and this is a fundamentally Kantian critical point. ‘Der kritische Weg 
ist allein noch offen’, Kant (1990 [1781/1787]: A856/B884) wrote when con-
cluding his first Critique.
The relationship between Kant and pragmatism can and should be critically 
considered not only in general terms but also through specific instances. In this 
chapter, I will first make some broad remarks on the relevance of Kantian criti-
cal philosophy as a background of pragmatism, moving on to pragmatist phi-
losophy of religion from the rather general metaphilosophical considerations 
of Chapter 2 (cf. also Pihlström 2010a, 2013a). I will then examine the ways 
in which Kantian issues are present in the distinctive way in which James—
at the very core of his development of the pragmatic method, already hinted 
at though not properly discussed in the introduction and Chapter 1—takes 
seriously the reality of evil and suffering, developing a thoroughly ‘antitheodi-
cist’ philosophical outlook. However, I also want to connect this theme with 
another development in more recent neopragmatism that might prima facie be 
taken to be relatively far from any Kantian ideas, namely, Rorty’s ironism, as it 
emerges from his reading of George Orwell’s groundbreaking novel, Nineteen 
Eighty-Four (1949).
I am certainly not claiming Rorty to be a critical philosopher in anything 
like the Kantian sense, but I am confident that even the context of pragma-
tist inquiry within which his liberal ironism is developed owes fundamental 
points of departure to Kantian transcendental philosophy. Finally, I will show 
how a certain worry regarding what might be considered a potential slippery 
slope from James to Rorty arises from the Kantian background of pragmatist 
antitheodicism. We will begin from an overall view of the Kantian roots of 
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what I am calling the ‘pragmatist protest’ and then move on to James’s prag-
matic method and antitheodicism, and finally to Rorty and Orwell—and, 
simultaneously, to the Kantian dimensions of pragmatist inquiry into suf-
fering. In this way, the present chapter will make a gradual transition from 
general pragmatist issues and arguments to more specific examinations of the 
problem of evil and suffering.
Pragmatism and the Kantian postulates
It may be argued that it is, to a significant extent, the Kantian nature of pragma-
tism, as well as the ability of pragmatism to critically reinterpret, transform, and 
further develop some key Kantian ideas, that makes pragmatism a highly rel-
evant philosophical approach today—in, e.g., metaphysical and epistemologi-
cal discussions of realism and idealism, ethics and axiology, the philosophy of 
religion, and many other fields. There are a number of central aspects in which 
pragmatism, early and late, can be regarded as a Kantian philosophy, focusing 
on the nature of metaphysics, the relation between fact and value, and religion. 
James, to be sure, saw philosophical progress as going ‘round’ Kant instead 
of going ‘through’ him. Undeniably, many pragmatists have defended non- or 
even anti-Kantian views regarding various philosophical problems: contrary to 
Kant’s universalism and apriorism, pragmatism tends to emphasize the contin-
gent practice embeddedness of knowledge, morality, and value. However, prag-
matism—even James’s—also shares crucial assumptions with Kant’s critical 
philosophy, to the extent that Murray Murphey (1966) aptly called the classi-
cal Cambridge pragmatists ‘Kant’s children’. Recent scholarship has extensively 
covered the Kantian background of pragmatism and the affinities between 
pragmatism and transcendental philosophical methodology (see, e.g., Gava & 
Stern 2016). In this chapter or even the entire book, we obviously cannot do 
justice to the richness of the question concerning the pragmatists’ relation to 
Kant—either historically or systematically—although the basic Kantian-cum-
pragmatist idea of scheme dependence was already pursued in the previous 
chapter. One may, however, shed light on this topic by exploring this relation 
through the case of pragmatist philosophy of religion and its relation to one of 
the fundamental ideas of Kant’s philosophy of religion, i.e., the postulates of 
practical reason, as well as the more specific case of the theodicy issue.
As is well known, Kant transformed and transcended various controver-
sies and dichotomies of his times, critically synthesizing, e.g., rationalism 
and empiricism, realism and idealism, determinism and freedom, as well as 
nature and morality. Similarly, pragmatism has often been defended as a criti-
cal middle ground option (cf. the introduction above). For James, famously, 
pragmatism mediates between extreme positions, particularly the conflict-
ing temperaments of the ‘tough-minded’ and the ‘tender-minded’. In the 
philosophy of religion, in particular, one may also find Kantian aspects of prag-
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matic approaches in, e.g., the problems of theism vs. atheism and evidentialism 
vs. fideism (see Chapter 1). For virtually no pragmatist can religious faith be 
said to be a strictly evidential issue on a par with scientific hypotheses. Evi-
dence plays only a relatively marginal role in religion, as religion has to do with 
the way in which one understands and relates to one’s life as a whole. According 
to Kant as well as pragmatism, religion must be intimately connected with the 
ethical life. We can pursue moral theology, no theological ethics: religion can-
not be the ground of ethics but must itself be grounded in the requirements of 
morality. One may, then, employ both Kantian and pragmatist insights in order 
to argue that the theism vs. atheism issue is not exhausted by the narrowly 
intellectual (evidentialist) considerations one might advance in favor of either 
theism or atheism. 
Pragmatist philosophy of religion (especially James’s) can be seen as reinter-
preting and further developing Kant’s postulates of practical reason, i.e., the 
freedom of the will, the existence of God, and the immortality of the soul. It is, 
in particular, from the perspective of the pragmatist proposal to (re-)entangle 
ethics and metaphysics that this Kantian topic deserves scrutiny. One may ask 
whether the defense of the postulates in the Dialectics of Kant’s second Critique 
leads to a metaphysical position according to which God exists. Here the prag-
matist may plausibly suggest that Kant’s postulates are, again, both metaphysical 
and ethical—with metaphysical and ethical aspects inextricably intertwined.
Although this is not Kant’s own way of putting the matter, one may say that 
the postulates presuppose that the world is not absolutely independent of 
human perspectives but is responsive to human ethical (or more generally val-
uational) needs and interests, or (in a Jamesian phrase) ‘in the making’ through 
such needs and interests. Human beings structure reality, including any pos-
sible religious reality, partly in terms of what their commitment to morality 
requires; there is no pre-structured, ‘ready-made’ world that could be mean-
ingfully engaged with. It remains an open question whether, or to what extent, 
this structuring is really metaphysical. Some interpreters prefer a purely ethical, 
‘merely pragmatic’, account of the Kantian postulates. Is there ‘really’ a God, or 
is one just entitled to act ‘as if ’ there were one? This question needs to be pur-
sued by pragmatists as much as Kantians (see also Pihlström 2013a).
Kant constructs his moral argument for the existence of God and the immor-
tality of the soul in the ‘Canon of Pure Reason’ (Kant 1990 [1781/1787]: A795/
B823ff.) and the Dialectics of the second Critique (Kant 1983a [1788]: A223ff.). 
As mere ideas of pure reason (‘transcendental ideas’), the concepts of freedom, 
God, and the soul lack ‘objective reality’. At best, they can be employed regula-
tively, not constitutively. This, however, is only the point of view that theoreti-
cal, speculative reason offers to the matter. From the perspective of practical 
reason—which, famously, is ultimately ‘prior to’ theoretical reason in Kant’s 
system (see ibid.: A215ff.)—there is a kind of ‘reality’ corresponding to these 
concepts. Their epistemic status, when transformed into postulates of practical 
reason, differs from the status of the constitutive, transcendental conditions 
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of any humanly possible experience, i.e., the categories and the forms of pure 
intuition, explored in the ‘Transcendental Analytic’ and the ‘Transcendental 
Aesthetic’ of the first Critique. The latter kind of conditions necessarily struc-
ture, according to Kant, the (or any) humanly cognizable world, that is, any 
objects or events that may be conceivably encountered in experience. However, 
the postulates of practical reason also structure—in an analogical albeit not 
identical manner—the human world as a world of ethical concern, delibera-
tion, and action. Yet, this ‘structuring’, one may argue, is not ‘merely ethical’ but 
also metaphysical. 
From a pragmatist point of view, as much as from the Kantian one, ethics and 
metaphysics are deeply entangled here. Religion, or theism, is pragmatically 
legitimated as a postulate needed for morality, for ethical life and practices. Yet, 
no theological ethics can be accepted; what is needed, according to both Kant 
and pragmatists like James, is moral theology. Any attempt to base ethics on 
theology, or religion, would (in Kantian terms) be an example of heteronomy 
instead of autonomy, but the only critical and rational way to provide a basis for 
theology is the ethical way.
The Kantian pragmatist needs to consider a problem here, though. Is theism 
in the context of this kind of argumentation practically legitimated a priori, 
as it of course is in Kant, or does it receive its legitimation empirically or psy-
chologically, as an attitude ‘energizing’ moral life, because we are the kind of 
beings we are, as in James and perhaps other pragmatists? One possible sugges-
tion is that just as Kantian transcendental (critical) philosophy synthesizes the 
pre-critically opposed epistemological doctrines of empiricism and rational-
ism, and just as pragmatism bridges the gap between facts and values, one may 
try to reconcile Kantian (transcendental) and Jamesian (pragmatist, empirical, 
psychological) ways of justifying theism ethically. The Kantian perspective on 
theism needs pragmatic rearticulation, and the thus rearticulated pragmatic 
aspects of theism are not disconnected from the Kantian transcendental work 
of practical reason. 
It is part of such rearticulation to perceive that Kant’s criticism of theodicies 
as rationalizing, speculative, intellectualistic attempts to provide reasons for 
God’s allowing the world to contain evil and suffering can also be reread from 
the standpoint of pragmatist (especially Jamesian) attacks on theodicies (to be 
soon explored in some more detail). It is not an accident that Kant is the starting 
point for both pragmatist criticisms of metaphysical realism and for pragmatist 
criticisms of theodicies, as both are crucial in the project of critical philosophy 
continued by pragmatism. From the pragmatist as well as Kantian perspective, 
theodicies commit the same mistake as metaphysical realism: they aim at a 
speculative, absolute account (from a ‘God’s-Eye View’) of why an omnipotent, 
omniscient, and absolutely benevolent God allows, or might allow, the world 
to contain apparently unnecessary and meaningless evil and suffering. Kan-
tian critical philosophy denies the possibility of such a transcendent account 
or such metaphysical, speculative truths—and this denial is itself, again, both 
Pragmatism and Critical Philosophy 51
ethical and metaphysical, followed by James’s firm rejection of any theodicies as 
insensitive to the irreducibility of other human beings’ suffering. 
We might even speak about a pragmatist ‘protest’ in the philosophy of reli-
gion, and about its Kantian roots. This is simply because we can see pragma-
tism as protesting against various received views of mainstream philosophy of 
religion today, such as metaphysical realism, evidentialism, and theodicism, all 
of which are typically maintained by leading analytic philosophers of religion—
but also against various tendencies in contemporary ‘postmodern’ or ‘Conti-
nental’ philosophy of religion, such as radical anti-metaphysics, constructiv-
ism, and relativism.
We should study this protest in relation to a special case, the theodicy vs. 
antitheodicy controversy. I want to emphasize that protest needs critique: it 
is one thing to simply abandon some position or protest against it, and quite 
another to base one’s protest on a careful critical analysis and argumentation. 
In the case of critical philosophy, this particularly means self-criticism and self-
discipline.1 The pragmatist version of this idea is the Deweyan view of philoso-
phy as a critical method for developing methods of criticism. In this funda-
mental sense, even Deweyan pragmatists (despite Dewey’s occasionally sharp 
attacks on Kant) continue the Kantian critical project—and this is even more 
clearly so with James, whose antitheodicist protest we will now examine.
The pragmatic method and the reality of evil
To properly set the stage for a pragmatist inquiry into the problem of evil and 
suffering, I will now briefly explore James’s views on the pragmatic method and 
metaphysics, thus elaborating on the kind of Kantian reading of James already 
hinted at earlier. I will then suggest that the problem of evil and suffering plays 
a crucial role in James’s philosophy of religion, metaphysics, and the pragmatic 
method—and it is this problem, in particular, that needs to be examined in 
relation to its Kantian background.
James famously argued that in every genuine metaphysical dispute, some 
practical issue is, however remotely, involved. If there is no such issue involved, 
then the dispute is empty. Jamesian pragmatism is thus here both influenced 
by and in contrast with the Kantian (somewhat proto-pragmatist) idea of the 
‘primacy of practical reason’ in relation to theoretical reason. As we just saw, for 
Kant, the metaphysical ideas of God, freedom, and immortality are only vindi-
cated by the practical, instead of theoretical, use of reason. The Jamesian prag-
matist, however, goes beyond Kant in emphasizing not simply the ‘primacy’ 
of ethics (or practical reason) to metaphysics but their profound inseparabil-
ity and entanglement. Pragmatist inquiries into metaphysical topics, such as 
James’s, lead to the radical claim that metaphysics might not, in the last analy-
sis, even be possible without a relation to ethics: pragmatically analyzed, we 
cannot arrive at any understanding of reality as we humans, being ourselves 
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part of that reality, experience it, without paying due attention to the way in 
which moral valuations and ethical commitments are constitutive of that real-
ity by being ineliminably involved in any engagement with reality possible for 
us. Ethics, then, plays a ‘transcendental’ role constitutive of any metaphysical 
inquiry we may engage in. It is omnipresent in the contexts enabling our use of 
any ontologizing schemes (cf. Chapter 2).
More specifically, ethics seems to function as a ground for evaluating rival 
metaphysical hypotheses and for determining their pragmatic core meaning. 
The (conceivable) practical results the pragmatist metaphysician should look 
for are, primarily, ethical. Examples of such ethical evaluation of metaphysical 
matters can be found in the Jamesian pragmatic search for a critical middle 
path between implausible metaphysical extremes, as discussed in the third lec-
ture of Pragmatism, ‘Some Metaphysical Problems Pragmatically Considered’. 
The topics James there (and in the fourth lecture in which the analysis contin-
ues) considers include debates over substance, determinism vs. freedom, mate-
rialism vs. theism, monism vs. pluralism, and (somewhat indirectly) realism vs. 
nominalism. Some of these metaphysical examples are quite explicitly ethical. 
Such are, for instance, the dispute between determinism and free will, as well 
as the one between materialism and theism, which the philosopher employ-
ing James’s pragmatic method examines from the point of view of what the 
rival metaphysical theories of the world ‘promise’: how does, for instance, the 
conceivable future of the world change if theism, instead of materialism (athe-
ism), is true, or vice versa? In Lecture III of Pragmatism James argues, among 
other things, that theism, unlike materialism, is a philosophy of ‘hope’, because 
it promises us a world in which morality could make a difference.2
In this context I want to draw attention to a very important special way in 
which ethics is prior to, or contextualizes, any humanly possible metaphysical 
(and, arguably, theological) inquiry in Jamesian pragmatism. Recognizing the 
reality of evil is a key element of James’s pluralistic pragmatism and its concep-
tions of religion and morality. The critique of monism, especially the attack on 
monistic Hegelian absolute idealism, is a recurring theme in James’s philoso-
phy. An investigation of the problem of evil can show how he argues against 
monism and defends pluralism on an ethical basis and how, therefore, his prag-
matic metaphysics is grounded in ethics in a Kantian manner.
James was troubled by the problem of evil already during his spiritual crisis 
in 1870. He felt that the existence of evil might be a threat to a ‘moralist’ atti-
tude to the world, leading the would-be moralist to despair. ‘Can one with full 
knowledge and sincerely ever bring one’s self so to sympathize with the total 
process of the universe as heartily to assent to the evil that seems inherent in its 
details?’ he wondered, replying that, if so, then optimism is possible, but that 
for some, pessimism is the only choice.3 Already at this stage, he saw a prob-
lem with the idea of a ‘total process’ optimistically taken to be well in order. 
According to Ralph Barton Perry (1964 [1948]: 122), both optimism and pes-
simism were impossible for James, because he was ‘too sensitive to ignore evil, 
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too moral to tolerate it, and too ardent to accept it as inevitable’. It is already 
here that we can find the seeds of his melioristic pragmatism, which he later 
developed in more detail. This view says, in short, that we should try to make 
the world better, fighting against evil, without having any guarantee that the 
good cause will win, but having the right, or even the duty, to hope that it might 
and to invest our best efforts to make sure it will.
James worked on these issues throughout his life. In his last book, Some Prob-
lems of Philosophy, he offered several arguments against monism, among them 
the argument that monism creates, and will not be able to solve, the problem 
of evil:
Evil, for pluralism, presents only the practical problem of how to get 
rid of it. For monism the puzzle is theoretical: How—if Perfection be 
the source, should there be Imperfection? If the world as known to the 
Absolute be perfect, why should it be known otherwise, in myriads 
of inferior finite editions also? The perfect edition surely was enough. 
How do the breakage and dispersion and ignorance get in? (James 1996 
[1911]: 138.)
That pragmatists, unlike monists, must take evil and imperfection seriously, 
refusing to ‘be deaf to the cries of the wounded’ (as James put it elsewhere), 
is presented as one of the ethical motivations grounding the entire pragma-
tist method in the first lecture of Pragmatism. Referring to the actual fate of 
some suffering people, such as (drawing from a publication by Morrison I. 
Swift, an anarchist writer) an unemployed and in various ways disappointed 
and discouraged sick man who found his family lacking food and eventually 
committed suicide, James argued, against ‘the airy and shallow optimism of 
current religious philosophy’ (James 1975 [1907]: 20), that what such desperate 
human beings experience ‘is Reality’: ‘But while Professors Royce and Bradley 
and a whole host of guileless thoroughfed thinkers are unveiling Reality and 
the Absolute and explaining away evil and pain, this is the condition of the only 
beings known to us anywhere in the universe with a developed consciousness 
of what the universe is’ (ibid.: 21).4
Thus, idealist, optimistic philosophers ‘are dealing in shades, while those 
who live and feel know truth’ (ibid.: 22); a Hegelian or Leibnizian theodicy 
postulating a metaphysical or theological ultimate harmony of the universe is 
‘a cold literary exercise, whose cheerful substance even hell-fire does not warm’ 
(ibid.: 20). What I am calling theodicism is, for James, part of the ‘unreality 
in all rationalistic systems’ of ‘religious’ philosophy that remain ‘out of touch 
with concrete facts and joys and sorrows’ (ibid.: 17). James here even quotes 
at length from Leibniz’s Théodicée (ibid.: 19–20), concluding that ‘no realistic 
image of the experience of a damned soul had ever approached the portals 
of his mind’ (ibid.: 20). In order to overcome the ethically unbearable condi-
tion of the philosophical (and theological) tradition of theodicism, James offers 
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pragmatism as a philosophy that can, pluralistically, respond to a variety of 
experiences, including genuine loss and evil, without simply tolerating such 
experiences, and without entirely losing the potential consolation of religion 
with the abandonment of theodicies (cf. ibid.: 23). It is from this antitheodicist 
challenge that Pragmatism, like pragmatism, unfolds.
We should take seriously the fact that James uses the notion of truth in this 
context, as well as terms such as ‘fact’, ‘reality’, ‘unreality’, and ‘realistic’. His 
invoking the concept of truth in particular is not just a non-technical loose 
way of speaking but, I submit, an instance of his pragmatist account of truth in 
action. We must, in particular, take James’s concern with the truth of pluralism 
(and the falsity of monism and absolute idealism) in his own pragmatic sense, 
the same sense in which he speaks about ‘living’ and ‘feeling’ people knowing 
‘the truth’ (ibid.: 20, cited above). This is truth not in the sense of metaphysical 
realism postulating a correspondence relation holding (or failing to hold) inde-
pendently of human beings and their needs and interests, but a pragmatic truth 
dynamically emerging from human valuational practices of engaging with real-
ity and their experiences of it (see further Chapter 4 below).5
Nevertheless, it would be highly misleading to claim that James was not 
interested in the question about the ‘real’ (genuine, objective) truth of (say) 
pluralism (vs. monism), or other metaphysical views he considers in Pragma-
tism and elsewhere—just as it would be misleading to claim that Kant would 
not have been interested in the truth of theism, for instance. Certainly truth 
plays a role here, and neither James nor Kant subscribes to an easy antirealism 
or relativism according to which the truth (vs. falsity) about evil and suffer-
ing (or about God) would simply be a human perspectival construction; yet, 
our human practice-embedded perspectives can never be eliminated from the 
consideration of these truths, and this is exactly where the Kantian and the 
Jamesian approaches to the philosophy of religion join forces.6 Indeed, it can 
be suggested that the special moral significance of the pragmatist conception 
of truth (and reality), as articulated by James in Pragmatism (and elsewhere), 
arises from the fundamental link between antitheodicism and the acknowledg-
ment of truth and reality along the phrases just quoted. We (pragmatically) 
need the pragmatist conception of truth in order to make sense of this demand 
of acknowledgment of the reality of pain and suffering. A non-pragmatic (e.g., 
metaphysically realistic correspondence) notion of truth just cannot do the job. 
Moreover, it is, from the Jamesian perspective, a kind of ‘fake news’ based on an 
unconcern with truth to claim, with theodicists, that there ‘really’ is no unnec-
essary or meaningless evil, or that suffering has some ‘real’ sense or purpose.
James’s pragmatist and pluralist position can now be summarized as an out-
come of a transcendental argument in a quasi-Kantian fashion (cf. Kivistö 
& Pihlström 2016: chapters 5–6). Our taking seriously the reality of evil is 
understood by James to be a necessary condition for the possibility of ethically 
meaningful or valuable life (in a pluralistic metaphysical setting), including any 
true religious meaning one may find in one’s life. Evil itself is not intrinsically, 
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metaphysically, necessary to the universe itself, as the absolute idealist would 
be forced to hold, but it is necessary in a presuppositional sense: if there is any 
legitimate role for religious (theistic) beliefs to play in our lives, such a sys-
tem of beliefs must acknowledge the reality of evil while resisting the ‘corrupt’, 
immoral idea that an ultimately moral creator ‘planned’ it and is prepared to 
pay the price in order to secure some greater good.
Furthermore, the metaphysical acceptance of evil and the fight against it 
constitute a pragmatic criterion of adequacy for pragmatism itself. Pragmatism 
proves to be a philosophy taking evil seriously (cf. Pihlström 2014b), without 
hiding it or trying to explain it away (as monistic idealism does, according to 
James), yet encouraging us to join in a struggle against it, melioristically trying 
to make our world a better one. This is a reflexive pragmatic argument in favor 
of pragmatism and pluralism themselves. By enabling us to make a difference, 
pragmatism offers a more satisfactory picture of the nature and role of evil in 
human lives than monistic idealism (or, mutatis mutandis, many contemporary 
analytic philosophers’ evidentialist theism typically postulating a theodicy). 
The price to be paid here, however, is an irresolvable metaphysical and theo-
logical insecurity: there is no final solution to the problem of evil, as new expe-
riences of ever more horrendous evils may eventually even make it impossible 
for us to go on actively fighting against evil. Insofar as a pragmatic defense of 
pragmatism is available, such a defense will have to remain thoroughly fallibil-
ist. We may be unable to react pragmatically to the problem of evil, after all, and 
for many thinkers this may be a ground for rejecting religious beliefs altogether.
According to this Jamesian antitheodicy, the recognition of genuine evil is 
required as a background, or as I prefer to say, a transcendental condition, of 
the possibility of making a difference, a positive contribution, in favor of good-
ness.7 The problem of evil can be seen as a frame that puts the other philo-
sophical explorations of James’s Pragmatism into a certain context. It shows 
that reacting to the problem of evil—and the highly individual experiences of 
being a victim to evil that we may hear in the ‘cries of the wounded’—is essen-
tial in our ethical orientation to the world we live in, which in turn is essential 
in the use of the pragmatic method as a method of making our ideas clear, both 
metaphysically and conceptually (and even religiously or theologically). Prag-
matism, as we saw, opens the project of advancing a melioristic philosophy with 
a discussion of the concrete reality of evil, and in the final pages of the book 
James returns to evil, suffering, loss, and tragedy:
In particular this query has always come home to me: May not the 
claims of tender-mindedness go too far? May not the notion of a world 
already saved in toto anyhow, be too saccharine to stand? May not reli-
gious optimism be too idyllic? Must all be saved? Is no price to be paid 
in the work of salvation? Is the last word sweet? Is all ‘yes, yes’ in the 
universe? Doesn’t the fact of ‘no’ stand at the very core of life? Doesn’t 
the very ‘seriousness’ that we attribute to life mean that ineluctable noes 
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and losses form a part of it, that there are genuine sacrifices somewhere, 
and that something permanently drastic and bitter always remains at 
the bottom of its cup?
I cannot speak officially as a pragmatist here; all I can say is that my 
own pragmatism offers no objection to my taking sides with this more 
moralistic view, and giving up the claim of total reconciliation. […] It 
is then perfectly possible to accept sincerely a drastic kind of a universe 
from which the element of ‘seriousness’ is not to be expelled. Whoso 
does so is, it seems to me, a genuine pragmatist. (James 1975 [1907]: 
141–142.)
It is this very same moral seriousness that I find essential to emphasize in the 
contemporary discourse on evil. There is a sense in which our moral life with 
other human beings in a world full of suffering is tragic: given our finitude, we 
will never be able to fully overcome evil and suffering; yet we must constantly 
try. James’s pragmatism is not only generally relevant as a critical middle path 
solution to several controversies in contemporary philosophy of religion, but 
also a promising move toward the kind of antitheodicism I think we vitally 
need in any serious moral philosophy. It may also keep our eyes open to the 
reality of the tragic dimension of human life. Yet, even the notion of tragedy 
might lead us astray here in something like a theodicist manner. Tragedies, 
though not themselves theodicies, are meaningful and ‘deep’ in a sense in 
which human real-world evils and sufferings such as the Holocaust often are 
not. It is presumably better to speak about Jamesian melancholy—about the sick 
soul’s fundamentally melancholic way of approaching ethics, religion, and the 
world in general.
Moreover, it must be kept in mind that James’s antitheodicy (and the under-
standing of the problem of evil as a ‘frame’) emerges in the context of develop-
ing pragmatism in general as a philosophy—not only as an ethical approach but 
as a philosophical orientation in general. It is in this context that James offers 
pragmatism as a critical middle ground between ‘tough-minded’ and ‘tender-
minded’ philosophies. Antitheodicy and melancholy are, thus, conditions for 
the adequacy of (pragmatist) philosophizing as such.
Rortyan ironism and Nineteen Eighty-Four
Having briefly defended a resolutely antitheodicist reading of James and an 
antitheodicist way of developing pragmatism generally—as a philosophical 
contribution to the discourse on evil, but also more comprehensively as a con-
tribution to the examination of the relations between ethics and metaphys-
ics—we should consider the way in which this antitheodicism is both rooted in 
Kantian antitheodicism and threatened by a certain kind of problematization 
of the notions of truth and reality that James’s own pragmatism takes some 
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crucial steps toward. In this context, we will have to expand our horizon from 
James and Kant to Rorty’s neopragmatism and especially to Rorty’s treatment 
of Orwell (again, see also Kivistö & Pihlström 2016: chapter 5). 
According to Rorty, famously, cruelty is the worst thing we do. This is, one 
might suggest, another pragmatist version of the Jamesian principle according 
to which we should always listen to the ‘cries of the wounded’. There is a kind 
of holism involved in Rorty’s position, just like in James’s: ‘don’t be cruel’ could 
be regarded as a meta-principle governing all other moral principles (and, to 
put it in a Kantian way, governing the choice of all moral principles), yet itself 
(like all more specific principles, and unlike the Kantian meta-principle, the 
categorical imperative) fallible and revisable, even though it may be difficult or 
even impossible to imagine how exactly it could fail—just like it is impossible 
to imagine, say, in the context of Quinean holism, what it would really be like 
to falsify a logical or mathematical principle.8 There are, pace Kant, no uncondi-
tional ideals or principles, either for James or for Rorty, while both pragmatist 
philosophers do operate with broader and more inclusive (as well as narrower 
and less inclusive) moral views and principles. Whereas for James the broadest 
imaginable principle seems to be the requirement to realize the largest possible 
universe of good while carefully listening to the cries of the wounded, for Rorty 
an analogous role is played by the liberal principle of avoiding cruelty and real-
izing individual freedom as fully as possible. All ethical requirements, includ-
ing these, are contingent and in principle fallible, as everything is contained in 
a holistic, revisable totality of our on-going ethical thought and conversation. 
(Analogously, we may say, the transcendental is contained in the empirical, and 
vice versa: for a Kantian pragmatist, the transcendental constitutes and con-
strains the empirical, but also arises from our empirically real capacities.)
In his essay on Orwell, Rorty—whose protest against mainstream analytic 
philosophy is much stronger than most other pragmatists’—rejects realistic 
readings of Nineteen Eighty-Four, according to which the book defends an 
objective notion of truth in the context of a penetrating moral critique of the 
horrible and humiliating way in which the protagonist, Winston, is made to 
believe that two plus two equals five.9 Consistently with his well-known posi-
tion (if it can be regarded as a ‘position’ at all), Rorty denies that ‘there are any 
plain moral facts out there in the world, […] any truths independent of lan-
guage, [or] any neutral ground on which to stand and argue that either torture 
or kindness are preferable to the other’ (Rorty 1989: 173). Orwell’s significance 
lies in a novel redescription of what is possible: he convinced us that ‘nothing in 
the nature of truth, or man, or history’ will block the conceivable scenario that 
‘the same developments which had made human equality technically possible 
might make endless slavery possible’ (ibid.: 175). Hence, O’Brien, the torturer 
and ‘Party intellectual’, is Orwell’s key invention, and he, crucially, offers no 
answer to O’Brien’s position: ‘He does not view O’Brien as crazy, misguided, 
seduced by a mistaken theory, or blind to the moral facts. He simply views him 
as dangerous and as possible’ (ibid.: 176).
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The key idea here, according to Rorty, is that truth as such does not matter: 
‘[…] what matters is your ability to talk to other people about what seems to 
you true, not what is in fact true’ (ibid.).10 Famously, in Nineteen Eighty-Four, 
Winston’s self is in a way destroyed as he is made to believe that two plus two 
equals five and to utter ‘Do it to Julia!’ when faced with his worst fear, the rats. 
Rorty points out that this is something he ‘could not utter sincerely and still be 
able to put himself back together’ (ibid.: 179).
The notion of sincerity is central here, as it leads us to the way in which Kant 
critically discusses theodicies in his 1791 essay, ‘Über das Misslingen aller 
philosophischen Versuche in der Theodicee’ (‘On the Miscarriage of all Philo-
sophical Trials in Theodicy’), a largely neglected short piece that usually does 
not get the kind of attention that Kant’s more famous doctrine of ‘radical evil’ 
does (not to speak of the main works of his critical philosophy).11 I believe we 
should follow Kant in rejecting theodicies not only for intellectual but also for 
ethical (and, therefore, religious) reasons; indeed, James (as I have interpreted 
him above) is, in this sense, a Kantian. As Richard Bernstein points out in his 
introduction to what is one of the most important contributions to the prob-
lem of evil in the 21st century, Kant’s rejection of theodicies is a crucial part 
of his critical philosophy: insofar as theodicies aim at theoretical knowledge 
about God, they are not merely contingent failures but, much more strongly, 
impossible and must fail, given the limitations of human reason; on the other 
hand, it is precisely by limiting the sphere of knowledge that Kant, famously, 
makes room for faith (Bernstein 2002: 3–4). Kant, therefore, is ‘the modern 
philosopher who initiates the inquiry into evil without explicit recourse to 
philosophical theodicy’ and hence also leads the way in our attempt to rethink 
the meaning of evil and responsibility ‘after Auschwitz’ (ibid.: 4).12 Kant writes 
about evil in a conceptual world entirely different from the one occupied by his 
most important predecessors, such as Leibniz. This Kantian conceptual world 
is, if my argument in the earlier sections of this chapter is on the right track, 
shared by James. We may say that Kant’s antitheodicism was transformed into 
a pragmatist antitheodicism by James.
The details of Kant’s analysis of the failures of theodicies need not concern us 
here (cf. Kivistö & Pihlström 2016: chapter 2). As I want to focus on the issues 
of realism and truth, I must emphasize how Kant invokes the Book of Job as an 
example of the only ‘honest’ way of formulating a theodicy—which, for him, 
actually seems to be an antitheodicy. Job’s key virtue, according to Kant, is his 
sincerity (Aufrichtigkeit), which establishes ‘the preeminence of the honest man 
over the religious flatterer in the divine verdict’ (Kant 1983b [1791]: 8:267):
Job speaks as he thinks, and with the courage with which he, as well as 
every human being in his position, can well afford; his friends, on the 
contrary, speak as if they were being secretly listened to by the mighty 
one, over whose cause they are passing judgment, and as if gaining his 
favor through their judgment were closer to their heart than the truth. 
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Their malice in pretending to assert things into which they yet must 
admit they have no insight, and in simulating a conviction which they in 
fact do not have, contrasts with Job’s frankness […]. (Ibid.: 8:265–266.) 
For Kant, the leading feature in Job’s virtuous character is not, then, his 
patience in suffering (as many traditional, particularly Christian, interpreters 
of the Book of Job might suggest), but his inner sincerity, integrity, and honesty. 
Indeed, Job protests against his suffering in the poetic dialogues of the book; 
he does not simply endure his fate or quietly suffer, but complains and insists 
on the injustice of his adversities. Thus, Job’s honesty, rather than his alleged 
patience, is his greatest virtue. 
Toward the end of his essay, Kant discusses the moral evil of insincerity—of 
our tendency ‘to distort even inner declarations before [our] own conscience’—
as ‘in itself evil even if it harms no one’ (ibid.: 8:270). Thus, he seems to be 
saying in so many words that speculative, rationalizing theodicies—the kind 
of theodicies manifested by Job’s ‘friends’—are themselves exemplifications of 
evil. They are also evil in a very specific sense: they do not acknowledge the 
Kantian—and more generally Enlightenment—ideal of free, autonomous, and 
responsible thinking based on the idea of inner truthfulness (which is some-
thing that we should see pragmatist philosophers like James and Rorty very 
highly appreciating as well). They are therefore revolts (not primarily against 
God but) against humanity itself, conceived in a Kantian way. We might even 
say that the insincerity of theodicist thinking does not recognize the essential 
human capacity for freedom and responsibility, for the kind of autonomous 
thinking that is the very foundation of morality.13 It is not implausible, it seems 
to me, to suggest that James could have sympathized with, or even implicitly 
shared, this Kantian line of thought in his criticism of theodicies. For James, 
too, there is something ethically fundamentally insincere in theodicies, which, 
as we saw through some illustrative quotations from Pragmatism, do not live up 
to the ideal of knowing the truth instead of living in shades.14 Moreover, reflect-
ing on what goes wrong in our own tendencies to succumb to the temptations 
of theodicy (as Bernstein [2002] calls them in his discussion of Levinas) is a 
prime example of critical yet pragmatic reflexivity at work.
A fundamental distinction between truth and falsity is, however, necessary 
for the concepts of sincerity and truthfulness, and given the role these con-
cepts play in Kantian antitheodicism, such a distinction is necessary for the 
antitheodicist project generally as well, also in its Jamesian reincarnation. Now, 
insofar as Rorty’s pragmatism carries Jamesian pragmatism into a certain kind 
of extreme, one is left wondering whether there is any way to stop on the slip-
pery slope arguably leading from James to Rorty (and eventually even bringing 
in, with horror, Orwell’s O’Brien). Reality, shocking as it often is, must still be 
contrasted with something like unreality, while truth and truthfulness must be 
contrasted not only with falsity but also with lying and self-deception, and pos-
sibly other kinds of loss of sincerity and truthfulness that may follow from the 
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collapse of the truth vs. falsity distinction itself. What we find here is, one might 
say, the problem of realism in its existential dimensions. This is, arguably, the core 
pragmatic meaning of the problem of realism—or even, echoing the reading of 
Pragmatism presented above, an approach to the problem of realism framed 
by the problem of evil. In the terms introduced in the introduction above, it 
is right here that the epistemic and the existential interests in our inquiry into 
religion, or into the world, merge.
Insofar as the distinction between truth and falsity collapses, as (in a sense) it 
does in Nineteen Eighty-Four, the very project of antitheodicy, which (I believe 
we may argue) is based on and depends on the Kantian notion of Aufrichtig-
keit (sincerity),15 becomes threatened. Truthfulness or sincerity itself collapses 
here. Hence, this is another special message and problem of Orwell, an implicit 
warning of his great novel: there may be no theodicy available even in this neg-
ative sense, no happy end or moral harmony available, even by going through 
antitheodicism. Taking evil and suffering seriously entails acknowledging that 
we constantly run the risk of losing whatever truthfulness we might be capa-
ble of possessing, and of thereby losing the sincere attitude to evil and suffer-
ing that antitheodicists like Kant and James have found crucially important 
for an adequately (or even minimally) ethical attitude to suffering. Thus, the 
Orwellian challenge (or warning) lies right here: is there, or can there be, or 
can we at least imagine, such evil that makes antitheodicy itself impossible 
by destroying the very possibility of Kantian Aufrichtigkeit (by destroying the 
truth vs. falsity distinction that is necessary for truthfulness or sincerity)?
This fragility of antitheodicy, the fragility of sincerity necessary for antitheod-
icy, is a dimension of the more general fragility of the moral point of view;16 we 
can consider it a meta-antitheodicy. By destroying Winston’s capacity for sincer-
ily uttering something and still being able to ‘put himself back together’, O’Brien 
not only engages in evil that almost (yet not quite) lies beyond description and 
imagination but also leads us to imagine the possibility of evil that renders 
(Kantian) antitheodicy itself impossible. This will then collapse the Jamesian 
antitheodicist approach as well, given that it starts from a kind of pragmatic 
softening of the notion of objective truth culminating in the ‘truth happens to 
an idea’ view characteristic of James’s ethically grounded metaphysics.17
While James (on my reading) only resisted certain metaphysically realistic 
forms of metaphysics, especially Hegelian monistic absolute idealism (and cor-
responding metaphysical realisms), without thereby abandoning metaphys-
ics altogether (see Pihlström 2008a, 2009), Rorty’s reading of Orwell is deeply 
based on his rejection of all forms of metaphysics. In his view, Orwell tells us 
that ‘whether our future rulers are more like O’Brien or more like J. S. Mill does 
not depend […] on deep facts about human nature’ or on any ‘large necessary 
truths about human nature and its relation to truth and justice’ but on ‘a lot of 
small contingent facts’ (Rorty 1989: 187–188). Now, this is hard to deny, at least 
in a sense; various minor contingent facts have enormous influence on how our 
world and societies develop. This is also a very important message of Rortyan 
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ironism in general: our firmest moral commitments, our ‘final vocabularies’, 
are all historically contingent. But the worry is that if we give up (even prag-
matically rearticulated) objective truth entirely, we will end up giving up the 
very possibility of sincerity, too, and that is something we need for resisting the 
future of all possible O’Briens’ (paradoxically) theodicist newspeak seeking to 
justify evil, suffering, and torture. It is one thing to accept, reasonably, historical 
contingency and to reject overblown metaphysics of ‘deep facts about human 
nature’; it is quite another to give up even a minimal pragmatic sense of objec-
tive truth required not only for sincerity but for the very possibility of sincerity 
(and, hence, for the possibility of insincerity as well, because insincerity is pos-
sible only insofar as sincerity is possible, and vice versa). This worry ought to be 
constantly kept in mind by anyone sympathizing with the Jamesian antitheodi-
cist suggestion to apply the notion of pragmatic truth to the acknowledgment 
of the reality of suffering.
Acknowledging Rorty
I am not saying that Rorty (or James) is wrong, or has a mistaken conception of 
truth (or facts, or history, or anything). What I am saying is that if Rorty is right 
(whatever it means to say this, given the disappearance, in Rorty’s neopragma-
tism, of the distinction between being right and being regarded as being right 
by one’s cultural peers), then we may be in a more serious trouble than we may 
have believed in our attempts to think clearly about the relations between real-
ism, truth, evil, and suffering.18 Jamesian pragmatism seems to take the correct, 
indeed vital, antitheodicist step in refusing to philosophically justify evil and 
suffering, and in constructing the entire pragmatic method on this basis of tak-
ing evil seriously. This step was initially made possible by Kant’s antitheodicism, 
especially the concept of sincerity at its core, and Kantian critical philosophy 
more generally. However, insofar as Jamesian pragmatism develops—rather 
naturally, it might be suggested—into something like Rorty’s neopragmatism, 
which lets the notion of truth drop out as unimportant, the end result is not 
only an insightful emphasis on historical contingency (and on the role of litera-
ture in showing us fascinating, and dangerous, contingent possibilities) but also 
the possible fragmentation of sincerity itself, which seems to depend on a rela-
tively robust distinction between truth and falsity. Antitheodicy thus becomes 
fragmented through that fragmentation.
What this shows is a quasi-Rortyan point: Orwell is more important, and 
O’Brien more dangerous, than we may have thought. But it also shows that 
Rorty deprives us of certain linguistic, literary, and philosophical resources that 
we might see Orwell as having equipped us with. Pragmatism can maintain 
those resources only by being consistently critical—that is, Kantian. Only the 
critical path is open: this Kantian message should be taken home by all prag-
matists, and not only by pragmatists.

CHAPTER 4
Religious Truth, Acknowledgment, 
and Diversity
While the previous chapter made a (hopefully relatively smooth) transition 
from general pragmatist explorations of realism to a (preliminary) pragmatist 
treatment of the problem of evil and suffering, this chapter takes up the prob-
lem of religious pluralism or diversity by focusing on the questions of truth, 
recognition, and theodicy. A pragmatist approach to truth—again crucially 
indebted to James’s pragmatism—will be argued to yield both a vital philosoph-
ical enrichment of the issue and a challenge that must be critically acknowl-
edged. I will draw particular attention to how the question of truth comes into 
the picture when we need to deal with the diversity of religious (and non-reli-
gious) responses to human suffering. This is a decisive test case for pragmatist 
approaches to religious pluralism.1
It might be suggested that if we endorse realistic truth and objectivity in 
a full-blown sense (cf. Chapters 1–2), we will be on the road to exclusivism 
regarding the issue of religious diversity, that is, the view that there is at most 
only one single true religion and the truth of any one religious outlook would 
exclude the truth of any other. Pragmatist conceptions of truth can, I will argue, 
be interpreted as seeking a plausible middle ground option here. As we have 
seen, pragmatism has, especially since James, been defended as a critical medi-
ator between realism and antirealism as well as evidentialism and fideism, and 
it can be suggested that it mediates between religious inclusivism and exclu-
sivism, too. This offers an indirect meta-level argument for pragmatism itself 
(and for pragmatist views on truth applied to religion and theology), because 
it seems that pragmatism is uniquely able to deal with the problem of combin-
ing (humanly speaking) realistic objective truth with a (moderately) inclusivist 
account of religious diversity.
The later sections of this chapter deal more explicitly with the relations 
between truth, realism, and theodicy. We may see pragmatists, among others, 
as arguing against what they take to be an illusionary metaphysically realist 
view postulating allegedly objective (absolute, God’s-Eye View) reasons for 
the reality of suffering. This yields another ethical argument for pragmatism 
and against metaphysical realism. I will try to show how pragmatism can be 
enriched by recognition-theoretical considerations that are highly relevant to 
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the pursuit of religious inclusivism in the debate over religious and theologi-
cal diversity, though this relevance will inevitably remain somewhat implicit in 
this inquiry. While I will defend a pragmatic approach to truth and religious 
diversity affirming a close link between the concepts of (objective) truth and 
individual, existential truthfulness, antitheodicism also needs the concept of 
objective, realistic truth. Pragmatism, as was noted in the previous chapter, 
runs the risk of opening a slippery slope from James toward Rorty and even 
Orwell’s O’Brien, which is particularly problematic in our age of ‘post-truth’ 
and ‘post-factuality’. Therefore, I do acknowledge the worry that the concept of 
truth might get messed up in pragmatism in such a way that the very project 
of responding to religious diversity and the ethical needs of inclusion become 
threatened. The chapter will pragmatically defend the value of (objective) truth 
and truthfulness. However, it will also be concluded that various tensions 
remain and that pragmatism is therefore needed at the meta-level, even if ordi-
nary realistic truth is to be defended at the ‘first-order’ level.
I hence prefer to leave open the possibility that even the pragmatist might 
need to end up with a defense of objective, realistic truth—within pragmatism. 
When developing a pragmatist approach to the realism debate (in science, reli-
gion, and theology—and elsewhere), the genuine differences between all these 
human practices must be appreciated. This, we might say, is to embrace a ‘prag-
matic realism’ about the realism debate itself. The ways in which this debate is 
pragmatically committed to employing an objective concept of truth—embed-
ded in a more inclusive concept that also includes truthfulness—needs to be 
carefully addressed.
Recognizing diversity
Full-blown realism—at least metaphysical realism operating with the concept 
of an absolute representation of reality from a ‘God’s-Eye View’—about reli-
gion, theology, and religious truth may easily lead to religious exclusivism. 
According to such metaphysical realism, there is, in principle, an absolute way 
the world is independently of the human mind or any human practices, beliefs, 
perspectives, and theories. Truth is strictly non-epistemic correspondence 
between true statements and the pieces of the world they are about. The fact 
that pragmatism seeks a middle ground in the realism debate by rejecting such 
a strong form of realism without rejecting realism tout court is highly relevant 
to the diversity issue. 
Insofar as pragmatism is indeed philosophically and (arguably) theologically 
relevant in the various ways indicated in the previous chapters, then it should 
come as no surprise that pragmatist conceptions on realism and truth bear 
considerable relevance to the issue of religious diversity and especially the con-
troversy between exclusivism and inclusivism. It is, in short, metaphysical real-
ism with its dream of a ‘God’s-Eye View’ that leads to religious and theological 
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exclusivism. It is such realism with its non-human—theocentric—pursuit of 
objectivity (or, rather, ‘Objectivity’ with a capital ‘O’) that makes it impossible 
for us to maintain that different, even apparently conflicting, religious and theo-
logical claims and ideas could all be ‘true’ in a more moderate, perspectival, and 
practice-embedded—human, pragmatic—sense. We pragmatically need such a 
pragmatism softening the notion of truth into something like humanly valu-
able pursuit of truthfulness, in which ethics and metaphysics are inseparable.
The ways in which pragmatism succeeds in articulating and making sense 
of a sound version of religious inclusivism—an inclusivism that does not turn 
into an uncritical relativism rejecting all normative criteria in terms of which 
truth claims can be critically compared to each other—should be regarded as 
meta-level pragmatist ‘tests’ of pragmatism itself. Pragmatism, then, is a self-
critically reflective philosophy par excellence—and this fact again underlines its 
relevance to the religious diversity topic.
I have already proposed that pragmatism can be enriched by the theory 
of recognition. As theorists of recognition in the broadly Hegelian tradition 
famously developed by Honneth (2005 [1992]) and Taylor (1995), among oth-
ers, have emphasized, a proper analysis of the concept of recognition, especially 
in its applications to interpersonal relations, crucially requires an ‘as’ clause 
specifying the content of the relevant requests for recognition and the corre-
sponding acts of granting recognition (cf. Saarinen 2014, 2016; Kahlos et al. 
2019). In paradigmatic interpersonal (or inter-group) cases, A asks B to rec-
ognize it as something specific, say, as X, and then B either grants or refuses 
to grant such recognition of A as X. (By requesting such recognition, A also 
recognizes B as a potential recognizer of A as X.) Obviously, we are here deal-
ing with a notion that has huge relevance to discussions concerning religious 
diversity. It is a continuous challenge to religious groups and orientations in a 
multicultural society to recognize each other (as religions, as sources of mean-
ing and value for their members, and so on), and the phenomenon of religious 
diversity itself needs to be adequately recognized in order for us to be able to 
deal with its ethical, political, and epistemological features.
The details of theories of recognition and the discussion following Honneth’s 
Kampf um Anerkennung need not concern us here any more than in earlier 
chapters.2 What is important for the present inquiry is that there is an interest-
ing difference between the concepts of recognition and acknowledgment. This 
difference becomes relevant when we employ these concepts in our attempts 
to understand the ways in which we may and should respond to other human 
beings’ suffering—a major case of (potential) conflicts in a religiously diverse 
multicultural situation. Hence, this difference needs to be examined when 
developing a pragmatist account of the kinds of realism and truth that may 
be at issue in relation to religious diversity, especially the diversity of ways of 
responding to suffering.3 Indeed, it turns out that truth is highly central here.
We may say that the concept of recognition inevitably invokes issues of truth, 
especially regarding the truth of the relevant ‘as’ clause, that is, whether A is X, 
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or is what s/he/it is recognized as. When we are interested in the recognition 
of another’s suffering, or of the victim of suffering and their unique experi-
ences, we cannot avoid the question of what the sufferer or the victim, or their 
experiences, are to be recognized as. However, this already creates a (possibly 
also politically sensitive) field of power structures (possibly only strengthened 
in circumstances of religious diversity). The potential recognizer has, at least 
within certain limits (presumably constrained by the initial request for recogni-
tion), the power to determine as what the potential recognizee is to be recog-
nized. This may create ethically difficult issues of proper communication of suf-
fering and its recognition. Even the very act of recognizing someone, or some 
group, as a ‘victim’ of some particular evil may be politically problematic, if that 
person or group does not wish to be categorized as a victim, or if their wish to 
be so characterized plays a controversial political role.4 At least the potentially 
problematic aspects of ‘victimization’ (either by oneself or by others) have to be 
taken into consideration whenever a question about recognizing someone or 
some group as a victim is raised.
Philosophical theorization on recognition should also appreciate the fact that 
empirical research—for instance, results drawn from history or the social sci-
ences—may be fundamentally important, and also philosophically highly rel-
evant, to filling in the various ‘as’ clauses in our recognizing others’ suffering. 
In a sense, historical and social-scientific studies of evil and suffering offer us 
‘naturalized’ and empirically diverse yet philosophically significant approaches 
to these phenomena, thus considerably expanding the traditional philosophical 
ways of dealing with evil and suffering (such as the aprioristic and specula-
tive theodicy discourse, to which pragmatists like James have been strongly 
opposed). Such empirical enrichment enables us to more effectively commu-
nicate our religious and/or theological (or fully secular) attitudes to others’ 
suffering—much better than a mere abstract philosophical theory of suffer-
ing, for instance, let alone a theodicy allegedly justifying innocent suffering, or 
excusing God (if one believes in God) for allowing it to take place. Here one’s 
communicative interest may be inextricably intertwined with a philosophical 
interest in deeper understanding of the true nature of evil and suffering.5
However, no matter how substantially empirically enriched philosophy of 
evil and suffering may fill in the relevant ‘as’ clauses in our analyses of relations 
of recognition, we arguably also need a more purely philosophical (though not 
for that matter entirely non-empirical) notion of acknowledgment. It may be 
suggested that acknowledgment differs from recognition in not requiring, or 
not even allowing, the same kind of ‘as’ clause as recognition. Thus, the truth 
about the ‘as’ of recognition, the truth about, say, A’s really being X in our sche-
matic formulation, does not necessarily come to the picture, either. This does 
not mean that truth would be irrelevant to relations of acknowledgment, how-
ever. On the contrary, one may argue that a deeper, more dynamic concept 
of truth—something we may derive from James’s pragmatism—plays a fun-
damental role here. What we need is a broader, richer, and more clearly non-
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foundationalist—that is, preferably (but perhaps not necessarily) pragmatist—
notion of truth in order to communicate suffering, and our acknowledgment 
of others’ suffering, in an ethically appropriate way across diverse religious, 
theological, and secular outlooks. It should be easy to see that this is precisely 
the issue of truth that comes into the picture when we want to deal with the 
religious diversity problem in an ethically sensitive way.
This ethical challenge is ipso facto a challenge of developing the notion of 
truth itself in a pragmatist way, in a manner in which the acknowledgment of 
others’ experiences, such as experiences of suffering, particularly in their ethical 
dimensions—e.g., our future-oriented worry, care, or Sorge for the other—is an 
ineliminable part of the dynamics of truth in adequately responding to other-
ness, including the others we encounter when encountering religious diversity 
in our societies. It is this essentially ‘worried’ future-directedness that the prag-
matist conception of truth takes into account better than any other, especially 
if we also read James’s writings on truth (e.g., James 1975 [1907]: Lecture VI) 
alongside his relational conception of identity based on his radical empiricism, 
as suggested in José Medina’s (2010) interpretation of his theory of truth. It is 
on these grounds that we may seek to develop a true synthesis of pragmatism 
and recognition theory (or, rather, the theory of acknowledgment), focusing 
on the notions of truth and truthfulness, and especially their intimate relation.6
It can be argued that James’s conception of truth already incorporates impor-
tant aspects of the concept of truthfulness. Moreover, it can be further argued 
that it is precisely this broader notion of truth that we need when hoping to 
reconcile (moderate) religious inclusivism and its recognizing and/or acknowl-
edging attitude to otherness and diversity with the possibility of still continuing 
to pursue truth and objectivity in theological and religious matters. 
The pragmatist theory of truth is far from uncontroversial, as anyone who 
ever read undergraduate textbooks on truth knows, but we may approach it by 
referring to the distinction between truth and truthfulness, analyzed, e.g., in 
Bernard Williams’ (2002) important book with that title (see also, e.g., Allen 
1995). These are clearly different notions. One may pursue truthfulness with-
out thereby having true beliefs; one can be truthful also when one is mistaken, 
insofar as one sincerely seeks to believe truths and avoid falsehoods and also 
honestly seeks to tell the truth whenever possible (and whenever the truth to 
be told is relevant).7 Thus, clearly, whatever one’s theory of truth is, one should 
in some way distinguish between truth and truthfulness. On the other hand, 
certain theories of truth, such as the pragmatist theory, may be more promising 
in articulating the intimate relation between truth and truthfulness than some 
other theories. 
We might say that this distinction itself is in a way ‘softened’ in James’s prag-
matist conception of truth, which rather explicitly turns truth into a value 
to be pursued in one’s (individual and social) life rather than simply a mat-
ter of propositional truth corresponding to facts that are independently ‘there’. 
Truth(fulness) in the Jamesian sense is richer and broader than mere proposi-
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tional truth. It is a normative property of our thought and inquiries (in a wide 
sense), not simply a semantic property of statements or beliefs. Its normativity 
is, we might say, both epistemic and ethical. James’s pragmatic truth incorpo-
rates truthfulness, as truth itself belongs to the ethical field of inter-human rela-
tions of dependence and acknowledgment. It also incorporates an acknowl-
edgment of the ‘inner truth’ of others’ experiences, especially experiences of 
suffering. It is therefore also an account of truth perfectly suited for our needs 
of living in a situation of religious diversity.
Jamesian pragmatic truth is inextricably entangled with our individual 
philosophical temperaments and their existential needs; therefore, James’s 
conception of truth is indistinguishable from his general individualism, which 
in this context is also obviously relevant as a Jamesian point of departure to 
any inquiry into religious pluralism. Religious diversity starts at the individual 
level. Individuals’ responses to existential challenges of life having a religious 
dimension vary considerably, and any existentially or religiously relevant 
conception of truth must in some sense appreciate this temperamental vari-
ation—without succumbing to the temptations of uncritical subjectivism or 
relativism, though.8
In his discussion of James’s theory of truth, which I find highly relevant to 
these concerns, Medina (2010) defends Jamesian pluralism in a politically 
relevant manner: in ethics and politics, we can never reach an ‘absolute’ 
conception of what is universally best for human beings and societies, but 
different suggestions, opinions, experiential perspectives, and interests must 
have their say—or must be recognized or acknowledged (though this is not 
Medina’s own specific terminology). A conception of political solidarity can, 
then, be grounded in Jamesian ideas concerning truth. James advocated not 
only pragmatic pluralism and individualism but also (on Medina’s reading) a 
relational conception of individual identities: nothing exists in a self-sustained 
manner but only as parts of networks of mutual interdependence. Obviously, 
such a metaphysics of relationality is also hospitable to a pragmatist philosophy 
emphasizing acknowledgment. While James’s pluralism and relationalism are 
elements of a metaphysical view according to which ‘nothing can be under-
stood in and by itself, but rather in relation to other things, in a network of 
relations’, they are irreducibly ethical and political, applying even to the reality 
of the self: ‘to have a sense of self is to have a sense of the dependences that 
compose one’s life’ (ibid.: 124). We are, Medina continues, ‘diverse and hetero-
geneous beings […] shaped and reshaped through diverse and heterogeneous 
networks of interpersonal relations’, and the Jamesian self is a bundle of such 
relations (ibid.: 125).
It is in this context that we should, according to Medina, understand and 
appreciate James’s theory of truth. True beliefs are ‘good to live by’; when main-
taining a belief, any belief, we are responsible for its consequences in our lives, 
and in those of others. The pragmatic ‘theory’ of truth—which presumably 
should not be called a ‘theory’, in order to avoid seeing it as a rival to, say, the 
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‘correspondence theory’—invokes not only, say, the agreeable consequences 
of true beliefs but also ethical ideas such as solidarity and justice. Therefore, 
we may say that truth (in the pragmatic sense), truthfulness, and acknowledg-
ment are conceptually tied to each other. One cannot really pursue truth in 
the Jamesian sense unless one also acknowledges, or at least truthfully seeks 
to acknowledge, others’ perspectives on reality—especially those structured by 
suffering. Therefore, again, something like Jamesian pragmatic truth is what 
our need to account for religious diversity and inclusivism requires.
Recall James’s pronouncements on the significance of the problem of evil and 
suffering (see Chapter 3 above). We should note how thoroughly those discus-
sions of the diversity of our human responses to such predicament are colored 
by references to reality and truth. I suggested in Chapter 3 that these occur-
rences of such philosophical terms ought to be taken seriously as elements of 
James’s theory of truth and reality—and thus as elements of his pragmatism. 
James, remember, argued that what desperate and suffering human beings 
experience ‘is Reality’ and that idealist, optimistic philosophers ‘are dealing in 
shades, while those who live and feel know truth’ (James 1975 [1907]: 21–22). 
These are as important characterizations of what James means by truth and 
reality in the pragmatic sense as are his famous pronouncements about truth 
being ‘only the expedient in our way of thinking’, truth being satisfactory, etc. 
Furthermore, theodicism is, for James, part of the ‘unreality in all rationalistic 
systems’ of ‘religious’ philosophy that remain ‘out of touch with concrete facts 
and joys and sorrows’ (ibid.: 17).9
Such formulations can be seen as philosophically urging us to acknowledge 
the meaninglessness of suffering, i.e., the fact that in reality there is no harmo-
nious world system or a necessary divine reason for suffering. This is, in a sense, 
to recognize the sufferer as a sufferer. As recognition requires the ‘as’ clause—B 
recognizes A as something, as X—the one who employs the concept of recog-
nition here must presuppose that there is something like the truth about the 
matter whether A is X, or can be construed as being X. This can, and in many 
obvious cases is, a truth created by the act of recognition itself; in our social life 
many important social facts, statuses, and institutions are created in this way. 
Thus, the fact (or the factual or propositional truth) that A is X, which enables 
B to recognize A as X, is either independent of B’s recognition act or constituted 
by it, by B’s ‘taking’ A to be X. However, in both cases we are dealing with truths 
about the (social) world.
Now, it may be argued that the traditional correspondence theory of truth 
does not serve this situation very well. What we (arguably) need here is a more 
dynamic pragmatic notion of truth also covering cases where the truth of 
A’s being X is ‘made’ by us. But even more importantly, we need a pragmatic 
notion of truth for those cases where there is no ‘as’ dimension at all—that 
is, for acknowledgment rather than recognition. This is another kind of ethi-
cal truth, truth conceived or reconceived as something like truthfulness. It is 
a conception of ethical truth compatible with, or perhaps even required by, 
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James’s famous dictum in ‘The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life’, accord-
ing to which there can be no ‘final truth’ in ethics until the ‘last man’ has had 
his experience and his say (James 1979 [1891]: 141). Thus, this is precisely the 
kind of ethical truth we need for a conception of ethics that admits, with James, 
that ‘there is no such thing as an ethical philosophy dogmatically made up in 
advance’ (ibid.).10
Acknowledging that there is no such final truth in ethics—or religion—is, we 
may argue, part of what we can, and should, mean by our being committed to 
ideals such as truthfulness and sincerity in our acknowledgment of others and 
their morally relevant perspectives on the world we jointly inhabit, both secu-
larly and in contexts of religious diversity where we feel an inclusivist attitude 
is needed. There can, then, be something like the pursuit of truth, as well as 
something like truth itself, in the act of acknowledgment even if there is no nar-
row propositional sense of truth available regarding the ‘as’ clause, as required 
in recognition.11 This pursuit of truth in a pragmatist sense is essentially the 
pursuit of a truthful attitude to the other person’s suffering (or one’s own suffer-
ing), which in the end will then lead into, or at least enable, a truthful attitude 
to experience in general—or the world in general.12 At this point it should come 
as no surprise that precisely this kind of pursuit of truth and truthfulness is rel-
evant in an inclusivist understanding of religious diversity. This yields an indi-
rect (and reflexive) argument in favor of pragmatism: its conception of truth 
(and truthfulness) in the service of acknowledging diverse others and other-
nesses, and their diverse experiences of suffering and attempts to communicate 
those experience to others, pragmatically works.
Truth, antitheodicy, and the slippery slope
However, things are not as simple as that. While James’s pragmatism integrates 
truth and truthfulness, or incorporates elements of the notion of truthfulness 
into the pragmatically articulated notion of truth itself, and while (we may say) 
pragmatism generally is framed by taking evil and suffering seriously in an 
antitheodicist manner (that is, without succumbing to the temptations of theod-
icy that would allegedly explain away the reality of meaningless suffering), it can 
be argued that the notion of truth itself is, in an irreducible way, required by the 
kind of antitheodicist attitude that James is recommending as a sine qua non of 
a properly ethical acknowledgment of otherness. This is because the notions of 
truth and truthfulness are needed for antitheodicism itself. It is not implausible, 
it seems to me, to suggest that James could have sympathized with, or indeed 
implicitly shared, the Kantian line of antitheodicist thought (based on Job’s sin-
cerity, as articulated in Chapter 3 above) in his criticism of theodicies analyzed 
above, without sharing Kant’s moral philosophy more generally, of course. For 
James, too, there is something fundamentally ethically insincere in theodicies.
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A basic distinction between truth and falsity is, however, necessary for the 
concepts of sincerity and truthfulness. The potential slippery slope from James 
to Rorty and Orwell’s O’Brien considered in Chapter 3 is a problem that runs 
straight through the problem of ethically adequate (or even appropriate) com-
munication of suffering, especially in contexts of religious diversity. How do 
our philosophical resources of truth and truthfulness, our discourses employ-
ing such notions, suffice here?
Rorty, famously, rejects the very idea of our being responsible or answer-
able to any non-human objective reality—traditionally assumed, he believes, 
in realist accounts of truth—and emphasizes that we can only be answerable to 
human audiences.13 Again, this could be analyzed as a relation of recognition:14 
we recognize human audiences as our potential rational critics in a way we can-
not recognize non-human reality. However, part of our response to a (relevant) 
audience is a response to an audience using the concept of objective reality. 
We have to recognize the relevance of that concept by recognizing the relevant 
audience. This is a case of what has been called mediated recognition: we rec-
ognize objective reality and truth by recognizing the relevant audience(s) and 
our responsibility or answerability toward them. We recognize objective reality 
itself by being answerable, and recognizing ourselves as being answerable, to 
an audience (or potential rational critics) that might challenge our views on 
reality. Such challenges could, of course, take place (again) in contexts of 
religious diversity, and it is for that reason that we need pragmatic truth and 
truthfulness for a proper acknowledgment of that diversity.
One obvious problem is that the relevant audience could change (randomly) 
in an Orwellian manner. The use and (thus) meaning of the concept of an objec-
tive reality could even be destroyed. Then the kind of mediated recognition 
sketched above would no longer work. In a sense there would no longer be an 
audience we would be responsible to any more. There would then be no views 
to have on anything any more; rational thought would collapse. In other words, 
we can recognize each other as using the concept of objective reality (and a 
related concept of truth), and thereby recognize each other and ourselves as 
being normatively committed to pursuing objective truth about reality—but 
only until O’Brien (or some other enemy of facts and truth) gets us. Then that 
commitment collapses, and so does our recognition of each other as users of 
the notion of truth—and as communicating agents. So does, then, our commit-
ment to sincerity and truthfulness, which are needed for antitheodicist moral 
seriousness in communicating suffering. The very possibility of taking religious 
diversity seriously as a situation of ethical, political, and epistemological argu-
ment and reflection would thus also collapse. No pursuit of inclusivist truth in a 
pragmatist sense would then be possible. In this way, pragmatism might end up 
in self-reflective incoherence: a Jamesian inclusivist attempt to take individual 
perspectives and their diversity seriously might lead to a collapse of that very 
project, as a result of the fragmentation of the concept of truth.
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One reason why the Rortyan-cum-Orwellian outcome is so troubling and 
so deeply threatening is that it threatens to destroy our antitheodicist com-
mitment to the idea that taking evil and suffering seriously in the first place—
recognizing its irreducible reality in its sheer meaninglessness—entails view-
ing the world in general in a different light.15 This is because the very idea of 
viewing the world in any way whatsoever, as well as the Jamesian usage of the 
concepts of ‘real’ and ‘fact’, for instance, presupposes some version of the con-
cepts of objectivity and truth, and these are now in a danger of collapsing. In 
Nineteen Eighty-Four, there is no viewing the world at all any more, no rational 
answerability to anyone regarding how to view it. (The answerability an indi-
vidual has toward the Party is not rational.)
Can truthfulness (in the sense fundamental to acknowledgment) be main-
tained even if mere propositional truth (fundamental to recognition, given the 
central role of the ‘as’ clause) collapses in the style of Rortyan neopragmatism? 
Acknowledgment, rather than recognition, can be seen as the key to truth-
ful communications of suffering, just as it is key to a (moderately) inclusiv-
ist understanding of religious diversity. This can also be seen as a fundamen-
tally Jamesian view. James, we may again recall, argued against our instinctive 
‘blindness’ and ‘deafness’ in relation to other human beings and their individual 
ways of viewing the world (see the introduction above). James may therefore 
be interpreted as presenting us with a profound, and endless, ethical challenge 
to acknowledge otherness, especially the other’s suffering (as the framing of the 
entire pragmatist project makes clear).
We are here dealing with the need to acknowledge others’ suffering itself 
as well as others’ attempts to communicate suffering, possibly across diverse 
religious and theological (and non-religious) outlooks. As James maintains in 
his 1899 lecture ‘Human Immortality’, encouraging us to acknowledge what he 
calls our ‘half-brutish prehistoric brothers’: 
Tis you who are dead, stone-dead and blind and senseless, in your way 
of looking on. You open your eyes upon a scene of which you miss the 
whole significance. Each of these grotesque or even repulsive aliens is 
animated by an inner joy of living as hot or hotter than that which you 
feel beating in your private breast.’ (James 1982 [1898]: 99.) 
The same line of thought is strongly present in James’s 1899 essay ‘On a Certain 
Blindness in Human Beings’. There James, observing the work of outdoor manual 
laborers, charges himself, and us, of being ‘as blind to the peculiar identity of their 
[those others’] conditions as they certainly would also have been to the ideality 
of mine, had they had a peep at my strange indoor academic ways of life’. (James 
1983 [1899]: 134; quoted more fully in the introduction above.) It is extremely 
difficult for us to fully grasp, let alone ethically acknowledge, the diversity of the 
inner meaningfulness of individuals’ very different forms of life—or, conversely, 
the diversity of individuals’ sincere experiences of meaninglessness in suffering.
Religious Truth, Acknowledgment, and Diversity 73
It is this kind of blindness that we have a moral duty to avoid (no matter how 
natural it is for us), just as we are, according to Emmanuel Levinas (who, of 
course, comes from a quite different philosophical tradition), invited to appre-
ciate the other’s face.16 It is, moreover, by self-critically countering such instinc-
tive blindness that we may cherish the virtues of acknowledgment and truthful-
ness—and this, I am suggesting, is part of what it means to develop the notion 
of truth itself in a pragmatic manner. When developed in this Jamesian way, the 
notion of truth already has an ethics of truthfulness and acknowledgment built 
into it and may not be as vulnerable to the Rortyan-Orwellian (O’Brienian) 
slippery slope as it might seem. Yet, the pragmatist inclusivist should be con-
stantly aware of the danger of sliding down that slippery slope.17
Testimony and martyrdom
The issue of truth and truthfulness in relation to recognition and acknowledg-
ment, especially in the context of communication, should also be linked with 
the (possibility of) testimony, especially moral testimony and martyrdom18—
which, as has sometimes been remarked, were in some sense rendered impossi-
ble in the Holocaust, in which people were murdered anonymously, deprived of 
any reason to die for anything, let alone of the possibility to communicate their 
experiences of suffering.19 The witness, especially the moral witness, testifies of 
something whose actual (factual) propositional truth and its actual historical 
occurrence is, though not irrelevant, not the most important issue. The moral 
truth of what happened is what really matters in such cases of communicating 
(the diversity of) suffering—and thus, again, we need to revisit the issue of truth 
and truthfulness, as this kind of moral truth may have more to do with truth-
fulness than with the propositional truth of moral statements that philosophers 
participating in the mainstream metaethical dispute over moral realism and 
antirealism focus on. Moreover, again, the moral truth (truthfulness) relevant 
here is a matter of developing a general attitude to the world, not confined to 
facts about any particular historical event (cf. also Chapter 6 below).
In any case, even then we still need a notion of truth, even if we reach the lim-
its of testimony, or the impossibility of bearing witness—something that Holo-
caust writers and philosophers investigating the Holocaust have emphasized in 
diverse ways. Even the non-testifiability and non-martyrdom of the suffering 
of the Holocaust victims will not destroy the concept of truth. But what if this 
concept is destroyed in Orwell’s, or rather O’Brien’s, manner? Then, arguably, 
not only antitheodicy in the Kantian sense based on the Book of Job or its prag-
matic Jamesian version urging us to acknowledge the reality of others’ suffering 
but also the very idea of a moral witness or moral testimony becomes obsolete, 
or even impossible. This has, again, a direct bearing on the issue of religious 
diversity and inclusivism. We can fully acknowledge the limits and fragility of 
testimony and the moral witness only by acknowledging the fundamental inse-
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curity and foundationlessness of the (or any) moral truth(s) that we (can, or 
could) testify about. Acknowledging the seriousness of moral testimony is itself 
an inherently inclusivist project, as the logical compatibility of (propositional) 
truth claims is not the central issue here; instead, the diversity of individual 
ethico-religious outlooks emerging from the need to share experiences of hor-
rible suffering (impossible to be ever fully communicated by any single testi-
mony) is at the core of the very idea of (for instance) Holocaust testimony, and 
this idea itself needs inclusivist elaboration. But then the notion of truth can 
never completely disappear from the picture, either.
The impossibility of ever fully acknowledging the ‘whole truth and nothing 
but the truth’ about the non-testifiable suffering of the martyr, or of any suf-
fering individual, or any moral witness, is a crucial part of the antitheodicist 
acknowledgment of others’ suffering in general, and of the (related) melan-
cholic worldview of a Jamesian ‘sick soul’ (cf. James 1958 [1902]). Again, the 
relevant notion of truth needed here for proper communication of suffering, in 
this case specifically for the communication of moral witnessing or testimony, 
viz., a notion of truth incorporating truthfulness, is the broader pragmatic 
notion, not the more traditional correspondence-theoretical one narrowly 
restricted to propositional truth.
Metaphysical realism as the proton pseudos of theodicism
The argument of this chapter started out from the discussions of the previous 
chapters concerning the issue of realism in general and in relation to religion in 
particular (at various levels), affirming the relevance of this issue to the topic of 
religious diversity. It is against that background, already covered in the intro-
duction, that I have suggested that inclusivism—which should be seen as mor-
ally motivated or even required, though only in a moderate sense that does not 
collapse into full-blown relativism—makes it necessary for us to reject meta-
physical realism. The present chapter has so far focused on the argument that 
pragmatist accounts of truth and realism along the lines of James might save a 
plausible kind of inclusivism, while also maintaining an adequate conception 
of truth. I have suggested (with some qualifications) that pragmatism might be 
uniquely able to accommodate both moderately objective realistic truth and 
subjective-existential ‘truth’ that incorporates truthfulness. In particular, I have 
distinguished between recognition and acknowledgment, maintaining that the 
former needs propositional truth while the latter is based on a richer pragmatic 
view of truth incorporating truthfulness.
I believe we can only conclude that the continuous need to be committed 
to pursuing truth must be affirmed, however pragmatic our notion of truth 
becomes in its ‘softened’ Jamesian versions. Otherwise others’ suffering, or the 
diversity of our religious (and, for that matter, non-religious) responses to suf-
fering, will not be properly ethically acknowledged. Pragmatism may not be 
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sufficient for dealing with the vast issues surrounding religious diversity, mul-
ticultural tolerance, recognition, acknowledgment, and inclusivism, let alone a 
solution to the problem of evil and suffering, but it may very well be a practi-
cal necessity for our attempts to explore these topics in a religiously sensitive 
and ethically appropriate manner. The fact that pragmatism itself may ‘work’ in 
pursuits like this may turn out to be a very important indirect—reflexive—con-
sideration in its favor. There is no non-circular defense of pragmatism available 
but only a pragmatic argument that self-critically seeks to show that there are 
ways in which pragmatism does seem to work—if not ideally, at least satisfac-
torily. This comes close to saying that pragmatism is pragmatically true as a 
response to the problem of religious diversity, though this view also needs to be 
conjoined with a full recognition of the diversity of pragmatisms.
Now, let me again turn to the view pragmatism is more or less straightfor-
wardly opposed to: metaphysical realism. My key objective in the rest of this 
chapter is to move on toward an ethical critique of metaphysical realism by 
analyzing—more explicitly than I have done so far—its inability to acknowl-
edge the perspectival plurality and diversity of others’ suffering. Arguing that 
theodicism typically (though not strictly speaking logically) presupposes meta-
physical realism, as both assume the availability of a ‘God’s-Eye View’ theory 
of why there is evil and suffering (i.e., God’s reasons for allowing the world 
to contain apparently meaningless and unnecessary evil and suffering on the 
massive scale known to us), I will not only argue against theodicism by criti-
cizing its background assumption but also against metaphysical realism itself 
by rejecting its (typical) consequence, theodicism. Metaphysical realism and 
theodicism will then ultimately collapse hand in hand. Thus, I am now turning 
toward a more explicit critical examination of theodicism and the problem of 
evil and suffering, which have been with us since the start of this inquiry but 
will become more central in what follows.
However, we should remember that the argued collapse of metaphysical real-
ism and theodicism does not lead to a rejection of realism tout court. Antithe-
odicism, as we saw, needs a pragmatically realist understanding of humanly 
speaking objective reality and truth, but it is precisely the human dimension 
of this need that is not available within metaphysical realism. Moreover, I will 
make a meta-level point about an ethical argument regarding theodicies—espe-
cially their tendency to fail to recognize individual experiences and voices of 
suffering—yielding a metaphysical argument against metaphysical realism as 
their source. Thus, our concern with theodicy and antitheodicy results in a 
more general reflection on the relation between ethics and metaphysics.
Theodicism and realism (again): against objectification
As explained earlier, I propose to define theodicies and theodicism simply with 
reference to the attempt to provide a justification for apparently senseless (mean-
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ingless, absurd) suffering. Generally, theodicies seek a justification, legitimation, 
and/or excusing of an omnipotent, omniscient and absolutely benevolent God’s 
allowing the world (His creation) to contain evil and for allowing humans and 
other sentient beings to suffer. Classical formulations can be found, for example, 
in Augustine’s and his many followers’ appeal to God’s having created human 
beings with the freedom of the will as the reason why there is evil, and in Leib-
niz’s view, formulated in his famous Théodicée (1710), according to which God 
could not have created any better world than the one he, as omnipotent and 
absolutely good, did create; hence we live in the best possible world, and while 
there is some evil there, it is necessary for the overall good. 
By ‘theodicism’, furthermore, I have referred to attempts to deal with the 
problem of evil that regard theodicy as a desideratum of an acceptable theistic 
position, irrespective of whether they end up defending theism or rejecting it. 
The theodicist can, then, be an atheist, insofar as s/he concludes that God does 
not exist (or probably does not exist, or that there is no justification for the 
belief that God exists) precisely because the theodicist desideratum cannot be 
fulfilled. Also those who offer a mere ‘defense’—instead of a theodicy proper—
can be regarded as theodicists in the sense that they also seek to defend God 
and account for God’s justice by arguing that, for all we know, God could have 
ethically acceptable reasons to allow the world to contain evil, even on the mas-
sive scale familiar to us. By antitheodicism, in contrast, I mean the rejection of 
any such, or indeed any, theodicies, or better, of the very project of delivering 
a theodicy or the attitude of encouraging or requiring the engagement in such 
a project.
Theodicism and evidentialism are closely connected (see the introduction 
above). As mainstream philosophy of religion today is (albeit with significant 
exceptions) relatively strongly evidentialist (in a broad sense), it comes as no 
surprise that it is also often strongly theodicist when dealing with the problem 
of evil. That is, evil is in most cases seen as an empirical premise challenging the 
theistic belief in an argumentative exchange searching evidence in support of, 
or against, the theistic hypothesis. This is so irrespective of whether the prob-
lem of evil is regarded as a logical or as an evidential problem. The theistic 
goal is to respond to the atheists’ ‘argument from evil’. Just like theodicism is a 
normative view according to which any rationally acceptable theism ought to 
formulate a theodicy (or at least take steps toward the direction of a theodicy 
by formulating a ‘defense’), evidentialism is a normative epistemological view 
according to which any rationally acceptable theism ought to be defended by 
means of evidence, or rational considerations more generally. Theodicism is, 
then, a specific dimension of evidentialism: it tries to tell us how we should 
discuss the problem of evil when evil is regarded as a piece of evidence against 
theism that the theist needs to deal with. A philosophical critique of theodi-
cism is, therefore, a critique of the entire argument from evil and its use in both 
theistic and atheistic discourse. In this sense, again, our considerations in this 
chapter will have a metaphilosophical dimension.20
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While the link between theodicism and evidentialism seems to be relatively 
clear, the relation between theodicism and realism, especially metaphysical real-
ism, has not been studied in any great detail. I will try to argue that metaphysical 
realism is the proton pseudos of theodicism—just as it is a false start in many 
other philosophical areas of inquiry, too, including various recent conceptions 
of the self, of death, and related matters (cf., e.g., Pihlström 2016).21 What also 
needs to be noted here is that the distinction between metaphysical realism and 
its alternatives is itself a practice- and discourse-dependent construct, not an 
objectified distinction that would itself be based on metaphysical realism.22
Let me now briefly consider an example that explicitly refers to the link 
between realism and theodicism. Peter Byrne argues in his God and Realism 
(2003) that realism is needed in philosophy of religion partly, or even primar-
ily, because responding to the problem of evil by delivering a theodicy presup-
poses realism. Byrne suggests that theism needs to incorporate a ‘generic offer 
of a theodicy’, and this requires a realistic conception of the divinity conjoined 
with moral teleology and a conception of a ‘final good’ of human life (ibid.: vii). 
Byrne’s basic characterization of realism says that ‘the governing intent behind 
the concept of God is to refer to an extra-mental, extra-mundane, transcendent 
entity’ (ibid.: 6), and while theodicies may not be explicitly invoked in realism 
discussions in the philosophy of religion, Byrne seems to maintain that the 
entire realism debate is largely motivated by the need to provide a theodicy—
that is, by theodicism:
The need or problem is that of finding a response to evil. In particular, 
[religions] arise out of the human perception that the apparent order 
of the world around them is not a moral order; it is indifferent to the 
achievement of human happiness and the realisation of human good-
ness; it presents itself as blind and indifferent to justice. It is the job of 
a religion on this account to offer human beings a theodicy. (Ibid.: 17.)
It is prima facie surprising to hear that religions should offer us theodicies, as one 
might think that this is the job of theology (or perhaps of the philosophy of reli-
gion) rather than religion itself. Be that as it may, Byrne insists that ‘a religion is 
any set of symbols (and associated actions, attitudes, feelings and experiences) 
providing human beings with a solution to evil by way of a theodicy’; more 
generally, religion is ‘that propensity in human beings (however grounded) to 
respond to evil by seeking the kind of meaning […] associated with the enter-
prise of theodicy’ (ibid.: 18). Realism is needed for religion, because providing 
a theodicy invokes a ‘moral and providential causality in the world’ transcend-
ing natural and human powers as well as a relational conception of the human 
good as ‘a matter of living in right relation to the source of the providential, 
moral order postulated as response to evil’ (ibid.). The program of defending 
realism in the philosophy of religion thus includes, Byrne maintains, a critique 
of the very coherence of antirealist views of good and evil.23
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Antitheodicists are usually not only non-evidentialists but also non-realists 
(at least in the sense of rejecting metaphysical realism), albeit not for that rea-
son necessarily antirealists. This is so whether they start from Wittgensteinian-
ism (e.g., Phillips), pragmatism (e.g., James), or Jewish post-Holocaust ethics 
(e.g., Levinas). For example, Levinas seems to maintain that the metaphysically 
realist attempt to occupy a totalizing God’s-Eye View on others’ suffering is the 
source of theodicist immorality.24 Phillips, in turn, regards transcendent theis-
tic accounts of moral goodness as morally corrupting, as they do not acknowl-
edge the ‘pointlessness’ of evil. Byrne’s (ibid.: 132–135) metaphysical moral tel-
eology and his theodicism based on metaphysical realism are thus as far from 
Phillips’s position as anything can be. The bone of contention seems to be that 
while for Byrne goodness ultimately serves cosmic divine purposes, for Phillips 
goodness is non-teleological, ‘purposeless’ (just like evil, analogously, is point-
less) (ibid.: 134). Indeed, the very attempt to base moral goodness—or evil—
on some external meaning or purpose is problematic (see Chapter 6 below). 
Metaphysical realism, then, is the key issue here. Similarly, James’s criticism of 
the ‘absolute’ (and Hegelian monistic idealism, for him the paradigmatic form 
of metaphysical realism) is also primarily ethical; the metaphysical critique is 
based on the ethical unacceptability of the absolute yielding an irresolvable the-
odicy problem.
Why exactly is realism such a key issue here? It seems to me that this is because 
metaphysical realism at least typically reductively objectifies—that is, tends to 
view as mere objects in the world—something that cannot (and ethically ought 
not to) really be viewed as mere objects among others ‘out there’ in the mind-, 
practice-, and discourse-independent world: (i) God (easily, albeit perhaps not 
inevitably, leading to a kind of simplistic anthropomorphism) as well as (ii) oth-
ers’ suffering (reduced into a mere process in the objective empirical world),25 
and hence also (iii) otherness itself. Such objectifications are in striking con-
trast with Levinas, in particular, for whom the other is more fundamental than 
any object-subject structure—but of course they also contrast with pragmatism 
and pragmatic pluralism, as defended in this book. By thus reductively objec-
tifying things that should remain beyond objectification, theodicism based on 
metaphysical realism also overlooks the diversity and perspectivalness of both 
suffering and people’s individual (religious or non-religious) responses to suf-
fering. In other words, metaphysical realism and the theodicism based upon it 
are essentially detached views when it comes to responding to others’ suffering; 
instead of being involved and engaged, the theodicist relies on metaphysical 
realism in seeking to maintain a ‘view from nowhere’.
From a Kantian point of view, in particular, the basic problem with meta-
physical realism and its applications in theodicism—and everywhere else—is 
the tendency to seek a theocentric perspective, which is necessarily unavailable 
to us (or better, not just unavailable but incoherent). It is arguably also unethi-
cal to try to reach it precisely because it is ethically problematic to reduce oth-
ers’ experiences of suffering into mere objective processes and events in the 
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world taken to be independent of the ethical acknowledgment of suffering. A 
related problem in metaphysical realism is the attempt to make metaphysics 
prior to ethics, whereas the kind of critique of metaphysical realism advanced 
here makes a case for the profound entanglement of these two areas of philoso-
phy. Again, however, the entanglement of ethics with metaphysics is not itself 
an objective fact based on metaphysical realism but a feature of our human 
lifeworld and its practices.
An antitheodicist ethic of acknowledgment thus cannot be based on any 
objectifying metaphysical realism, but it must defend a ‘realistic spirit’ about 
evil and suffering as well as an ordinary (pragmatic) notion of objective truth 
needed for the requirement of sincerity fundamental to Kantian antitheodicism 
(as argued in Chapter 3 above). Failure of acknowledgment is the crucial ethical 
failure here; this is the antitheodicist’s fundamental charge against theodicism. 
These thoughts also lead us to appreciate why there should, and indeed can, be 
no argument from evil. This is precisely because arguing from evil, or respond-
ing to such arguments theodicistically, presupposes metaphysical realism (and 
evidentialism), objectifying the very experiences of suffering that must not be 
objectified.26 The very use of the empirical premise stating the reality of evil in 
the argument from evil—and theodicist responses to that use—objectifies as 
well as instrumentalizes suffering.
We should, furthermore, note that skeptical theism27 also problematically 
presupposes metaphysical realism: God is claimed to have (or possibly have) 
reasons for allowing suffering that we just do not or cannot know. The divine 
hiddenness discussion is yet another debate in contemporary philosophy of 
religion problematically based on metaphysical realism. All these issues con-
cerning the relation between God, human beings, and the world objectify God 
as well as otherness, presupposing that we could actually adopt a theocentric 
perspective on these matters (to which there are only finite anthropocentric 
perspectives available for us, amidst our ethico-religious human practices). 
Even the skeptical theist assumes that in principle such a theocentric perspec-
tive could and should be available, while it merely de facto contingently is not.
When the divine hiddenness issue is raised as a purely intellectual puzzle 
allegedly external to religious life itself, it differs crucially from the genuinely 
religious and/or existential anxiety associated with real-life experiences of the 
hiddenness of God (which may or may not lead to one’s losing one’s religion). 
As against the mainstream analytic divine hiddenness discussion, I would sug-
gest that the experience of God’s ‘hiding’, or being unavailable, is internal to a 
religious way of life, challenging the life and thought of a person engaging in 
religion from within. It could also challenge a non-believer, or an agnostic, as 
an ‘awareness of what is missing’.28 Indeed, it is possible that this is the form of 
religious experience available to a secular modern person (who might never-
theless be a Jamesian ‘sick soul’), an experience possibly arising from a consid-
eration of the problem of evil and suffering: it does not seem like God would be 
in charge of the world or history.
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At the meta-level, a secular yet religiously sensitive (or ‘religiously musical’) 
educated person might long for the possibility of (still) being part of the kind 
of meaningfulness or significance (internally belonging to a religious form of 
life) that makes possible the religiously relevant meaninglessness of a religiously 
experienced divine hiddenness. This meta-level question of meaningfulness 
and meaninglessness (which includes the ethical requirement of adequately 
acknowledging others’ experiences of meaninglessness) is presumably the clos-
est that some secular persons today can get to religious experience.
It should be clear at this point that metaphysical realism is seriously inad-
equate for exploring experiences and possibilities like this. These experiences 
of divine hiddenness and meaninglessness require a transcendental framework 
to be adequately addressed, and such a framework is unavailable in metaphysi-
cal realism. Our reaction to evil and suffering may therefore lead us to explore 
the limits of religious language use—and of language in general, especially the 
language of philosophical theorization. We will therefore in the next chapter 
make a lengthy excursus to an interpretation of Wittgenstein as maintaining 
that a transcendental investigation of the limits of language focuses on necessi-
ties (transcendental conditions) themselves grounded in contingencies, in how 
we think and act within our (contingent) form of life. Similarly, our rejection of 
metaphysical realism is not itself based on metaphysical realism (which is not 
false in any metaphysically realistic sense, but rather verges on incoherence); 
instead, this rejection emerges from our contingent, perspectival practices hav-
ing an irreducibly ethical dimension.
Thus, the distinction between contingency and necessity is not necessarily 
drawn in the way we actually draw it—or even if it is, that meta-necessity is 
(meta-)contingent and depends, reflexively, on our contingent language use 
and the kinds of human problems, especially ethical ones, we find ourselves 
living with. Therefore, continuous self-critical attention to our practices of 
speaking and acting is more fundamental than any metaphysically realistic 
objectifying theorization. In the next chapter, I will elaborate on this with some 
references to the issue of the limits of language in Wittgensteinian philosophy 
of religion (relevant to both pragmatism and antitheodicism).
Some criticisms and responses
I must, however, next consider some issues that the metaphysical realist or the-
odicist could be thought to raise against the kind of criticism briefly presented 
here, trying to counter those criticisms as well as I can.
It could be argued, first, that the claim that the metaphysically realist position 
amounts to a kind of reductionism that effaces sufferers, treating their suffering 
as a mere process rather than something of profound significance that merits an 
appropriate ethical and affective response, is ill founded and not supported by 
argument. It might, in brief, remain unclear why metaphysical realism would 
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entail anything like that. Here the easy response is that I am not claiming there 
to be strictly speaking any relation of entailment or implication either way. I 
am only suggesting a certain kind of relation of association or a paradigmatic 
link. I think of both theodicism and metaphysical realism as ‘family resem-
blance’ views in the sense that quite different specific positions can be found 
under either rubric, and it is not clear there is any essential defining criterion 
for either (except perhaps at a highly general level). So what I am suggesting 
is that typically, or paradigmatically, these two go together, and in most cases 
theodicism is associated with a rather strong metaphysical realism.
This can be seen by taking seriously the literary versions of theodicism and 
antitheodicism that Sari Kivistö and myself study in our joint book, Kantian 
Antitheodicy (Kivistö & Pihlström 2016). In the works by Kafka and Orwell 
we discuss there (and of course in the Book of Job), there is the assumption of 
there being a kind of super-perspective (a ‘God’s-Eye View’, as it were) unavail-
able to the protagonists, a perspective of absoluteness which in a way unethi-
cally neglects or reduces away—in any case fails to recognize or acknowl-
edge—the significance of the protagonists’ first-person individual (human) 
perspective(s). So there is a certain clash between the anthropocentric and 
the theocentric perspectives here, comparable to the way in which critics of 
metaphysical realism—starting with Kant and extending to recent neopragma-
tism and Wittgensteinianism—attack the idea of our being able to climb into a 
divine or pseudo-divine super-perspective. In some other antitheodicist works, 
such as Beckett’s Godot, the very existence of such a super-perspective is sug-
gested to be fundamentally illusory. There is no perspective of that kind; there 
is no overall explanation or account of how things are, not even one that would 
be hidden from us; it is only a human (and perhaps humanly understandable or 
even unavoidable, as in the case of Kantian transcendental illusions) to suppose 
there is, or to hope one could achieve such a perspective. So Beckett shows us 
how human beings struggle—in vain—to find such a perspective which simply 
is not there to be found. For Kafka and Orwell it might be there while remain-
ing unavailable; for Beckett we are living under an illusion when supposing it 
to be there in the first place.
Furthermore, I admit it may sound unusual to propose that a philosophi-
cal debate that originally emerged in the core areas of theoretical philosophy, 
especially philosophy of science, i.e., the (metaphysical) realism debate, can be 
directly applied to the theodicy issue. It has of course been applied to the phi-
losophy of religion more generally (cf. Chapter 1). However, those applications 
of realism and its alternatives rarely explicitly comment on theodicies. I am 
then merely pointing toward a tendency in theodicism to assume, explicitly or 
implicitly, a relatively strong form of realism. 
Critics of theodicism from Kant to James, Levinas, and Phillips (and many 
others) typically also reject metaphysical realism. Such philosophers need not 
reject realism as such, or versions of pragmatic or internal realism (to borrow 
terminology from the more standard realism debate), but they do typically 
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reject the kind of realism that supposes that there is something like a God’s-
Eye View absolute account of reality—an account that would include a final 
account of the reasons for human suffering, as seen from the divine super-per-
spective. However, these and other antitheodicists would be equally critical of 
the kind of atheism that concludes from the argument ‘from’ evil that there is 
no God because the absolute perspective is unachievable. Believing in God, 
even in a ‘hidden’ God, might be an individual way of responding to suffering 
in the absence of any such super-perspective.
It could, secondly, be claimed that a metaphysically realist absolute descrip-
tion could (and arguably should) include metaphysically objective facts about 
suffering, including the suffering of creatures created by God (if one is a the-
ist). However, the very attempt to include such facts about creaturely suffer-
ing (or, analogously, flourishing) in the absolute description of reality from a 
God’s-Eye View is what makes theodicism problematic in the ethical sense. It is 
precisely by ‘including’ (in the sense of reducing) individuals and their suffer-
ings into this overall interpretation (which ‘knows better’ why the individuals 
have to suffer, for instance) that constitutes a failure of ethically appropriately 
acknowledging the irreducible individual perspective as what it is—as a per-
spective that, at least potentially, simply cannot attach any meaning or signifi-
cance to the suffering at issue. It is the very meaninglessness of suffering, or the 
individual’s experience of such meaninglessness, that is not recognized by the 
metaphysically realistic theodicist. Suffering individuals’ experiences of their 
suffering—while being accounted for in the objectifying metaphysically realist 
picture—are treated from a third-person or absolute perspective, not from the 
first-person (or second-person) perspective that makes their meaninglessness 
strikingly obvious. This is comparable to the way in which strongly objectiv-
ist third-personal accounts of death and mortality fail to address the issue of 
human ‘being toward death’ from the first-personal existential point of view—
or, for that matter, from the Levinasian second-personal point of view focusing 
on the other person’s mortality (see Pihlström 2016).
Thirdly, the theodicist could claim that even the pointlessness or meaning-
lessness of evil itself could somehow be part of the absolute God’s-Eye View 
description of reality, including the reality of evil and suffering. Now, if this 
were so, then the ‘pointlessness’ of evil would be merely apparent in the sense 
that the fact that there can be pointless evil (for example, evil resulting from 
our free actions, as free will theodicies would suggest) does serve the ulti-
mate purpose of having a world with human beings equipped with freedom 
and responsibility. That is then viewed as the supreme value that God finds 
more important than preventing horrible suffering. The experience of the utter 
meaninglessness of evil and suffering that the antitheodicist urges us to take 
seriously as an (at least possible) individual experience cannot include even 
such meta-level instrumentalization of evil and suffering.
Fourthly, it is not only the metaphysical realist or the theodicist who (in a 
way that, I have claimed, fails to recognize the individual sufferer) weighs or 
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measures the positive and negative values of human experiences of suffering 
on some allegedly objective scale. Also any ‘moralist’ who engages in any even 
rudimentary activity of moral deliberation must inevitably make such ‘calcu-
lations’ that could be regarded as insensitive to the incommensurability and 
immeasurability of sufferings. Now, on Levinasian and arguably also Jamesian 
grounds it is not implausible to maintain that all moral agents (and myself in 
particular) do inevitably fall short of meeting the requirements of morality. We 
all more or less inevitably engage in the kind of totalizing and non-acknowl-
edging practices that I am criticizing theodicism and metaphysical realism for. 
This is, ultimately, a kind of Levinasian picture of ethics as involving a com-
mitment to the infinite duty of being responsible to and for the other without 
ever (per impossibile) objectifying the other into something to which we have 
primarily cognitive or epistemic access. The Levinasian ethical subject is sub-
ordinate to the other in the sense that there is no ethical subject(ivity) at all 
without the prior ethical relation to the other.29
In criticizing theodicism and the metaphysical realism that (typically, para-
digmatically) underlies it we should, then, be criticizing our own tendencies to 
distort the morally fundamental nature of our relation to otherness, i.e., our 
own tendencies to fail to acknowledge otherness in its irreducibility (i.e., its 
irreducibility to my categorizing the world in terms of some pre-fixed catego-
ries, or its irreducibility to my believing the world to be so pre-categorized in 
the absence of any individual perspectives). The moral criticism of theodicism 
(and realism) ought to be primarily self-criticism, a criticism of our temptation 
to theodicy (cf. Bernstein 2002)—and to too strong forms of realism.
Acknowledging reality: the humanism of antitheodicism
Acknowledging reality—whatever we exactly mean by that vague phrase—does 
not, I believe, require metaphysical realism. On the contrary, metaphysical real-
ism itself fails to acknowledge reality in its diversity, as it reductively objectifies 
everything into a single total picture.30 What proper acknowledgment requires 
is objective truth and truthfulness in a pragmatic sense (as articulated above) 
and a ‘realistic spirit’ rather than any overall assumption of metaphysical real-
ism. Therefore the pursuit of not just pragmatism but of a plausible form of 
pragmatic realism (within pragmatism) is crucial in the philosophy of religion, 
as already argued in the earlier chapters of this volume.
Theodicies are of course only one specific, albeit ethically highly important, 
example of a distorted non-acknowledgment of reality (especially of the reality 
of otherness). Other examples include a quasi-Orwellian (or, perhaps today, 
‘Trumpist’) failure to acknowledge the very significance of truth and facts (as 
witnessed by the horrifyingly Orwellian pseudo-discourse of ‘alternative facts’), 
as well as popular self-help literature advancing various manipulative pseudo-
therapies, self-branding, easy solutions to the complex challenges of human 
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life, etc. There are profoundly problematic elements of insincerity in such cul-
tural phenomena that are in interesting ways analogous to theodicist narra-
tives with their harmonious total world picture. What we need as a remedy is 
not metaphysical realism with its imagined super-absolute facts but an ethical 
acknowledgment of the diversity of humanly constituted and reconstructed 
reality and objectivity. It is part of this acknowledgment to also acknowledge 
the essentially contestable nature of any facts we may be committed to as well 
as the fragility of any meanings and meaningfulness we may find in our world.31 
When Rorty (1989) tells us that if we take care of freedom, truth can take care 
of itself,32 he needs to be reminded that this is true only if freedom is not just 
negative freedom from constraints but positive freedom that includes responsi-
bility and a genuine commitment to acknowledgment, including the acknowl-
edgment of human limits, finitude, and fragility. Rortyan pragmatists also need 
to be reminded that a pragmatist conception of truth must never entirely give 
up our ordinary realistic commitment to objective reality and truth.33
I have suggested that the realism discussion in the philosophy of religion, 
while apparently independent of the theodicy discussion, is actually very 
closely tied to the latter—to the extent that theodicism (typically, paradigmati-
cally) presupposes a problematic form of metaphysical realism and should be 
criticized along with such realism. The collapse of metaphysical realism hardly 
directly entails the collapse of theodicism, but the antitheodicist should focus 
on attacking the metaphysically realist background assumptions of theodicism 
in addition to focusing on the main task of showing the colossal failure of moral 
acknowledgment in all attempts to justify others’ suffering.34
The theodicy vs. antitheodicy issue is often seen as purely metaphysical (as 
in, say, Leibnizian theodicies and their contemporary variants) or, alternatively, 
as primarily ethical (as in ‘moral antitheodicism’ based on, say, Levinasian 
criticism of the immorality of justifying others’ suffering, going beyond ontol-
ogy). I have tried to argue, at least implicitly, that both are too narrow ways of 
conceiving the matter. The issue actually exemplifies the deep entanglement of 
the moral and the metaphysical. The way to see this entanglement at the core 
of this issue is to note how deeply theodicies are committed to metaphysical 
realism. Antitheodicism, as has been suggested, is based on the ethical affirma-
tion of the fundamental need to recognize or acknowledge—ontologically as 
well as ethically—individual sufferers’ (or victims’ of evil) perspectives in their 
distinctiveness and irreducibility. This presupposes that we reject metaphysical 
realism as a non-acknowledging (and therefore at least potentially even mor-
ally corrupting) totalizing attempt to view the world as a totality from a God’s-
Eye View. This rejection is both ethical and metaphysical, with the two aspects 
inseparably present. Not only are the ethical and the metaphysical entangled 
here; similarly (and entangled with this entanglement), there is the entangle-
ment of the unintelligibility or incoherence, on the one hand, and the ethical 
unacceptability, on the other, of the kind of metaphysics invoked by theodicies, 
based on metaphysical realism. Recall again how James rejected the Hegelian 
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idealists’ absolute as both conceptually unintelligible and as morally corrupt-
ing—with these two criticisms inseparably intertwined.
It could also be suggested that if metaphysical realism and thereby theodi-
cism really are incoherent responses to the reality of suffering (or to reality 
generally), then we could not really be theodicists even if we tried. We would be 
in ‘bad faith’; we would in reality always already have acknowledged the moral 
status of the other person and thus also the irreducibility and unobjectifiability 
of their suffering, simply as a (transcendental) necessary precondition for our 
own moral subjectivity, and therefore the theodicy argumentation could not 
really get off the ground at all.35 An engagement in theodicies, or a commit-
ment to theodicism, would thus in a way be a self-denial, a concealment of one’s 
inevitable (transcendental) commitment to moral acknowledgment. We may 
agree with this suggestion while also maintaining that it is important to empha-
size the incoherence of theodicist and metaphysically realist thinking. Kant had 
to write hundreds of pages in defense of transcendental idealism while also 
maintaining that in some sense anyone who even so much as has experiences 
of objects and events must be a transcendental idealist (even against their own 
will), as transcendental realism is ultimately incoherent.36
It should also be re-emphasized that pragmatic pluralism (as opposed to 
metaphysical realism, to reductive objectification, to what Kant called tran-
scendental realism, and to various forms of reductionism and totalizing) and 
antitheodicism (acknowledging individual suffering in its perspectival variety, 
as opposed to theodicist postulations of a totalizing overall perspective) are 
really two sides of the same coin; they go very well together. These, for our 
present purposes at least, are fundamentally just aspects of a single thought pat-
tern, or a tendency of thinking, a philosophical temperament in James’s sense, 
a temperament taking seriously individual diversity that cannot be reduced 
to any totality (and thus a temperament opposed to reductionism in its many 
other forms as well).
However, we should recognize a reflexive problem here. Am I saying that 
these are generally right or correct views or ideas to embrace? Am I betraying 
my own defense of pluralism, perspectivalness, and respect for diversity by fail-
ing to recognize the philosophical value of monism and reductionism? Am I 
claiming pragmatism to be ‘true’ from a God’s-Eye View?
I have no final response to provide here. I am tempted to point out that this is 
like saying that one should, if one is tolerant, also tolerate intolerance; the only 
possible response to such a criticism in the end is ‘no, one should not’. The fact 
that we have to be reflectively self-critical in our pursuit of antitheodicism (and 
pragmatism) yields one final comment on what we might call the humanism 
of antitheodicism. We should defend the individual human being’s right and 
duty to take responsibility for creating—or failing to create—moral meaning 
into her/his life and the world s/he lives in, in the absence of any transcendent, 
metaphysico-theological or theodicist grand narratives of the meaningfulness 
or significance of suffering. The human being stands at the center of this ethical 
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project of constructing meaning; this is her/his existential task which cannot be 
handed over to any (real or imagined) God. ‘Creating moral meaning’ does not 
amount to discovering any ready-made meanings or moral truths (in a meta-
physically realistic sense) but to living an open, possibly difficult life fully aware 
of what Wittgenstein in the Tractatus called the ‘problem of life’ (see the next 
chapter), even aware of the constant possibility of meaninglessness.
This is also a humanism of a ‘de-selfing’, disappearing subject: the ethically 
engaged person does not set her-/himself at the center but disappears into the 
world like the transcendental subject of Wittgenstein’s solipsism in the Trac-
tatus. Such humanism is very far from the way in which the human being (or 
more precisely, one’s own self) is placed at the center of things in our contem-
porary ‘selfie’ culture and popular self-help. The self-critically reflective antithe-
odicism I am defending contains the requirement of constant vigilance in not 
setting oneself first and thereby failing to recognize others’ sufferings. This is 
why it is important to fight against one’s own theodicist temptations—and the 
related temptation to embrace the only apparently consoling absolute picture 
of metaphysical realism.
CHAPTER 5
The Limits of Language and Harmony
Philosophers of religion inspired by Ludwig Wittgenstein typically focus on the 
‘grammatical’ methodology emerging from Wittgenstein’s later work.1 When 
examining the problem of evil and suffering, they often suggest that the very 
formulation of this problem, in the traditional form calling for a theodicy, is 
deeply confused, as it violates the grammar of genuinely religious language 
use. Similarly, many of them also find the problem of realism confused—to the 
extent that very few of them would be willing to embrace the kind of pragmatic 
realism I have defended in the earlier chapters.
This chapter focuses on the theodicy issue rather than the realism issue, but 
we know already that these two are closely related. Let us begin by observing 
that philosophers taking their departure from Wittgensteinian grammatical 
considerations may argue that, religiously speaking, theodicies can be criti-
cized not only as confused but as superstitious or blasphemous. Thus, several 
Wittgensteinian philosophers maintain that theodicies allegedly justifying ‘the 
ways of God to man’—that is, arguments seeking to make sense of apparently 
meaningless and absurd evil and suffering within God’s overall harmonious 
plan—amount not only to ethically insensitive use of language disregarding 
or misrecognizing others’ suffering in its pointlessness but also to pseudo-reli-
gious and therefore religiously confused use of language. It is not only ethi-
cally wrong but also meaningless and conceptually confused, i.e., a violation 
of the meaning-constitutive grammar of religious language games, to claim 
that others’ suffering has a metaphysical or theological meaning, function, or 
explanation. This is so irrespective of which specific theodicy (such as ‘free will 
theodicy’ or ‘soul-making theodicy’) is postulated. The ‘conceptual oddness’ of 
theodicies has been noted not only by D.Z. Phillips, arguably the best-known 
Wittgensteinian antitheodicist, but also by Ben Tilghman—who uses this very 
phrase—and by Stephen Mulhall, who explicitly suggests that theodicies end up 
with blasphemy.2 In a similar vein, Andrew Gleeson, also writing in a broadly 
Wittgensteinian tradition, notes that theodicies should be criticized on both 
moral and conceptual grounds, while Mikel Burley points out that the theodi-
cist is ‘so confused as to be unaware of the degree of their own insensitivity’ to 
pain and suffering—with moral as well as logical and conceptual dimensions 
pertaining to this confusion.3
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According to these and many other Wittgensteinian philosophers of religion, 
theodicies thus presuppose a confused and immoral kind of harmony in the 
world and in our attitude to other human beings’ sufferings, as already noted 
in our critical treatment (especially in Chapter 4 above) of the metaphysical 
harmony postulated by the kind of God’s-Eye View realism presupposed by 
theodicism. Such a harmony is allegedly ethical in postulating not only a per-
fectly just God but also a balance between moral (or immoral) actions and 
their reward or punishment, but according to critics of theodicies it is in reality 
unethical in its disregard for individual human beings’ experiences of mean-
ingless suffering.4 What may be called Wittgensteinian antitheodicy resists such 
a temptation to embrace a metaphysically and theologically harmonious world 
picture (or a harmonious view of God, for that matter) as a pseudo-religious 
tendency (cf. Pihlström 2007; 2013a: chapter 5), insisting on the need to take 
seriously the profound disharmony of human lives and sufferings. Here I can-
not examine any detailed arguments for Wittgensteinian antitheodicism, but 
let me offer a few observations on Phillips’s approach, setting the stage for the 
main concerns of this chapter.5
The Wittgensteinian method Phillips (along with many other Wittgenstein-
ians) subscribes to carefully looks at the actual use of language in concrete 
human situations and practices, instead of any a priori rules or principles estab-
lishing linguistic meanings. Yet, he also emphasizes the general Wittgenstein-
ian ideas that ‘it is only in the context of [religious] language games that belief 
in God has any meaning’ and ‘concepts have their life’ ‘only in practice, in what 
we do’ (Phillips 1993: xi, xiii). In his criticism of theodicies, in particular, Phil-
lips focuses on what goes wrong in the very form of the allegedly moral reason-
ing the theodicist engages in; he interestingly cites the Book of Job here: ‘Job 
cannot make sense of his afflictions in terms of the [theodicist] arguments of 
his would-be comforters’ (ibid.: 157). While those defending theodicies try to 
calculate what kinds of goods or benefits (such as the general goodness of free 
will) might outweigh or compensate for the evils and sufferings there are (e.g., 
those resulting from the misuse of freedom), thus thinking in terms of a kind 
of divine harmony, the Phillipsian-cum-Wittgensteinian antitheodicist objects 
to ‘the concept of calculation in this context, because it excludes moral concepts’ 
(ibid.: 158).
Phillips argues that the truly religious reaction to the contingencies and 
adversities of human life does not seek to ‘tidy up’ messy human reality or to 
find explanations and understandings of suffering (see Phillips 1993: 166–168). 
Rather, properly (genuinely, truly) religious uses of language, when address-
ing the problem of evil and suffering, recognize the limits of understanding 
and linguistic expression—not as contingent limitations that could in principle 
be transcended yet de facto cannot be overcome by us, but rather as neces-
sary limits defining the relevant language game and therefore playing a quasi-
transcendental6 role in constituting what is meaningful and possible for us (see 
ibid.: 168), albeit in the end only contextually necessary limits that could in 
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principle be redrawn as our lives change. A ‘transcendental’ critique of the-
odicies, when formulated from a Wittgensteinian perspective along Phillipsian 
lines, thus crucially focuses on the grammar constitutive of moral and religious 
language, that is, on the meaning-structuring rules of the relevant language 
games—rules that might, however, themselves be historically transformed (cf. 
also, e.g., Phillips 1986). If we take seriously the late-Wittgensteinian view that 
there can be no meaning without practice-laden, habitual, world-engaging use 
of expressions within public human ways of acting, or language games—i.e., 
that ‘meaning is use’ in the sense of the Investigations (cf. PI, I, §23)—then we 
should also acknowledge the fact that the meanings of such expressions as ‘evil’, 
‘suffering’, ‘God’, ‘meaning’, and ‘harmony’ (as well as, for that matter, ‘reality’ 
and ‘truth’), are inextricably entangled with their use in religious (and other) 
language games and thus in our forms of life. If we do take this seriously, then 
it is conceptually, morally, and religiously misguided to seek to provide a the-
odicy—or to require one.
Wittgenstein himself had little to say about this particular topic, even though 
he famously commented on various other issues in the philosophy of religion 
on several occasions—to the extent that the entire paradigm of ‘Wittgenstein-
ian’ philosophy of religion has been based on such remarks. The few references 
to anything like the problem of evil and suffering in Wittgenstein’s own work 
(as available in diary notes, or as documented by his friends and pupils) include 
the remarks against any ‘moral meaning of suffering’ and against any moralistic 
understanding of God in conversations with Malcolm Drury,7 and the well-
known comments on the ‘infinite distress’ (‘die höchste Not’) in Vermischte 
Bemerkungen (CV 52, c. 1944). However, while the material is scarce in this 
regard, the more general tone of Wittgenstein’s way of thinking about religion 
arguably makes it clear that he would have been harshly critical of contempo-
rary analytic philosophers’ of religion preoccupation with explanatory and jus-
tificatory theodicist discourse, as well as the realistic background assumptions 
of this preoccupation.
The so-called Wittgensteinian philosophers of religion who (rightly, in my 
view) reject both theodicies and the theodicistically framed problem of evil and 
suffering to which theodicies are offered as responses only rarely discuss Witt-
genstein’s early work, however. The early Wittgenstein—the author of Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus (1921), ‘A Lecture of Ethics’ (1929, reprinted in PO), and 
of course the early pre-Tractarian Notebooks 1914–1916—does have things to 
say about topics such as happiness and harmony that are worth considering 
in relation to the late-Wittgensteinian antitheodicist recognition of the ethical 
need to take seriously a certain kind of disharmony. It is to this task that the 
first half of the present chapter is devoted. I will begin by going through some 
(mostly relatively familiar) Wittgensteinian passages on happiness and har-
mony before moving on to an interpretation of (Wittgensteinian) antitheodicy 
as an acknowledgment of disharmony. I will then show how this discussion 
needs to be examined from a transcendental point of view—viewing Wittgen-
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stein himself as a Kantian thinker as well as the entire antitheodicy approach as 
an essentially Kantian undertaking—thus raising a reflexive problem that needs 
attention.8 The latter half of the chapter will then return to late-Wittgensteinian 
(and pragmatist) considerations by emphasizing the historical mutability and 
contingency of any transcendental limits of language that can be taken to con-
stitute and constrain our thinking and discourse. My (quasi-)Wittgensteinian 
elaborations are thus intended to serve as an example of a certain kind of tran-
scendental pragmatism that I think could be developed further in this context.
An important caveat is in order here. The (anti)theodicy discourse primar-
ily focuses on the acknowledgment of others’ suffering. Famously, the early 
Wittgenstein is mostly silent about other subjects and is preoccupied with the 
first-personal point of view (see also Pihlström 2016). In this sense, the (anti-)
theodicy issue seems to be rather far removed from any early-Wittgenstein-
ian considerations. Nevertheless, this hardly prevents us from trying to learn 
something from the complex interplay of harmony and disharmony we may 
approach via Wittgenstein’s cryptic writings, even if our primary concern is 
(as it is here) to make a contribution to the antitheodicy discussion rather than 
historical Wittgenstein scholarship.
We also have to be extremely careful about which views to actually attribute 
to Wittgenstein—and, indeed, about the question of whether any philosophical 
views or theses can be attributed to him at all. I am of course fully aware of the 
fact that there is no obvious sense in which any of the early Wittgenstein’s pro-
nouncements on harmony or happiness (or related topics) could actually make 
sense in his own terms. We will briefly revisit this issue in due course, though 
the focus of the chapter is not on interpreting Wittgenstein’s comments on 
sense and nonsense but on the use some of his ideas may be put into—whether 
they make sense or not—in the explorations of theodicy and antitheodicy that 
some ‘Wittgensteinians’ have been busily contributing to. Indeed, I will read 
Wittgenstein ultimately as a kind of Kantian as well as a pragmatist, but this 
should not be taken to mean that I would imagine Wittgenstein himself to have 
been explicitly committed to those, or any, philosophical positions.
Happiness and harmony
Wittgenstein’s fragmentary remarks on happiness fall into a peculiar place in 
the development of philosophical reflections on happiness9 and the good life 
in Western philosophy. We may recall that Socrates and Plato maintained, as 
a corollary of the Platonic rationalistic theory of the good life as life guided by 
reason, that in a sense the good person is necessarily happy—virtue and hap-
piness (the good life) are inextricably entangled—whereas Aristotle, holding 
a more realistic and commonsensical view, acknowledged the possibility that 
even the most virtuous person can be unhappy due to various misfortunes, 
i.e., virtue fails to guarantee happiness.10 It is a more general classical Greek 
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idea that happiness and unhappiness concern a person’s life as a totality and 
that, therefore, strictly speaking, a person can really be considered happy or 
unhappy only after her/his life is over. At any rate, for classical philosophers 
like Plato and Aristotle, it would have been strange or perhaps even incompre-
hensible to set the demands of morality and the pursuit of happiness against 
each other. However, this is exactly what happens two millennia later in Kant’s 
moral philosophy: happiness is irrelevant to moral duty; moreover, our ten-
dency to pursue our own happiness as empirical natural creatures is often in 
contrast with, and needs to be overcome by, the moral law. Indeed, this is why 
we human beings (rational yet finite and empirical beings) need the moral law 
in the first place—unlike, say, angels, whose will would necessarily conform to 
the demands of morality. We can, according to Kant, seek to be worthy of hap-
piness by doing our moral duty out of pure respect for the moral law. However, 
whether or not our virtuous actions actually make anyone happy is completely 
irrelevant to the moral status of those actions.
A new chapter in this story of the development of moral thought on happi-
ness is written when Wittgenstein states in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: ‘Die 
Welt des Glücklichen ist eine andere als die des Unglücklichen’ (‘The world of the 
happy man is a different one from the world of the unhappy man’) (TLP 6.43). 
This peculiar view is based on Wittgenstein’s conception of ethics as (only) con-
cerning the subject’s (my) relation or attitude to the world as a totality. There 
is no good or evil (or God, or happiness) in the world. Living a right kind of 
life—with ‘life’ identifiable with the ‘world’—is the fundamental ethical task 
ultimately identical to the pursuit of happiness. But this, of course, cannot be 
put to words. There is no way in which any philosophical or ethical theory 
could advise us how to achieve such happiness.
As far as I can see, the overall picture is roughly the following. Socrates and 
Plato maintained that goodness entails happiness, i.e., that nothing can really 
harm the good person. (There are variations of this idea in Christianity, but 
on the other hand the idea of martyrdom, for instance, does require a sacrifice 
of empirical happiness; if death were no loss at all, then there would hardly be 
any significant value in martyrdom.) The history of Western moral philosophy 
then seems to gradually give up the idea that ‘nothing can harm the good man’, 
starting with Aristotle but most strikingly in Kant’s account of the irrelevance 
of happiness to moral duty. However, the original Socratic idea makes a kind 
of return in Wittgenstein (and philosophers influenced by him), for whom 
neither goodness nor happiness is anything ‘in the world’ but a matter of my 
inner relation to the world: if I am happy—if my world is the world of a ‘happy 
man’—then indeed nothing in the world can harm me.11
This return of the Socratic idea comes with a twist, however. Wittgenstein is 
clearly interested in transcendental happiness, not empirical happiness. Even for 
Kant, happiness remains an empirical concept.12 The Wittgensteinian move is 
thus crucial in transforming our picture of the very nature of (morally relevant) 
happiness. We do not have to force Wittgenstein into the brief historical narra-
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tive starting with Plato, but we may see his transcendental remarks on happi-
ness as fundamentally changing that narrative.
Let us now take a somewhat closer look at how Wittgenstein elaborates on his 
idea of the world of the ‘happy man’. The world of the happy person is, the Note-
books tell us, a ‘happy world’ (‘eine glückliche Welt’) (NB, July 29, 1916).13 This 
requires seeing the world as a harmonious totality; as Newton Garver (1994: 89) 
observes, happiness consists in ‘being in harmony with the world’—and thus, 
in the context of the Tractarian account of the world as a totality of facts (cf. 
TLP 1.1), not ‘with the substance of the world, since the substance of this world 
is the same as the substance of any possible world’, but precisely with the facts 
constituting this world, i.e., facts that are independent of my will (Garver 1994: 
89; cf. TLP 6.373).
The Notebooks remarks on happiness are richer than the very few ones 
remaining in the Tractatus.14 Beginning his reflections on this topic in July 
1916, Wittgenstein finds Dostoevsky to be right in saying that ‘the man who 
is happy is fulfilling the purpose of existence’ (‘dass der, welcher glücklich ist, 
den Zweck des Daseins erfüllt’) (NB, July 6, 1916). In this context, Wittgenstein 
further reflects: ‘I am either happy or unhappy, that is all. It can be said: good 
or evil do not exist. // A man who is happy must have no fear. Not even in the 
face of death. // Only a man who lives not in time but in the present is happy’ 
(‘Ich bin entweder glücklich oder unglücklich, das ist alles. Man kann sagen: gut 
oder böse gibt es nicht. // Wer glücklich ist, der darf keine Furcht haben. Auch 
nicht vor dem Tode. // Nur wer nicht in Zeit, sondern in der Gegenwart lebt, ist 
glücklich’).15 The association of happiness with a kind of metaphysical harmony 
becomes clear in the entry on the same day when Wittgenstein suggests that I 
must be ‘in agreement’ (‘in Übereinstimmung’) with the world in order to live 
happily; this is what being happy ‘means’ (‘heisst’) (NB, July 8, 1916). Being in 
agreement with the world can, furthermore, be regarded as doing God’s will 
(‘ich tue den Willen Gottes’)16—to the extent that Wittgenstein asks whether one 
is only happy when one(self) wants or wills nothing (‘Oder ist nur der glücklich, 
der nicht will?’) (NB, July 29, 1916).17
Given the identification of happiness with harmony at such a highest possible 
(cosmic and even divine) level, it is no surprise that ‘Live happily!’ (‘Lebe glück-
lich!’) is the highest moral command to which nothing can be added (NB, July 
29, 1916). If one asks why one should live happily, that is a tautological question: 
‘the happy life seems to be justified of itself, it seems that it is the only right life’ 
(‘es scheint, dass sich das glückliche Leben von selbst rechtfertigt, dass es das einzig 
richtige Leben ist’) (NB, July 30, 1916). As Gordon Bearn explains, the ethical life, 
or the happy life, is ‘the existential analog of the tautology’: ‘Violate logical laws 
and your marks will make no sense, violate ethical laws and your life will make 
no sense’ (Bearn 1997: 66, 68; cf. 71–72; see also Suter 1989). No wonder that 
Wittgenstein finds both ethics and logic ‘transcendental’, related to the meaning 
or sense (Sinn) of the world—either the world conceived as life, or the world con-
ceived as a structure of possible facts isomorphic to the structure of language.18
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Accordingly, there can be no objective criterion for the happy and harmoni-
ous life—nothing that could be described in language or incorporated into a 
realistic world picture—but only, so to speak, a transcendental criterion (NB, 
July 30, 1916), as happiness and unhappiness cannot belong to the world (‘Glück 
und Unglück können nicht zur Welt gehören’) (NB, August 2, 1916).19 It is for this 
reason that, as Richard Brockhaus (1991: 329) aptly notes, happiness is not an 
intellectual achievement based on arguments but needs the kind of first-personal 
experiences Wittgenstein tries to describe in ‘A Lecture on Ethics’ (to which we 
will shortly turn).20 The lack of any objective or ‘outward’ criterion of happiness 
in Wittgenstein’s transcendental sense can also be expressed by saying, as Ilham 
Dilman (1974: 179–180) does, that happiness in this sense is an ‘inward’ attitude 
belonging to one’s ‘inner life’—such as a ‘genuine love of the good’ which would 
be better described as something like the state of one’s ‘soul’ rather than as (for 
example) mere conformity to some objective moral standards.21
The conception of happiness as harmony22 can, hence, be rather interestingly 
compared to the feeling of ‘absolute safety’ describe in Wittgenstein’s 1929 text, 
‘A Lecture on Ethics’ (PO 37–44)—just like the view that happiness is funda-
mentally or absolutely ‘justified of itself ’ is readily comparable to the idea of 
there being nothing more fundamental to ground the ethical demand of living 
or behaving well, as also elaborated on in ‘A Lecture on Ethics’. Both views are 
important examples highlighting the peculiar character of ethical judgments 
in the ‘Lecture’. Wittgenstein articulates the latter point by comparing moral 
behavior to playing tennis (PO 38–39). If someone tells me that I play tennis 
badly, I may answer that I know but I do not want to play any better, in which 
case my critic can only accept my answer. Playing tennis well, or better, is, then, 
optional. But ethics is radically different:
But suppose I had told one of you a preposterous lie and he came up to 
me and said ‘You’re behaving like a beast’ and then I were to say ‘I know 
I behave badly, but then I don’t want to behave any better,’ could he 
then say ‘Ah, then that’s all right’? Certainly not; he would say ‘Well, you 
ought to want to behave better.’ Here you have an absolute judgment of 
value, whereas the first instance was one of a relative judgment. (PO 39.) 
In the vocabulary of the Notebooks and the Tractatus, we might say that it 
simply makes no sense at all to claim that one does not want to live rightly or 
be happy (in the transcendental sense sketched in Wittgenstein’s remarks). The 
command, ‘Live happily!’, is absolute and categorical—or even comparable to a 
divine command. One’s not wanting to do as that command says is simply out 
of the question—and the sense in which it makes no sense to say that one does 
not want to be happy is to be distinguished from the nonsensical propositions 
of the Tractatus not making sense in the terms of the Tractatus itself, because 
in those terms ethical judgments or propositions do not make sense anyway 
(or are not actually judgments or propositions at all). One may certainly utter 
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the sounds (or write down the letters), ‘I do not want to be happy’, but by so 
doing one makes no significant gesture toward anything; one does not even 
lead a life about which it could be asked whether it is happy or unhappy. Or 
so, I suppose, we may try to read those remarks in the terms provided in ‘A 
Lecture on Ethics’.23
The experience of feeling absolutely safe is the other point of contact between 
the ‘Lecture’ and the early remarks on happiness I have cited. Wittgenstein’s 
account of ‘the experience of feeling absolutely safe’, by which he means ‘the 
state of mind in which one is inclined to say ‘I am safe, nothing can injure me 
whatever happens’ (PO 41), emphasizes the way in which such expressions 
breach the boundaries of language:
We all know what it means in ordinary life to be safe. I am safe in my 
room, when I cannot be run over by an omnibus. I am safe if I have had 
whooping cough and cannot therefore get it again. To be safe essen-
tially means that it is physically impossible that certain things should 
happen to me and therefore it’s nonsense to say that I am safe whatever 
happens. […] Now I want to impress on you that a certain characteris-
tic misuse of our language runs through all ethical and religious expres-
sions. (PO 42.)
This complements the picture of there being no ordinary, outward, objective, or 
metaphysically realistic criterion for (transcendentally) happy life. There is no 
more such a criterion than there is any physical, natural, or ‘worldly’ criterion 
for absolute safety. There is no absolute safety—or God, or happiness, or ethical 
harmony—to be found in the world of facts that can be stated in language. The 
metaphysical realist’s fully objective, totalizing God’s-Eye View account of real-
ity (cf. Chapter 4) would not contain anything like that. Qua transcendental, 
happiness is something quite different, as far from being a mere worldly state of 
affairs as the (imagined) state of absolute safety. It is, rather, a mystical kind of 
harmony with the world and God, inexpressible and ineffable.
Let me offer one more excursus into Wittgenstein’s ethical and existential 
writings before moving on to a more explicit consideration of the relations 
between these views and the Wittgensteinian antitheodicy project described 
above. In the slightly later diary notes from 1930–1932 and 1936–1937, avail-
able as Denkbewegungen, Wittgenstein interestingly sets madness (Wahnsinn) 
and happiness (Glück) against each other. If madness does not come, he main-
tains, that is certainly happy (or, perhaps better, ‘lucky’), but if it does, he says, 
I must not flee it. This is because madness, Wahnsinn, is the highest judge 
(Richter) of whether my life is right or wrong. While these remarks are consid-
erably later than the Notebooks, they can be interestingly read along with the 
early Tractarian view on happiness.24 Insofar as only the happy life (or world) 
is ‘right’, it is ultimately madness that judges whether I am happy at a transcen-
dental level. This is what Wittgenstein says:
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Du sollst so leben, dass Du vor dem Wahnsinn bestehen kannst, wenn er 
kommt. Und den Wahnsinn sollst du nicht fliehen. Es ist ein Glück, wenn 
er nicht da ist, aber fliehen sollst Du ihn nicht, so glaube ich mir sagen zu 
müssen. Denn er ist der strengste Richter (das strengste Gericht) darüber 
ob mein Leben recht oder unrecht ist; er ist fürchterlich, aber Du sollst 
ihn dennoch nicht fliehen. Denn Du weisst ja doch nicht, wie Du ihm 
entkommen kannst, & während Du vor ihm fliehst, benimmst Du Dich ja 
unwürdig. (D 185–186, July 20, 1937; original emphasis.) 
Many of the themes found in the early texts can be seen at work here again, in 
a somewhat different context. There is again the fundamental ethico-existen-
tial concern with living ‘rightly’—an absolute ethical matter for Wittgenstein. 
Whether or not madness ‘comes’ is, furthermore, independent of me or my 
will. It either comes or does not come, depending on whether I have been able 
to live harmoniously and rightly. If my world is a ‘happy’ world, I (presumably) 
will not become mad, but if I do, then this matter is ultimately not up to me but 
in a way my fate. And the worst thing to do would be to run away from one’s 
life and fate; such a desperate attempt to escape would amount to a disgrace-
ful, ‘wrong’, and thus deeply unhappy life. One might be left wondering which 
one is the worst kind of unhappiness: madness itself (assuming it is happy, or 
lucky, not to be mad) or the wrongful attempt to flee madness if it does come? 
It would seem to me that the Wittgensteinian answer would be latter one.
Antitheodicy and disharmony
After this sketch of a Wittgensteinian picture of happiness as a kind of tran-
scendental metaphysical and theological harmony, it is vitally important to 
keep in mind that Wittgensteinian antitheodicists, in contrast, emphasize the 
acknowledgment of a certain kind of disharmony as a constitutive feature 
of genuinely religious language use and of the moral point of view that does 
not overlook others’ suffering. Religious life, according to thinkers like Phil-
lips (1977: 119), recognizes that catastrophes may strike us ‘without rhyme or 
reason’. There is, and can be, no overall harmonious reconciliation with the 
evil and suffering that characterize human lives in this world. The theodicist 
search for such metaphysical and theological harmony is immoral—or even 
itself evil—because it fails to take seriously others’ meaningless suffering and 
the profoundly, irreparably disharmonious world it yields. It is the acknowl-
edgment of disharmony rather than harmony that is a necessary feature of the 
ethical task of living ‘rightly’. In this sense, truly ethical life, and therefore truly 
religious life, requires antitheodicy rather than theodicy.25
It could be protested that this link between theodicy and harmony is not as 
clear as it seems. The antitheodicist need not simply be opposed to the the-
odicist’s tendency to view the world as ‘harmonious’ in the sense of some easy 
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(e.g., utilitarian or more generally consequentialist) moral structure. Rather, 
the antitheodicist criticism of theodicies charges the theodicist for viewing the 
world as if it could be evaluated in moral terms at all (at a general metaphysical 
or theological level). Moreover, the antitheodicist position can itself be claimed 
to be committed to a kind of harmony precisely in the denial that the world 
is pre-structured in moral terms independently of the individual’s own per-
spective. It is precisely by rejecting any simple harmonious solution that the 
antitheodicist implicitly if not explicitly claims to be able to find a more genu-
inely harmonious meta-level position. We should definitely acknowledge this 
possibility of rephrasing the antitheodicist approach in terms of harmony. Even 
so, I believe there is—precisely due to this availability of a harmony-postulating 
interpretation of antitheodicy—a tension right at the heart of the antitheodicist 
argument, and I want to take some steps toward analyzing this tension.
Now, the Wittgensteinian antitheodicist may reason as follows. Insofar as 
Wittgenstein’s transcendental view of happiness—of the world of the ‘happy 
man’—in its deepest sense pertains to the Kantian question of whether I am 
worthy or unworthy of happiness, it looks like the truly happy person, or the 
person whose happiness has a truly moral character, must never rest satisfied 
with a harmonious theodicy picture of the world but must take seriously the 
disharmony that the irresolvable problem of evil and suffering creates. In brief, 
others’ sufferings and the metaphysical disharmony they bring along with 
them to the world (to my world) are inevitably a challenge to my being able 
to be happy—a challenge that, presumably, can never be fully and completely 
resolved. Let us therefore take a look at what Wittgenstein writes in a notebook 
entry in August 1916:
Angenommen, der Mensch könnte seinen Willen nicht betätigen, müsste 
aber alle Not dieser Welt leiden, was könnte ihn dann glücklich machen?
Wie kann der Mensch überhaupt glücklich sein, da er doch die Not dieser 
Welt nicht abwehren kann?
Eben durch das Leben der Erkenntnis.
Das gute Gewissen ist das Glück, welches das Leben der Erkenntnis 
gewährt.
Das Leben der Erkenntnis ist das Leben, welches glücklich ist, der Not der 
Welt zum Trotz.
Nur das Leben ist glücklich, welches auf die Annehmlichkeiten der Welt 
verzichten kann.
Ihm sind die Annehmlichkeiten der Welt nur so viele Gnaden des Schick-
sals. (NB, August 13, 1916.)
This is, admittedly, puzzling. The ‘life of knowledge’ (or, perhaps, ‘life of cogni-
tion’)26 could be seen in a theodicist light as a life based on some kind of theo-
retical knowledge explaining and justifying the fact that there is evil and suf-
fering, or (for religious believers) explaining and justifying the fact that God 
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allows the world he created to contain so much evil and suffering. But it could 
also, alternatively, be seen in an antitheodicist light as a life acknowledging 
(that is, ‘anerkennen’ rather than ‘erkennen’)27 the irreducibility of (others’) 
sufferings that have no meaning, function, or justification—experiences of suf-
fering that could ‘educate’ one to believing in God (CV 97, remark in 1950), 
but on the other hand might also equally well educate one out of one’s belief 
in God.
Only such knowledge (or, rather, acknowledgment) could then bring true 
happiness with itself—but then such happiness, though transcendental, would 
only be limited or temporary, available only with the dramatic qualification 
that there is so much unhappiness around us. Such genuine happiness would 
therefore, so it seems, immediately have to cancel itself out. One could only 
be (transcendentally) happy by being (empirically) deeply unhappy about the 
unhappiness of others. As we might paraphrase Martin Luther King’s famous 
remark on justice and injustice, unhappiness (or suffering) anywhere is a threat 
to happiness everywhere. The more philosophical variant of this thought is 
Levinas’s insistence on the idea that the only ethically acceptable ‘meaning’ or 
‘sense’ of suffering lies in my suffering for the suffering of the other; suffering 
has a sense only in my suffering because the other suffers.28 And even a sin-
gle instance of such meaningless suffering would have to make me—the only 
moral subject according to Wittgenstein’s demanding first-personal picture of 
ethics—suffer enormously.29
Ilham Dilman suggests a plausible reading of the Notebooks passage just quoted. 
It is, we saw Wittgenstein claiming, only ‘through the life of knowledge’ that even 
a person who cannot ward off the misery of the world can be happy. Here, Dil-
man (1974: 180) says, ‘knowledge’ is close to what Plato meant by ‘knowledge’ 
or ‘wisdom’, a necessary condition of which is ‘detachment’, ‘renouncing [ver-
zichten] the amenities [Annehmlichkeiten] of the world’. He continues, in a man-
ner highly relevant to the theodicy vs. antitheodicy discussion:
This [detachment] does not mean indifference to the pain of others. 
Quite the contrary. For a man who is immersed in a life of worldliness 
will be relatively deaf to other people’s cries of pain.30 Detachment is a 
positive renunciation of such a life which allows the soul to turn to the 
good, to become sensitive to moral considerations. […] The condition 
of such renunciation is love—the kind of love that is present in pity for 
the afflicted, forgiveness of those who wrong one, gratitude for those 
who help one, and remorse for the wrong one has done to others. It is 
this love which both Plato and Wittgenstein see as a form of knowl-
edge—this love which for Wittgenstein is an attitude of the will towards 
the world as a whole.
It may be called love of the good, and the kind of pity which Dos-
toyevsky portrays in Sonia is a concrete manifestation of it. In that form 
it […] usually goes under the name ‘love of one’s neighbour’. The rela-
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tion between such selfless love and the kind of knowledge in question is 
internal. (Ibid.: 180–181.)
Therefore, Dilman tells us, the kind of happiness Wittgenstein is thinking of 
in the Notebooks is not ‘indifferent to the misery of the world, though it is one 
which that misery need not and even, perhaps, cannot destroy’ (ibid.: 182). In 
any case, Wittgenstein’s enigmatic remarks on happiness and harmony should 
make us reflect on the ways in which, or the degree to which, the antitheodi-
cist perspective is available to the one following the compelling ethical line of 
thought of Wittgenstein’s early philosophy. Is too much emphasis laid on hap-
piness and harmony there? Is the solipsistic detachment of the moral subject 
too severe, despite Dilman’s admittedly consoling interpretation? What kind of 
antitheodicy can still be maintained if we follow Wittgenstein in regarding ‘Live 
happily!’ as the highest ethical command?
Things are not simple, as the basic demand of living ‘rightly’ or of seeing the 
world ‘aright’ should, arguably, be linked to antitheodicy rather than theodicy.31 
It is, above all, the task of being attentive to others’ suffering that is necessary 
for living rightly—and thus for happiness—but it is this same task that, when 
taken seriously, deprives us from happiness. We may perhaps join Dilman in 
concluding that the view of happiness of Wittgenstein’s Notebooks invokes ‘a 
state of soul which contains its own reward’ (ibid.).32 There is nothing external 
or ‘outward’ in this transcendental happiness—whether or not it is available to 
the one pursuing antitheodicy. Such a ‘reward’ may, however, be a complex one.
Dilman is right, I believe, in perceiving an important link between the inter-
nal happiness of a morally engaged soul and the concept of love; after all, Witt-
genstein himself declares love to be the greatest happiness of a human being 
(CV 87, remark in 1948).33 This ‘love’, however, must presumably be the kind of 
love that is usually denoted by the Greek word agape, instead of eros, although 
Wittgenstein’s own words may be deliberately ambiguous here. In any event, 
this kind of Wittgensteinian transcendental picture of happiness and love (of 
the good) is in striking contrast with the various banalizing treatments of these 
notions that surround us in contemporary popular culture. Dostoevsky’s Sonia 
(in Crime and Punishment) may indeed be full of love, but she does not boast 
about her love, or her moral character, in the way our narcissistic culture today 
may encourage us to do, and hence her love (unlike, perhaps, most real-life 
individuals’) remains genuine and uncorrupted.34
The transcendental perspective—and a reflexive problem
Wittgenstein’s transcendental happiness is, of course, very different from 
Kant’s conception of empirical (pursuit of) happiness, which from the Kantian 
point of view is morally irrelevant.35 It is, as we have seen, much closer to what 
Kant calls our worthiness of being happy, because the basic idea of our relation 
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to our (the) world being ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ is built into the notion of the world 
of the happy (or unhappy) person. This clearly requires a transcendental per-
spective for the development of any Wittgensteinian account of these matters. 
Only from a properly transcendental standpoint does the question of how to 
live ‘rightly’ or how to see the world ‘aright’ arise in the sense in which Witt-
genstein seeks to deal with these questions in the early writings and the later 
diary entries, and it is this very standpoint that the later Wittgensteinian para-
digm in antitheodicy invokes, even though it often seems that Wittgenstein-
inspired antitheodicist philosophers of religion like Phillips are either unaware 
of their own transcendental tendencies or actively resist any Kantian readings 
of Wittgenstein.
Now, it should be clear (on the basis of the materials quoted in the two pre-
vious sections) that from a transcendental perspective, Wittgensteinian har-
mony—or happiness—cannot be found in the world, any more than the meta-
physical (transcendental) subject, or God, or value can. Nor, however, can it 
be found anywhere outside the world, either, as there is no such ‘outside’ any-
where; we might say that Wittgenstein’s philosophy, even his ethics and mystical 
thought, remains thoroughly this-worldly (cf. Brockhaus 1991). The theodicist 
confusion, based on a kind of metaphysical realism (see again Chapter 4), is to 
look for these ‘higher’ values either in the world or in some imagined supernat-
ural realm beyond the world. As the Wittgensteinian antitheodicist may articu-
late her/his criticism of theodicy in terms of the kind of early-Wittgensteinian 
transcendental picture in addition to the (more typical) late-Wittgensteinian 
account emphasizing the ‘grammar’ of religious language use, a crucial element 
of this Wittgenstein-inspired criticism of theodicies should be a criticism of 
the realistic assumptions that do not take seriously the need to consider these 
issues transcendentally.
However, we now have to face the further worry already acknowledged above. 
The antitheodicist her-/himself may at the transcendental meta-level view the 
world in a ‘harmonious’ light, thus ‘seeing the world aright’ (TLP 6.54) precisely 
when seeing it disharmoniously in its irreducible plurality of meaningless suf-
fering. In this sense, antitheodicism may lead to transcendental (not empiri-
cal) happiness. It is precisely the perception that (to paraphrase Martin Luther 
King again) suffering and unhappiness anywhere are threats to happiness eve-
rywhere that may eventually lead us to the meta-level harmony and happiness 
of seeing the world rightly, of taking others’ suffering seriously wherever and 
whenever it occurs. Or at least this is a line of argument we might imagine a 
Wittgensteinian antitheodicist thinker developing. But then we might become 
‘too happy’ while remaining at the detached meta-level. We might, indeed, be 
detached in such transcendental happiness without ever really attending to the 
empirical, first-hand experiences of suffering that we were hoping to acknowl-
edge. Dilman’s morally serious detachment associated with a ‘love of the good’ 
might just be an ideal we will never achieve. It may even be suggested that the 
antitheodicist world is not the world of the Wittgensteinian ‘happy man’ but 
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closer to the world as experienced by the ‘sick soul’ William James invokes in 
his Varieties of Religious Experience (1902).36 This suggestion can be backed up 
by appreciating what Leszek Kolakowski says on happiness:
In short, the word ‘happiness’ does not seem applicable to divine life. 
But nor is it applicable to human beings. This is not just because we 
experience suffering. It is also because, even if we are not suffering at a 
given moment, even if we are able to experience physical and spiritual 
pleasure and moments beyond time, in the ‘eternal present’ of love, we 
can never forget the existence of evil and the misery of the human con-
dition. We participate in the suffering of others; we cannot eliminate the 
anticipation of death or the sorrows of life. (Kolakowski 2012: 213–214.) 
One can hardly find a more straightforward and appropriate account of the 
antitheodicist denial of eventual harmony and happiness—a denial that, how-
ever, itself takes place at the transcendental level (though this is not Kolakows-
ki’s own way of putting the matter). Kolakowski concludes:
Happiness is something we can imagine but not experience. If we 
imagine that hell and purgatory are no longer in operation and that all 
human beings, every single one without exception, have been saved by 
God and are now enjoying celestial bliss, lacking nothing, perfectly sat-
isfied, without pain or death, then we can imagine that their happiness 
is real and that the sorrows and suffering of the past have been forgot-
ten. Such a condition can be imagined, but it has never been seen. It has 
never been seen. (Ibid.: 214–215.) 
Now, as compelling as this is, the worry raised above is the following (cf. also 
Kivistö & Pihlström 2016: 283–284). Insofar as theodicies operate with the idea 
of a harmonious total world picture—an imagined condition of happiness in 
which all sufferings will finally be eliminated, at least post mortem37—is not the 
antitheodicist who reminds us that disharmony will be with us to stay also still 
attempting to offer a meta-level harmonious total picture, albeit an antitheodi-
cist one, that is, her/his own (only different) version of how to see the world 
aright and how to live rightly and to be happy in the transcendental Wittgen-
steinian sense? Does not antitheodicy, thus, lead to the very same predicament 
it found theodicism guilty of, the pretension of happiness and harmony, only 
at the meta-level?38
There is no easy answer to such a self-reflective worry. We just have to keep 
asking ourselves these questions. This is part of our never-ending concern with 
living rightly—with happiness. A world in which we were able to resolve this 
matter would indeed be too harmonious for us. One key problem is, then, the 
following. Is the transcendental move we have taken a betrayal of the antithe-
odicist pursuit of taking evil and meaningless suffering ethically seriously and of 
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recognizing the suffering other (who may never be able to reach happiness)? This 
question returns, preventing any full, complete harmony—even transcendental.
There is also a somewhat disturbing thought that we might pause to consider 
at this point. Wittgenstein, who in the Tractatus had maintained that the ‘solu-
tion’ to the problem of life (‘das Problem des Lebens’) can only be seen in the 
disappearance of the problem—something that could be seen as a variant of 
transcendental happiness, of living in harmony—later suggests that ‘someone 
who lives rightly does not experience the problem [of life] as sorrow, hence not 
after all as a problem, but rather as joy, that is so to speak as a bright halo round 
his life, not a murky background’ (CV 31, remark in 1937). If our problem of 
life has something (anything) to do with our inability to reconcile ourselves 
with the suffering there is in the world—especially others’ suffering—how can 
we possibly say that, even at a transcendental meta-level, this irreconcilability 
would take the form of a joy? This would be a version of the claim that our see-
ing the world aright—even when this means seeing it in the full irreducibility 
of suffering it incorporates—would amount to transcendental happiness. Witt-
gensteinian antitheodicism would then collapse back to immoral theodicism.
I have not raised these issues in order to resolve them. Rather, I think they are 
irresolvable.39 I also believe that appreciating Wittgenstein’s remarks—the ones 
cited and analyzed here, as well as many others—may help us recognize their 
irresolvability. But this requires that we do not merely seek to interpret Witt-
genstein himself but actually attempt to do something with what he wrote, to 
work on our own problems of life, to engage in philosophy as the kind of ‘work 
on oneself ’, on ‘how one sees things’ (CV 24, remark in 1931), that Wittgenstein 
himself deeply valued. There is no guarantee we can do this. Indeed, one’s read-
ing of Wittgenstein may bring one to the point he expressed about his attitude 
to Shakespeare: ‘I could only stare in wonder at Shakespeare; never do anything 
with him’ (CV 95, remark in 1950).
The limits of language
Having reached a preliminary conclusion regarding the tension between har-
mony and disharmony in Wittgensteinian transcendental antitheodicism 
(which inevitably invokes the transcendental notion of a limit), I will, in the 
remainder of this chapter, more thoroughly examine the limits of language from 
the point of view of Wittgenstein’s (and ‘Wittgensteinian’) philosophy of reli-
gion. Hence, I will raise some further fundamental issues characterizing the 
loose Wittgensteinian tradition in this field from the perspective of the ques-
tion concerning the limits of language, as it arises in Wittgenstein’s work. I do 
believe that, by contrast to what some Wittgensteinians argue, the notion of a 
limit of language in Wittgenstein’s discussion of religion ought to be taken very 
seriously—even if we are only aiming at a Wittgenstein-inspired illumination of 
the nature of religious language and religious belief.40
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There is plenty of evidence for so-called Wittgensteinian philosophers’ 
uneasiness with the limit metaphor. For instance, when Phillips, in his editorial 
preface to a volume of his teacher’s Rush Rhees’s writings, acknowledges that 
the idea of ‘the limits of language’ was important for Rhees, he continues to 
note that he (Phillips) himself ‘never could get into the simile of ‘bumps and 
bruises’ which come from striking one’s head against the limits of language—
and speaking of the worry or distress which belongs to philosophy in those 
terms’ (Phillips 2006: xx; see also Rhees 2006: 222).41 More specifically, it seems 
to me that Wittgensteinian philosophers of religion such as Phillips have not 
been fully conscious of the way in which the issue concerning the limits of 
language arises in the philosophy of religion as a Kantian issue, needing a tran-
scendental analysis. Nor have they therefore sufficiently appreciated the ways 
in which Wittgenstein himself ought to be interpreted as a Kantian thinker pre-
senting something like transcendental arguments investigating the necessary 
conditions for the possibility of linguistic meaning. Indeed, some of the core 
arguments characterizing Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion, identifiable 
in the work of Phillips, among others, can (pace Phillips himself) be reinter-
preted as transcendental.42
Those arguments also, importantly, raise the issue of relativism about religion, 
because it might seem that from the Wittgensteinian perspective one may sim-
ply reject scientific (or presumably any external) criticism of religion by point-
ing out that it does not follow the rules of religious language games that are 
available only ‘from within’ the religious use of language itself. As is well known, 
critics of such relativist views have used pejorative terms like ‘Wittgensteinian 
fideism’ to highlight the unwelcome relativistic, fideistic, or even irrationalist 
consequences of the proposal to simply ground the meanings of religious lan-
guage in the activities engaged in by people who actually ‘play religious language 
games’ or ‘engage in a religious form of life’. If such meanings are unavailable to 
those who do not share such activities, no rational criticism of religious belief 
seems to be possible at all. In particular, no science-based critique of religion is 
relevant to the critical assessment of religion, or even strictly speaking possible, 
because by confusing the grammar of religious language such critique does not 
even speak about religion in the end. Evaluating the validity of the Wittgenstein-
ians’ concerns with relativism (and related views) would require a detailed anal-
ysis of what exactly is and ought to be meant by ‘relativism’. Instead of entering 
that discussion, we may directly explore the ‘limits of language’ issue without 
taking any final stand on the relativism question.
My main aim in the rest of this chapter is to offer selected insights into the 
way in which the Wittgensteinian approach in the philosophy of religion dif-
fers from other relevant approaches—that is, into what is truly distinctive in it 
in comparison to mainstream analytic philosophy of religion in particular—
by emphasizing the central status of the problem of the limits of (religious) 
language. I will also suggest that the distinctiveness of the Wittgensteinian 
approach can be perceived much more clearly if we are willing to read Wittgen-
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stein as engaged in transcendental reflection. This does not preclude us from 
appreciating, for example, Phillips’s (and other Wittgensteinians’) emphasis on 
the significance of literary fiction in philosophical attempts to understand reli-
gious language use and religious problems, especially in drawing our attention 
to the particular and personal in religious language use (see, e.g., Phillips 1991). 
On the contrary, transcendental considerations themselves can be embedded 
in literature—though this is not a topic for the present chapter.43
As an illustration of my general claims, I will toward the end of the chapter 
briefly return to the problem of evil and suffering, suggesting that Wittgen-
steinians like Phillips can be taken to have offered transcendental considera-
tions in favor of antitheodicism, refuting theodicies as violations of genuinely 
religious language use. However, we should first take a look at how the issues 
concerning the limits and conditions of religious language arise in Wittgen-
stein’s early and late philosophy44 as well as some ‘Wittgensteinian’ views based 
thereupon. That discussion will lead us to an appreciation of what I propose to 
call ‘the contingency of necessity’—something that will turn out to be highly 
relevant in the theodicy vs. antitheodicy explorations as well.
Let us again consider the way in which the ‘early Wittgenstein’ formulates his 
view that religion, analogously to ethics and aesthetics, is something that can-
not be put to words but is, rather, ‘mystical’. Wittgenstein tells us that God does 
not make himself manifest in the world (‘Gott offenbart sich nicht in der Welt’, 
TLP 6.432), and as the limits of my language designate, famously, the limits 
of the (or my) world (TLP 5.6), this seems to rather straightforwardly suggest 
that God cannot be meaningfully spoken about in language; anything we try 
to say about God falls beyond the limits of language. The realm of ethics and 
religion simply lies beyond language and the world. The purpose of language 
is to describe the world, which is a collection of states of affairs (‘Sachver-
halte’), as Wittgenstein tells us already in the opening remarks of the Tractatus 
(TLP 1.1), and clearly God’s existence is not among such worldly states of affairs 
but something entirely different—so different that we should not speak about 
God’s existence at all. Our attempts to say something about God are, rather, 
attempts to say something about the meaning of life or the world, or perhaps 
about the ‘problem of life’ (cf. TLP 6.521). Indeed, Wittgenstein says that the 
Sinn of the world must lie outside or beyond (‘ausserhalb’) it (TLP 6.41) and 
that propositions (‘Sätze’) cannot express anything ‘higher’ (TLP 6.42). What 
is ‘mystical’ (‘das Mystische’) is not how the world is but that it is (TLP 6.44).
Thus, according to the early Wittgenstein, religion (along with ethics and 
aesthetics) seems to be beyond the limits of language in a rather obvious sense. 
As mystical, religion belongs to the transcendent realm. This transcendence of 
ethics and religion is also forcefully expressed in the above-cited ‘Lecture on 
Ethics’, where Wittgenstein tells us that ‘absolute’ ethical expressions are non-
sensical attempts ‘to go beyond the world and that is to say beyond significant 
language’ (PO 44). The tendency of all attempts to discuss ethics or religion in 
language is ‘to run against the boundaries of language’, but this ‘running against 
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the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless’ (PO 44). Religion, or God, 
is something we must pass over into silence (cf. TLP 7).
However, things may be not as simple as that, if we take seriously the Kantian 
transcendental interpretation of Wittgenstein defended in this chapter.45 If reli-
gion and ethics (and aesthetics) are truly analogous in the Tractatus, then we 
should again pay close attention to the fact that ethics (which is ‘one’ with aes-
thetics) is, just like logic, claimed to be transcendental—not ‘transcendent’. This 
is highly significant. Insofar as ethics is comparable to logic in providing a kind 
of (in itself linguistically inexpressible) transcendental structure for the empir-
ical world that we can speak about in language, then religion must in some 
sense be doing the same thing. That is, for the religious person, religion may 
play the ‘transcendental’ role of providing the fundamental framework through 
which such a person sees, or is able to see, the world in general and everything 
contained in it. In this sense, religion might, for the religious person, be the 
framework through which the significance of any worldly fact (all of which are 
in principle describable in language) can (perhaps only) be ultimately viewed—
though this viewing itself cannot be put to words and lies beyond any sensible 
linguistic expression. God’s being manifest not ‘in’ the world but (as it were) 
somewhere else would then have to be construed not along the lines of God’s 
manifestation anywhere ‘outside’ the world—Wittgenstein’s somewhat unfor-
tunate use of the word ‘ausserhalb’ at TLP 6.41 and his tendency to speak about 
ethics as ‘supernatural’ in the ‘Lecture on Ethics’ (e.g., PO 40, 43) notwithstand-
ing—but as God’s being somehow ‘at the limit’, playing a transcendental rather 
than a transcendent role there. There is no point beyond the linguistically 
describable world where God could be manifested; there is nothing there. But 
there is the transcendental limit making the world possible as a world of states 
of affairs describable in language. For the religious person, God (or, perhaps, 
one’s faith in God, which could simply correspond to one’s viewing the world as 
a limited whole, to a faith that sees some inexpressible—potential—meaning in 
the fact that there is a world at all) would be a transcendental condition for the 
possibility of the world itself, somewhat analogously to the way in which the 
metaphysical (transcendental) subject is claimed by Wittgenstein to be a ‘limit’ 
(‘Grenze’) of the world instead of being a ‘thing’ in the world (TLP 5.632).46
In brief, while according to Wittgenstein anything we try to say about reli-
gion (or ethics) is bound to be nonsensical in the sense that it cannot describe 
any states of affairs that could obtain in the world, such futile attempts are 
indications of something ‘higher’, of the religious person’s attempt to view the 
world in a certain way, with a kind of fundamental seriousness. While nei-
ther ethics nor religion that is supposedly about the ultimate meaning of life 
or about ultimate value ‘can be no science’ and ‘does not add to our knowledge 
in any sense’, our (futile) attempt to put such things into words ‘is a document 
of a tendency in the human mind which I [he tells us] personally cannot help 
respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it’ (PO 44). From such 
a perspective, the fundamental flaw in (say) mainstream analytic philosophy 
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of religion, which tends to operate in terms of realism and evidentialism (in 
their various versions), is precisely that its representatives believe religion to 
be a kind of ‘science’, something that ‘adds to our knowledge’ something that 
for example science cannot add. The hopelessness of this view can be exposed 
by a transcendental critique that reveals the underlying confusion of mixing 
fundamentally different types of language use.
The later Wittgenstein and the ‘factual dependence’ 
of language games
This brings us to the remarks on religion by the ‘later’ Wittgenstein—remarks 
that are available not so much in the main works like the Investigations and 
On Certainty but in brief writings and notes such as ‘Lectures on Religious 
Belief ’ (in LC), ‘Remarks on Frazer’s The Golden Bough’ (PO 115–155), and 
some remarks collected in Culture and Value. I will not be able to go through 
this material in any systematic way here. We should note, however, that one 
of the central metaphors now is the one of picture—rather than the metaphor 
of a limit suggesting that one might in principle (while one in practice can-
not) move across some boundary dividing sense from nonsense.47 According to 
Wittgenstein, the religious person ‘uses a picture’, and ‘[t]he whole weight may 
be in the picture’ (LC 72). Certain pictures—for the religious person, religious 
ones—may express our basic convictions that are as firm as anything can pos-
sibly be for us, something we are absolutely certain of (in the sense of On Cer-
tainty) and something without which our lives would be entirely different from 
what they are, and perhaps inconceivable from our present standpoint. Such 
pictures can (though this is not Wittgenstein’s own terminology) be regarded as 
‘transcendental’ precisely in the sense that using them makes a certain world—
and a certain way of relating to, or viewing, the world—possible for us. They 
could act as the enabling conditions without which certain kinds of language 
use and forms of life would simply not be there, or would be unavailable to us.48
Pictures, religious pictures included, are used by real human beings in real-
life circumstances, within various contexts of using language and thus within 
certain forms of life. Hilary Putnam, reflecting on Wittgenstein’s ‘Lectures on 
Religious Belief ’, emphasizes this deep connection between understanding reli-
gious discourse and understanding a human being engaging in such a discourse:
What then is Wittgenstein saying? I believe that what Wittgenstein (in 
company with Kierkegaard) is saying is this: that religious discourse can 
be understood in any depth only by understanding the form of life to 
which it belongs. What characterizes that form of life is not the expres-
sions of belief that accompany it, but a way—a way that includes words 
and pictures, but is far from consisting in just words and pictures—of 
living one’s life, of regulating all of one’s decisions. […] What Kierke-
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gaard and Wittgenstein have in common is the idea that understanding 
the words of a religious person properly—whether you want to speak of 
understanding their ‘meaning’ or not—is inseparable from understand-
ing a religious form of life, and this is not a matter of ‘semantic theory’, 
but a matter of understanding a human being. (Putnam 1992: 154.)
At the same time, precisely because we are here concerned with understand-
ing real human beings in their real this-worldly circumstances, religion may 
be a response to real events of life, especially to the deepest despair or torment 
that individuals may feel—that is, the kind of despair Wittgenstein had in mind 
in the above-quoted diary remark that the whole world cannot be in a more 
intense ‘distress’ than a single lost soul experiencing ‘die höchste Not’ (CV 52, 
c. 1944).49 Hence, one’s use of religious ‘pictures’ may (potentially) be such a 
response; indeed, this possibility of using religious pictures or other expressions 
as indicators of one’s ultimate concern regarding suffering, meaning, the loss 
of meaning, or other such profound existential experiences is itself a transcen-
dental feature of the ways in which the meanings of religious language (and 
religious symbols more generally) are constituted. That religious language can 
make such a response to existential dimensions of human life is, we might say, 
constitutive of the possibility of genuine religiosity, and for some (religious) 
people the availability of such responses may be comparable to the availability 
of the logical form of language as something that is, according to the Tractatus, 
isomorphic to the form of the world. We might put this more clearly by saying 
that the possibility of religious responses is grounded in a certain ‘picture’, just as 
the transcendental logic in the Tractatus makes meaningful language possible.50
As has often been observed, the Wittgensteinian approach—analogously to 
some forms of pragmatism—seems to lead to the issue of relativism and per-
haps even more problematically to fideism in the philosophy of religion. The 
fideist maintains that religious faith can be accepted without any epistemologi-
cal justification or critical examination as a basic conviction underlying all our 
actions; in particular, no evidential considerations are needed or even possible. 
Some uncritically (or rather acritically) embraced basic convictions are, argu-
ably, needed for us simply to be able to live and act at all. A firm and certain 
belief (either religious or something else)—a basic conviction—cannot be jus-
tified or criticized, since there is nothing more basic, more certain, or more 
fundamental on the grounds of which it could be justified or criticized. There 
is, in the end, only the life the believer leads, the rules s/he follows ‘blindly’ (cf. 
PI I, §219). It is thus easy to understand why Wittgenstein’s On Certainty has 
been a source of inspiration for religious fideists, or has at least been taken to 
be such a source by their critics (cf., e.g., Nielsen & Phillips 2005). However, the 
relation between fideism and the very possibility of rational thought remains 
problematic. Arguably, fideism, at least in its extreme form, stands in an irre-
solvable conflict with the basic requirement of rationality, according to which 
we must aim at defending our beliefs against actual or potential criticism in a 
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process of inquiry aiming at the truth (even though such a defense need not be 
cashed out in terms of evidential considerations but may, pragmatically, invoke 
the ways in which religious beliefs ‘work’ in relation to our existential worries 
and concerns, including the ‘höchste Not’ that individuals could respond to by 
means of religious pictures). According to the extreme relativist and fideist, 
there may, however, be no religious truth to be achieved at all, let alone any 
inquiry pursuing the truth—even existential inquiry—if religion is simply a 
matter of ‘blindly’ engaging in, or adopting, a form of life or a set of pictures 
characterizing that form of life.
Wittgenstein famously points out that the believer and the non-believer, 
despite the enormous difference between their ways of thinking and living 
(i.e., between the kinds of pictures they use), need not disagree regarding their 
conceptions of reality at all (LC 55). This could be taken to be an expression 
of relativism. The two perspectives on reality are so different that no genuine 
disagreement is possible; there is no common ground between the two parties 
to the debate, and therefore no genuine debate at all. This rather radical relativ-
ism may seem to be an unwelcome consequence of certain initially plausible 
Wittgensteinian ways of thinking emphasizing the form-of-life embeddedness 
of religious language use. Analogously, pragmatism might be taken to lead to 
a similar relativism about the contextuality of not just the norms of rationality 
but of all ontological commitments we make (cf. Chapter 2).
While it is certainly naïve to characterize Wittgenstein, or later Wittgenstein-
ian philosophers of religion (or most pragmatists, for that matter), as simple 
relativists, I do not think there is any straightforward way out of this predica-
ment. Even as insightful a reader of Wittgenstein as Putnam has, in my view, 
difficulties in maintaining the balance between appreciating the individual use 
of religious pictures as a ground of one’s (religious) forms of life, on the one 
hand, and keeping the doors open for critical and rational discussion of reli-
gion, on the other.
Putnam does not seem to endorse any relativist interpretation of Wittgen-
stein: ‘To say something is true in a language game is to stand outside of that 
language game and make a comment; that is not what it is to play a language 
game’ (Putnam 1992: 176). So we can ‘stand outside’ our language games and 
comment on the truth of the statements made within them. Moreover, the 
thought that ‘everything we believe is, at best, only ‘true in our language game’ 
isn’t even a coherent thought’, Putnam reminds us; as he rhetorically asks, ‘is 
the very existence of our language then only “true in our language game”? So 
our language game is a fiction?’ (ibid.: 177). But then, drawing on the central 
insight of Wittgenstein’s work, Putnam goes on to say that our language—the 
language by means of which we can say that ‘some things are true and some 
things are warranted and some things are reasonable’—rests on ‘trust’ instead 
of any metaphysical foundation (ibid.; cf. OC 508–509; see also Hertzberg 
1994: chapter 5). Trust sounds like a basic conviction or certainty that cannot 
be set into doubt through inquiry but functions as the basis of any possible 
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inquiry that could be pursued in order to confirm or disconfirm any (other) 
views whatsoever.
An adequate appreciation of the Wittgensteinian approach in the philosophy 
of religion crucially requires a detailed philosophical reflection on these basic 
notions, including trust and rationality, instead of any straightforward fideistic 
declaration of the ‘arationality’ of religious belief or any easy ‘language-game 
relativism’. The issue of the limits of language is fundamental to this entire dis-
cussion and must therefore be taken seriously by anyone inquiring into these 
matters from a Wittgensteinian perspective (or from a perspective critical of 
Wittgenstein). In any event, it is highly important to maintain a critically falli-
bilist attitude to the possible changes in our basic convictions and certainties—
something that Wittgenstein himself does in On Certainty by acknowledging 
the historical mutability of our basic certainties. While our basic convictions 
cannot be rejected or revised because of conflicting evidence, as the availabil-
ity of any evidence presupposes such basic convictions, they may nevertheless 
change along with changes in our (forms of) life, including changes that require 
us to reconsider our responses to existential challenges of life. This is why we 
should take very seriously what Lars Hertzberg (1994: chapter 2) aptly calls the 
‘factual dependence’ of language games, something he introduces by quoting 
On Certainty:
Certain events would put me into a position in which I could not go on 
with the old language-game any further. In which I was torn away from 
the sureness of the game.
Indeed, doesn’t it seem obvious that the possibility of a language-
game is conditioned by certain facts? (OC 617).
We must not, that is, set up any metaphysical barrier between our language 
games and the reality in which we live and act and use language; we must not 
do so even when treating the limits of language as transcendental. That, indeed, 
would be a misunderstanding of what ‘transcendental’ means in this context. 
Instead, we should (following Hertzberg 1994) understand Wittgenstein as 
suggesting that our ways of speaking and living are inevitably connected with 
the ways the world around us factually is, though of course those ways are avail-
able to us—i.e., we can take the world to be in any way whatsoever—only from 
the point of view of the language games we play within our forms of life situated 
in that very same world. Playing language games is not merely a matter of using 
language itself absolutely independently of any worldly connection. Language 
games should, borrowing terms used by Jaakko Hintikka in a related though 
somewhat different context, be considered ‘outdoor games’ rather than ‘indoor 
games’ (cf., e.g., Hintikka 1996: 166).
While On Certainty offers us a picture of language (a picture, as we have 
seen, highly relevant to the philosophy of religion) according to which we must 
rely on our ‘basic convictions’ whose possibility of being false we cannot even 
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conceive of (Hertzberg 1994: 48), i.e., beliefs or fundamental assumptions we 
just cannot think as mistaken, because they are not based on reasons or evi-
dence at all, nor in need of reasons and evidence—that is, convictions we have 
simply learned to trust, as we have ‘grown into them’ (ibid.: 49–50)—there are 
nevertheless facts ‘conditioning’ those convictions and the language games 
based upon them, in the sense that ‘certain events’ (as Wittgenstein himself 
says) could force us to reject such convictions (though, again, not in the sense 
of providing new evidence against them). If something like that happened, then 
our language game could change into something different. Not the truth of 
what we claimed when we were playing the ‘old’ language game, but the very 
meanings of our expressions—what we can or cannot believe or claim to be 
true—would then change (cf. ibid.: 52–55). Therefore, the limits of language 
would change in such situations. Those limits are not fixed once and for all, as 
they seem to be according to the early Wittgenstein, but they may naturally be 
redrawn along with rearrangements in our forms of life. It is in this sense that, 
as Hertzberg puts it, On Certainty offers us a ‘this-worldly’ picture of language: 
‘our language-games are tied to the actual world we live in’ (ibid.: 59).
In the case of religion, in particular, when such changes do take place, they 
are beyond any common standards regarding stable meanings or epistemic 
assessment. Hertzberg notes that there is a kind of ‘metaphysical insecurity’ 
we have to live with when subscribing to the Wittgensteinian conception he 
is articulating:
[W]e have no guarantees that the world will go on being comprehen-
sible to us. In this regard, the insecurity of our language is a feature it 
shares with our ways of acting. Our ability to go on acting in this world 
is dependent on certain facts about ourselves, our bodies, and our envi-
ronment remaining unchanged. (Ibid.: 60.)
Now, I am tempted to suggest that the fact that some of us play religious lan-
guage games and engage in religious forms of life (whatever that exactly comes 
down to in the last analysis) to a certain degree reflects the need to live with 
such metaphysical insecurity, the permanent possibility of experiencing ‘die 
höchste Not’, of finding one’s soul threatened. The world could turn out to be 
incomprehensible to us, and it occasionally does. For instance, when faced by 
extreme evil and cruelty, and unspeakable sufferings, whether in our own case 
or in our neighbors’, we might find the very comprehensibility of the world we 
live in to be at issue, as has been repeatedly emphasized in the theodicy discus-
sion (cf. Neiman 2002; Pihlström 2014b; Kivistö & Pihlström 2016).
The basic message I want to drive home at this point is that the issues of 
relativism and fideism invoked by the late-Wittgensteinian conception of lan-
guage, as applied to the case of religion, are, first, much more complex than any 
simple account of relativism acknowledges, and secondly, cannot be fruitfully 
discussed without paying due attention to the problems surrounding the limits 
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of language. Our need to examine these problems by means of transcendental 
reflection, moreover, does not entail any simple theological antirealism. This is 
because we need to acknowledge the ‘factual dependence of language games’ 
(in Hertzberg’s terminology). It is in and through our living and acting in the 
world, our natural and social surroundings, that we (can only) give meanings to 
our religious (or any other) expressions, even though the world we live and act 
in is structured by us to any humanly meaningful shape precisely by our always 
already using language to structure it.
Accordingly, the limits of language become relevant as a philosophical prob-
lem in the context of this quasi-naturalist or (arguably) pragmatist under-
standing of religious language and its contextually constrained and historically 
transforming meanings.51 In order to highlight the importance of the peculiar 
kind of contingency that characterizes the transcendentally necessary limits of 
language, we now need to take a closer look at how these topics emerge in Witt-
gensteinian philosophy of religion and how they are manifested in the lectures 
on religious belief Wittgenstein delivered in the early 1930s.
The contingency of necessity: 
how the limits of language change
Acknowledging the factual dependence of language games should make us rec-
ognize a closely related phenomenon, i.e., what may be called the contingency 
of necessity—adopting an expression that has been occasionally used in recent 
contributions to metaphysics, philosophical cosmology, and French new real-
ism (e.g., by Quentin Meillassoux) but employed here in a somewhat different, 
transcendental sense. In brief, what is at issue here is that while the limits of 
language grounded in the rules and grammar of a language game set condi-
tions for what is possible and impossible for us to express within that language 
game (i.e., by making ‘moves’ within it according to its grammatical rules), it 
seems that, given the contingent historical variability of such rules—or the his-
torical changes in how language games are played—there is a sense in which we 
have, at least potentially, a variety of different limits of language that are con-
tingently drawn in the ways they are based on the life (with language) we lead. 
Our contingent form of life determines (albeit not immutably but always in a 
historically contextualized and therefore potentially changing manner) how we 
are ‘minded’ (cf. Lear 1998), or how we draw the limits of expressibility—and 
this ‘we’ (our socio-historical transcendental subjectivity, if we want to put it 
that way) may itself change and be reinterpreted along with such transforma-
tions of the structures of the language we use, to the extent that Lear speaks 
about the ‘disappearing “we’’’ (ibid.: chapter 12).
Let us, instead of continuing a lengthy transcendental exercise at a highly 
abstract metaphilosophical level, briefly examine some of Wittgenstein’s formu-
lations (as they appear in his pupils’ notes) in ‘Lectures on Religious Belief ’. In 
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those lecture notes from the early 1930s, Wittgenstein is, among other things, 
concerned with ‘[w]hat we call believing in a Judgement Day or not believing in 
a Judgement Day’ (LC 55, my emphasis). He then says he ‘can’t contradict’ the 
person who believes. The following passage is crucial:
In one sense, I understand all he says—the English words ‘God’, ‘sepa-
rate’, etc. I understand. I could say: ‘I don’t believe in this,’ and this would 
be true, meaning I haven’t got these thoughts or anything that hangs 
together with them. But not that I could contradict the thing. […] My 
normal technique of language leaves me.’ (LC 55, my emphasis; see also, 
e.g., Putnam 2012: 490.)
That is, the thoughts that I (or you) have (or have not) contingently ‘got’ deter-
mine the limits of language for me (or for us), at least regarding this particular 
matter at the moment. Necessity is, then, grounded in contingency. Whether you 
can contradict someone or not (i.e., what your logic is like, or what you can 
do, logically speaking, by using your language) depends on your contingently 
‘having got’ certain thoughts, or your leading a life that ‘hangs together with 
them’. The distinction between modalities (necessity, possibility) and factual 
contingencies is not necessarily drawn in the way we draw it; it could be drawn 
in a different way. The ways in which we (contingently) do draw this distinc-
tion reflexively influence our understanding of the notions of contingency and 
modality themselves. Clearly, when we are engaged in a certain language game, 
the rules governing our operations within that game are necessary, but when-
ever we take a step out of the game, we realize that our playing the game in the 
first place is itself contingent. We could play another game and follow rules 
different from the ones we do follow, and then the division between the neces-
sary and the contingent would be completely (or at least partially) rearranged 
in our lives.
Consider some analogies raised earlier. The distinction between the epistemic 
and the non-epistemic (e.g., regarding the notion of truth) is itself (partly) epis-
temic, not independent of our epistemic standpoints in drawing the distinc-
tion. Our epistemic perspective may have an ineliminable influence on how we 
view the interplay between epistemic and non-epistemic factors in our concept 
of truth, i.e., whether we consider truth something radically non-epistemic and 
potentially recognition transcendent or an idealization of epistemic notions 
such as rational acceptability or justification. Analogously, we may say that the 
distinction between the natural and the supernatural is relative to our concept 
of nature, and hence to the historical development of science (pretty much like 
the distinction between science and pseudoscience is itself a historical product 
of the way our scientific self-understanding of what science is develops). Now, 
what is crucial here is that it is not out of any absolute metaphysical necessity 
that the distinction between contingency and necessity is drawn in the way we 
actually draw it—or even if it were, that meta-necessity would then be (at a yet 
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higher meta-level) contingent and would depend, reflexively, on our contingent 
language use. I take this to be a vital (late-)Wittgensteinian point that must not 
be overlooked in any attempt to understand the grammar of language games, 
religious language games included.52
This is also why we need empirical understanding of contingent religious 
practices in order to study the philosophical issue of the limits of religious 
language. Even so, we also vitally need philosophical (even transcendental) 
analysis and argument focusing on the limits of language—the conditions of 
what is possible within a religious way of using language—in order to appreci-
ate the relevance of such empirical investigations. Theology and empirical (or 
comparative) religious studies seek to understand the systems and practices 
within which religiosity is manifested, either from within those systems and 
practices or from without them.53 Such investigations are philosophically rel-
evant in order for us to be able to understand the grounding of transcendental 
necessities in empirical (practical) contingencies. But a philosophical examina-
tion of the limits of language issue is, conversely, needed to guide such inves-
tigations.54 Paraphrasing Kant, we might say that mere philosophy of religion 
focusing on the limits of (religious) language in the absence of any empirical 
(non-reductively naturalized) understanding of the kinds of practices people 
contingently engage in within such limits (i.e., the ‘systems’ or ‘worldviews’ 
they live and think within) is empty, while mere empirical study of religion in 
the absence of guiding philosophical questions and analyses is blind. This may 
not be a thoroughly Wittgensteinian understanding of the relation between the 
philosophical and the empirical, as Wittgenstein certainly wanted to keep phi-
losophy ‘pure’ from everything empirical, but it is, at least, a pragmatist one.
The lectures on religious belief by Wittgenstein primarily seek to refute the 
evidentialist view that evidence, or neutral rational argument more generally, 
is essential to the assessment of religious belief. At the same time, they con-
tain profoundly interesting remarks on the limits of language. Consider, for 
example, this: ‘Whether a thing is a blunder or not—it is a blunder in a par-
ticular system. Just as something is a blunder in a particular game and not in 
another’ (LC 59). Wittgenstein’s note again invokes transcendental conditions 
and limits, grounded in the contingent reality of a particular ‘system’, in the fact 
that we do operate within that particular system (perhaps comparable to what 
pragmatists typically prefer to call ‘practice’). Our having the life we do makes 
the necessities that appear as constitutive (grammatical) rules conditioning all 
possible meanings within that life possible for us.55
Another relevant example Wittgenstein discusses is this: ‘“Seeing a dead 
friend,” again means nothing much to me at all. I don’t think in these terms. 
I don’t say to myself: “I shall see so and so again” ever’ (LC 63). Again, what is 
essential here is whether I contingently think in certain terms or say to myself 
certain things (or not). At this point we may return to the famous remark in 
the Investigations: ‘If I have exhausted the justifications, I have reached bed-
rock and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I 
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do’’’ (PI I, §217). What we are able to do—what our grammar and rules enable 
us to do or say—depends on what we actually do, and it is in this sense that 
necessities and possibilities are ultimately grounded in contingency. Or so 
Wittgenstein seems to be arguing.
The asymmetry between the ‘I’ and the ‘we’ is, arguably, important here. 
It may be highly significant that Wittgenstein, in passages like this, does not 
speak in terms of ‘we’ (i.e., a shared, public form of life) but in terms of ‘I’ (i.e., 
in terms of what I habitually or customarily do). The ‘truth’ in solipsism (or 
skepticism)—the significance that I do not ‘know’ but can only acknowledge 
that there is, for instance, an external world and other human beings in it—thus 
becomes relevant in this context (cf. Cavell 1979; see also Putnam 2008: 26; 
2012: 489). The way I use certain words, or the way I think, may be the crucial 
thing here, no matter what or how others around me think. The transcenden-
tal limits of language, and hence transcendental necessities about what can be 
said or expressed within those limits, may constitutively depend on contingent 
facts about my using words, or having thoughts, in certain ways, comprising 
networks of words and thoughts hanging together.
The significance of all this for philosophy of religion is enormous, but it is 
equally important to point out that here we in the end return to the relevance 
of the ‘first-person’ quasi-solipsistic picture of language Wittgenstein sketched 
in the Tractatus. The metaphysical subject disappearing into the world (cf. 
TLP 5.64) corresponds to the social subject of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy 
precisely in its transcendental function. Even a thoroughly pragmatist reading 
of Wittgenstein cannot therefore get rid of the transcendental predicament of 
critical philosophy, nor of its conception of transcendental subjectivity (even 
though that must remain an issue to be explored on another occasion).
Theodicy vs. antitheodicy revisited
I want to add one more twist to this discussion by again revisiting the problem 
of evil and suffering. In this context, theodicies, in particular, have, as we have 
seen, from a Wittgensteinian perspective been regarded as unethical violations of 
religious language use (even though Wittgenstein himself had little to say about 
this particular topic). Religiously speaking, theodicies could even be criticized 
as superstitious or blasphemous (cf. Phillips 1977, 2004). In addition to making 
this general point, I now wish to suggest, more specifically, that the theodicy vs. 
antitheodicy issue can interestingly be approached from the point of view of the 
phenomenon of the contingency of necessity (as briefly characterized above on 
the basis of Wittgenstein’s ‘Lectures on Religious Belief ’). Contingent historical 
sufferings may motivate a response (viz., antitheodicy) that may even turn out 
to be transcendentally necessary by functioning as a necessary condition for the 
possibility of occupying a serious moral perspective at all in a certain historical 
(again contingent) situation—such as our post-Holocaust world.
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Let us, once again, recall the fact that several Wittgensteinian philosophers 
have argued that theodicies amount not only to ethically insensitive use of lan-
guage disregarding or misrecognizing others’ suffering in its pointlessness but 
also to conceptual confusion and pseudo-religious use of language, suggesting 
that it is not only ethically wrong but in an important sense meaningless and 
conceptually confused, and thus beyond the meaning-constitutive grammar of 
religious language games—hence, indeed, a violation of the limits of language—
to claim that others’ suffering has a metaphysical or theological meaning, func-
tion, or explanation. Phillips or other Wittgensteinians would hardly endorse 
my transcendental reconstruction of the antitheodicist argument (cf. the early 
sections of this chapter). Certainly they need not embrace the transcendental 
vocabulary; that particular vocabulary is not forced on anyone developing a 
Wittgensteinian antitheodicy. I am merely suggesting that their way of attack-
ing theodicies as confused responses leading us out of genuinely religious—and 
genuinely ethical—ways of using language can be rather naturally rephrased as 
a transcendental critique drawing attention to the limits of (religious, ethical) 
language, as long as we keep in mind the fundamental contingency of the way 
in which those limits, and the structures of necessities and possibilities they 
constrain, are drawn by us. Phillips and others thus tend to slide toward some-
thing like transcendental philosophy.
In many cases, for a genuinely religious person who sincerely attempts to speak 
about God in a religious way, belief in God’s reality is the necessary background 
of any potential theological or philosophical account of evil and suffering. Any 
possible argument, including the atheist’s argument challenging the theist to 
provide a theodicy by appealing to the problem of evil, will have to be evaluated 
against this background. The believer might point out, against both the atheist 
and the theist seeking to provide a theodicy, that it is strictly speaking nonsensi-
cal (i.e., beyond the meanings available in religious language games) for human 
beings to try to evaluate God’s motives morally, or to seek to criticize or justify 
them. At the moment when the theodicist begins to engage in an argument, pro 
or contra, regarding the problem of evil conceived as an atheist challenge, the 
grammar of the religious language game will already have been violated and the 
relevant expressions will no longer be used in a genuinely religious meaning. 
Therefore, the atheist argument starting from the problem of evil does not even 
get off the ground due to this confusion. But those theists who try to respond 
to such an argument by producing a theodicy are even more confused, because 
they do not perceive the atheists’ confusion any more than their own. Theodi-
cies should therefore be rejected as transcendentally confused misuses of the 
language of ‘God’, ‘evil’, and ‘suffering’. It can be suggested that one comes close 
to illegitimately transgressing the limits of meaningful discourse—the limits of 
religious language—simply in examining the problem of evil in terms of the 
alleged ‘argument from evil’ and in attempting to respond to such an argument 
theodicistically. Both the theist and the atheist theodicists fail to use the gram-
mar of religious language religiously and thus breach the limits of language.56
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It is roughly in this way that I would like to suggest we can reinterpret Phil-
lips’s and other Wittgensteinians’ perceptive remarks on theodicies being both 
morally and conceptually (or even logically) confused. The reason why these 
confusions are so deep is that they are transcendental in the sense of this word 
that remains available in the later Wittgenstein’s thought. This is the pragmatic 
transcendentality of the constitutive (albeit historically transformable and rein-
terpretable) features of language games and forms of life. It is only by violating 
the limits of language that the problem of evil and suffering construed as an 
atheist argument requiring a theodicy as a response can so much as be formu-
lated. When we realize that such a (mis)formulation is based, precisely, on a 
violation of grammar, we realize that the entire business of theodicy is miscon-
ceived from the start. It is by means of a Wittgensteinian analysis of the limits 
of language that this point can be brought home—but in this context this is a 
transcendental analysis that also invokes a pragmatic reflection on what we do 
in our language.57
However, as soon as we note all this we should re-emphasize that the gram-
mar and meanings of our expressions may vary historically along with the 
changes and transformations taking place in our forms of life. The necessity 
of transcendental rules is based on the contingency of human life (as we saw 
above). This applies with full force to the problem of evil and suffering. Dif-
ferent reactions to this problem may become possible in different historical 
circumstances characterizing the forms of life through which the grammar of 
the relevant language games is established. We may, for instance, find it neces-
sary to examine the problem of evil and suffering after the Holocaust in a way 
essentially different from its pre-Holocaust articulations.58 In the contingent 
historical context in which the Holocaust actually took place and will there-
fore permanently, ineliminably, irredeemably, be part of our human history, it 
may seem that certain (new) limits of appropriate religious language have been 
established. It is no longer possible—morally or conceptually—to approach the 
problem of evil by providing a theodicy. We now—after the Holocaust—can 
see this as a striking, violent confusion. Moreover, we can now see—after the 
Holocaust—that it was never possible, even if that was not as clearly perceivable 
earlier. Historical contingencies may thus ground philosophical, ethical, and 
conceptual necessities—and this I take to be a fundamental Wittgensteinian 
message that we may learn from reading not only On Certainty but also the 
lectures on religious belief quoted in the previous section. Historical contin-
gencies may thus also render the early-Wittgensteinian concern with harmony 
examined earlier in this chapter incoherent, or at least ethically highly prob-
lematic, in the antitheodicist context.
I have not in this chapter attempted to determine in any great detail what 
Wittgenstein himself really thought either about the theodicy issue or about 
the limits of language in relation to religion and theology. I suppose my discus-
sion is compatible with several different interpretations of Wittgenstein—albeit 
not, I think, with the extreme ‘postmodern’ or radically ‘new Wittgensteinian’ 
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account according to which Wittgenstein’s main point would be a merely ironi-
cal one about our being unable to engage in any systematic and argumentative 
philosophical activity at all. I have basically suggested that it makes sense to 
approach his thoughts from a Kantian (transcendental) perspective in order 
to be able to fully appreciate the special character of the kind of thought on 
religion that some of his most original followers (e.g., Phillips) have developed 
in their attempts to understand religious belief—and also to understand what 
it means to lose such belief as believers’ forms of life change. At the same time, 
I want to re-emphasize that Wittgenstein (and Wittgensteinians) come(s) close 
to pragmatism in the philosophy of religion, as both firmly reject the totaliz-
ing project of metaphysical realism (cf. Chapter 4)—and may even lead us to 
observe a close link between such realism and theodicism.
Let me close this chapter with a brief metaphilosophical suggestion that 
strengthens the transcendental analysis presented here but perhaps also makes 
it more controversial. In investigating the limits of language in the context of 
the philosophy of religion—Wittgenstein’s and Wittgensteinian—I have repeat-
edly emphasized the historical contextuality and mutability (in principle) of the 
transcendental necessities grounding the meanings possible in any language 
games we may engage in.59 This ‘factual dependence’, this contingency of neces-
sity, can itself at a meta-level be regarded as a transcendental condition for 
the possibility of the kinds of meanings that can so much as be available to us 
human beings, given the kind of language-using beings we naturally are. Thus, 
we would here be dealing with yet another meta-level transcendental necessity 
that would itself be based on contingent facts about the ways we live our lives—
and so on, potentially ad inifinitum.
For us, no firmer transcendental necessities are possible. Yet, again for us, it 
is necessary that our contingent forms of life do function as the background for 
any (contextually) necessary sets of grammatical rules that enable us to say any-
thing definite and meaningful in any concrete circumstances of using language. 
We can get rid of neither contingency nor necessity—they are, so to speak, 
co-constitutive or mutually constitutive here—and this meta-level necessity (or 
impossibility) is again itself constitutively part of human life as we contingently 
know it. This reflexive spiral of co-constitutivity can perhaps be compared to 
the indefinitely complex reflexivity of pragmatic contextualism explored in 
Chapter 2 above, and any Wittgensteinian investigation of religious language 
and its limits should appreciate such an interplay of transcendental necessities 
and contingencies.
CHAPTER 6
Beyond the Theory-Practice Dichotomy
Let me begin this final substantial chapter of the book by first recapitulating 
some familiar points already discussed in the previous chapters. While the-
odicies have traditionally been proposed as responses to the problem of evil 
and suffering, which challenges theism by arguing that the empirical reality of 
apparently meaningless evil and suffering is incompatible with the existence of 
an omnipotent, omniscient, and absolutely benevolent God, or at least poses a 
severe evidential challenge to the theist who believes in the existence of such a 
deity,1 the purpose of this chapter (any more than of this book) is not to review 
either the historical or contemporary debate over theodicies in any detail. I will 
now briefly focus on a specific form of moral antitheodicism that is opposed 
to the very project of theodicies for moral reasons. I have argued throughout 
this book and already in earlier work (especially Kivistö & Pihlström 2016) 
that theodicies, seeking to philosophically justify or legitimize God’s allowing 
apparently unnecessary and meaningless evil and suffering—or offering some 
secular proxy for this traditional theological project—amount to a colossal 
ethical failure to acknowledge the suffering other and the utter pointlessness 
of their suffering. Instead of taking others’ suffering morally seriously and thus 
fully recognizing it as what it is, theodicies (as well as the only allegedly more 
moderate ‘defenses’) arguably instrumentalize suffering in the service of some 
postulated or imagined overall good.2
An argument for antitheodicism focusing on the ethical need to appropri-
ately recognize the reality of suffering, or to take evil morally (and metaphysi-
cally) seriously, can draw from various sources, including James’s pragmatism, 
Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion, as well as post-Holocaust Jewish moral 
reflection exemplified by Levinas’s ethics of otherness, all of which can be 
interpreted as fundamentally Kantian approaches to theodicism and antithe-
odicism (ibid.: chapters 3–5). These antitheodicisms are ‘Kantian’ not because 
they would necessarily explicitly refer to Kant’s own criticism of theodicies but 
because (i) they can (implicitly) be traced back to Kant’s 1791 ‘Theodicy Essay’ 
and its rejection of theodicies as violations of the limits of human reason, based 
on the general approach of Kantian critical philosophy (cf. Chapter 3 above), 
and (ii) they arguably seek to show that theodicies violate the necessary condi-
tions for the possibility of adopting a moral perspective on the world and other 
human beings.3
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Here I cannot continue to explore the Kantian nature of antitheodicism (or 
pragmatism) in any depth, but it should be kept in mind throughout this final 
discussion that antitheodicism is, even when pragmatically developed, a spe-
cies of critical philosophy in a sense indebted to, even if not directly derived 
from, Kant. It is critical not only of theodicies themselves but of the very project 
we seek to engage in when attempting to deliver a theodicy as a response to the 
‘argument from evil’ challenging theism by referring to apparently unnecessary 
and meaningless evil and suffering. There is, I have argued in both pragmatist 
and Wittgensteinian contexts, something seriously wrong in this entire dis-
course, primarily because its key assumption, i.e., that evil and suffering can in 
some sense meaningfully be objectively ‘measured’, quantified, and defined—
and that sufferings could therefore be seen as appropriate prices to be paid for 
some other, comparable goods—as such tends to fail to acknowledge the suf-
ferer who experiences their suffering as meaningless, immeasurable, incompa-
rable, perhaps even undefinable.
The availability of antitheodicy
In general, the moral antitheodicist claims theodicies to be immoral, confused, 
or even pseudo-religious and superstitious (see, e.g., Trakakis 2008, 2018; 
Simpson 2009; Gleeson 2012, 2018; Betenson 2016, 2019; Snellman 2019; cf. 
also again Kivistö & Pihlström 2016; Pihlström 2013a, 2014b). This is the basic 
critical picture of theodicism we have reached in the previous chapters through 
our Kantian, pragmatist, and Wittgensteinian explorations.
However, an important caveat is needed here: we cannot seriously main-
tain that major historical theologians and philosophers such as Augustine or 
Thomas Aquinas would have been ‘pseudo-religious’ thinkers, as their work to 
a great extent defines the tradition of Western theology (claiming anything like 
that would surely amount to a reductio ad absurdum of any antitheodicism). 
Generally, medieval philosophers’ reactions to the problem of evil seem to have 
manifested either an accidental strategy or an instrumental one (Posti 2017): 
either evil is a mere unintended consequence of good things (i.e., some evil fol-
lows from goodness) or God can use evil instrumentally for good purposes (i.e., 
some good follows from evil). Medieval philosophers concerned with divine 
providence were thus inevitably theodicists of some kind, though many of them 
also discussed empathy or compassion (misericordia) toward the sufferer as an 
important virtue—and this, for many of them, may in fact have been a more 
important context for the discussions of suffering than any metaphysical theori-
zation about theodicy. These concepts have a very interesting history going back 
to Aristotle, and they are also used in contemporary discussions in a variety of 
ways. In general, compassion in this tradition involves the emotion of sorrow 
felt due to another person’s misfortune (cf. Knuuttila 2019), and it is in this spirit 
of compassion—or, more critically, of ‘compassionate indignation’ (cf. Gleeson 
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2012) triggered by unjust suffering—that the antitheodicist approaches human 
miseries, resisting all rationalizing theodicist reconciliation attempts.
In order to avoid anachronistic moralizing judgments on, say, medieval phi-
losophers’ theodicist attitudes, we must, in any case, understand the problem 
of evil and suffering itself as historically contextualized and mutable, drawing 
serious attention to the fundamental differences among the contexts within 
which this problem is discussed, and the approaches made possible by those 
contexts. The problem of evil and suffering is inextricably intertwined with 
our practices of reflecting on experiences of evil and suffering in the historical 
situations we live in, and those practices evolve along with the changes in our 
lives and the general human practices we engage in. This is one reason why 
our topic is inherently related to the historically evolving practices of recogniz-
ing other human beings. Furthermore, when construing the other’s suffering 
in a theodicist manner, we not only fail to recognize the suffering victim as 
what s/he is—a victim of meaningless evil and suffering—but we arguably also 
misrecognize their suffering itself as something that is in some sense meaning-
ful, functional, or measurable, thus forcing a certain ethically and possibly also 
politically oppressive ‘recognizing as’ structure into the other’s experiences that 
request a very different kind of acknowledgment (viz., as something immeasur-
able, as lacking any function or meaning—and as hence in a sense lacking the 
‘as’ structure of recognition).
Now, someone like Thomas Aquinas, for instance, lived and wrote in a world 
entirely different from ours. His theodicy problem is (was) not ours. Clearly, for 
him, God’s existence is no issue; the theodicy problem is merely how exactly 
(not whether) his classical version of theism and the reality of evil are compat-
ible. For us modern thinkers, the problem of evil and suffering highlights the 
general fragility and uncertainty of any permanent and deep values, includ-
ing our (possible) commitment to God’s reality. It is a problem that haunts 
any attempt to view the world we live in as meaningful, as morally structured, 
as humanly comprehensible, and so forth—whether those attempts are reli-
gious or secular. In this regard, while traditional philosophers of religion like 
Peter van Inwagen (2006) consider the problem of evil narrowly in terms of 
the coherence and rationality of theism, broader discussions of this issue such 
as Susan Neiman’s (2002) emphasize the general (in)comprehensibility of the 
world as a key to the problem.
It is, arguably, only with Kant’s critical philosophy that the theodicy issue 
receives its existentially burning form: how should we (or I) respond ethically to 
others’ suffering and their experiences of its meaninglessness? How, then, does 
the problem of evil and suffering turn into a truly ethical (and hence practical) 
problem from the rather purely intellectual and metaphysical form it takes in 
someone like Leibniz? Our problem—especially after the Holocaust—is how 
to properly, or morally adequately, acknowledge the suffering other (either in 
a theistic context or in a secular one), and this problem is very different from, 
say, the scholastics’ problem of securing the coherence of Christian theism, or 
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even from Leibniz’s general metaphysical concerns. It is (only) in this context, 
framed by the ethical task of acknowledging the suffering other (conceived 
as a Kantian or quasi-Kantian moral obligation), that (arguably) antitheod-
icy becomes available to us as something like a ‘genuine option’—that is, as a 
forced and ‘momentous’ choice between two rival hypotheses both of which are 
‘live’ ones for us—in William James’s (1979 [1897]: chapter 1) sense. It is such 
a genuine option for us, especially after the Holocaust, while we may readily 
admit that it was not available, at least not exactly in the same sense, for (e.g.) 
medieval Christian thinkers. It gradually emerged, we might say, as a genu-
ine option through the critique of Leibnizian theodicy launched by Voltaire in 
his Candide (satirically referring to the Lisbon Earthquake of 1755) and other 
Enlightenment critics of religion, soon followed by Kant,4 and later by James, 
Jewish post-Holocaust moral thinkers, and the Wittgensteinian antitheodicists 
of the twentieth century (among many others). 
Theory and practice
A typical response to antitheodicist moral criticisms of theodicies in contem-
porary mainstream philosophy of religion pursuing theodicies (or ‘defenses’) 
starts from a sharp distinction between theory and practice. Theodicists can 
easily maintain that at a theoretical level their justifications for evil and suf-
fering (or, more modestly, the defense according to which God might, for all 
we know, have acceptable moral reasons justifying his allowing the world to 
contain apparently meaningless evil and suffering) may indeed fail to fully 
acknowledge the suffering other, or their experiences of meaningless suffering, 
while also maintaining that such a failure does not matter philosophically or 
ethically insofar as the theodicist exercise is, and remains, merely theoretical, as 
explicitly announced by the theodicist theoretician. Theodicists can (and argu-
ably should) avoid engaging in their theory construction when actually faced 
by suffering human beings—by the concrete other invoked by someone like 
Levinas—and the practical need to comfort them. This practical task of conso-
lation is to be clearly distinguished from the purely theoretical or intellectual 
task of constructing a theodicy argument or a more moderate ‘defense’, merely 
intended to shift the burden of proof to the atheist.
For example, van Inwagen (2006: 12) tells us that his careful analytic exami-
nation of the problem of evil is ‘purely intellectual’ and that his ‘defense’ is not 
intended to even hypothetically comfort anyone (ibid.: 108); similar caveats 
are added by a number of other recent theodicists. Hence, it could be claimed 
that no failure of acknowledgment is necessarily committed by the theodicist 
(or the one who seeks to offer a ‘defense’) at the practical level of engaging 
with suffering human beings needing consolation (or, in a theological context, 
pastoral care). Given that the distinction between theory and practice is drawn 
carefully enough, theodicies and defenses may remain purely metaphysical and 
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epistemological, i.e., theoretical and intellectual, while comfort and consolation 
are practical matters to be dealt with separately in an entirely different context.
However, it can be argued—especially from a pragmatist (e.g., Jamesian) 
point of view—that the very attempt to defend theodicism by drawing such a 
sharp theory vs. practice dichotomy itself (at a meta-level) constitutes a moral 
failure of acknowledgment. The suffering other ought to be ethically recog-
nized as a sufferer, and their suffering ought to (at least in some cases) be rec-
ognized as meaningless, precisely by not drawing such a dichotomy—that is, by 
not engaging in the theoretical argumentative exchange of purely intellectual 
ideas pro and contra theodicies at all.5 The issue, then, concerns the ways in 
which our practical contexts of responding to suffering may, or should, con-
strain our theorization about the problem of evil and suffering. The antithe-
odicist argues that we must not develop or maintain practices that even at an 
allegedly merely theoretical level encourage mis- or non-recognition. The mere 
fact that they do so is already a practical feature of those practices, thus subject 
to moral criticism—analogously to the way in which metaphysical realism was 
ethically criticized in Chapter 4 above.6
This, we may say, is where the metaphilosophical relevance of moral antithe-
odicism for the pursuit of philosophy of religion primarily lies. Again, antithe-
odicist arguments and positions as diverse as James’s pragmatism, Phillips’s 
Wittgensteinianism, and Levinas’s insistence on the ethical primacy of the 
other’s face can be regarded as variations on this general theme. James (1975 
[1907]: Lecture I) seems to base his entire pragmatic method on an antithe-
odicist refusal to attach any absolute or abstract God’s-Eye View metaphysi-
cal significance (either Hegelian or Leibnizian) to individual experiences of 
concrete sufferings (see Chapter 3 above), while Phillips (2004) warns us 
against the morally corrupting language of anthropomorphic accounts of the 
divinity that seem to turn God into an agent calculating the advantages and 
disadvantages of allowing his creation to suffer. In a different but arguably 
analogously pragmatic vein, Levinas (2006) maintains that the justification 
of others’ suffering is the foundation of all immorality. In a way, it morally 
corrupts the practice of responding to suffering. According to these very dif-
ferent thinkers, moral antitheodicism, it may be suggested, is necessary for 
appropriately recognizing other human beings as fully human or sharing a 
common humanity (cf. Gaita 2000).7
We may, thus, formulate a meta-level pragmatic antitheodicism by maintain-
ing that it is already ethically problematic to even try to move onto the purely 
intellectual or theoretical level of theodicy discourse. This amounts to seriously 
neglecting the practical task of acknowledging the other within our philosophi-
cal and theological practices themselves. The question now is to whom this duty 
to avoid the purely intellectual point of view (or, analogously, metaphysical 
realism) is set as a moral obligation. The pragmatist response is that it is entirely 
fine to adopt different points of view serving different practical purposes, but 
we have to carefully—ethically—evaluate those purposes themselves, as well as 
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our attempts to move between them. The purposes allegedly served by the the-
odicist intellectualizing perspective can themselves be heavily criticized from 
the practical point of view as ethically problematic—i.e., non- or misrecog-
nizing. There is no perspective- or standpoint-neutral meta-standpoint for 
switching the perspectives, but at the meta-level we are always already engaged 
in practical ethical evaluation. I cannot develop this theme further here, but I 
would suggest that this metaphilosophical pragmatism expresses a constitutive 
feature of our ethical world engagement.8
Moral criticism
However, as strongly ethically motivated as our antitheodicism may be, it should 
also acknowledge the ‘need for a moral order’ that James (1979 [1897], 1975 
[1907]) always found an inescapable need in human lives. Theodicies might 
seem to function as a (misguided, corrupted) exemplification of this need. The 
morally committed antitheodicist should recognize and appreciate this need 
itself while seeking to offer a thoroughgoing critique of its theodicist interpre-
tations and manifestations. It is part of the ethical practice of antitheodicist 
thought to both recognize the need for a moral order that may lead to theodicies 
and to offer philosophical guidance out of the theodicist predicament.
As I have suggested elsewhere (e.g., Pihlström 2013a, 2014b; Kivistö & 
Pihlström 2016) and in Chapters 3–4 above, James, in particular, was a prag-
matic antitheodicist committed to the philosophical primacy of the ethical 
acknowledgment of the suffering other, approximately along the lines sketched 
in the previous section—contra, for example, the tendency to prioritize any 
metaphysics or epistemology of otherness and subjectivity in relation to ethics. 
In contrast, ethics is what grounds our theoretical pursuits, including meta-
physics (cf. also Pihlström 2009), and this pragmatic starting-point leads us 
to also engage in metaphysical argumentation against theodicies. We cannot 
first settle the metaphysical and epistemological issues concerning, say, ‘other 
minds’, but we must, for ethical reasons, start our inquiries into the significance 
of otherness from the ethical (Levinasian) acknowledgment of the suffering 
other and the pointlessness of their suffering.
However, one might ask whether there is something like a theodicy by other 
means in James, too, or possibly even in Kant—the arch-antitheodicist—inso-
far as pragmatism (or, analogously, Kantian ethics and philosophy of religion) 
amounts to a philosophy of hope, leading us toward a philosophical legitima-
tion of theism on pragmatic grounds. James did maintain that we may legit-
imately hope for the realization of the humanly natural need for an eternal 
moral order. Now, it is precisely this need for a moral order that grounds, in my 
view, not only religion in general, pragmatically conceived, but also antitheodi-
cism itself. Theodicism postulates a forced, fixed, rationalizing, and speculative 
order that is in the end alien to our natural human experience and its practices. 
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Our active pursuit of the moral order never justifies the very real losses and 
sufferings there are; nor does it explain them away. Thus, it is by no means 
theodicist (not even ‘by other means’). It demands, rather, that we recognize 
the reality of such losses and their significance for our fellow human beings. 
Theodicies would, then, violate, instead of responding to, the human need for a 
moral order James is fully aware of.
It can be further argued that antitheodicism, insisting on not explaining away 
the meaninglessness of suffering, is needed precisely as a necessary condition 
for the possibility of adequately recognizing the other person as a (potential or 
actual) sufferer. It can be part of that adequate recognition to acknowledge that 
there are sufferings that simply cannot be rendered meaningful in any morally 
acceptable sense. Therefore, there is a sense in which theodicist attitudes to oth-
ers should not themselves be (philosophically, ethically) recognized as ethically 
appropriate attitudes, or perhaps not even tolerated, and this rejection of the-
odicism can be articulated in terms of pragmatism that is generally critical of 
any principled theory-practice dichotomies. We may say that, for pragmatists, 
theory and practice are inevitably entangled, and the failure to recognize this 
entanglement again constitutes a failure to adequately engage in the practical 
task of acknowledging otherness.9
One way of pragmatically recognizing the deep interplay and entanglement 
of theory and practice in this context might be attempted by emphasizing the 
relevance of the concept of irony. Richard Bernstein (2016) suggests that phi-
losophy can be seen both as theory and as a practice or a way of life—and irony 
particularly highlights this. It is the commitment to the merely theoretical 
ideal of philosophy that also gives rise to theodicism—and, mutatis mutandis, 
metaphysical realism. (In the context of irony, the dichotomy between theory 
and practice is, again, part of the problem rather than any solution.) Irony is 
needed to liberate us from this commitment to the merely speculative and 
theoretical—as witnessed by Rorty’s philosophical development, for instance. 
Thus, it is only natural that Bernstein has insightfully written both about evil 
and about irony.
Irony and philosophical sincerity are, then, eminently compatible: irony can 
be regarded as the full consciousness of our contingency—to put it in Rortyan 
terms (cf. Rorty 1989)—yet linked with a passionate commitment to recogniz-
ing, and alleviating, human suffering in its absurdity and meaninglessness. In 
addition, irony is obviously an excellent method of revealing situations of non-
recognition, or recognition failure—both in fictional literature and in real life. 
Both irony and sincerity are thus also crucial to antitheodicism as understood 
in this chapter; this topic, however, would deserve a much more comprehensive 
discussion. It suffices to note here that the key role played by irony is one reason 
why the issue of acknowledging otherness needs to be dealt with not only by 
philosophical argument but by literary means, too; indeed, I will shortly con-
clude my discussion by taking a slightly more detailed look at a famous literary 
engagement with the absurd suffering of the Holocaust.
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Before turning to that final part of the chapter, however, I would like to sug-
gest a way of investigating further the relations between attitudes such as rec-
ognition and toleration—attitudes that are increasingly perceived to be crucial 
in the philosophy of religion and theology more generally (cf. again Saarinen 
2016; Koskinen 2017, 2019)—by allowing iterations of the attitudinal ‘opera-
tors’ representing these and related attitudes. For example, we may say that a 
certain kind of recognition or non-recognition act is (or ought to be) tolerated 
(by someone in a certain context), or that it is not or should not be tolerated. 
Conversely, we may say that certain attitudes of tolerance or intolerance ought 
to be recognized (or non-recognized) as appropriate by someone in some 
context(s), and so forth.
It is easy to see that indefinitely complex cases of ‘nested’ attitudes of recogni-
tion and toleration (or their negations) can be constructed in this manner. This 
is relevant to our analysis and moral criticism of antitheodicism and the ethical 
recognition failures of theodicism precisely because a certain kind of failure to 
recognize others’ suffering, a failure ultimately based, as argued above, on an 
unpragmatic theory vs. practice dichotomy, is criticized (by pragmatist moral 
antitheodicists in particular) as a morally problematic attitude that in a certain 
sense should not be recognized as enabling a moral perspective to other human 
beings at all, or perhaps should not even be (ethically) tolerated due to its lack of 
such a perspective, or its undermining the very conditions for the possibility of 
occupying such a perspective. The fact that this kind of interplay of pragmatist 
and recognition-theoretical ideas in the philosophy of religion (cf. the intro-
ductory chapter above) seems to be necessary for such a moral antitheodicism 
to be properly developed suggests that a more wide-ranging and more thor-
oughgoing integration of pragmatism and the theory of recognition would be 
vitally needed. The problem of evil and suffering provides an excellent context 
within which the promises of such an integration can be critically examined. 
Such an examination should also illuminate the relation between the theoreti-
cal and the practical—a topic, as we have seen, fundamental to both Kantian 
and pragmatist approaches in the philosophy of religion.
Primo Levi’s antitheodicism: acknowledging the ‘drowned’
Moving to the final substantial part of this chapter, I want to consider, as a case 
study of the relation between theory and practice in acknowledging the suffer-
ing other, Primo Levi’s compelling contributions to our understanding of the 
Holocaust, focusing on the way in which Levi rejects (without using that term) 
all theodicist construals of the kind of suffering the Holocaust involved for 
its victims.10 From Levi’s ethical perspective, we should clearly refuse to even 
tolerate a theodicy failing to recognize the sufferer’s experience. We should, 
rather, acknowledge the meaninglessness and absurd excess of the victims’ suf-
fering, including their shame and guilt caused by the demonic Nazi tendency to 
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make the victims complicit in the evil brought upon them. Levi’s powerful writ-
ings on this topic, based on his first-hand experience while carrying a universal 
human message, have for good reason been standard references also among 
philosophical commentators of the Nazi horrors.11
Levi has repeatedly emphasized that the Holocaust left an irrecoverable 
injury that ‘cannot be healed’ and ‘would never again be able to be cleansed’ 
(Levi 1988: 12, 66; see also 52; cf., e.g., Alford 2009: 3). He quotes approvingly 
Jean Améry’s statement that anyone who has been tortured ‘remains tortured’ 
and, having lost their faith in humanity, ‘never again will be able to be at ease 
in the world’ (Levi 1988: 12). One (but presumably not the only) reason for this 
irrevocability is that the perpetrators of the Holocaust were able to shift the 
burden of guilt on to the victims, too, destroying not only their lives but their 
innocence as well by creating a ‘grey zone’ between the guilty and the innocent 
(ibid.: chapter 2)—thus in a sense destroying not just their bodies but their 
souls (ibid.: 37, 42). Moreover, this kind of shame and guilt concern everyone, 
not just those directly involved; this is ‘the shame which the just man experi-
ences when confronted by a crime committed by another, and he feels remorse 
because of its existence, because of its having been irrevocably introduced into 
the world of existing things’ (ibid.: 54; cf. 65; see also Agamben 2002 [1999]: 
87–88; Woolf 2007: 48).12 Such shame and guilt that even the survivors can 
never get rid of are readily comparable to the shame that remains after Josef K. 
at the end of Kafka’s The Trial.13
While Levi offers us little in the way of explicit theorizing about theodic-
ies, he is absolutely clear in his moral rejection—with horror—of any idea of 
‘Providence’, emphasizing, in contrast, the contingency and chance in survival 
(see Levi 1988: 117; 1996: 157–158; cf. Giuliani 2003: 47–51; Woolf 2007: 41; 
Alford 2009: 143). After the Holocaust, there is no way we could continue using 
(without irony) the concept of providence or related concepts. Levi would thus 
be morally horrified about any attempt to take philosophically or theologically 
seriously, say, medieval philosophers’ (or contemporary Christian thinkers’) 
firm belief in providence and their attempts to solve the problem of evil in that 
context.14 Accordingly, the idea that he was somehow ‘destined’ to survive in 
order to be able to write his books, for instance, ‘seemed monstrous’ to him, 
because those who survived (‘the saved’) were not at all the best but ‘the fittest’, 
in some sense even the worst (ibid.: 62–63; see also Agamben 2002 [1999]: 
60)—hence, we may say that they were, ironically, not ‘the saved’, after all, but 
rather ‘the drowned’.
He reflects further: ‘My religious friend had told me that I survived so that 
I could bear witness. I have done so, as best I could, […] but the thought that 
this testifying of mine could by itself gain for me the privilege of surviving […] 
troubles me, because I cannot see any proportion between the privilege and 
its outcome’ (Levi 1988: 63; see, however, also 143). This could, I suppose, be 
rather naturally read in the context of Levinas’s (2006: 97) insistence on the 
sheer disproportionality of Holocaust suffering in comparison to any explicit 
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or implicit theodicy. There is nothing whatsoever in the entire world that could 
be so valuable that it would render the Holocaust suffering acceptable or justi-
fied in any sense. C. Fred Alford (2009: 101) explicitly argues—in the context 
of Levi’s reading of the Book of Job (see Levi 2005: 61–62)—that, from Levi’s 
point of view, to even ask the theodicy question, ‘Why do the innocent suffer 
if God is all good and all powerful?’, amounts to a misunderstanding of ‘one’s 
place in the universe’.15
Levi rejected not only the theology of providence but religion generally—but 
not because the Holocaust would have functioned for him as a manifestation 
of the ‘argument from evil’ or any other theoretical argument against theism. 
Rather, because he was not religious when he entered Auschwitz, he felt (he 
explains) that it would have been wrong for him to ‘change the rules of the 
game at the end of the match’ (Levi 1988: 118). When faced with the ‘selec-
tion’ and thus imminent mortal danger, he once felt the temptation to pray but 
rejected it: ‘A prayer under these conditions would have been not only absurd 
(what rights could I claim? and from whom?) but blasphemous, laden with the 
greatest impiety of which a non-believer is capable’ (ibid). This attitude, one 
may suggest, was possible for him because he ‘took seriously what he didn’t 
believe’ (Alford 2009: 146). More generally, serious philosophical antitheodi-
cism, whether religious or non-religious, takes seriously both religious and 
non-religious ways of responding to human suffering.16
An example of what Levi regarded as blasphemous prayer—and thus as a 
dramatic failure to acknowledge the suffering other—is provided by him in his 
first book, If This Is a Man (1958; also known by the English title, Survival in 
Auschwitz), where he tells us what happened after one particular selection in 
1944, after some prisoners had been selected to be murdered in the gas cham-
bers and others to continue their desperate lives in the camp until the next 
selection. A prisoner called Kuhn had avoided death (this time) and thanked 
God by praying aloud, while another (much younger) one, Beppo, was lying in 
the next bunk, knowing he had been chosen to be murdered. Levi’s moral con-
demnation of Kuhn’s attitude is harsh: ‘Does Kuhn not understand that what 
happened today is an abomination, which no propitiatory prayer, no pardon, 
no expiation by the guilty—nothing at all in the power of man to do—can ever 
heal?’ And he adds: ‘If I was God, I would spit at Kuhn’s prayer’ (Levi 1996 
[1958]: 129–130).
This passage in Levi’s early work has been insightfully discussed not only by 
Alford (2009: 145–146), whose reading of Levi I have already cited, but also 
by Jonathan Druker (2009: 32–33), whose reading I will comment on shortly, 
as well as more recently by Jennifer L. Geddes (2018). She notes how outraged 
Levi is ‘at the theodical logic implicit in Kuhn’s prayer’ (ibid.: §2). Kuhn fails 
to see Beppo as a fellow human being—thus failing to acknowledge him. But 
his failure is much broader: ‘By ascribing responsibility to God for not being 
selected, Kuhn’s prayer of thanks implicitly ascribes responsibility to God not 
only for Beppo’s selection, but by extension, for the whole genocidal system of 
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which it is but one moment’, thereby actually liberating the Nazis from their 
guilt and ignoring the full human responsibility for the horror (ibid.). Accord-
ingly, Kuhn’s prayer is, Geddes maintains, blasphemous in obscuring human 
responsibility and by invoking the idea of divine providence that Levi so force-
fully argues against. As ‘Levi’s critique strikes to the heart of theodicy itself ’, it 
can, Geddes shows, be usefully compared to Levinas’s account of the useless-
ness of suffering (ibid.: §§2–3; cf. Levinas 2006). From Levi’s perspective, the-
odicies are thus deeply problematic both ethically and religiously.
Employing the vocabulary of this book, we might suggest that Levi argues 
against a certain morally reprehensible practice of theodicism manifested by 
even a merely theoretical commitment to a theodicy (though Kuhn’s behavior 
certainly is not ‘merely theoretical’). Above all, what theodicists like Kuhn fail 
to recognize is another person’s experience of the meaninglessness of suffering. 
Their blasphemous prayers try to fit everything, even the unthinkable, even the 
murderous selection, into a coherent narrative rendering the world meaning-
ful—even in the ‘black hole’ (cf. Levi 2005) of sheer meaninglessness.
However, Geddes (2018: §4) also plausibly suggests that just as we should not 
impose a theodicist claim of meaningfulness on another person’s (experiences 
of) meaningless suffering, we must not violently impose meaninglessness on 
the suffering of someone who does believe in a theodicy and construes the 
meaning of their own suffering along theodicist lines. Even if our antitheodi-
cism is strongly morally motivated by the kind of horror that Levi feels at the 
mis- and non-recognition exemplified by Kuhn’s neglect of Beppo in the next 
bunk, we cannot, for analogous ethical reasons, impose our antitheodicism 
on the suffering other who does find genuine comfort in theodicies (a point 
acknowledged, independently of Geddes’s work, also in Kivistö & Pihlström 
2016: chapter 6). The (Levinasian) ‘ban on theodicy’ rightly emphasized by Levi 
cannot thus be absolute or symmetrical. It is, as also suggested in our 2016 
book, primarily a moral demand set for us, or for me, in our relations to others.
Even so, we should maintain the moral right to be horrified at the kind of 
failure of recognition that is inherent in a theodicist construal of even the most 
absurd and disproportional suffering as manifesting an imagined providential 
logic. Such recognition failures should not be (ethically) tolerated, and this 
is forcefully argued by Levi in his literary work. Nor should, conversely, the 
forced attempt to ‘recognize’ meaningfulness in the most meaningless suffer-
ing be tolerated. Even our private and theoretical engagements in theodicist 
thinking—such as our prayers, at least if spoken aloud—do not remain private 
and theoretical but have practical implications regarding our attitudes to oth-
ers around us, as the case of Kuhn and Beppo strikingly illustrates. The same 
goes for our apparently purely theoretical ideas such as metaphysical realism 
(cf. Chapter 4); they might also have ethically problematic consequences pre-
cisely because they enable theodicist appeals to overall meaningfulness, thus 
implicitly supporting non-acknowledging practices. Or so, I am suggesting, a 
pragmatist antitheodicist can and should argue.
128 Pragmatic Realism, Religious Truth, and Antitheodicy
Thus, the distinction between merely ‘first-personal’ theodicism and ‘second- 
or third-personal’ theodicism intended to be public may in the end collapse. 
It would be against the pragmatist approach of this book to suggest that at a 
purely theoretical level we can accept theodicist thinking (or praying) in first-
personal cases (allegedly only interpreting our own suffering in a theodicist 
manner) while having to reject theodicism (only) when it concerns our rela-
tions to others. Our moral puzzlement at the face of suffering—others’ or our 
own—cannot be easily removed. How we interpret our own case has implica-
tions on how we interpret the world generally. Accordingly, though we should 
avoid imposing antitheodicism (any more than theodicism) to others, we do 
have a moral responsibility to be extremely cautious in engaging in theodicist 
accounts in general, also when they concern our own situation.
Furthermore, an even more disturbing conclusion seems to follow from our 
taking seriously Levi’s ruthless analysis of blasphemous prayer. The Kuhn-
Beppo case might even be extrapolated to morally problematize any gratitude 
or thankfulness we are tempted to feel regarding our own fortunate situation—
also outside the extreme circumstances of Auschwitz, in ordinary human life, 
religious and secular life included. If we seriously entertain the idea that our 
fortunate situation (in comparison to our less fortunate fellow human beings), 
whether in terms of health, wealth, social relations, professional success, or 
whatever, is in some sense an indication of divine grace that falls upon us rather 
than some others (or any secular proxy thereof), are we not in a sense acting 
like Kuhn in Levi’s description? Are we not thanking God (or the world, or 
life) aloud and thereby disregarding, non-acknowledging, the suffering other? 
Is gratitude by definition theodicist by implicitly accepting the immoral and 
unjust logic of a world—divinely or secularly structured—that lets some of us 
flourish while crushing others?
I have no proper response to offer to this worry that we may end up with 
upon reading Levi’s compelling work (and I am not implying that Levi himself 
would have intended his writings to be interpreted in such an extreme manner). 
In any case, the mere possibility of extrapolating the concern with blasphemy 
in this way perhaps shows how central the responsibility for acknowledging 
another human being within the context of a shared human life is for Levi, and 
how vitally important his analysis of the destruction of such responsibility in 
the Holocaust is.17
Another recent commentator discussing Levi’s antitheodicism also deserves 
a brief response here. Jonathan Druker (2009: especially chapters 1 and 4) 
draws on Levinas and Adorno, among others, in his treatment of Levi as a critic 
of theodicies who nevertheless problematically remains at least partially stuck 
within the tradition of humanistic ethics in Western thought. One manifesta-
tion of theodicism (though this is not Druker’s exact word) is, he argues, the 
tendency to place everything at the ontological level—something famously 
criticized by Levinas, in particular. ‘The ontological position is repeatedly inter-
rupted by the ethical call of the other’, Druker reminds us (ibid.: 75), approv-
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ingly citing Levinas’s idea that ethics is ‘against nature’ as it tells me not to ‘put 
my own existence first’ (ibid.). Where Druker goes wrong, in my view, is in his 
move from this legitimate attack on the primacy of ontology (and epistemol-
ogy) to the allegedly Levinasian rejection of ‘Kantian ethics’ and humanism 
more generally (a move that, he claims, Levi does not fully succeed in making). 
Because the representation of the inhumanity of the Holocaust as an utter limit 
of humanity leads us beyond reciprocal recognition, Druker seems to maintain 
that the only way of properly ‘acknowledging the other’ in our post-Holocaust 
world is by rejecting, in a ‘posthumanist’ manner, the humanistic tradition and 
especially the Kantian ethical subject (see, e.g., ibid.: 85). Pace Druker, the Levi-
nasian rejection of all theodicies as ‘attempts to justify suffering or find a pur-
pose in it’ (ibid.: 86) can be seen as a moral duty precisely for the (humanistic) 
subject committed to acknowledging the other—and to viewing the world in 
an appropriately ethical light based on this commitment (as has been argued 
throughout this book).18
I find Druker’s reading of Levi—and hence Levi’s work itself—extremely valu-
able for the main goals of this book, namely, the antitheodicist resistance to the 
kind of ‘objectification of humans’ (ibid.: 133) that not only makes theodicism 
possible (cf. Chapter 4 above) but also contributed to making the Holocaust 
possible (see ibid.). Where I disagree with Druker is in his understanding of 
(especially Kantian but more generally ‘Western’ or ‘Enlightenment’) human-
ism. I do not think that the ‘new Humanism’ required by our taking seriously 
the Levinasian task of acknowledging the other without reducing them to the 
ontological level of objectification (or, analogously, the famous critique of the 
Enlightenment in critical theory) leads us to a posthumanist rejection of Kan-
tian critical philosophy. On the contrary, I believe critical philosophy is exactly 
what we need here. I have tried to argue that the best—or at least a promis-
ing—way to preserve what is valuable in critical (transcendental) philosophy 
while being fully committed to the fundamental antitheodicist moral duty of 
acknowledgment is by working through a pragmatist articulation of our rela-
tion to the world in general. This can, it seems to me, only take place within 
the broad tradition of the Enlightenment, to which pragmatism also belongs. 
Critical philosophy itself operates within that overall tradition, examining criti-
cally many of its background assumptions, such as the realistic ones concerning 
truth and objectivity that have been explored in the previous chapters.
Levi has in this section served as an example of an antitheodicist thinker 
whose work turns out to be highly relevant to this critical task, even though it 
would of course be misleading to force any artificial link to, say, Jamesian or any 
other form of pragmatism into Levi’s writing. Levi, in any event, draws serious 
moral attention to our on-going practices of writing and remembering, and 
therefore his representation of the moral horror of the Holocaust is exemplary 
precisely in its refusal to operate in terms of the kind of theory vs. practice 
dichotomy that I argued to be a problematic background assumption in the-
odicists’ reactions to antitheodicist ethical critique. Insofar as this self-reflec-
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tive enterprise is part of Enlightenment humanism, as I think it is, then it is 
Enlightenment humanism itself that needs, via pragmatism, a critical renewal 
liberating it from metaphysical realism but not from the infinite ethical task of 
viewing the world ‘aright’ by acknowledging the other.
Meaninglessness
As suggested in the early sections of this final chapter, the refusal to draw any 
principled dichotomy between theory and practice in this area amounts to a 
pragmatist approach to antitheodicism (at least at the meta-level). In addition, 
the rather complex ethical attitude I have sketched regarding the rejection of 
theodicies (a view compatible with the asymmetrical toleration of someone’s 
theodicist thinking when it really is—unlike Kuhn’s in Levi’s novel—confined 
to their own suffering and not anyone else’s) can also be seen as a corollary of 
the Kantian imperative of respecting the human person, in others and oneself, 
as an end in itself, never as a mere means. But (again pace Druker 2009) the 
Kantian nature of the analysis provided in this chapter extends further.
We may note, once again, that Kant is a crucial background figure for this 
entire discussion, its pragmatist dimensions included, not only because theodi-
cies tend to view human suffering, and the world in general, from a ‘God’s-Eye 
View’, being thus committed to the kind of metaphysical realism Kant firmly 
rejected in urging us to adopt the resolutely anthropocentric perspective of crit-
ical philosophy (see again Chapters 3–4 above). He is fundamentally important 
also because theodicism can be claimed to be analogous to the analysis of what 
Kant called transcendental illusion (Schein). Human reason inevitably tends to 
seek to transcend its own limitations, even though that is of course impossible 
for us (according to Kant’s analysis). Theodicies are thus confused more or less 
in the way in which the arguments regarding the immortal soul, the world as 
a totality, or God’s existence are—as analyzed by Kant (1990 [1781/1787]) in 
the Paralogisms, the Antinomies, and the Ideal of Pure Reason (respectively). 
It is the most deeply Kantian task of acknowledgment to learn to acknowledge 
this kind of limitations of human reason, and to learn this in an ethically sensi-
tive way, moving from the recognition of our human limits to the acknowledg-
ment of others’ suffering, especially of its meaninglessness. Moreover, it could 
be argued to be a dimension of this acknowledgment to refrain from ascribing 
too much meaning (e.g., in terms of excessive gratitude) for one’s own contin-
gent success in avoiding meaningless suffering. Historically, such a move of 
acknowledgment focusing on our finitude marks the victory of Kant over Hegel 
as far as the concepts of recognition and acknowledgment are concerned—but 
the antitheodicist philosopher celebrating such a victory must remain self-
critical enough not to overlook Levi’s reminder that the intellectual ‘tends to 
follow in Hegel’s footsteps’ by easily becoming an ‘accomplice of Power’ (Levi 
1988: 117).
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It is right here that our moral acknowledgment of the experience of mean-
inglessness is indistinguishable from an acknowledgment of meaninglessness 
itself.19 Only an insensitive theodicist can respond to others’ suffering by claim-
ing it to be ‘really’ meaningful in some hidden sense. It is the task of pragmatic 
moral antitheodicism to remind us of the necessity of acknowledging otherness 
also in this sense of recognizing experiences of utter meaninglessness. Unprag-
matic dichotomies between theory and practice are, I have argued, hindrances 
to such adequate recognition. In order to properly acknowledge this, we should 
be prepared to examine both philosophical arguments against theodicies (such 
as Kant’s, Levinas’s, Phillips’s, or James’s, for example) and literary—yet shock-
ingly real—cases, as exemplified by the work of Levi.
Most importantly, we must acknowledge the unending task of responding 
to suffering with genuine compassion and recognition—without theodicies—
as ours. As Levinas (2006) powerfully argues, we, or rather I, must be seen as 
being always more responsible for the other than anyone else.20 And as Levi 
(1988: 43) reminds us, ‘one is never in another’s place’, even though, paradoxi-
cally, we may be ashamed of being alive ‘in place of another’, as every one of us 
‘has usurped his neighbour’s place and lived in his stead’ (ibid.: 62; cf. Agamben 
2002 [1999]: 91; Druker 2009: 103). Therefore, one must always ‘answer 
personally for sins and errors’ (Levi 1988: 147)—and this could, essentially, 
be regarded as a Kantian (again in contrast to Hegelian) affirmation of the 
irreducibility of moral subjectivity. If my overall argument is on the right track, 
the very possibility of affirming moral responsibility in such a pregnant Kantian 
sense requires antitheodicism.
The final reflexive challenge to be met is to acknowledge that my own 
defense of antitheodicism along these lines derived from Levi and many others 
may itself be detached, in a problematic way, from the recognizing practice it 
seeks to defend. We, as wealthy people in a stable society with a safe historical 
distance from the horrors of the Holocaust (among others), can afford discuss-
ing the problem of evil and suffering from a philosophical and literary point 
of view, advancing a complex articulation and defense of a stance we label 
‘antitheodicism’, a stance affirming the entanglement of theory and practice, as 
I have tried to do here. This argumentation, as such, does little to practically 
alleviate any meaningless suffering actually taking place in the world. The kind 
of antitheodicism defended here is, I have suggested, motivated by a certain 
kind of compassion (genuine, sincere compassion toward the sufferer and the 
victim of evil, I hope), but it inevitably remains disengaged from concrete suf-
fering itself even when at the meta-level insisting on the need to overcome 
any theory vs. practice division itself leading to non- or misrecognition. It is 
still a theoretical position in the context of philosophical and literary contem-
plation, available to us in ‘philosophy’s cool place’ (to borrow a phrase from 
Phillips), and this fact about it must be self-critically recognized as firmly as 
Levi recognizes the fact that the best did not survive and that true witnessing 
is impossible.21
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These self-critical concluding thoughts should also make us aware of the fact 
that even though the crucial moral failure of theodicies can be captured by the 
concepts of misrecognition, non-recognition, or recognition failure, the kind 
of wrong that is done to people who suffer in or from historical atrocities such 
as the Holocaust cannot be reduced to mere mis- or non-recognition. Their 
sufferings are a result of something considerably deeper and more sinister, 
i.e., (deliberate) failures to acknowledge even any common humanity in them 
(cf. again Gaita 2000; Sparti 2005). Such failures of acknowledgment are, I am 
tempted to say, ‘transcendental’ in the sense of violating constitutive conditions 
of the moral point of view, and hence destroying the human world we live in. 
Understanding them properly, as failures of this kind, requires that we sharpen 
our philosophical abilities to ‘see the world aright’. This, ultimately, is why I 
think the problems of realism and evil are thoroughly entangled, as I have tried 
to show in this book.
Conclusion: Meaningful 
and Meaningless Suffering
I would like to begin this brief concluding chapter by summarizing the main 
argument I have sketched in the pages above. I will then add some further 
thoughts on the meaninglessness of suffering—as something that needs to be 
acknowledged in any serious antitheodicist reflection—because at a fundamen-
tal level it seems to me that the distinction between meaningfulness and mean-
inglessness is a key to this entire set of issues.
In the introduction and the first two chapters, I articulated and defended a 
pragmatist approach to the philosophy of religion generally and to the problem 
of realism more specifically, formulating a version of pragmatism that takes 
seriously the potentially indefinitely complex contextuality—both metaphysi-
cal and ethical—of our practice-embedded structurings of reality. At that stage, 
I only hinted at the relevance of these ideas to the debate over evil, suffering, 
and theodicies, which were not yet in the main focus of Chapters 1–2. This 
relevance is obvious, however, as soon as we realize that we are responsible for 
the practice-laden contextualizations within which we categorize our human 
world—metaphysically as much as ethically. No metaphysical theorizing is 
absolutely independent of ethical valuation, but conversely, there is no meta-
physically neutral place to stand in any discussions of ethics and value; indeed, 
one of the key arguments the pragmatist may employ here is the observation 
that the attempt to imagine such a neutral territory of non-contextuality—that 
is, the metaphysical realist’s idea of a ‘God’s-Eye View’ on the world—is, pre-
cisely, something merely imagined, nothing that could ever be genuinely avail-
able to us as the kind of finite human beings we are. (In this sense, I see my 
inquiry as being in the end an investigation of what our human form of life is 
like, hence as something like pragmatist philosophical anthropology: cf. also 
Pihlström 2016.)
As suggested in Chapter 3, this pragmatist critique of metaphysical realism is 
most naturally cashed out in Kantian terms, loosely paralleling Kant’s transcen-
dental idealism (see also Skowronski & Pihlström 2019): it is Kantian critical 
philosophy in its pragmatist rearticulation that leads us to appreciate the way in 
which metaphysical realism is problematic especially in the ethical sense. The 
totalizing tendency of metaphysical realism (or what Kant called ‘transcenden-
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tal realism’) is a sine qua non of both religious exclusivism and theodicism, as 
argued in Chapter 4. The kind of Kantian pragmatism developed in the third 
and the fourth chapters takes seriously the individual diversity in the contex-
tualizations that render our world meaningfully structured for us. However, 
the pragmatist as much as the Kantian needs to remain committed to a seri-
ous pursuit of truth, though the very concept of truth can be understood as 
value-laden and thus inextricably linked (albeit not identified) with the notion 
of truthfulness. Some attention was therefore directed in Chapters 3–4 to the 
Jamesian pragmatic conception of truth as well as its possible fragmentation in 
Rorty’s neopragmatism.
In order to open up a constructive comparative dialogue between pragma-
tism and other philosophical orientations relevant to the theodicy debate and 
the philosophy of religion more generally, I devoted Chapter 5 to Wittgen-
steinian considerations. While noting the striking similarities between the 
kind of pragmatist (and Kantian-inspired) antitheodicism sketched in the 
earlier chapters and some Wittgensteinian philosophers’ criticisms of the-
odicies, I also examined critically Wittgenstein’s own potentially theodicist 
employment of the concepts of happiness and harmony in his early philoso-
phy. Whatever Wittgenstein’s own specific position was, the Kantian pragma-
tist can freely employ the idea that transcendental necessities are contextual-
ized (embedded) in historically changing uses of language. This meta-level 
contextualization is itself contingent. The Wittgensteinian twist in the overall 
argument is important because it shows that this basic view need not be spe-
cifically expressed in explicitly pragmatist terms but can receive an equally 
accurate articulation in the Wittgensteinian vocabulary of language games 
and forms of life—even though no strictly speaking scholarly interpretation 
of Wittgenstein’s own position, any more than, say, Kant’s, has been offered in 
this book.
Chapter 6 finally turned, after a summarizing account of theodicism as a fail-
ure to recognize others’ perspectives, especially their experiences of the mean-
inglessness of their suffering, to a case study on Primo Levi’s Holocaust writ-
ings, interpreted as an extended ethical argument against theodicism. I suppose 
it has been implicitly clear throughout my discussion (though this presumably 
became fully explicit only in the sixth chapter) that the problem of suffering 
crucially focuses on meaninglessness. Meaningful suffering—suffering serving 
some ‘point’ or function—is not even nearly as problematic as absurd suffering 
that cannot be rendered purposeful (see also Samuelson 2018). This issue is 
more specific than the rather indeterminate problem of the ‘meaning of life’ (or 
‘meaning in life’), which philosophers are often in popular discussions expected 
to respond to, yet obviously highly relevant to the latter problem, too, given the 
obvious fact that our lives are often full of suffering experienced as meaning-
less—indeed, suffering that may threaten to make life itself meaningless. It is 
this kind of suffering that needs to be antitheodicistically acknowledged, as 
Levi, among others, has urged us to do.
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These are topics that need to be pursued not only by philosophical but also 
by artistic means. Indeed, some philosophers—e.g., John Cottingham and D.Z. 
Phillips—have compellingly argued that the standard analytic methods of phi-
losophy of religion in particular ought to be enriched by literary reading and 
interpretation (see again also Kivistö & Pihlström 2016). Accordingly, Levi’s 
work was in Chapter 6 analyzed as developing an essentially ethical argument 
against theodicies with a philosophical-cum-literary structure. I hope I have 
been able to shed some light on the problem of meaningless suffering, espe-
cially by canvassing a line of argument enabling a moral critique of theodicist 
attempts to force all suffering into a meaningful pattern. This examination of 
compelling Holocaust testimony should also lead us to a broader appreciation 
of the power of imaginative literature in the analysis of evil and suffering. In 
general, literature may of course deal with types of suffering that are not real 
but imagined—yet could be real—and hence enhance our abilities to critically 
reflect on the kind of suffering human beings can inflict on one another. Liter-
ary analysis, however, has not played any substantial role in the present inquiry.
However, in Levi’s writing, for instance, the suffering represented is, or was, 
fully real, yet its depiction is literary and thus utilizes not just testimonial 
memory but also its author’s creative capacities of imagination. By writing on 
not merely imagined but fully real suffering, Levi succeeds in not just imagin-
ing but representing the unimaginably horrible, and that is part of his lasting 
legacy. By so doing, Levi and other antitheodicists succeed in arguing that a 
transcendent point of view from which we could render suffering as meaning-
ful—the kind of God’s-Eye View postulated by metaphysical realism, and hence 
by theodicism—is itself merely imagined and ought to be rejected as morally 
unimaginable. Levi is thus one of the sources employed in this study that may 
show us how the problem of evil and suffering is ultimately a problem of how 
to view the world, and what kind of language to use in describing reality. The 
examination of Levi in the final chapter was thus by no means a marginal addi-
tion to the discussion focusing on realism but in its own way a culmination 
of the overall argument of the book: by abandoning theodicism we abandon 
certain morally distorting ways of categorizing reality.
I have argued both in this book and in earlier work that the key to antitheodi-
cism is the fundamental ethical demand to acknowledge the other, especially 
other human beings’ experiences of the sheer meaninglessness of their suffer-
ing. (While I have occasionally used the concept of recognition as well, referring 
the reader to some recent work on that concept, I have made no detailed formal 
differentiations between recognition and acknowledgment, for instance, speak-
ing rather loosely of both, hoping that my remarks may be compatible with a 
wide array of more specific theoretical understandings of recognition.) Such 
an ethical demand of acknowledgment can be seen to be present, for instance, 
in Levinas’s resolutely antitheodicist moral thought, according to which the 
justification of the other’s suffering is the very beginning of immorality, but it 
is equally strongly (though perhaps less explicitly) present in William James’s 
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development of the pragmatic method, urging us to get rid of our instinctive 
blindness to the inner significance (or, mutatis mutandis, lack of significance) 
of others’ perspectives on reality.
We have perceived that Levi’s writings on the Holocaust are exemplary regard-
ing the acknowledgment of meaninglessness and antitheodicy, yet contributing 
to our appreciation of the value and meaning of human life in general—that is, 
refusing to succumb to nihilism, despite the utter meaninglessness of suffering 
and the ‘disproportionality’ (to use Levinas’s [2006] word) of any theodicist 
meaning-making in comparison to the concreteness and excess of suffering. 
As also repeatedly observed in Raimond Gaita’s (2000, 2004) work, morally 
admirable action—rendering life in some sense more meaningful—may take 
place in entirely meaningless circumstances, even at a place like Auschwitz. For 
example, Gaita (2004) draws attention to Levi’s account of the case of a prisoner 
helping a dying man at the sick ward with no hope of saving that man, and 
indeed with a major risk for his own life. Just like suffering, goodness can, thus, 
be meaningless—there is, perhaps, a sense in which it must be meaningless—
and it may actually suffer from the pursuit of meaningfulness, or from our pur-
suing any specific meanings, especially if our being good is instrumentalized 
into the service of the search for meaning in our own lives. Morality obligates 
us irrespectively of whether it makes our lives meaningful or meaningless—
and this is, at least indirectly, an obviously Kantian point. Thus, we may learn 
from Levi one more extremely important lesson: we should be firmly opposed 
to the idea of grounding moral motivation in the pursuit of meaningfulness in 
one’s own life; even when it remains fully secular, such a grounding attempt is 
comparable to ‘soul-making’ theodicies.1 Goodness subordinated to meaning-
fulness self-destructs.
The concept of critical distance is, I would like to suggest, fundamental to 
the implicit (never fully explicit) antitheodicism we find not only in Levi but 
in many other thinkers commented upon in the preceding chapters.2 While we 
ought to be attentive to others’ suffering, seeing it as the kind of (meaningless) 
suffering it is rather than violently imposing artificial meaning upon it, we nev-
ertheless should not naively claim to be able to share that suffering, no matter 
how much we care for the other. Understanding and acknowledging another 
human being’s suffering as that other person’s suffering, not mine, requires an 
appropriate kind of critical distance, and keeping such a distance also involves 
a continuous critical (especially self-critical) reflection on whether the kind of 
distance or detachment we are (or I am) maintaining ‘regarding the pain of oth-
ers’ (cf. Sontag 2003) is correct or ethically adequate. Am I too close or too far? 
That’s a question that never disappears. Reflecting seriously on this question 
concerning appropriate distance itself requires distance (detachment) at the 
meta-level.3 This is a never-ending spiral of critical reflection. Asking oneself 
these critical questions is, again, to pursue truth—in a deeper sense than mere 
propositional correspondence truth, i.e., a sense pragmatically including ethi-
cal truthfulness (cf. Chapter 4). Truth itself requires distance, however; truth, 
Conclusion: Meaningful and Meaningless Suffering 137
especially the truth about others’ suffering, can never be naively ‘immersive’.4 
Rather, we must develop our capacities of ethically viewing others’ suffering 
as theirs, and their meaninglessness as theirs, too. The pragmatic project of 
developing an ethically reflective form of antitheodicy that is both attentive 
enough and stays at a respectful critical distance cannot fail to take seriously 
the concept of truth, and we need to examine all the possible resources we 
might have—drawing from James’s Pragmatism but also from non-pragmatist 
theorists of objective, realistic truth—to maintain a critical pragmatic realism 
that does not sacrifice the objectivity of truth and the sincerity of truth seeking, 
while at the same time understanding that project as a deeply human value-
laden practice.
In this sense, the very project of antitheodicism should be based on the kind of 
critical philosophy we find not only in Kant but also in pragmatism, emphasiz-
ing the continuous reflexivity of human inquiry and reason use (see also Chap-
ter 1). The Kantian transcendental self (also in its pragmatist reincarnation) is 
thoroughly critically self-reflective—never naively immersed—in its own world 
involvement, and therefore it engages in a continuous reflexive critique of its 
own capacities as well as limits. This is one of the crucial morals the pragmatist 
draws from the Kantian legacy of critical (transcendental) philosophy.
This leads me to a further critical comment on Jonathan Druker’s (2009) read-
ing of Levi, already briefly discussed in Chapter 6. As we saw, Druker attacks the 
Enlightenment humanist way of conceptualizing the subject as complicit in the 
guilt of the Holocaust, partly because the humanist tradition does not leave room 
for the Levinasian ‘humanism of the other’. Levi’s work, Druker argues, is ambiv-
alent in this regard: it is antitheodicist, as Levinas’s, yet committed to humanism, 
which Druker proposes to replace by ‘posthumanism’. This critique of humanism 
(comparable to and partly based on not only Levinas’s but also, e.g., Adorno’s and 
Agamben’s criticisms)5 in my view severely fails to capture the sense in which 
the transcendental version of the humanist subject in the Kantian tradition is 
itself needed for the Levinasian humanism of the other. (And the same, mutatis 
mutandis, goes for pragmatist versions of humanism and posthumanistic cri-
tique.) The transcendental subject is continuously self-critically and reflexively 
aware of the deeply ethically (and hence ontologically) problematic nature of 
its world-involvement. It is never naively immersed in its world but maintains 
critical distance also to its own viewing of the world. It is not Levi’s homecoming 
‘Ulysses’ (cf. ibid.: chapter 5) but incorporates also the ‘Abrahamic’ dimension of 
ethical subjectivity emphasized by Levinas (who, in his own peculiar way not to 
be further discussed here, is a Kantian philosopher, too).
This book has not examined in any great detail the idea (basically raised only 
here in the concluding remarks) that philosophy and literature can share the 
joint pursuit of something like meta-level meaningfulness through sincerely 
acknowledging meaninglessness in suffering, and thus also meaninglessness 
in life. However, I have tried to argue at some length that a certain kind of 
creative synthesis of philosophical traditions, especially the ones of Kantian 
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critical philosophy and pragmatism, may effectively advance this pursuit by 
showing us how to ‘view the world aright’, that is, rejecting the metaphysical 
realist’s postulation of a God’s-Eye View as well as the theodicist’s imagined 
narrative of ultimate meaningfulness. Obviously, there would be much more to 
be said on how exactly the kind of pragmatic realism I have recommended dif-
fers from the forms of metaphysical realism that also (as I claimed in Chapter 4) 
give rise to theodicism. In some respects, this division may be difficult to draw, 
and further philosophical work, both systematic and historical, is needed for a 
proper understanding of the relations between pragmatism and realism (some-
thing I have been engaged in since the 1990s: see, e.g., Pihlström 2003, 2009, 
2014a). While the pragmatist, in my view, ought to firmly reject the metaphysi-
cally realist claim that the world possesses ‘its own’ pre-categorized ontological 
structure—including the kind of structures of meaningfulness that theodicist 
arguments could rely on—and to affirm the dependence of any ontological 
structure that we humans may fruitfully examine and analyze on our own 
value-laden processes of structuring that always invoke ethical considerations, 
this definitely does not mean that the pursuit of objective truth about a world 
that we simply did not make up or create ex nihilo would have to drop out as 
superfluous. Rorty’s neopragmatism, emphasizing freedom in contrast to truth 
(cf. Chapter 3), is too radical in this respect, and it does open the unfortunately 
slippery slope toward a kind of fragmentation or disappearance of truth, strik-
ingly depicted in Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four (and perhaps somewhat less 
dramatically present in our own ‘post-truth’ or ‘post-factual’ societies).
I have, hence, tried to argue that responsible (non-Rortyan) pragmatism and 
Kantian critical philosophy should join forces in leading us out of the predica-
ments of metaphysical realism and theodicism, yielding a pragmatic realism 
committed to an enriched conception of truth accommodating ethical truth-
fulness. I have also argued that Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion comes in 
certain respects very close to these two traditions, especially in its engagement 
with the ‘contingency of necessity’ (cf. Chapter 5), and I have at an intuitive 
and tentative level suggested how pragmatists might employ the vocabulary of 
recognition theory (in dialogue with the tradition developed by Axel Honneth 
and his many followers) and especially the concept of acknowledgment (drawn 
from Stanley Cavell) in their antitheodicist argumentation. I have thus hope-
fully been able to indicate some potentially significant philosophical resources 
that might be valuable for tackling the question concerning the meaningfulness 
of our ways of viewing the world and our own place in it especially in relation 
to others that need our attentive response. This is also part of the pragmatist 
approach to ‘viewing the world aright’: there is a plurality of conceptual frame-
works to employ, no single over-arching absolute standpoint available from 
which we could settle once and for all how exactly the relations between, say, 
theodicies, antitheodicies, and various forms of realism are related to each other.
From a pragmatist perspective, metaphysical realism ought to be abandoned 
not only as the background theory of theodicism but also as a mystification of a 
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certain kind of illusive ‘depth’ in evil. A (pragmatically speaking) more ‘realis-
tic’ account of evil—realistic in a more ‘humane’ sense (cf. Cottingham 2014)—
rejects such non-human mystifications, refusing to appeal to any deep underly-
ing structure of evil (which, presumably, would again be available only from the 
imagined God’s-Eye View). There are excellent examples of a more pragmatic 
realism about evil and suffering available, starting from James’s recognition of 
the ‘blindness’ in human beings preventing us from acknowledging the signifi-
cance of others’ perspectives, and ranging through Levi’s above-analyzed cool 
and accurate descriptions of what human beings are capable of doing to each 
other, descriptions based on an almost scientific-like realism about human suf-
fering (Levi, by the way, was a chemist by training), all the way to Hannah 
Arendt’s (1994 [1963]) account of the ‘banality of evil’, i.e., the observation that 
evil lacks depth—being never radical but ‘only extreme’, and often superficial, 
spreading everywhere like a fungus (while not being the mere absence of good-
ness in the Platonic sense dominating all too many historical treatments of 
evil in Western philosophy and theology). These examples of (in my terms) 
pragmatically realistic ways of dealing with the reality of evil and suffering are 
attempts to view the world in an irreducibly ethical light by acknowledging the 
suffering other, and it is a crucial part of such analyses of our ethical responsi-
bilities in dealing with others’ suffering that no ultimate metaphysical explana-
tion or essentialist theory of the nature of evil is provided.6 On the contrary, 
such explanations and theories are critically analyzed as points of departure 
for theodicies that fail to take that kind of ultimate responsibility in the face of 
the other.
This, again, is a deeply humanistic project of critical analysis. While this 
book has not taken up the topic of humanism in any detail (apart from some 
brief remarks on ‘the humanism of antitheodicism’), it can be suggested that 
a certain kind of humanism runs through the entire pragmatist argumenta-
tion based on the ethical thrust of Jamesian antitheodicism and extends to the 
explorations of what it means to pursue truth in a pragmatist context as an 
ethically engaged process of truthful acknowledgment. Pragmatist humanism 
must constantly renew itself, of course, and the challenges presented by vari-
ous posthumanist and even antihumanist thinkers (such as Druker 2009) need 
to be taken seriously. But to do so is to be a humanist. Paraphrasing Larry 
Hickman’s quip that Dewey’s pragmatism is a form of ‘post-postmodernism’,7 
we may say that the kind of humanistic pragmatism sketched here amounts to 
‘post-posthumanism’, and thereby to the recognition that we will never get rid 
of humanism if we seriously try to reflect on what it means to be human in an 
ethical context. Antihumanisms are just hopeless attempts to deny our basic 
humanity, and the humanist can acknowledge that it is a most human tendency 
to try to deny one’s humanity (cf. also Putnam 1994).
I am perfectly aware of the limitations of this work. It would require a much 
more comprehensive study to provide detailed differentiations between the 
relevant forms of metaphysical realism and pragmatic realism (and other 
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realisms),8 or the various sophisticated versions of theodicism that might be 
argued not to be guilty of failing to acknowledge meaningless suffering, not to 
speak of the much wider issue of humanism raised only here in the conclud-
ing remarks. I have presumably only managed to provide a kind of (possibly 
somewhat Wittgenstein-inspired) ‘übersichtliche Darstellung’. An overview at 
a critical distance is, however, a philosophical task par excellence. Much more 
philosophical attention needs to be focused on the details of how, for example, 
certain specific metaphysically realistic assumptions are made by specific the-
odicist arguments—either by atheists putting forward an ‘argument from evil’ 
or by theists responding to them by means of theodicies or ‘defenses’—and how 
different kinds of meaningfulness and meaninglessness may be present in our 
(moral and metaphysical) ways of viewing the world. 
Now, at the end of this inquiry, a self-critically reflexive thinker finally needs to 
ask whether all this examination—the dialectical and often self-reflective argu-
ments I have tried to go through in the course of my explorations—constitutes 
a problematic pursuit of meaning, after all. Is there a self-reflective incoherence 
involved in the very attempt of viewing the world aright, even if that attempt is 
structured in terms of antitheodicism and remains fully aware of the pragmatic 
contextuality of meaning? The question arises whether we will eventually move 
the horizon of meaninglessness out of our sight when engaging in such philo-
sophical construals of meaningfulness. This, again, is one of those questions that 
self-critical philosophical reflection can never avoid. We are also invited to go 
on reflecting on the appropriate measure of critical distance to our own fragile 
attempts to maintain such distance. And so it goes, with no end in sight.
Notes
Preface
 1 More specifically, we should be careful to distinguish between antitheodi-
cism and antitheodicies. By ‘antitheodicy’ we should mean the critique and 
refutation (e.g., moral, metaphysical, Kantian, etc.) of theodicies, while 
by ‘antitheodicism’ I understand the broader normative view accord-
ing to which the problem of evil and suffering ought to be examined and 
approached not by means of providing, or even requiring, a theodicy but 
rather by seeking to develop an antitheodicy. Accordingly, antitheodicies 
may be parts of the more general framework of antitheodicism.
 2 On the intimate relation between evil and meaningless suffering, see, e.g., 
Dalferth (2011).
 3 The distinction between theoretical/intellectual and practical/existential/
religious versions of the problem of evil and suffering is discussed in a num-
ber of contributions to the topic, including Trakakis’s (2018) recent collec-
tion of highly useful essays on theodicies and antitheodicies.
 4 While many antitheodicist attacks on theodicies are predominantly ethical 
(see, e.g., Tilley 1991; Simpson 2009; Betenson 2016; Kivistö & Pihlström 
2016), it is of course also worth critically exploring the metaphysical back-
ground assumptions of theodicism (see Snellman 2019, 2020, as well as a 
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response to Snellman in Betenson 2019). We thus need not only moral but 
also metaphysical antitheodicies. (I am indebted to Lauri Snellman’s work 
here.) This book (like some of my previous work) defends the profound 
entanglement of ethics and metaphysics—in the specific context of theodi-
cies vs. antitheodicies—but it does not simply claim ethics to be prior to 
metaphysics, or vice versa. We might say that it pursues moral antitheodi-
cism by exploring some of the crucial background problems concerning 
realism and truth, in particular. For a representative sample of theodicist 
approaches that cannot be discussed in detail in this book but that are in my 
view vulnerable to antitheodicist criticism, see, e.g., Plantinga (1974), Hick 
(1978 [1966]), Adams (1989, 2013), van Inwagen (2006), and Stump (2010). 
See also the essays in Sterba (2017).
Introduction
 1 Larry Hickman’s discussion of Dewey as a ‘post-postmodernist’ is also 
highly relevant to these topics: see Hickman (2007).
 2 The concepts of objectivity and rationality cannot be defined here with any 
technical precision. Rather, what I hope to do is to shed some light on how 
these concepts could be used within a pragmatist philosophy of religion. 
See further Chapter 1. For a concise overview of pragmatist philosophy of 
religion, see Zackariasson (2015).
 3 It might be objected that, according to pragmatism, religious thought 
ought to remain arational rather than being either rational or irrational. 
For instance, some of Putnam’s views on religion might be understood in 
this Wittgensteinian fashion: see Putnam (2008). Certainly Wittgenstein-
ians like D.Z. Phillips have often been read in this way. However, it seems 
to me that the distinction between arationality, on the one hand, and the 
rationality vs. irrationality dimension, on the other, is itself based on a prior 
non-pragmatist understanding of rationality (and, hence, irrationality). If 
we do not begin from such a non-pragmatist (purely theoretical) concep-
tion of rationality but, rather, view rationality itself as practice involving 
and practice embedded all the way from the start, I do not think that we 
need to resort to the account of religion as ‘arational’. On the contrary, we 
can understand religious responses to reality as potentially rational—and, 
therefore, also potentially irrational—in terms of the broader, practice-sen-
sitive account of rationality that pragmatism cherishes.
 4 This book is obviously indebted to my earlier articulations of antitheodi-
cism jointly with Sari Kivistö (cf. Kivistö & Pihlström 2016, 2017; see 
also Pihlström 2013a, 2014b). Hence, instead of providing any detailed 
catalogue of the different antitheodicisms available, I will simply refer 
the reader to those previous publications for such details, focusing here 
primarily on the relations between antitheodicism, realism, and pragma-
tism. It might be noted that even though there are, increasingly, antithe-
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odicist contributions available in the literature, such as Betenson (2016) 
as well as Trakakis’s (2018) and Gleeson’s (2018) essays in Trakakis’s 
(ed., 2018) in many ways valuable collection, pragmatist antitheodicies 
are still very rarely recognized—either by pragmatism scholars or antithe-
odicist philosophers and theologians. (See, however, also Wright 2006; 
Knepper 2013.)
 5 I am not saying that evil actions and events (or people) can always be under-
stood; nor am I saying, however, that evil necessarily escapes understand-
ing. I will return to the problem of evil and theodicies more substantially in 
Chapters 3–6.
 6 I am obviously alluding to Richard Swinburne’s ideas here—ideas that for 
me come close to being a parody of genuine religiosity. But I am doing so 
only in passing, without any detailed study of either Swinburne’s or anyone 
else’s views. For Swinburne’s views on theodicy, see his (1998).
 7 In later chapters, especially Chapter 4, I will distinguish between the con-
cepts of recognition and acknowledgment.
 8 For my reading of Dewey within pragmatist philosophy of religion more 
generally, see Pihlström (2013a: chapter 2).
 9 I take it as obvious that non-religious ethical-political approaches to the 
problem of evil, such as Card’s (2002, 2010) or Dews’s (2008), are highly 
relevant to the theodicy vs. antitheodicy discussion in a broad sense.
 10 For a considerably more comprehensive examination of Kant’s philosophy 
of religion, see, e.g., Godlove (2014).
 11 Peirce’s late essay, ‘A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God’ (in Peirce 
1992–98, vol. 2), is a locus classicus here, examined in great detail by Atkins 
(2016).
 12 I have used the online version available here: https://www.uky.edu/~eushe2/
Pajares/jcertain.html. On theodicies as exhibiting ‘moral blindness’, see 
Betenson (2016: especially 59–60). See also, e.g., Gleeson (2012, 2018). 
Neither of these contemporary antitheodicists refers to James, though.
 13 As Carl Sachs (2011: 277, 281) reminds us, citing Adorno, Cavell, and Levi-
nas, knowledge and acknowledgment may also run into conflict with each 
other. In some cases, our ethical acknowledgment of others’ suffering may 
require us to take distance from the project of knowing the reality of suf-
fering that would be ‘reducible to scientific knowledge’ (ibid.: 281). Cavell’s 
(1979) distinction between knowing and acknowledging is a crucial back-
ground for such ideas.
1. A Pragmatist Approach to Religious Realism, 
Objectivity, and Recognition
 1 See, for instance, Niiniluoto (1999) for a very helpful classification of differ-
ent forms of realism. A major recent collection of articles on various aspects 
of the realism issue is Westphal (2014).
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 2 There has been considerable debate over which dimension is the most 
important one. Michael Devitt (1991) is famous for the claim that realism 
is a purely ontological thesis about the mind-independent existence of cer-
tain kinds of entities, either about something in general or about specific 
classes of entities such as the theoretical entities of science. This contrasts 
with Michael Dummett’s (1996) equally well-known view that realism is a 
semantic issue about whether statements of certain types (e.g., about the 
past) have truth values that are objectively determined. 
 3 I critically discuss Fine’s NOA from the point of view of the philosophy of 
religion in Pihlström (2005b).
 4 Obviously, there are many different varieties of atheism available in the dis-
cussion; see, for a detailed and influential investigation, Martin (1990).
 5 In a more careful presentation of religious realism (and antirealism), it would 
be important to distinguish between reality and existence. One might, for 
instance, construe God along the lines of Peirce’s ‘extreme scholastic realism’ 
as a ‘real general’, arguing that God does not exist in the way in which par-
ticular objects, such as stones or galaxies, exist but is nevertheless real in the 
way in which general tendencies, habits, or modalities (e.g., laws of nature) 
are. Accordingly, God would be something like a general world-process 
instead of being a mere individual entity existing in the world. On Peirce’s 
realism about generality, see a number of influential essays collected in Peirce 
(1992–98), including the famous 1871 ‘Berkeley Review’ (in vol. 1) and 
several later essays on pragmatism and pragmaticism (in vol. 2). On Peirce’s 
philosophy of religion, see Atkins (2016), already cited in the introduction.
 6 Theological and religious views and problems may also influence our views 
on realism in other domains: for example, the problem of evil has typi-
cally been discussed presupposing moral realism; it may look quite differ-
ent if one begins from moral antirealism. T.L. Carson (2007) argues that 
J.L. Mackie (a famous critic of both moral realism and theism) seems to 
assume the truth of moral realism in his discussion of the problem of evil 
(see Mackie 1983), because he assumes that pain or suffering is mind-inde-
pendently bad or evil. 
 7 Does the ‘miracle argument’, which we owe to philosophers of science such 
as Hilary Putnam and Richard Boyd, work in theology or religious studies? 
This further question, though highly interesting, cannot be pursued here. 
The miracle argument—as analyzed and defended, for instance, in Putnam 
(1975)—is the argument according to which only realism can adequately 
explain the fact that science has been enormously successful in its predic-
tions and practical applications, including technology. Unless the theories 
in advanced sciences were at least approximately true and unless the theo-
retical terms of those theories (at least approximately) referred to real enti-
ties in the world, this success of science would be a ‘miracle’, an unexplain-
able cosmic coincidence. The reason why there may be no clear analogy to 
this argument in either theology or religious studies is that there may be no 
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clearly identifiable empirical success to be explained. At least the question 
about the empirical and/or practical success of these disciplines is much less 
straightforward.
 8 Perhaps one could, after all, be a realist about theological doctrines in the 
sense of claiming that they are objectively true or false, while being an anti-
realist about their implementations in actual religious life, viewing such life 
as a matter of symbols and rituals rather than any propositionally express-
ible theological commitments.
 9 In the Nordic countries, for instance, theology is usually understood as a 
non-confessional study of religious beliefs, doctrines, practices, their his-
tory, etc. The theologian need not be committed to the doctrines s/he stud-
ies, or to any religious ideas. This is the case, for instance, at the University 
of Helsinki Faculty of Theology in Finland. In some other religious and 
theological traditions, it may be harder to understand, or even inconceiv-
able, that one could engage in theology while avoiding religious commit-
ments altogether.
 10 For example, the criticism of the ‘realist aims’ of theology by Wang-Yen Lee 
(2009) by analogy to constructive empiricism starts from the problematic 
assumptions that theological theories are to be seen as ‘scientific’, in princi-
ple open to similar empirical considerations as scientific theories. I am not 
sure that ‘theological constructive empiricism’ even makes any sense (even 
though constructive empiricism about religious studies might make sense, 
while I would certainly not recommend maintaining that, or any, version of 
constructive empiricism as an alternative to (pragmatic) scientific realism). 
For a general treatment of pragmatism as a third option between eviden-
tialism and fideism, as well as realism and antirealism, in the philosophy of 
religion, see Pihlström (2013a).
 11 See, e.g., Herrmann (1997, 2003). In the 1997 essay, Herrmann draws on 
Putnam in arguing that sciences and ‘views of life’ such as religions have 
different functions and hence different notions of truth. In the latter, being 
true means not ‘to be the case’ (as in science) but to be ‘true to life’ in a 
qualitative sense, with true expressions being ‘adequate expressions of what 
it means to be a human being’ (1997: 92). See also, for an excellent recent 
contribution to a re-evaluation of the pragmatist perspective on theological 
and religious realism along broadly Putnamian lines, Brunsveld (2012). 
 12 This position is comparable to, albeit not identical with, the “practical real-
ism” Vihalemm (2012) defends in the philosophy of science.
 13 See, e.g., James (1975 [1907]: Lecture VIII). On the distinction between 
theocentric and anthropocentric perspectives as parallel to the Kantian dis-
tinction between transcendental realism and transcendental idealism, see 
Allison (2004 [1983]). On Putnam’s approach to metaphysical issues in the 
philosophy of religion, see also Putnam (1997a, 1997b, 2008).
 14 I am adopting the phrase ‘realistic spirit’ from Cora Diamond’s Wittgen-
stein-inspired work; see Diamond (1991). See also Pihlström (2013a).
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 15 See Pihlström (2009). Putnam’s key work in this area is his (2002).
 16 The ‘holistic pragmatism’ defended by Morton White, e.g., in White (2002), 
could at this point be invoked as a systematization of pragmatist philosophy 
of religion and pragmatist methodology in general. That must remain to be 
discussed on another occasion, however.
 17 Cf. Honneth (2005 [1992]). For a recent attempt to apply the concept of 
recognition to theology, see Saarinen (2016); cf. Smith’s (2017) analysis, as 
well as Kahlos et al. (2019).
 18 Arguably, the Kantian idea of a moral community is based on a mutual 
recognition among autonomous agents necessary for this (and therefore 
recognition is not only a Hegelian notion). I am grateful to Philip Rossi for 
a discussion of this point.
 19 I am here helping myself to phrases familiar from Wittgensteinian and Put-
namian contexts. Cf., e.g., Putnam (1994).
 20 For an influential contemporary employment of the notion of the space of 
reasons, which we owe to Wilfrid Sellars, see McDowell (1996).
 21 Cf., e.g., Westphal (2013). According to Westphal, this is a transcendental 
condition for the possibility of rational judgment. (Hence, this argument 
leads to a form of Kantian pragmatism.)
 22 The kind of (arguably antirealistic) epistemic concept of truth associated 
with Putnam’s internal-realist-phase theory of truth as idealized rational 
acceptability, or epistemic justification in ideal conditions, in a way denies 
(at least strong) recognition transcendence. As is clear in his later writings, 
Putnam has come to reject such an epistemic theory of truth altogether. 
See Putnam (2012); in that volume, he avoids connecting these issues with 
religion and theology, though.
 23 A fundamentally important case of this to be explored in later chapters is 
the failure to recognize the world and our place in it as embedded in the 
failure to recognize others’ perspectives on the world (a failure typical of the-
odicies). Here we come close to the key point of the book, the entanglement 
of the issues of realism and theodicism—though at this stage this remains 
mostly implicit.
 24 This comes close to the picture sketched by Dewey (1991 [1934]).
 25 Furthermore, the two interests I have distinguished are not dichotomously 
separable but, rather, deeply entangled (just like ethics and metaphys-
ics are). The pragmatist philosopher of religion, and the pragmatist phi-
losopher more generally, can and should make distinctions wherever and 
whenever they serve useful pragmatic purposes; what s/he should avoid 
is turning those distinctions that really make a difference to our inquir-
ies into essentialistic and ahistorically fixed structures and dichotomies, or 
dualisms that cannot possibly be bridged. Even so, there are problematic 
and even deeply wrong ways of entangling the two ‘interests’ I have spoken 
about. For instance, when the problem of evil, which I have categorized 
under the ‘existential interest’, is seen as a purely or even primarily epistemic 
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and/or evidential issue having to do with the rationality of religious faith 
within an evidentialist context, as it is, e.g., in van Inwagen (2006), things 
go seriously wrong. The existential interest is then reduced to the epistemic 
one, and such non-pragmatic reductionism should be resisted. See further 
Chapters 4–6 below.
 26 James’s early essay, ‘The Sentiment of Rationality’ (1879), in James (1979 
[1897]), is highly relevant here. A Levinasian philosopher might claim, 
however, that speaking of ‘ethical perspectives’ is unfortunate here, because 
ethics—or the ethical attitude—can never be a mere perspective that could 
be adopted at will or something that one could refuse to or fail to adopt. It 
is, transcendentally, always there, structuring our lives and our world. It is 
omnipresent, ubiquitous. In fact, I do believe that the pragmatists, espe-
cially James, are close to Levinas in this respect. (I am indebted to a discus-
sion with Panu-Matti Pöykkö regarding this point.)
 27 This is a Kantian rereading of James I propose in Pihlström (2013a: 
chapter 1). I must skip the details of this discussion here.
 28 The notion of ‘transcendence’ is here used in a (broadly) Kantian sense: 
the transcendent is something that transcends the bounds of experience. 
It could include the supernatural (which is how the notion is often used in 
religious and theological contexts), but all Kantian ‘transcendental ideas’ 
are transcendent in this sense.
 29 I am, of course, referring to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787), the 
sections on ‘The Ideal of Pure Reason’ in the ‘Transcendental Dialectic’.
 30 The reason I include freedom in this list is of course the Kantian one: these 
three are Kant’s postulates of practical reason. I am not saying that free-
dom is a religious concept; it is, however, part of the same set of concepts 
Kant famously saves from the point of view of practical reason after having 
rejected speculative attempts to ground their objectivity, or objects, in theo-
retical reason use.
 31 For specific references, see the 6.5’s of TLP (Wittgenstein 1974 [1921]), 
to be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 below. Also note the striking 
resemblance to Stoicism in Wittgenstein’s comments on the will: freedom, 
and ethics, is about the subject’s attitude to the world, whose facts s/he can-
not change; the subject is, famously, a ‘limit’ of the world.
 32 It is from these remarks that the early Wittgenstein’s peculiar form of solip-
sism emerges. In a sense, for the solipsistic subject of the Tractatus, all the 
objects in the world are ‘mine’. But this transcendental solipsism no more 
sacrifices the objectivity of those objects than the transcendental idealism 
of Kant’s First Critique, which is compatible with empirical realism (see also 
Pihlström 2016).
 33 While pragmatism and recognition theory have developed rather indepen-
dently with little mutual contact, the concept of ‘pragmatic recognition’ 
is actually employed (in the context of contemporary critical theory) in 
Decker (2012).
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 34 In addition to contemporary classics such as Honneth (2005 [1992]), see, 
e.g., Ikäheimo & Laitinen (2011), Saarinen (2014, 2016), and Koskinen 
(2017, 2019). I cannot provide adequate references to this growing litera-
ture. I am only using the concept of recognition intuitively here without 
seeking to make any contribution to the systematic theory of recognition 
(while believing that it can and should be brought into more explicit dia-
logue with pragmatism). Toward the end of the book, I will slide into speak-
ing more about acknowledgment than about recognition, for reasons to be 
sketched in Chapter 4.
 35 See the relevant essays in Pihlström (2015a) for the diversity of the ways in 
which the concept of inquiry is central to pragmatism.
 36 The most important reference here is Peirce’s best-known essay, ‘The Fixa-
tion of Belief ’ (1877), available in, e.g., Peirce (1992–98): vol. 1. Also the 
important anti-Cartesian writings from the late 1860s can be found in the 
same volume. 
 37 This conception of habituality has also been emphasized by pragmatist 
social theorists: see, e.g., Kilpinen (2000).
 38 ‘Real things’ in this Peircean sense could also be humanly created objects 
and structures, as of course is the case in social-scientific inquiry. This is not 
the place to inquire into the ways in which (Peircean) pragmatism can or 
cannot embrace scientific realism; cf. Niiniluoto (1999).
 39 It might, for instance, be extremely problematic to apply the Peircean ‘final 
opinion’ account of truth to such areas of inquiry. Still we would hardly like 
to say that they have nothing at all to do with the concept of truth or that 
truth would simply be irrelevant in such fields. Here as elsewhere, pragma-
tism generally seeks to offer a balanced middle ground view.
 40 In particular, at the empiricist extreme, the Vienna Circle logical empiri-
cists famously regarded theistic (but also, symmetrically, atheistic) views 
as meaningless because they are neither verifiable nor falsifiable empiri-
cally. (Among the very few twentieth-century logical empiricists who 
also held religious ideas was Richard Braithwaite.) The standard reaction 
among scientifically and empiricistically oriented believers would be 
that religious faith is, precisely, beyond evidence and experience and that 
precisely for this reason it must not be confused with scientific inquiry 
at all.
 41 I would even go as far as to claim that the metaphysical relations of depend-
ence among human persons are ultimately based on ethical relations of 
(mutual) recognition, and that metaphysics (especially the metaphysics of 
selves) is thus grounded in ethics (cf. Pihlström 2009), but that would be a 
longer story, possibly also defensible along pragmatist lines. 
 42 Such as, e.g., Peirce’s characterization of the scientific method in ‘The Fixa-
tion of Belief ’.
 43 For novel pragmatist contributions to the ethics of belief discussion, 
inspired by James, see Rydenfelt & Pihlström (2013). 
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 44 Furthermore, the challenges posed by ‘postmodern’ trends in the philosophy 
of religion—e.g., attempts to ‘save’ religion from ‘onto-theological’ doctrines 
postulating divine reality beyond language—may also be re-examined from 
this perspective. How does the postmodern project of deliberately blurring all 
rational, normative, and other boundaries change this problem framework?
 45 Religious believers may also maintain that the scientific and explanatory 
discourse manifested in, e.g., cognitive study of religion today fails to appre-
ciate yet another kind of limit that must be recognized. This could be called 
the limits of scientific explanation. Religious practices or forms of life, some 
believers may argue, can only be adequately understood ‘from within’; to 
attempt to explain them causally and with reference to, e.g., evolutionary 
history from an external non-religious point of view sets a serious limita-
tion for the adequate understanding of religious life qua religious. Here the 
critical discussion of the recently influential cognitive paradigm in religious 
studies could be connected with the Wittgensteinian orientation in the phi-
losophy of religion, which emphasizes understanding rule-governed prac-
tices or forms of life from within them—and comes in that respect close to 
pragmatism. Again, the limits between these two groups—not identical to 
the groups of atheists and believers—may be crossed by means of mutual 
recognition. And again the same kind of questions arise: can, e.g., a cog-
nitive scholar of religion and a Wittgensteinian philosopher emphasizing 
the fundamental differences between religious forms of life and scientific 
appeals to reason and evidence even recognize each other as members of 
the same intellectual community of inquirers committed to shared concep-
tions of reason, rationality, and science? Is religion a special case here, fun-
damentally different from science or everyday reasoning? Pragmatism may, 
by offering its middle path, facilitate such processes of mutual recognition 
among participants of these and other practices.
2. The Pragmatic Contextuality of Scheme (In)Dependence
 1 The fact that I am in this chapter and in this book formulating my problem 
from the standpoint of pragmatism should not be taken to imply that the 
realism issue would not be a problem for non-pragmatists. On the con-
trary, our discussion below will be general enough to be relevant to much 
of post-Kantian philosophy. Note also that I am not here going to settle the 
interpretive question of what pragmatism is. This is not the right place to 
provide textual evidence for pragmatists’ commitment to the problem(s) of 
realism. Different pragmatists, classical or recent, may be committed to it/
them in quite different ways.
 2 Realism in this sense can, of course, be applied to universals or to the mind-
independent world as a whole; thus, the first and second dimensions of the 
realism issue could be formulated as special cases of the third.
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 3 The ‘error theory’ was made famous by Mackie (1977). For a pragmatist dis-
cussion of the problem of moral realism in particular, see Pihlström (2005a). 
It can also be suggested that methodological realism is a species of norma-
tive realism, focusing on methodological normativity in (scientific) inquiry.
 4 See Schiller (2008); on relativism in modern philosophy, see, e.g., Baghra-
mian (2004).
 5 Kenneth R. Westphal has argued, in a series of works since his (1989), that 
Hegel was ‘the first pragmatic realist’. While Hegel was a major figure in 
the realism debate and would arguably deserve a ‘milestone’ of his own 
(between my fourth and fifth milestones), I will not further comment on 
his views in this chapter.
 6 For a now classical antirealistic work, see van Fraassen (1980). 
 7 In addition, the debate between semantic realism and antirealism, as con-
ceived by Dummett and his followers, is another twist in this rearticulation 
of realism in the (late) twentieth century. See, e.g., Dummett (1978).
 8 See, e.g., Kant (1990 [1781/1787]), James (1975 [1907]), Schiller (2008), 
Dewey (1960 [1929]), Carnap (1950), Wittgenstein (1953), Quine (1980 
[1953], 1969), Putnam (1981, 1990), Goodman (1978), Kuhn (1970), Rorty 
(1979, 1991), and Sellars (1963). However, we must not forget Donald 
Davidson’s famous critique of such forms of relativism and of the implicated 
distinction between a conceptual scheme and its allegedly scheme-neutral 
content, or other noteworthy criticisms of conceptual and ontological rela-
tivisms. For Davidson’s seminal critique of the scheme–content distinction 
and the resulting conceptual relativism, see his (1984); cf. also, e.g., Niini-
luoto’s (1999) vigorous attack on cognitive relativism.
 9 As in Chapter 1 above, I am assuming an ontological sense of both depend-
ence and independence here. Roughly, an entity a is ontologically depend-
ent on another entity b, iff a cannot exist unless b exists, that is, b’s existence 
is required for a’s existence. For example, tropes (or modes) are dependent 
on the particulars they qualify: if there is no such entity as this particular 
shirt, its particular shade of red cannot exist (be real) either—unless particu-
lars themselves are construed as bundles of tropes. The relevant notion of 
ontological (in)dependence must be distinguished from causal (in)depend-
ence (and of course logical (in)dependence). A table is causally dependent 
on its maker’s activities, but when made, it is ontologically independent of 
them (at least according to realists), because it could remain existing even 
if its maker disappeared from the world. For more detailed discussions of 
ontological dependence and independence, see Lowe (1998, 2006). Here 
I must ignore the differences between, say, Lowe’s ‘rigid’ and ‘non-rigid’ 
notions of ontological dependence. Lowe’s metaphysically realist (very anti-
pragmatist) ontology makes the interesting twist of regarding persons as a 
metaphysically primitive ground upon which other things are dependent. 
Compared to many other contemporary largely materialist forms of meta-
physical realism, this is a relatively unorthodox position. 
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 10 Cf. Pihlström (2009). Neither this chapter nor this book argues for the pos-
sibility of pragmatist metaphysics but investigates a fundamental problem 
within it (which is also a problem for pragmatist epistemology), not ade-
quately dealt with in my 2009 book.
 11 I will from now on simply speak about scheme (in)dependence, instead of, 
say, mind (in)dependence, practice (in)dependence, language (in)depend-
ence, perspective (in)dependence, or categorization (in)dependence, just in 
order to stick to a uniform terminology. Individual thinkers may use dif-
ferent expressions here. Also, I will speak about entities, intending this as 
an extremely broad ontological category ranging over such sub-categories 
as particulars (individuals), properties (whether universals or tropes), pro-
cesses, or even states of affairs. Nothing serious regarding the realism issue 
I am examining depends on these terminological choices.
 12 On the distinction between a (mere) distinction and a (harmful) dichot-
omy, see Putnam (2002).
 13 Consider, for instance, the ‘problematic situations’ (and ‘indeterminate 
situations’) Dewey invokes in his account of inquiry and experience. For a 
classical formulation, see Dewey (1960 [1929]).
 14 The key Kantian-cum-pragmatic ‘facts’ about us and our ‘cognitive archi-
tecture’, facts defining our finiteness and practice-embeddedness, are truly 
natural facts, though they at the same time play a transcendental role, com-
parable to what may in the Kantian framework be called ‘transcendental 
facts’ about the irreducible difference between intuitions and concepts, 
about there being exactly two forms of sensible intuition and twelve cat-
egories, about the spontaneous synthesizing power of imagination, about 
the original synthetic unity of apperception, about the outer affection on 
our sensibility of the mind-independent causal source of experience, etc. 
(Hanna 2001: 118.) Note, however, that Kant himself does not call these 
(or anything else) ‘transcendental facts’. I am here employing Hanna’s in my 
view useful terminology, without claiming to interpret Kant’s original views 
in any manner whatsoever. As Hanna argues, these facts about us are ‘deep’; 
they are constitutive and transcendental, not simply accidental or empiri-
cal, and they function as ‘ultimate explanatory starting points’ for which no 
further reasons can be reasonably required (see ibid.: 117–118).
 15 See also Chapter 3 for a more comprehensive discussion of why I think the 
pragmatist should (especially in the philosophy of religion) adopt a Kantian 
strategy of analysis and argumentation.
 16 This might also be cashed out by considering the relation between pragmatic 
pluralism and contextualism, on the one hand, and the traditional concep-
tion of ontology as general category theory, on the other. Pragmatic plu-
ralism acknowledges a plurality of categorial structures, or ontologies. The 
pragmatic pluralisms defended by figures like James, Putnam, or Goodman 
still employ a set of relatively traditional ontological—albeit epistemologized 
and to some extent even ethically structured—categories. According to such 
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thinkers, what the categorial structure(s) of the world is (are) depends on 
our perspectives and practices, but the set or ‘pool’ of potential structures 
is still independent of us, at least in some basic metaphysical sense. Quite 
independently of us, the world could be such that there are, or are not, uni-
versals, processes, states of affairs, etc. A more radical pragmatic pluralism 
would argue that we can construct (a plurality of) novel structures of cat-
egories, even previously unheard-of categories, based on the development of 
our practices, discourses, and/or forms of life. We can reform our categorial 
possibilities, not only our postulations of actual categories or structures. An 
example of this kind of reform would be a revision of the category of divinity 
in response to the problem of evil. At the meta-level, one might also suggest 
that the ways of meta-metaphysically determining how to examine the cat-
egorial structure of reality (e.g., whether it is epistemic or ethical in addition 
to being ontological) is itself dependent on our epistemic as well as ethical 
standpoints. Pragmatism thus prevails at the meta-level. Further develop-
ments of these ideas must be left for another occasion, however.
 17 Rorty’s neopragmatist way of understanding conceptual development in 
terms of causal clashes of vocabularies—a version of the survival of the fit-
test—is too reductive from the perspective of the kind of pragmatism I am 
trying to develop. See, e.g., Rorty (1998). 
 18 For further reflections on this reflexive structure of naturalized and prag-
matic transcendental philosophy, see Pihlström (2003, 2009).
 19 Gava’s & Stern’s (2016) volume provides a number of scholarly exami-
nations of the relations between pragmatism and Kantian transcendental 
philosophy, as does the more recent collection Skowronski & Pihlström 
(2019).
 20 This is also quoted in Slater (2008: 675).
 21 Putnam’s reasoning can be reconstructed as a pragmatic transcendental 
argument (cf. Pihlström 2003: chapter 7). See the brief discussion in the 
previous section on the possibility of interpreting pragmatism as a (natural-
ized) form of transcendental philosophy.
 22 For Putnam’s rejection of the internal realist (epistemic) theory of truth, see 
Putnam (1999, 2012). For discussions of Putnam’s struggle with realism and 
pragmatism, see Pihlström (2009).
 23 The Wittgensteinian background of this formulation should be obvious. 
For some discussion of the possibility of integrating pragmatism and late-
Wittgensteinian philosophical methodology, see Pihlström (2006b). I do 
not want to take any stand on the question of whether it is meaningful at all 
(either in a Wittgensteinian or, say, Jamesian pragmatist context) to speak 
about the ‘truth’ of such philosophical or metaphilosophical theses as prag-
matic contextualism. See Chapter 5 for a more detailed Wittgensteinian 
twist to my overall argument.
 24 On the concept of truthmaking in metaphysics, see Armstrong (2004); for a 
pragmatic critique, see Pihlström (2009: chapter 2).
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 25 Here, I cannot discuss the hotly debated question of whether we may take 
Wittgenstein to be arguing at all, or committing himself to any philosophi-
cal theses, in the Philosophical Investigations or elsewhere. For a lucid criti-
cal discussion, see Wallgren (2006). See also Chapter 5 below.
 26 For an explicitly transcendental formulation of such argumentation, see 
Taylor (1979).
 27 This is further defended in Pihlström (2003).
 28 For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Pihlström (2010b).
 29 See again Lowe (2006). Notably, however, most of the work on ontological 
dependence relations, including Lowe’s, has been strongly metaphysically 
realist and is therefore only of limited use to the kind of transcendental 
pragmatist I am here imagining as a potential advocate of the contextualiza-
tion thesis.
 30 At this point, I am indebted to David Carr’s analysis of the ‘paradox of 
subjectivity’—our need to understand ourselves as both subjects to whom 
the world is given and as natural objects in the world—developed in Carr 
(1999).
3. Pragmatism and Critical Philosophy
 1 Compare this to Kant’s articulation of the idea of the ‘discipline of reason’ in 
the ‘Doctrine of Method’ (Methodenlehre) of the first Critique.
 2 In her very interesting analysis of Jamesian pragmatism as a philosophy 
of eschatological hope, Angela Sager (2017) defends a kind of pragmatist 
and melioristic theodicism, thus taking a critical stance toward the kind of 
Jamesian approach I have tried to develop in my earlier work (Pihlström 
2013a, 2014b) as well as in this book.
 3 Notebook sheets from 1870, quoted in Perry (1964 [1948]: 120–121). Here 
James saw that fighting evil—holding that ‘though evil slay me, she can’t sub-
due me, or make me worship her’ (ibid.: 121)—presupposes the freedom of 
the will, and was thus connected with the key problem of his spiritual crisis. 
(Freedom, of course, is necessary, according to James, for any serious ethical 
philosophy. Perry notes that ‘moralism’ is just one name for what might be 
described as James’s ‘fundamental seriousness’; see ibid.: 388.) 
 4 In a strikingly non-Jamesian manner, Trakakis (2018) defends an antithe-
odicism indebted to Bradley’s absolute idealism. While it is easy to agree 
with Trakakis (see also his introduction to Trakakis [ed.] 2018) that new 
approaches—including new metaphysical approaches and novel analyses 
of the divinity—are vitally needed in the stalemate that the philosophi-
cal discussion concerning the problem of evil and suffering has reached, 
and even that Hegelian-cum-Bradleyan absolute idealism may be able to 
avoid crude anthropomorphisms often presupposed in theodicist concep-
tions of God, it is less easy to maintain that the absolute idealist’s way of 
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getting rid of the problem of evil would be anything more than a theodicy 
by other means.
 5 Note also that it is fully compatible with this Jamesian concern with the 
reality of, and truth about, evil to maintain that evil is real not as a substance 
of its own, let alone any ‘demonic’ greatness, but rather in its superficiality 
and banality, in a kind of emptiness that nevertheless tends to spread like 
a ‘fungus’. See Arendt (1994 [1963]) and Bernstein’s (2018: 66–67) analysis 
of the Arendtian refusal to ‘mythologize’ evil. For James as much as for 
Arendt, the reality of evil and suffering is non-mythological. On banality, 
see also Minnich (2017).
 6 A critical question, to be explored later in this chapter, is whether this rejec-
tion of metaphysical realism and its conception of objective truth maintains 
sufficient grounds for continuing to think in terms of an ordinary notion 
of truth needed for the kind of sincerity necessary for the antitheodicist 
project generally, or whether a slippery slope is opened from the Jamesian 
position toward a Rortyan one (see below).
 7 Positive thinking is possible and meaningful (arguably only) against a mel-
ancholic background, against the negativities that a ‘sick soul’ perceives in 
her/his world. Positive individual contributions, then, have their legitimate 
role to play, empirically speaking, provided that a pessimistic position is 
accepted transcendentally. Only the sick soul sees, profoundly enough, that 
everything is not all right, that the world is, for many of us (at least ‘the 
wounded’), in an important sense a wrong or even evil place, and that there-
fore pragmatic, even positive, thinking and ‘difference-making’ is required. 
Otherwise, no ‘positive’ approach can be serious enough. On James’s views 
on the ‘sick soul’, see James (1958 [1902]), as well as the discussion in Kivistö 
& Pihlström (2016: chapter 6).
 8 According to Quine’s famous holism, logical and mathematical beliefs (or 
sentences) are in principle on a par with empirical scientific beliefs (or sen-
tences). See Quine (1980 [1953]: chapter 2).
 9 For the realistic reading, also directed against Rorty’s own pragmatism, see, 
e.g., van Inwagen (1993: 69) and Mounce (1997: 211–218).
 10 This is followed by the well-known Rortyan one-liner, ‘If we take care of 
freedom, truth can take care of itself ’.
 11 Kant (1983b [1791]). The essay was first published in Berlinische Monats-
schrift, September 1791: 194–225. In referencing, even though I am citing 
the Cambridge English translation, the standard Akademie-Ausgabe num-
bering will be used. For secondary literature focusing on the theodicy essay, 
see, e.g., Brachtendorff (2002) and Galbraith (2006). For a more detailed 
consideration, see Kivistö & Pihlström (2016: chapter 2); cf. also Dahl 
(2019: chapter 3).
 12 For Bernstein’s insightful reading of Kant’s theory of radical evil, see Bern-
stein (2002: chapter 1). 
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 13 On insincerity and dishonesty in the philosophy of religion, with the prob-
lem of evil as an example, see Trakakis (2017).
 14 The Jamesian suggestion that a truthful relation to reality in general neces-
sarily includes as its element a full recognition of individual experiences 
of suffering in their irreducibility can be compared to the way in which 
the Party of Nineteen Eighty-Four, despite the horrible light of the torture 
rooms and the gaze penetrating everywhere, leaves into the shade precisely 
such individual experiences. Light everywhere may actually disclose the 
truth of hidden suffering. A comparison to Hemingway’s short story, ‘A 
Clean and Well-Lighted Place’, suggests itself but must be left for another 
occasion. (See also Allen [1995] for related, highly relevant explorations of 
the relation between truth and truthfulness.)
 15 This is argued in some detail in Kivistö & Pihlström (2016: chapter 5).
 16 It might be suggested, for Levinasian reasons (and here I am again indebted 
to Panu-Matti Pöykkö), that it is misleading to speak about the moral ‘point 
of view’, because such a phrase seems to presuppose that one could either 
adopt or refuse or fail to adopt such a point of view. In contrast to such 
assumptions, one might argue that the moral standpoint, or the moral 
framework, or attitude, is inescapable—or, better, transcendentally present 
and constitutive of our lives (including our adoption of any points of view 
whatsoever). I am sticking to this phrase in the interest of brevity and easi-
ness of expression, but I do acknowledge this Levinasian critical point.
 17 Note that I am not claiming that James would be committed to any explic-
itly Kantian antitheodicy. His antitheodicism, in my view, is Kantian in the 
broader sense of arguing that it is a necessary condition for the possibility 
of a moral point of view that evil and suffering are not explained away or 
justified. He rejects precisely the kind of rationalizing justification that Job’s 
‘friends’ paradigmatically offer. My worry is whether this Kantian approach 
works in the overall context of Jamesian pragmatism, with its softened 
pragmatic notion of truth applied to the acknowledgment of the reality of 
suffering (as outlined above).
 18 This criticism of Rorty (which is also, implicitly, a qualified criticism of 
Jamesian pragmatism, though not a proposal to give up that pragmatism 
but, rather, to carefully rethink its current value, being aware of its poten-
tial problems) comes close to James Conant’s highly detailed—and devas-
tating—attack on Rorty’s reading of Orwell. See Conant (2000) as well as 
Rorty (2000).
4. Religious Truth, Acknowledgment, and Diversity
 1 It could be suggested—though this line of inquiry lies beyond the scope of 
my discussion—that the diversity and plurality characteristic of the human 
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condition characterized in terms of Hannah Arendt’s notion of natality, 
our ability to initiate things, to always begin something new, is inherently 
antitheodicist, because it must be opposed to any imagined historical neces-
sity that theodicies also typically invoke. For a lucid discussion, see Bern-
stein (2018: 88–89, 118–119). The classical reference here is Arendt (1958).
 2 See Honneth (2005 [1992]). For a major recent contribution to the recogni-
tion discussion in theology and religious studies, see Saarinen (2016).
 3 See also, for a very different but not unrelated analysis, Rähme’s (2018) dis-
cussion of religious disagreement as irreducible to explicit disagreement 
about the truth of ‘religious propositions’.
 4 On the topic of ‘political evil’ more generally, see Wolfe (2011).
 5 I have in mind cases like Hannah Arendt’s (1994 [1963]) report on Adolf 
Eichmann’s trial and Timothy Snyder’s (2010) thought-provoking historical 
investigations of Eastern Europe before and during World War II. These are, 
for philosophers or theologians reflecting on evil and suffering, not merely 
concrete examples but profoundly philosophical material. I am not saying, 
of course, that philosophical inquiries into evil and suffering ought to be 
reduced to empirical studies. However, the empirical material analyzed in 
this kind of reflections on evil and suffering can play a key role in our philo-
sophical attempts to understand these phenomena. It may, that is, enrich 
and pragmatically naturalize our reflections on the constitutive role played 
by an antitheodicist approach to evil and suffering—constitutive, above all, 
for the possibility of the ethical point of view itself (see below). Another 
kind of enrichment, or pragmatic naturalization, of philosophical views on 
evil and suffering is the type we find in fictional literature, e.g., Orwell’s 
Nineteen Eighty-Four.
 6 One possible way of cashing out the distinction between the concepts of 
recognition and acknowledgment I am trying to articulate here is by sug-
gesting that acknowledgment operates at a transcendental level in compari-
son to the empirical acts of recognition directed toward concrete others. 
Acknowledgment, qua transcendental, would thus always be ‘realized as’ 
empirical/factual recognition acts. (Think of this through an analogy taken 
from the philosophy of mind: mental states and acts are realized in physio-
logical, neural, or ultimately physical states.) This intuitive idea needs more 
systematic development, though.
 7 In some imaginable cases, one’s being truthful—or ‘true to oneself ’, or 
authentic, as one might also phrase it—might require one’s not, or not 
immediately, telling the truth about some particular matter to everyone 
concerned.
 8 For analyses of James’s individualism in relation to his views on religion 
and truth, see, e.g., Pawelski (2007) and Polke (2018). See also Pihlström 
(2013a).
 9 On James as a critic of theodicism, see Kivistö & Pihlström (2016: 
chapter 5).
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 10 For a more comprehensive discussion, see Kivistö & Pihlström (2016).
 11 Another way of cashing out the distinction between recognition and 
acknowledgment might be the following (perhaps indebted to Levinas 
rather than the pragmatists—and thus I’m here influenced by Panu-Matti 
Pöykkö’s ideas on how to read Levinas in relation to Stanley Cavell). While 
recognizing others in the real empirical world is always a matter of recog-
nizing ‘as’, with some specific ‘as’ clause defining the content of recognition, 
at a transcendental level we may also speak about acknowledgment without 
any such specific ‘as’. The transcendental recognition (acknowledgment) of 
the other as such, without any ‘as’ at all, is like a Kantian Grenzbegriff, or—
in a way comparable to Wittgenstein’s transcendental subject—a ‘limit’ of 
the world. Such transcendental acknowledgment always collapses into, or is 
realized in terms of, some empirical or factual (‘real-life’) recognition (‘as’ 
something). This could be thought of in terms of the concept of realization 
as it has been used in the philosophy of mind and general metaphysics (e.g., 
every mental property is realized in some physical system), but here it is 
important to understand the transcendental character of the issue. See also 
Pihlström (2016).
 12 This also again leads us to the examination of suffering in the Book of Job, 
where Job’s, unlike his friends’, attitude to suffering can be regarded as 
truthful and sincere. For a recent overview of the problem of evil taking its 
departure from the Book of Job, see Dahl (2019).
 13 This theme runs through Rorty’s entire work, but Rorty’s 1989 book con-
taining the Orwell essay is one of its best articulations.
 14 On the concept of mediated recognition, see Koskinen (2017, 2019) and 
Saarinen (2016). I am crucially indebted to Koskinen for his careful system-
atic analysis of recognition and other recognition-theoretical notions.
 15 For an articulation of this idea, see Kivistö & Pihlström (2016: chapter 6).
 16 Acknowledging otherness and others’ suffering by acknowledging the 
truthfulness and sincerity of the others’ experience (and face, à la Levinas) 
could be seen as a theme integrating the concerns of James and Levinas. 
Surprisingly, the problem of evil is not really thematized in Megan Craig’s 
(2011) otherwise important study on Levinas and James. This truthfulness 
or sincerity, again, is to be distinguished from the attitude of Job’s so-called 
friends, who pursue theoretical and theodicist truth—propositional truth—
rather than ethically profound and communicative truthfulness. Reading 
James through Levinas here requires us to read him through Levinas’s read-
ing of Kant and the Kantian antitheodicy. For Levinas’s antitheodicy, see 
especially Levinas (2006).
 17 This observation internal to the critical self-examination of pragmatism 
might be interestingly compared to the kind of commitment to truth in 
ethics and politics that we find in Hannah Arendt’s work, in particular, as 
analyzed by Bernstein (2018).
 18 As analyzed, e.g., in Margalit (2002).
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 19 See, e.g., Primo Levi’s works (to be discussed in Chapter 6 below), as well as 
Agamben (2002 [1999]). Sachs (2011: 290) insightfully analyzes how ‘the-
odicy interferes with our capacity to acknowledge the Holocaust’.
 20 It seems to me—though I cannot defend this view here (but it is defended 
in Kivistö & Pihlström 2016)—that the most interesting and profound disa-
greement lies not between theism and atheism or between religious believ-
ers and nonbelievers, but between the overall ethical and religious attitudes 
to suffering (and, hence, to reality generally) adopted by theodicism and 
antitheodicism.
 21 By metaphysical realism we may here (as earlier in the book) simply mean 
the view that the world possesses its own fundamental ontological structure 
independently of our perspectives of conceptualization and inquiry and can, 
therefore, in principle be truly and completely described from an absolute 
standpoint (i.e., a ‘view from nowhere’, or a ‘God’s-Eye View’). Metaphysical 
realism is, in fact, a conjunction of various more specific forms of realism, 
especially ontological, semantic, and epistemological (see especially Chap-
ter 1 above for more details on various realisms).
 22 Consider, again, some analogies raised earlier. The distinction between the 
epistemic and the non-epistemic (e.g., regarding truth) is itself (partly) epis-
temic, not independent of our epistemic standpoints in drawing the distinc-
tion. The distinction between ‘real’ and ‘virtual’ reality is itself neither fully 
real nor fully virtual; these are interpenetrated and interdependent in the 
drawing of the distinction (with some form of realism entangled with con-
structivism). Similarly, the distinction between natural and supernatural is 
relative to our concept of nature, hence to the historical development of 
science (more or less like the distinction between science and pseudosci-
ence is). However, none of these distinctions simply reflects something that 
is ‘given’ in the fundamental structure of reality as such, or the world as it is 
in itself. We should keep these analogies in mind when exploring the pros-
pects of realism and its critical alternatives in relation to theodicism.
 23 On the other hand, atheist criticisms of theism, based on the argument 
from evil (e.g., J.L. Mackie’s well-known logical argument), have also been 
attacked precisely because of their commitment to axiological or moral real-
ism, a standard assumption in the theodicy discourse. Consider especially 
Carson (2007), criticizing Mackie’s problematic combination of moral error 
theory and assumption of moral realism in his formulation of the logical 
problem of evil. Mackie, a famous critic of moral realism and theism, seems 
to assume the truth of moral realism in his discussion of the problem of evil, 
as he assumes that pain and suffering are mind-independently bad or evil. 
The issue, then, concerns the mutual (in)coherence of Mackie’s widely read 
works such as Mackie (1977, 1983). This argument obviously targets Mackie 
in an ad hominem fashion, but it may teach a more general lesson, though.
 24 I am indebted to Panu-Matti Pöykkö’s still mostly unpublished work on this 
feature of Levinas’s thought.
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 25 Similarly, metaphysical realism objectifies human death into a mere empiri-
cal and factual event in the world, while a more Kantian-oriented transcen-
dental approach to human mortality seeks to understand death as a limit 
phenomenon and horizon of life without which no worldly events would be 
humanly possible, cf. Pihlström (2016).
 26 Note, however, that the presupposing relation can be bilateral: according 
to Byrne realism itself presupposes the project of providing a theodicy (as 
something that generically and essentially belongs to religions).
 27 Or what Francis Jonbäck calls the ‘value agnostic response’ to divine hid-
denness: see Jonbäck (2016).
 28 See Jürgen Habermas’s book with this title: Habermas (2010).
 29 So the supposition that I could so much as be a moral subject in the absence 
of the more fundamental relation to the other, in the absence of taking seri-
ously the ethical demand of taking the other seriously, amounts to merely 
an attempt to conceal one’s fundamental ethically concerned predicament. 
(I will get back to this formulation, due to Steven Crowell, in the concluding 
section of this chapter.)
 30 Note that ‘reductively’ here does not mean, e.g., ‘materialistically’; one can 
be a reductionist by being a monistic idealist or Hegelian, for instance. 
James’s criticism of monism is again relevant here.
 31 It can be suggested that if evil indeed is part of God’s good creation, then 
the theodicy problem does not even arise, as its presuppositions are not 
fulfilled: it cannot even be coherently posed, because everything, as created 
by God, is by definition meaningful. (Akeel Bilgrami once formulated a 
friendly criticism of a related paper of mine in this way.) The antitheodicist 
criticism of theodicies can also focus on the very availability of the theodicy 
problem in this sense—and on the assumption that there must be (some-
where) the kind of meaning postulated by theodicies.
 32 See Chapter 3 above for a brief discussion as well as Kivistö & Pihlström 
(2016: chapter 5) for a more detailed treatment.
 33 Pragmatism can still function as the meta-level position within which real-
ism prevails. Reflexively, then, such meta-level pragmatism ‘works’ and is 
therefore pragmatically true.
 34 The fact that metaphysical realism and theodicies seek the objective, abso-
lute, and general truth—from a God’s-Eye View—about suffering and its 
reasons by itself incorporates a failure to acknowledge the perspectival 
diversity of individual suffering, yielding a moral reductio of metaphysical 
realism.
 35 I am here indebted to a suggestion made by Steven Crowell in relation to 
a paper of mine I presented at a conference on pragmatism and phenom-
enology in Tübingen in May, 2017. Crowell formulated this as a Levinasian 
rejoinder to the kinds of worries raised here.
 36 In fact, we might view Kant’s transcendental idealism as a presupposition 
of his antitheodicism. This is suggested explicitly in some hitherto unpub-
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lished work by Lauri Snellman (to whose careful analysis of the metaphysi-
cal background assumptions of the problem of evil I am greatly indebted). 
According to Snellman (2019), ‘Kant’s antitheodicy […] rests on his meta-
metaphysical theory of transcendental idealism to show that attempts to 
unify facts with values through the principle of sufficient reason end up 
in speculative metaphysics. Thus Kant takes up the need for a critique of 
speculative metaphysics for a successful antitheodicy’. Snellman has also 
fully convinced me that antitheodicism needs not only moral but also meta-
physical motivation and analysis. See his very comprehensive forthcoming 
work on the topic (Snellman 2020).
5. The Limits of Language and Harmony
 1 In this chapter, I will cite Wittgenstein’s well-known works by using the 
standard abridgments spelled out in the bibliography (e.g., TLP stands for 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, or Wittgenstein 1974 [1921], and so forth).
 2 See Phillips (1977, 2004); Tilghman (1994: 192); and Mulhall (1994: 18–19).
 3 See Gleeson (2012: chapter 1); Burley (2012: §5).
 4 A paradigm case of such insensitive disregard for the sufferer’s own perspec-
tive is manifested by the ‘friends’ in the Book of Job, as they come to deliver 
their allegedly comforting (theodicist) speeches (cf. Kivistö & Pihlström 
2016: chapter 2).
 5 Regarding Phillips’s philosophical methodology generally, I refer the reader 
to Koistinen’s (2011, 2012) illuminating analysis.
 6 Note that this is my rephrasing of Phillips’s view. Wittgensteinian philoso-
phers of religion, including Phillips, usually avoid the Kantian vocabulary 
of transcendental philosophy.
 7 Cited in Klagge (2011: 210n26).
 8 The basic point of the examination of Kantian antitheodicy in Kivistö & 
Pihlström (2016) is that antitheodicy is required for transcendental reasons 
as a necessary condition for the possibility of adopting a moral point of 
view on the world and other human beings. Apart from this specific ‘Kan-
tian’ feature of (Wittgensteinian) antitheodicist thought, there is of course 
the more general question concerning the degree to which Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy, early or late, should be approached from a Kantian transcen-
dental standpoint. My discussion here falls into the Kantian tradition of 
reading the Tractatus, as developed by Stenius (1960), Kannisto (1986), and 
Appelqvist (2016), among others, but I am also willing to view the later 
Wittgenstein along analogous lines as well (cf. also Pihlström 2003, 2006a).
 9 While these remarks are indeed fragmentary and in many ways difficult to 
interpret, I believe it makes sense to focus on this specific concept (along 
with related ones, especially harmony) rather than the elusive overall picture 
of Wittgenstein’s (early) ethics, invoking notions such as the metaphysical 
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subject (as a ‘limit’ of the world), God, the mystical, the limits of language, 
etc. All these notions belong to the same family of related concepts in terms 
of which we may try to express the inexpressible—i.e., the ethical—but it 
is helpful to restrict the discussion to a relatively narrow set of remarks 
explicitly dealing with happiness in order to highlight the main concern of 
this chapter, the relation between harmony and theodicy.
 10 Aristotle also famously maintains that only happiness (eudaimonia) is pur-
sued only as a goal in itself and never as a means for something else: ‘Now 
such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; for this we choose always 
for self and never for the sake of something else, but honour, pleasure, 
reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves (for if nothing 
resulted from them we should still choose each of them), but we choose 
them also for the sake of happiness, judging that by means of them we shall 
be happy. Happiness, on the other hand, no one chooses for the sake of these, 
nor, in general, for anything other than itself ’ (Nicomachean Ethics, I, 7).
 11 Peter Winch, one of the best-known Wittgenstein-inspired moral philoso-
phers, writes: ‘For to accept [the absolute demand of the moral ‘ought’] is to 
think that, compared with the importance of acting honourably and justly 
(for instance), nothing else matters. And this is to bear the afflictions that life 
brings patiently—i.e., not to be deflected from acting decently even under 
the pressure of misfortune. A man who has such an attitude to life sees that 
as long as afflictions do not thus deflect him, they do not harm him—not 
in relation to what he regards as really important in his life’ (Winch 1972: 
206–207; for a comparable discussion, interestingly citing Antigone, see Dil-
man 1974: 182). This is, obviously, also a (qualified) return to Kant’s view 
that there is nothing higher than the moral law or duty itself. What is at 
issue here is the ‘pointlessness’ of morality and moral virtue: asking ‘why be 
moral?’ (as if there could be some good reason for that) amounts to moving 
out of morality. The ‘point’ of morality is not to pursue happiness. The ‘point’ 
of morality is that morality does not have any ‘point’ beyond itself. To take 
this seriously is to take seriously the view that it is not happiness (especially 
not one’s own happiness) but, rather, others’ suffering that should be in the 
focus of our moral thought and deliberation (cf. again Kivistö & Pihlström 
2016). How exactly such a conception of the fundamental significance of the 
moral point of view can be tied up with Wittgensteinian considerations of 
happiness needs to be examined in some detail.
 12 It may also be noted that while Kant disconnects moral duty and virtue 
from happiness in his ethical theory he in a way reconnects happiness and 
virtue in the concept of the summum bonum employed in his argumenta-
tion for the postulates of practical reason. As this is not a study on Kant, 
I will set aside here the question of whether this leads to a theodicy by 
other means.
 13 A variant of this phrase is available early in the entry on July 29, 1916: ‘Und 
dass die Welt des Glücklichen eine andere ist als die Welt des Unglücklichen, 
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ist auch klar’ (cf. TLP 6.43). However, at the end of the entry, Wittgenstein 
also rhetorically asks whether there can be a world that is neither happy nor 
unhappy: ‘Kann es also eine Welt geben, die weder glücklich nor unglücklich 
ist?’ (NB, July 29, 1916).
 14 See especially NB 73-87, i.e., the series of entries starting around July 6, 
1916. (My references to NB will provide the dates of the entries; I will 
mostly cite the original German text.) For relevant discussions of the 
enigmatic passages on happiness in the Notebooks and the Tractatus, see, 
e.g., Mounce (1981: 96–97); Suter (1989); Brockhaus (1991: 327–331); 
Garver (1994: 99–101); Bearn (1997: 71–73); Klagge (2011: 8–10), with an 
emphasis on the Schopenhauerian influences of Wittgenstein; and Balaska 
(2014), rightly emphasizing the ‘non-contentful’ character of happiness 
yet unfortunately neglecting the transcendental aspects of Wittgenstein’s 
view. For an extended treatment, with plenty of references to second-
ary literature, of the peculiar (transcendentally) solipsistic character of 
Wittgenstein’s conception of ethics and the self in the Tractatus, see 
Pihlström (2020c).
 15 NB, July 8, 1916. Cf. also NB, July 14, 1916. In addition to being happy (in 
a sense comparable to the carpe diem tradition), the one who lives ‘in the 
present’ also, according to Wittgenstein, lives eternally (‘ewig’), insofar as 
eternity (‘Ewigkeit’) is understood not as infinite temporal duration but as 
timelessness or non-temporality (‘Unzeitlichkeit’) (NB, July 8, 1916; cf. TLP 
6.4311). On the relevance of the Tractatus and Wittgenstein’s views generally 
to the philosophy of death, dying, and mortality, see, e.g., Pihlström (2016).
 16 NB, July 8, 1916; cf. Bearn (1997: 71).
 17 All emphases in the original. At this point, it is natural to read Wittgen-
stein’s references to God, or God’s will, as somewhat Stoic articulations of 
the interdependence of the notions of the world, fate, and God. To be happy 
is to be in agreement with the world that is independent of my will, which 
is the same thing as to be in agreement with God’s will—or, equivalently, 
one’s ultimate fate—without ever complaining about it or trying to resist it. 
(Compare, however, also: ‘Der Mensch kann sich nicht ohne weiteres glück-
lich machen’; NB, July 14, 1916). In later diary entries, published as Denk-
bewegungen, Wittgenstein tends to associate this kind of happiness as being 
joyous about one’s work (‘fröhlich zu sein in meiner Arbeit’): ‘Das Höchste 
aber, das ich zu erfüllen bereit bin, ist: “fröhlich zu sein in meiner Arbeit”. 
D.h.: nicht unbescheiden, gutmütig, nicht direkt lügnerisch, im Unglück nicht 
ungeduldig’ (D 167-168, February 13, 1937). The link to the (anti)theod-
icy discussion is critical here: recall how Job resists and complains about 
his fate, refusing to accept either the sufferings that he must go through or 
his friends’ theodicist explanations and justifications postulating a kind of 
divine harmony (cf. Kivistö & Pihlström 2016: chapter 2).
 18 See TLP 6.421. Bearn (1997: 72) helpfully explains: ‘The propositions of 
logic are not fully propositions. The actions that make up a happy life are 
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not fully actions, for they do not serve the interests of the psychological will. 
Thus the happy life has no particular satisfaction-conditions in much the 
way that a tautology has no particular truth conditions. The actions of the 
happy man are no more easily called actions than the propositions of logic 
are called propositions. They may be discerned by their differences’. See also 
ibid.: 176.
 19 Here it is important to perceive (as has been emphasized by Hanne 
Appelqvist, among others, on several occasions) that while Wittgenstein in 
the Notebooks passage (at the end of the entry on July 30, 1916) claims ethics 
to be transcendent, he says, in the corresponding locus of the Tractatus, that 
ethics is transcendental (TLP 6.421). While even some highly recognized 
scholars occasionally tend to confuse transcendence and transcendentality 
in this context (see, e.g., Dilman 1974: 188–189), this cannot be a mere slip 
of pen on Wittgenstein’s part, given that Wittgenstein was very well famil-
iar with this Kantian vocabulary especially through his well-documented 
reading of Schopenhauer. Happiness and the related ethico-metaphysical 
notions (e.g., the metaphysical subject, the world, and life) are, precisely, 
transcendental in the sense that they do not lie anywhere beyond the world 
of facts but in a way at the limit of the world, structuring the world into a 
totality to which we (or I) can have an ethical attitude. See here also Garver 
(1994: 99–101). At this point, it seems slightly puzzling to me that Wittgen-
stein speaks about the happy life as in a sense ‘more harmonious’ (‘harmo-
nischer’) than the unhappy life (NB, July 30, 1916); one might suppose har-
mony in this profound transcendental sense to be an all-or-nothing affair 
with no comparativity.
 20 Thus, it could be suggested that the mere intellectual acceptance of ‘har-
mony’ in a metaphysical or theological sense is only a necessary, not a suf-
ficient condition for happiness, just like living in the present is (see Brock-
haus 1991: 327–328).
 21 For an antitheodicist appeal to divine love—instead of any theoretical argu-
ment allegedly justifying evil—see Gleeson (2012, 2018); cf. also Betenson 
(2019). As important as this theological response may be, one might won-
der whether it in the end arrives at a theodicy by other means (and one not 
altogether different from the anthropomorphisms of the kind of analytic 
theodicies to be rejected). In contrast, it seems to me that Dilman’s concep-
tion of love is thoroughly ethical, even if it does not preclude theological 
construals of the notion.
 22 One aspect of the Wittgensteinian conception of harmony is that it is not 
merely metaphysico-theological (relating to God or fate) and ethical (relat-
ing to our duty of living rightly) but also aesthetic; beauty, as the aim of art, 
Wittgenstein tells us, is what makes one happy (‘Und das Schöne ist eben 
das, was glücklich macht’) (NB, October 21, 1916). He also asks whether 
the world is from an artistic perspective seen ‘with a happy eye’: ‘Ist das 
das Wesen der künstlerischen Betrachtungsweise, dass sie die Welt mit glück-
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lichem Auge betrachtet?’ (NB, October 20, 1916). This is only natural given 
the famous identification of ethics with aesthetics (see TLP 6.421; NB, July 
24, 1916). On the aesthetic dimensions of happiness and harmony in Witt-
genstein, see, e.g., Tilghman (1991: 75–77, and chapter 4 passim); Balaska 
(2014); on the Kantian aspects of Wittgenstein’s views on aesthetics, see 
especially Appelqvist (2013).
 23 As noted above, a more general treatment of the vast issue of nonsensical-
ity in (early) Wittgenstein is beyond the concerns of this chapter (though I 
am grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this issue, along with many 
others). In an obvious way this entire discussion fails to make sense by the 
Tractarian standards. Wittgenstein’s transcendental pronouncements—
about not only mystical ethical matters but of course also about logic and 
the conditions for the possibility of linguistic meaning—themselves remain 
nonsensical in their own terms. In the ‘Lecture on Ethics’ Wittgenstein also 
speaks about the ‘cage’ of language whose walls we run against when trying 
to put ethics into words (see especially PO 44). In the famous metaphor, 
a book on ethics would, ‘with an explosion’, destroy all other books (PO 
40). Now this lack of self-consistency is a fair worry in any Wittgensteinian 
investigation, but here we must simply help ourselves to some (admittedly 
self-referentially inconsistent) Wittgensteinian ideas in order to look and 
see how they may figure in the theodicy vs. antitheodicy discussion this 
chapter primarily contributes to. I am happy to leave more detailed treat-
ments of Wittgenstein’s views on Unsinn to, e.g., those who want to con-
tinue the controversy regarding the ‘New Wittgenstein’ (cf. Crary & Read 
2000) and more traditional (e.g., Kantian) interpretations.
 24 It is also worth emphasizing that whenever Wittgenstein has anything to say 
about happiness, or about life being right or wrong, he is not just making 
general philosophical remarks but is also deeply concerned about the fate of 
his own soul, so to speak. According to many, his own life must have been 
‘fiercely unhappy’—as one of his early biographers, Norman Malcolm, puts 
it (Malcolm 1984: 81). However, as Malcolm and many others remind us, 
Wittgenstein’s last words in April 1951 indicated that he had had a ‘wonder-
ful’ life—whatever that ultimately means, or meant. See also Klagge (2011: 
153–154).
 25 On moral antitheodicism protesting against the illusion of harmony, see, in 
addition to the Wittgensteinian philosophers’ contributions already cited, 
e.g., Sachs (2011); Verbin (2015); Betenson (2016); as well as (again) Kivistö 
& Pihlström (2016).
 26 I will not take any stand on the accuracy of different possible translations of 
Wittgenstein’s text, but it should be noted that it is nowadays customary to 
translate Kant’s critical term ‘Erkenntnis’ as ‘cognition’ rather than ‘knowledge’.
 27 The crucial distinction between knowing and acknowledging has been 
emphasized by Cavell (1979), in particular. See also, e.g., Sachs (2011). See 
Chapters 1 and 4 for further remarks on recognition and acknowledgment.
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 28 See the chapter, ‘Useless Suffering’ (first published in 1986), in Levinas 
(2006).
 29 Accordingly, when Wittgenstein in the oft-cited remark in Culture and 
Value speaks about the ‘infinite’ or ‘ultimate’ distress (‘die höchste Not’) an 
individual can experience, maintaining that even the whole world cannot 
be in a greater distress than an individual soul, a person who feels her-/him-
self ‘lost’ (CV 52–53, c. 1944), this could be read as his personal reflection 
on his own despair but also as a detached reflection on the way in which we 
should always recognize others’ sufferings.
 30 Incidentally, this may be compared to the memorable phrase, ‘the cries of 
the wounded’, occurring in James’s 1891 essay, ‘The Moral Philosopher and 
the Moral Life’ (in James 1979 [1897]), arguably highly central in James’s 
pragmatist antitheodicy.
 31 As suggested in Kivistö & Pihlström (2016: chapter 6).
 32 Dilman thus also sees Wittgenstein (as well as, among others, Simone Weil) 
as returning to the Socratic view that the evil person is necessarily unhappy, 
while the one who ‘dedicates his life to justice’ is by necessity happy, ‘no 
matter how the world treats him’ (Dilman 1974: 183–184). See the quota-
tion from Peter Winch above.
 33 For some more elaboration on Dilman’s views on love, see Pihlström and 
Kivistö (2019).
 34 Wittgenstein is known for his high appreciation of Dostoevsky (as well 
as Tolstoy). The Brothers Karamazov is, of course, a standard reference in 
moral antitheodicism protesting against any allegedly harmonious recon-
ciliation with pain and suffering. See, e.g., Gleeson (2012).
 35 Also recall, however, Kant’s concept of the summum bonum (see above).
 36 See Kivistö & Pihlström (2016: 282–283); cf. James (1958 [1902]). Witt-
genstein’s high regard for James is also well known and documented (see, 
e.g., Goodman 2002). It is generally known that Wittgenstein read James’s 
Varieties carefully. The ways in which Jamesian ideas may have reached 
Wittgensteinian philosophers’ antitheodicist thought via Wittgenstein him-
self would still require further historical investigation, however. For a care-
ful recent investigation of Wittgenstein’s late views (especially On Certainty) 
in relation to the pragmatist tradition, see Boncompagni (2016).
 37 Cf., e.g., the postmortem compensation theodicy defended by Adams 
(1989, 2013).
 38 Admittedly, theodicies typically seek harmony in the world. A Wittgen-
steinian refusal to find harmony in the world while still seeking to find it in 
one’s transcendental attitude to the world as a whole might thus, despite its 
pursuit of harmony, be compatible with antitheodicy and its insistence on 
recognizing worldly disharmony. However, the worry here is that even the 
meta-level pursuit of harmony might in the end indirectly contribute to the 
theodicist project—or at least the antitheodicist ought to be aware of this 
potential risk.
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 39 See Kivistö & Pihlström (2016: chapter 6) on the need to see antitheodi-
cism as a criticism of one’s own potential tendencies toward theodicism 
rather than a moralising criticism of others’ views.
 40 The ‘New Wittgensteinians’, in particular, seem to dismiss the ‘limit’ meta-
phor rather straightforwardly: ‘[…] I think the spatial conception, the 
picture of boundary, is misleading here, in inviting us to take there to be 
something, the existence of certain limits, that explains the kinds of ways 
we are distant from each other, and makes possible also an explanation of 
the conditions for shared understanding’ (Diamond 2005: 114). On ‘New 
Wittgensteinianism’ generally, see Crary & Read (2000).
 41 Similarly—albeit in a somewhat different tradition of reading Wittgen-
stein—Hilary Putnam joins Stanley Cavell and James Conant in arguing 
that when distinguishing between what ‘makes sense’ and what does not we 
should not operate in terms of the distinction between what we ‘can’ and 
‘cannot’ do. See especially Putnam (1994: chapter 12) (‘Rethinking Math-
ematical Necessity’), also reprinted, e.g., in Crary & Read (2000). 
 42 Phillips, in particular, has offered numerous arguments in virtually all areas 
of philosophy of religion at least implicitly invoking the theme of the lim-
its of language—regarding, for example, evidence in relation to religious 
belief, death and immortality, religious conceptions of the soul and of God, 
as well as the problem of evil, typically claiming that realist and evidentialist 
views misconstrue the grammar of religious language, thus resorting to an 
account of religion that seriously distorts the way in which believers them-
selves use language. See, e.g., Phillips (1970, 1977, 1986, 1993, 2004); cf. my 
discussion of the limit between religious and pseudo-religious language use 
in Pihlström (2007, 2013a). On transcendental arguments in moral phi-
losophy, in particular, see Brune et al. (2017).
 43 One might thus suggest that the kind of particularism emphasized in liter-
ary readings and the kind of universalism embedded in Kantian transcen-
dental philosophy are not necessarily incompatible. But I will not be able to 
argue for this meta-level view here.
 44 I am not assuming any traditional received view on the simple divisibility of 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy into two phases, the early and the late. For exam-
ple, the ‘third Wittgenstein’ is to be taken very seriously in this context, and 
it is equally important to note the significant philosophical and methodo-
logical continuities between the ‘early’ and the ‘late’ Wittgenstein, perhaps 
most importantly the transcendental methodology itself. My references to 
Wittgenstein’s ‘early’ and ‘late’ writings in the context of the philosophy of 
religion are thus only intended to keep things relatively clear and simple; no 
heavy interpretive assumptions should be read into this categorization.
 45 I am here again basically following Hanne Appelqvist’s Kantian interpre-
tation of Wittgenstein, which builds upon Stenius’s (1960) and Kannisto’s 
(1986) scholarship but emphasizes the role of aesthetics (in relation to 
Kant) much more strongly. See Appelqvist (2012, 2013, 2016, 2018).
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 46 For an examination of the transcendental subject in this Wittgensteinian 
context (and more broadly), see, e.g., Pihlström (2016).
 47 On the other hand, Wittgenstein (in LC) also maintains that there is a ‘gulf ’ 
separating the believer from the non-believer.
 48 Note that Wittgenstein talks variously about pictures (mostly using the 
German word ‘Bild’), similes, patterns, images, metaphors, analogies, and 
so forth; works such as Culture and Value and Philosophical Occasions are 
rich sources of material here. It is worth pointing out that in the ‘Lecture 
on Ethics’ he maintains that ethical and religious expressions seem to be 
‘just similes’ (PO 42). In ethical and religious language ‘we seem constantly 
to be using similes’, he says, but then again ‘a simile must be the simile for 
something’, which is not the case here: ‘[…] if I can describe a fact by means 
of a simile I must also be able to drop the simile and to describe the facts 
without it. Now in our case as soon as we try to drop the simile and simply 
to state the facts which stand behind it, we find that there are no such facts. 
And so, what at first appeared to be a simile now seems to be mere non-
sense’ (PO 42–43). These reservations—again regarding the limits of lan-
guage—ought to be kept in mind when we turn to the later Wittgenstein’s 
use of the term ‘picture’, for instance.
 49 In a related remark in 1950 (CV 97) Wittgenstein suggests that there are 
experiences of life that may educate or even force us into believing in God, 
but these are not evidential experiences but for instance sufferings of vari-
ous kinds. We might suppose that such experiences may also include the 
kind of experience briefly discussed in ‘A Lecture on Ethics’, namely, the 
experience of being absolutely safe and the one of wondering at the exist-
ence of the world (cf. above).
 50 I am indebted to Hanne Appelqvist for this formulation—and for many 
others in this chapter as well.
 51 I have elsewhere argued at some length for a re-reading of Wittgenstein that 
links his late philosophy of language with both the Kantian transcendental 
tradition and the pragmatist tradition; see Pihlström (2003). For an attempt 
to connect broadly Wittgensteinian approaches with pragmatist philosophy 
of religion more specifically, see Pihlström (2013a).
 52 This also indicates a difference between the early Wittgenstein, for whom 
necessities are based on a universal and unchanging logical form, and the 
later Wittgenstein, for whom necessities arise out of the forms of life within 
which we engage in various language games.
 53 Compare this to methodological controversies related to, e.g., the cogni-
tive study of religion: it seems that such methodological issues might be 
more fruitfully discussed if the distinction between ‘internal’ (hermeneu-
tic, understanding) and ‘external’ (causally explanatory) perspectives were 
made more clearly.
 54 Even the direction of transcendental argumentation may vary according to 
our perspective of inquiry, as argued in Kivistö & Pihlström (2016: chapter 6).
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 55 Analogously, it could be suggested that even Kant’s original transcendental 
philosophy, despite its formalism and apiorism, fundamentally relies on the 
‘transcendental fact’ that the human cognitive faculty is of a certain kind and 
has certain specific features—features that it has contingently, not out of any 
metaphysical necessity. For example, it is, arguably, a contingent (yet tran-
scendental) fact about human beings and their cognition that we do not pos-
sess the capacity of intellectual intuition, even though this fact is then an ele-
ment in the transcendental structure of conditions and limits constitutive of 
any humanly possible experience and its objects. (‘Here one can only describe 
and say: this is what human life is like’ [PO 121]). See also Chapter 2.
 56 This is structurally analogous to the critique of metaphysical realism in 
Chapter 4 above. Note that I am here (as in Kivistö & Pihlström 2016) using 
the word ‘theodicism’ broadly to cover not only theistic theodicies but also 
the requirement that theism ought to provide a theodicy, which is something 
that atheists typically share when attacking theism by appealing to the ‘argu-
ment from evil’. (Moreover, theodicism also comes in secular versions.)
 57 Betenson (2019) defends antitheodicism by invoking the moral necessity of 
rejecting any way of ‘reasonably’ justifying the Holocaust, suggesting that this 
‘necessitated response’ is comparable to Wittgensteinian ‘hinge propositions’ 
and to what Raimond Gaita (e.g., 2000) and other Wittgensteinian philos-
ophers have called ‘unthinkabilities’. I am tempted to agree with him here, 
though I would construe the relevant kind of ‘unthinkabilities’ in a Kantian-
like transcendental fashion (cf. Pihlström 2011a)—and indeed I have argued 
for a transcendental account of antitheodicism as a constitutive condition 
for the possibility of the moral point of view (cf. Kivistö & Pihlström 2016: 
chapter 6). In Betenson’s (2019) preferred terms (partly derived from Gaita), 
this point may of course be rephrased by arguing that rejecting certain moral 
judgments (e.g., concerning the unacceptability of theodicist justifications of 
the Holocaust) would amount to rejecting the very practice of making moral 
judgments. It should be relatively easy to see that there would be both prag-
matist and Wittgensteinian ways of cashing this idea out in terms of concepts 
such as human practice, form of life, and language game.
 58 Consider, for instance, the ways in which Jewish philosophers like Hans 
Jonas have found it necessary to ‘rethink God’ after the Holocaust (Jonas 
1996; cf. Pihlström 2014b). See also Trakakis (ed., 2018) for attempts to 
rethink the metaphysics of divinity in the theodicy vs. antitheodicy context.
 59 See also the discussion of contextuality in relation to the realism issue in 
Chapter 2 above.
6. Beyond the Theory-Practice Dichotomy
 1 For some influential papers on these issues, see, e.g., Rowe (2001). See also 
Trakakis (2018).
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 2 Accordingly, as we have seen in earlier chapters, the concept of recognition 
is central to my concerns in this chapter, and to my defense of antitheodi-
cism more generally, even though I cannot here offer any systematic articu-
lation of that concept (cf. again, e.g., Koskinen 2017, 2019).
 3 For other influential antitheodicist considerations in the contemporary dis-
course on evil, see Bernstein (2002) and Neiman (2002).
 4 On this relatively complex history, see especially Neiman (2002).
 5 Invoking the recognition vs. acknowledgment distinction (paralleling the 
distinction between the empirical and the transcendental; cf. Chapter 4), we 
might say that acts of recognizing the other as a sufferer, and of their suffer-
ing as meaningless (and analogous recognition acts) may partially consti-
tute the (infinitely demanding, always escaping, never fully realized) task of 
acknowledging (without any specific ‘as’ clause) the other.
 6 Trakakis (2018: 100) also points out that theodicists usually invoke some 
version of the distinction between theoretical and practical problems of 
evil, while antitheodicists question its value and legitimacy.
 7 Gaita’s (2000, 2004) work on moral unthinkabilities (see also Pihlström 
2011a) is important for Betenson’s (2019) antitheodicism.
 8 Cf. further, e.g., Pihlström (2013a). Similarly, for a restricted purpose, 
defending realism and even correspondence truth might be encouraged 
within a more inclusive (meta-level) pragmatism (see Chapter 4).
 9 As Simo Knuuttila (2017) notes in his review of Kantian Antitheodicy, I do 
maintain, as I have also briefly explained above, that theodicies are morally 
untenable. Indeed, some antitheodicists have used rather harsh language 
in this regard; for example, according to Bernstein (2002), theodicies are 
‘obscene’. Are we thus trying to deliver a moral judgment about the ethi-
cally unacceptable views of (say) a group of contemporary theodicist (and 
theistic) philosophers of religion (such as Marilyn McCord Adams, Alvin 
Plantinga, Peter van Inwagen, Eleonore Stump, Richard Swinburne, and 
many others)? Not primarily, I am tempted to respond. We suggest in our 
book (Kivistö & Pihlström 2016: especially chapter 6), commenting on all 
the above-mentioned theodicists along with several others, that the moral 
criticism of theodicies advocated by the antitheodicist ought to be primar-
ily understood as moral self-criticism: we should be constantly wary of the 
theodicist tendencies in our own ways of thinking and our relations to other 
human beings, and we should actively resist those tendencies in order to 
properly acknowledge others in their suffering—even when we realize that 
it is difficult of perhaps impossible for us to ever genuinely ‘perceive the 
experience of others’ (Levi 1988: 128).
 10 In addition to Levi’s major works on the Holocaust, especially Levi (1988, 
1996), see also Levi (2005) for shorter writings on the topic.
 11 See, e.g., Agamben (2002 [1999]); Gaita (2000); Alford (2009); Druker 
(2009); cf., however, also Cheyette (2007) for a discussion of some prob-
lematic appropriations of Levi’s work in various contexts.
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 12 Levi is in fact here quoting his own text from his second book, The Truce 
(1963).
 13 For Levi on Kafka, see Levi (2005: 140–141). Kafka’s The Trial is one of the 
antitheodicist works of literature analyzed in Kivistö & Pihlström (2016: 
chapter 3).
 14 Robert Pirro (2017: 129) notes Levi’s rejection of providence but argues that 
even Levi was tempted to see Auschwitz as bringing some kind of purpose 
into his life, with a ‘clearly positive’ ‘sum total’ (ibid.: 122–123, and chapter 
6 passim).
 15 In the terms used in this book, such a question fails to be ‘true’ to our 
human predicament, and hence any answer to it presupposes an inhuman 
metaphysical realism, lacking in truthfulness (and thus failing to be true in 
a pragmatic sense).
 16 Of course it ought to be kept in mind that Levi never develops his antithe-
odicist views with any philosophical systematicity. I am here reading my 
own antitheodicism into his writings, but I do believe that this interpreta-
tion makes a lot of sense of what he has to say about the senselessness of 
suffering.
 17 On acknowledgment and sharing a common human form of life as cen-
tral to Levi’s work, and for a highly relevant comparison between Levi and 
the later Wittgenstein in this regard, see Sparti (2005). Sparti is particularly 
insightful in emphasizing how Levi’s If This Is a Man is a ‘moral book’ pre-
cisely in its sensitive description of various ‘scenes’ of Auschwitz—encoun-
ters between people, their experiences, gestures, etc.—without explicitly 
employing moral vocabulary (see especially ibid.: 456).
 18 Therefore, pace Druker (and perhaps even Levi), it could be suggested that 
it is the humanistic, ethically committed subject who ultimately realizes—
after the irrecoverable historical catastrophe of the Holocaust—that they 
cannot just safely return home (in the manner of Ulysses, a key figure for 
Levi) but must (like, rather, Abraham) continue the journey to an unknown 
place from which there is no return. This contrast between Ulysses and 
Abraham, or between Greek ontology and Hebrew ethics, is central in 
Levi and Druker’s (2009) reading of him. See also the brief remarks on the 
‘humanism of antitheodicy’ in Chapter 4 above.
 19 On ‘pointless suffering’ as an ineliminable feature of being human, see also 
Samuelson (2018).
 20 For some discussion, see Kivistö & Pihlström (2016: chapter 3). I again wish 
to emphasize how much my (here only very briefly formulated) Levinasian 
overtones have been influenced by Panu-Matti Pöykkö’s still largely unpub-
lished work on Levinas’s ethics and philosophy of religion.
 21 Cf. here Dilman’s (1974) comments on detachment and love, cited in 
Chapter 5 above.
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Conclusion: Meaningful and Meaningless Suffering
 1 For a famous attempt to revive soul-making theodicies in contemporary 
philosophy of religion, see Hick (1978 [1966]).
 2 In comparison, one might also take an analogous look at Susan Sontag’s 
impressive small volume, Regarding the Pain of Others. In her essay, Son-
tag discusses, e.g., the problems related to emotionally ‘moving’ pictures 
and sentimentality, reminding us that sympathy is in a way too easy (Son-
tag 2003: 91–92) and warning us that we might become cynical about the 
possibility of sincerity (ibid.: 99). (This, of course, resonates with Job and 
Kant’s reading of Job, focusing on sincerity.) Sontag emphasizes moral and 
psychological ‘adulthood’ requiring continuous critical thinking. ‘Perhaps 
too much value is assigned to memory, not enough to thinking’ (ibid.: 
103). ‘There is nothing wrong with standing back and thinking’ (ibid.: 
106). This, however, requires ‘meditative space’ (ibid.: 107)—and thus 
critical distance. Sontag’s own writing implicitly manifests such distance 
in an insightful way, discussing photographs without including a single 
photograph. 
 3 Interestingly, Druker (2009: 27) describes Levi’s style as ‘detached’ in com-
parison to Elie Wiesel’s and also discusses the ‘oddly distanced’ plural ‘we’ 
subject Levi employs (ibid.: 57). There is also a ‘disinterestedness’ in Levi 
that may contribute to a deconstruction of the traditional humanistic sub-
ject, Druker claims (ibid.: 116–117). On the other hand, Druker claims 
Hannah Arendt to be ‘detached’ when analyzing Eichmann, in contrast to 
Levi’s ‘angry and emotional’ tone (ibid.: 128).
 4 Compare here Ilman Dilman’s (1974) comment on love and detachment 
cited in Chapter 5.
 5 See the references in Chapter 6.
 6 It also needs to be recognized that philosophers working within the dif-
ferent traditions that have been slightly eclectically utilized here—e.g., 
pragmatism, analytic philosophy, and ‘Continental’ philosophy (whatever 
we ultimately mean by that)—may use some of these key terms, especially 
‘metaphysics’, in somewhat different ways. For my purposes, it has been 
important to emphasize that the very idea of metaphysics needs to be eman-
cipated from the metaphysically realistic assumption that only the attempt 
to describe reality from a ‘God’s-Eye View’ amounts to metaphysics. See 
further Pihlström (2009, 2013a).
 7 See Hickman (2007) for an attempt to argue that Dewey was already far 
ahead of postmodernists in various ways.
 8 In many of my earlier works listed in the bibliography, I have provided 
much more detailed characterizations and defenses of pragmatic realism, 
and more generally of the realism issue in the context of pragmatism.
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